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At least 343 records · Page 19

Development of a Multi-Sensor Data Science System Used for Signature Development on Solvent Extraction Processes in support of safeguards- an overview

A new nuclear fuel cycle test bed is being built at Idaho National Laboratory to support the purification of special nuclear material recovered from used fuel. The test bed provides an opportunity to research process flow and the application of computational tools in solvent extraction processes. A deeper understanding of process and equipment behavior coupled with real time data collection can indicate whether a process failure is accidental or purposeful. The goal of this project is to develop a system that utilizes non-traditional measurement sources such as vibration, acoustics, current, light, flow, and temperature in conjunction with data-based, machine learning techniques that will allow for signal discovery. This multi-sensor data can support the development of safeguards by design and security by design measures for such a facility. Additionally, it can aid in early detection and identification of removed materials indicating diversion, which is essential for initiating material recovery and actor identification. This overview encompasses the current research and testing of sensors to develop a spectrum of process signatures. To be followed by planned experiments aimed to characterize said signatures and study potential feature extraction techniques to identify a fault in the system (i.e. flow diversion).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nontraditional Sensors for Aqueous Separation Research & Workforce Development

Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) nuclear fuel cycle capabilities enable the deployment of technologies that sustain the current reactor fleet, support demonstration and deployment of new advanced reactors, and facilitate management and disposition of existing and future radiological waste materials. INL focuses on deploying nuclear energy systems with confidence by decreasing proliferation risk through research that demonstrates process transparency and supports safeguards and security by design. An example of these capabilities is the Beartooth test bed, set to begin operations toward the end of fiscal year 2026. Beartooth will include a cascade of centrifugal contactors, glove box lines, and solidification and dissolution equipment to aid in the progression of novel separation techniques and to provide hands-on experience to cultivate and maintain a robust workforce of experts. To support Beartooth’s enhanced instrumentation and monitoring equipment needs, several nontraditional sensors are being considered for future deployment. The non-traditional sensors include accelerometers, acoustic microphones, and infrared cameras. These nontraditional sensors have the potential to not only help monitor the process but also enhance nuclear safeguards.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

A Review of Global Radioxenon Background Research and Issues

Among the most important problems for the world-wide nuclear explosion monitoring is the interference of naturally occurring and man-made radionuclides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) frequently detects these interferences using sensitive radionuclide measurement equipment. We commonly refer to the presence of radionuclides that are relevant to the CTBT but do not originate from a nuclear explosion as “background”. Backgrounds are highest near the sources but are known to have regional and global effects on the IMS. This review paper summarizes much of the relevant work in the area of background and discusses issues of interest for nuclear explosion detection.

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Utilization of ACE nuclear data file toolkit ACEtk to calculate relative sensitivity coefficients of point-kinetics parameters

Sensitivity and uncertainty methods are quintessential for nuclear criticality safety and experiment design. This type of analysis relies on calculations of sensitivity coefficients; sensitivity coefficients of the effective neutron multiplication factor with respect to some nuclear data are predominantly calculated and used. As a part of the Laboratory Directed Research & Development project EUCLID (Experiments Underpinned by Computational Learning for Improvements in nuclear Data) at Los Alamos National Laboratory, sensitivity coefficients of many radiation detector measurement responses with respect to nuclear data were investigated. Specifically, this paper outlines a method to calculate point-kinetics parameters relative sensitivity coefficients with respect to nuclear data. Point-kinetics parameters such as the prompt neutron decay constant, effective delayed neutron fraction, and neutron generation time are especially important to experimenters and reactor operators designing systems with dynamic neutron populations. This method couples capabilities of the ACE (A Compact ENDF) nuclear data file toolkit, ACEtk, with the ability to load cross sections into the radiation transport code Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP). In conclusion, key aspects of optimizing this method for a particular application and sensitivity profiles of the Jezebel criticality experiment are examined and discussed.

