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At least 343 records · Page 19

Contextually aware roadside radiation measurement testbed

Here we demonstrate a contextually aware multimodal roadside radiation measurement detection testbed for traffic monitoring applications in nuclear nonproliferation. Many variables in traffic such as vehicle or cargo size, mass, speed, shape, and distance of closest approach can have significant impacts on the radiation measured from a vehicle-transported radiation source. These factors can lead to uncertainties in the analysis of the radiation source, especially for lower-strength radiation sources of interest. Our testbed, known as the Multimodal Measurement System (MMS) uses non-radiation sensors including magnetometers, geophones, radiofrequency receivers, cameras, and LiDAR to extract contextual information about vehicles passing by the system. These contextual data can then be fused with data from radiation measurements to increase the system’s sensitivity and accuracy in nuclear threat detection applications. This work describes the instrumentation of the MMS and its data acquisition pipeline. Furthermore, we describe the pre-analysis performed on the raw multimodal data streams for data fusion, and the high-level machine learning analyses for detection and characterization. The variety of sensors within the MMS provides a valuable testbed that can be used to identify the combinations of contextual sensors that provide the greatest improvements to radiation source detection and characterization within the restrictions for various proliferation detection applications. The MMS is also modular so that additional combinations of sensors can be explored in the future.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Spherical time-encoded radiation imaging simulations

Radiation source localization is important for nuclear nonproliferation and can be obtained using time-encoded imaging systems with unsegmented detectors. A scintillation crystal can be used with a moving coded-aperture mask to vary the detected count rate produced from radiation sources in the far field. The modulation of observed counts over time can be used to reconstruct an image with the known coded-aperture mask pattern. Current time-encoded imaging systems incorporate cylindrical coded-aperture masks and have limits to their fully coded imaging field-of-view. This work focuses on expanding the field-of-view to 4π by using a novel spherical coded-aperture mask. A regular icosahedron is used to approximate a spherical mask. This icosahedron consists of 20 equilateral triangles; the faces of which are each subdivided into four equilateral triangle-shaped voxels which are then projected onto a spherical surface, creating an 80-voxel coded-aperture mask. Furthermore, these polygonal voxels can be made from high-Z materials for gamma-ray modulation and/or low-Z materials for neutron modulation. In this work, we present Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations and simple models programmed in Mathematica to explore image reconstruction capabilities of this 80-voxel coded-aperture mask.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Producing 236 U reference standards for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry at the University of Notre Dame

36 U is a rare isotope of uranium, naturally occurring in ores with an abundance of 236 U/ 238 U$<$ 1 x 10 -9 . The ability to detect it and make isotopic ratio measurements has applications ranging from nuclear forensics and nonproliferation to energy production and environmental protection. Currently, Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) is the only technique sensitive enough to accurately measure 236 U/ 238 U isotopic ratios as they exist in naturally occurring ores in the range of 236 U/ 238 U = 10 -12 $-$ 10 -9 . Some AMS facilities have demonstrated their capabilities to make these measurements. Historically, the lack of commercially available reference standards covering the range of naturally occurring 236 U/ 238 U abundances has necessitated the use of absolute measurements, notoriously difficult to do using AMS, resulting in increased uncertainties in measurements and a reliance on knowledge of systematic effects. To mitigate these issues, various AMS facilities have sought to develop their own reference standards. Using a reference standard prepared for other forms of mass spectrometry, a series of AMS suitable standards was created through dilution with low-background natural uranium. The techniques used to produce and characterize these materials as well as analysis of them using AMS will be discussed.

236U↗

Machine Learning–Augmented Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy for Spectral Discrimination of Iron Oxalates

Enhanced characterization and phase identification of post-PUREX Pu Oxalates (PuOXA) are pivotal for nonproliferation and pre-detonation nuclear forensics. Despite significant advances in the characterization of PuO 2 samples, little is known about the impact of both the chemical structure and oxidation states of PuOXA (i.e., Pu(III) and Pu(IV)) have on optical emission signatures. Here, we demonstrate the analytical capabilities of laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) applied to Fe(II) and Fe(III) oxalate samples as surrogates for PuOXA, highlighting the discriminating features in the LIBS emission spectra arising from differences in the oxidation states within mixed FeOXA samples. We report the enhancement of spectral feature selection using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which enables the analytical superiority of machine learning algorithms such as Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA), Partial Least Squares Regression (PLSR), Support Vector Regression (SVR), and Random Forest Regression (RFR) over conventional univariate techniques for phase discrimination and chemometric analysis. Cluster analysis revealed how both matrix effects and laser ablation influence cluster separability by introducing spectral artifacts that misdirect the maximization of variance. PCA-selected emission lines were used in the regression models, demonstrating that both univariate and multivariate linear regression models (i.e., PLSR and SVR) can achieve acceptable performance, with machine learning models outperforming conventional calibration regressions. Furthermore, the application of non-linearly activated PCA-selected emission lines illustrates how simplifying the data while retaining captured variance enables the use of less complex and more computationally efficient models. Furthermore, this is particularly evident in the underperformance of RFR, which suffers from increased computational costs and overfitting owing to its high complexity.

Oxalates↗

The Lifecycle of Bayesian Network Models Developed for Multi-Source Signature Assessment of Nuclear Programs

The Multi-Source Signatures for Nuclear Programs project, part of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) Signature Discovery Initiative, seeks to computationally capture expert assessment of multi-type information such as text, sensor output, imagery, or audio/video files, to assess nuclear activities through a series of Bayesian network (BN) models. These models incorporate knowledge from a diverse range of information sources in order to help assess a country’s nuclear activities. The models span engineering topic areas, state-level indicators, and facility-specific characteristics. To illustrate the development, calibration, and use of BN models for multi-source assessment, we present a model that predicts a country’s likelihood to participate in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. We validate this model by examining the extent to which the model assists non-experts arrive at conclusions similar to those provided by nuclear proliferation experts. We also describe the PNNL-developed software used throughout the lifecycle of the Bayesian network model development.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Overview of Accelerator Applications for Security and Defense

Particle accelerators play a key role in a broad set of defense and security applications including war-fighter and asset protection, cargo inspection, nonproliferation, materials characterization and stockpile stewardship. Accelerators can replace the high activity radioactive sources that pose a security threat for developing a radiological dispersal device and be used to produce isotopes for medical, industrial, and re-search purposes. Lastly, we present an overview of current and emerging accelerator technologies relevant to addressing the needs of defense and security.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Simulated Energy Response in a Multiplicity Detector

Neutron multiplicity analysis is used for many applications, including nonproliferation and criticality safety. Multiplicity detectors have advantages over total neutron counting as they provide the ability to assess both multiplication and mass in fissionable material. In addition, multiplicity detectors can generate real-time information, e.g., dose estimation. The ability to evaluate the detector efficiency in each application is of primary importance in producing meaningful analyses. Multiplicity detectors usually house 3 He tubes within a polyethylene moderator. If the tubes are located behind different thickness of polyethylene, they will have different energy responses. This paper assesses 3 He tube efficiency as a function of neutron energy for a specific multiplicity detector.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards at almost all of its meeting.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Summary of FY13 Industry Interviews

The spread of weapons of mass destruction relies on the illicit procurement of dual-use items, and industry plays a critical role in preventing these transfers. Export control systems regulate industry’s sales, but there are additional steps that industry and government can take to stop proliferators. Collectively, these additional steps are known as industry self-regulation. The industry self-regulation project at PNNL has identified several approaches to going “beyond compliance” in recent years, including corporate sustainability, competitive advantages for nonproliferation, and a third party. In FY12 the project team moved from a research phase to an implementation phase, and prepared to seek feedback from industry on these topics. This effort included research to identify American manufacturers of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part 2 Annex commodities. To gain initial responses from industry about whether these ideas could be reasonably implemented, in FY13 the project team conducted a series of outreach interviews. Outreach was initially focused on firms in the carbon fiber, filament winding, and maraging steel sectors. The project team chose these sectors based on the number of firms that produce these items and their proliferation relevance. As the year progressed, the team widened its outreach to manufacturers of a variety of NSG-controlled commodities. In total, the project team contacted 57 firms and conducted 13 interviews. The interviewed firms manufactured or distributed at least 11 controlled commodities. All interviews were conducted on a not for-public-attribution basis, and all information in this summary, unless otherwise cited, can be assumed to be derived from the interviews.