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A structural description of the evolution of stakeholders and risk communication in the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities: Historical perspective, major stakeholders, and external events

Regulators and policymakers are routinely challenged with explaining complex concepts concerning risk. Part of the challenge is helping external and internal stakeholders to understand the context behind risk-related information and decisions. Here, this paper will describe the historical evolution of the safety and regulatory framework for an important category in the nuclear industry—defense nuclear facilities owned and operated by the US Department of Energy. In parallel with describing this evolution, three major events which occurred external to the complex of defense nuclear facilities will be summarized, and their impact on the maturation of the Department's safety and regulatory framework will be discussed. Finally, integrated with these two threads of discussion will be a chronicle of the changing set of involved organizations and the expanding set of external stakeholders involved in risk decisions—and therefore, the risk communications ecosystem surrounding defense nuclear facilities. It will be noted that this system was once describable as a classic “iron triangle,” but now has progressed to a complex network of federal and state organizations, numerous congressional committees, and expanding sets of external stakeholders. It is hoped that a comprehensive discussion of the context of risk assessment in the defense nuclear facilities complex—addressing historical insights, organizational evolution, and the maturing structure of regulation—will provide enhanced opportunities for building trust and understanding in this complex environment.

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INS Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Instructional Video Materials- FY 25 Full Scripts

Each section of the Adhesive TID Process Demonstration is broken down into subparts as referenced in the outline contained in the Contents section, these are referenced as Activity Sections. The structure of the Adhesive TID Process Demonstration items is, to the best of the writer’s ability, in the order of events that the NMAC mitigating techniques are performed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Yield Estimates of three Historical Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions at Lop Nor, from Reduced Order Models of Regionally Recorded Rayleigh Waveforms and One Seismic Station: A Brief Communication

We use a reduced order model (ROM) for Rayleigh waveforms sourced by large atmospheric explosions along with data collected from a single seismic station (TLG) to estimate the yields of three atmospheric nuclear tests with order-megaton (MT) yields. These historical tests were conducted by China between 1973 and 1980 (CHIC 15, CHIC 16, and CHIC 26). We use our ROM to estimate yields of 2.34 MT (CHIC 15), 0.51 MT (CHIC 16), and 1.15 (CHIC 26) in the 20.5 s period band that are consistent with publicly accepted values of 3 MT (CHIC 15), 0.50 MT (CHIC 16), and 0.730 MT (CHIC 26).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Fact Sheet - Long-length Scintillating Fibers for Radiation Detection

As the world looks to underground geological repositories for storing nuclear waste, technologies to safeguard the material are needed. An example of a project that developed a new technology is Tripwire. Tripwire proposes a multi-sensor system approach for geological spent nuclear fuel repositories that relies of radiation, vibration, and electromagnetic detection. Tripwire was developed by the Applied Radiation Measurements and Systems (ARMS) group at INL and sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The ARMS group performs research and development, testing and evaluation, operational support, and training focused on applied ionizing radiation detection and measurement. Application areas include nuclear engineering for advanced reactors and fuel cycle operations, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counterproliferation, nuclear forensics, and arms control and disarmament.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

An Evaluation of Three Dimensional Scene Reconstruction Tools for Safeguards Applications

Over the past 5 years, advances in digital imaging and image processing have enabled everyday computing hardware, such as that found on laptops and even phones, to easily create 3D models of scenes from a series of still images. This field is broadly known as photogrammetry. For safeguards applications, a safeguards inspector could evaluate a 3D model of a facility (such as an enrichment plant or the top of a reactor) constructed from multiple photos instead of reviewing each photo individually. This report compares the detailed capabilities of a particular commercial offering (Quidient) that Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has investigated in depth with the general capabilities provided in the industry and recommends areas where the general technology could be pursued for potential safeguards applications.

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Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Improved Nondestructive Isotopic Analysis with Practical Microcalorimeter Gamma Spectrometers

Advances in both instrumentation and data analysis software are now enabling the first ultra-high-resolution microcalorimeter gamma spectrometers designed for implementation in nuclear facilities and analytical laboratories. With approximately ten times better energy resolution than high-purity germanium detectors, these instruments can overcome important uncertainty limits. Microcalorimeter gamma spectroscopy is intended to provide nondestructive isotopic analysis capabilities with sufficient precision and accuracy to reduce the need for sampling, chemical separations, and mass spectrometry to meet safeguards and security goals. Key milestones were the development of the SOFIA instrument (Spectrometer Optimized for Facility Integrated Applications) and the SAPPY software (Spectral Analysis Program in PYthon). SOFIA is a compact instrument that combines advances in large multiplexed transition-edge sensor arrays with optimized cryogenic performance to overcome many practical limitations of previous systems. With a 256-pixel multiplexed detector array capable of 5,000 counts per second, measurement time can be comparable to high-purity germanium detectors. SAPPY was developed to determine isotopic ratios in data from SOFIA and other microcalorimeter instruments with an approach similar to the widely-used FRAM software. SAPPY provides a flexible framework with rigorous uncertainty analysis for both microcalorimeter and high purity germanium (HPGe) data, allowing direct comparison. Here, we present current results from the SOFIA instrument, preliminary isotopic analysis using SAPPY, and describe how the technology is being used to explore uncertainty limits of nondestructive isotopic characterization, inform safeguards models, and extract improved nuclear data including gamma-ray branching ratios.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Field Scoping Study of Gamma-Ray Measurement of UF 6 Cristillini Samples with CZT and HPGe Detectors