Nonproliferation↗

Commercial Nuclear Reprocessing in the United States

The short presentation outline: Reprocessing Overview; Events leading up to Carter’s Policy; Results of the decision; Policy since Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Conclusions reached: Reprocessing ban has become an easy and visible fix to the public concern about proliferation, but has not completely stopped proliferation; and, Reprocessing needs to become detached from political considerations, so technical research can continue, regardless of the policy decisions we decide to take.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Walk the Talk: How PNNL is developing a Supply Chain Security Culture

For the past decade, a team at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has engaged industry to “go beyond compliance” in controlling and securing their supply chains to ensure their goods are not diverted to nuclear weapons programs. This work has focused on dual-use industries that manufacture products that can be used in both commercial applications and in the development of a nuclear weapon. The team encourages industry to self-regulate to reduce proliferation risks. As part of that work, PNNL interviewed numerous companies about their compliance practices in order to understand their business and to build awareness around best practices to ensure security of goods and information along their supply chains. As a result, PNNL has identified seven indicators that a company can adopt as part of their commitment to nonproliferation ideals.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Summary 2016

This document is a summary of the full 2016 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/ NFO). This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER. NNSA/NFO prepares the NNSSER to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from potential nonradiological impacts. It is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. The NNSS is currently the nation’s unique site for ongoing national security–related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access as well as by lands that are open to public entry. In 2016, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), was the NNSS Management and Operations Contractor accountable for ensuring work was performed in compliance with environmental regulations. NNSS activities in 2016 continued to be diverse, with the primary goal to ensure that the existing U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons remains safe and reliable. Other activities included weapons of mass destruction first responder training; the controlled release of hazardous material at the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC); remediation of legacy contamination sites; characterization of waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or the Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho Falls, Idaho; disposal of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste; and environmental research. Facilities and centers that support the National Security/Defense mission include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility (DAF), National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located in the DAF, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility, Dense Plasma Focus (DPF) Facility located in the Los Alamos Technical Facility (LATF), and the Radiological/ Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (RNCTEC). Facilities that support the Environmental Management mission include the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS), which has been in cold standby since 2006.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Printed Proliferation: The Implications of Additive Manufacturing and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

The growth of additive manufacturing as a disruptive technology poses nuclear proliferation concerns worthy of serious consideration. Additive manufacturing began in the early 1980s with technological advances in polymer manipulation, computer capabilities, and computer-aided design (CAD) modeling. It was originally limited to rapid prototyping; however, it eventually developed into a complete means of production that has slowly penetrated the consumer market. Today, additive manufacturing machines can produce complex and unique items in a vast array of materials including plastics, metals, and ceramics. These capabilities have democratized the manufacturing industry, allowing almost anyone to produce items as simple as cup holders or as complex as jet fuel nozzles. Additive manufacturing, or three-dimensional (3D) printing as it is commonly called, relies on CAD files created or shared by individuals with additive manufacturing machines to produce a 3D object from a digital model. This sharing of files means that a 3D object can be scanned or rendered as a CAD model in one country, and then downloaded and printed in another country, allowing items to be shared globally without physically crossing borders. The sharing of CAD files online has been a challenging task for the export controls regime to manage over the years, and additive manufacturing could make these transfers more common. In this sense, additive manufacturing is a disruptive technology not only within the manufacturing industry but also within the nuclear nonproliferation world. This paper provides an overview of additive manufacturing concerns of proliferation.

3D↗

Contrastive Machine Learning with Gamma Spectroscopy Data Augmentations for Detecting Shielded Radiological Material Transfers

Data analysis techniques can be powerful tools for rapidly analyzing data and extracting information that can be used in a latent space for categorizing observations between classes of data. Machine learning models that exploit learned data relationships can address a variety of nuclear nonproliferation challenges like the detection and tracking of shielded radiological material transfers. The high resource cost of manually labeling radiation spectra is a hindrance to the rapid analysis of data collected from persistent monitoring and to the adoption of supervised machine learning methods that require large volumes of curated training data. Instead, contrastive self-supervised learning on unlabeled spectra can enhance models that are built on limited labeled radiation datasets. This work demonstrates that contrastive machine learning is an effective technique for leveraging unlabeled data in detecting and characterizing nuclear material transfers demonstrated on radiation measurements collected at an Oak Ridge National Laboratory testbed, where sodium iodide detectors measure gamma radiation emitted by material transfers between the High Flux Isotope Reactor and the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center. Label-invariant data augmentations tailored for gamma radiation detection physics are used on unlabeled spectra to contrastively train an encoder, learning a complex, embedded state space with self-supervision. A linear classifier is then trained on a limited set of labeled data to distinguish transfer spectra between byproducts and tracked nuclear material using representations from the contrastively trained encoder. The optimized hyperparameter model achieves a balanced accuracy score of 80.30%. Any given model—that is, a trained encoder and classifier—shows preferential treatment for specific subclasses of transfer types. Regardless of the classifier complexity, a supervised classifier using contrastively trained representations achieves higher accuracy than using spectra when trained and tested on limited labeled data.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Design of a Mixed-Spectrum Reactor With Improved Proliferation Resistance for Long-Lived Applications

Long-lived Small Modular Reactors are being promoted as an innovative way of catering to emerging markets and isolated regions. They can be operated continuously for decades without requiring additional fuel. A novel configuration of long-lived reactor core employs a mixed neutron spectrum, providing an improvement in nonproliferation metrics and in safety characteristics. Starting with a base sodium reactor design, moderating material is inserted in outer core assemblies to modify the fast spectrum. The assemblies are then shuffled once during core lifetime to ensure that every fuel rod is exposed to the thermalized spectrum. The Mixed Spectrum Reactor is able to maintain a core lifetime over two decades while ensuring the plutonium it breeds is below the weapon-grade limit at the fuel discharge. The main drawbacks of the design are higher front-end fuel cycle costs and a 58% increase in core volume, although it is alleviated to some extent by a 48% higher power output.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NNSA Staff Member Receives NNSA Recognition

This article is intended for publication in the NNSA Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) Highlights, a quarterly newsletter available in print and e-form. It will be published on the NNSA website and is intended for public release.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Bayesian Model Development for Analysis of Open Source Information to Support the Assessment of Nuclear Programs

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has spent several years researching, developing, and validating large Bayesian network models to support integration of open source data sets for nuclear proliferation research. Our current work focuses on generating a set of interrelated models for multi-source assessment of nuclear programs, as opposed to a single comprehensive model. By using this approach, we can break down the models to cover logical sub-problems that can utilize different expertise and data sources. This approach allows researchers to utilize the models individually or in combination to detect and characterize a nuclear program and identify data gaps. The models operate at various levels of granularity, covering a combination of state-level assessments with more detailed models of site or facility characteristics. This paper will describe the current open source-driven, nuclear nonproliferation models under development, the pros and cons of the analytical approach, and areas for additional research.

Bayesian network model, nonproliferation↗

Stopping Illicit Procurement: Lessons from Global Finance

Government regulators and the financial sector cooperate to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This information-sharing relationship is built upon a strong legislative foundation and effective operational procedures. As with money-laundering and terrorist financing, halting the illicit procurement of dual-use commodities requires close coordination between government and industry. However, many of the legal and operational features present in financial threat cooperation do not exist in the export control realm. This article analyzes the applicability of financial industry cooperative measures to nonproliferation.

Finance↗