A field scoping study was conducted to evaluate the ability of Cd-Zn-Te (CZT) detectors and High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors to quantify the U-235 enrichment in UF 6 samples collected on alumina in P-10 tubes, similar to the Cristillini method of sample collection for analysis by mass spectrometry. With in-field gamma-ray spectroscopy methods, international safeguards and verification missions could benefit from quick in-field confirmation of declared enrichment values prior to or without the need for additional shipping, sample preparation and analysis. Samples of depleted (DU), low-enriched (LEU) and high-assay low-enriched (HALEU) uranium were collected on Cristillini-type alumina in P-10 tubes and measured with two H3D, Inc. M400 CZT detectors as well as a Canberra Falcon HPGe detector. The M400 detectors were able to confirm enrichment in the DU and LEU samples but not the HALEU sample in measurements 8-40 hrs after collection. The Falcon system was able to confirm enrichment in all three samples. Improvements in detector geometry, increase in number of detectors as well as increase sample mass loading may allow measurement of U-235 enrichment in these types of samples within 4-8hrs of collection with 5-10% uncertainty.

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Area V: Waste Management and Subsurface Science (FY21-23 Final Report)

The objective of the Waste Management and Subsurface Science Topic Area V project is to evaluate the feasibility and safety of an intermediate-depth borehole for disposal of Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) nuclear waste. The IAEC nuclear waste is currently stored in above ground and/or in near-surface facilities that provide short-term radiological worker safety but do not provide long-term, full security and safeguards protection for the nuclear material. Disposal of the IAEC nuclear waste several hundred meters below the surface in a sealed borehole would provide long-term security and safeguards due to its depth underground, as well as long-term radiological safety, due to its isolation in a stable geological formation. This project supports the nuclear security and safeguards initiatives of the Science and Technology Working Group of the NNSA/IAEC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and addresses the Topic Area V objective and associated goals. The goals for Topic Area V are: (1) Assess the suitability of the vadose zone in the Yamin Plain of the northern Negev Desert, Israel as a host location for intermediate-depth borehole disposal of radioactive waste, (2) Define and refine the necessary characterization needs to better understand the regional climate, structure, and stratigraphy, geomechanics, geochemistry, hydrogeology, and seismicity of the stratigraphic sequence from the surface to the water table in the vicinity of the proposed host location for the disposal borehole(s), and (3) Develop a preliminary plan and schedule, including necessary resources and costs, for a borehole disposal concept and robust and transparent pre-closure and post-closure safety assessments. The safety assessments will require iteration with process level models at both site and regional scales. Upon completion, the information collected by this effort will allow the IAEC to make decisions regarding the viability and applicability of an intermediate depth (<500m) borehole for disposal in the vadose zone of the Yamin Plain. This FY21-23 final report is provided in lieu of a workshop report that was originally planned for delivery in January, 2024. Due to the conflict in Israel and associated delays, the workshop has been delayed to April 2024. The workshop will be held at LLNL but offsite and will switch to hybrid if travel restrictions remain in place. The associated workshop report will be provided as part of a new FY24-26 LCP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Noble gas constraints on spent fuel irradiation histories

Fission gas isotopic compositions are sensitive to a variety of reactor operating parameters that include the neutron flux, neutron fluence at different neutron energies, and operating temperature. Measurements of fission gas isotopic compositions thus have potential to constrain reactor simulations for nuclear forensics and safeguards applications. In this paper, we present Kr and Xe isotope measurements from a suite of samples obtained from locations that span the axial length a fuel pin with a well-characterized irradiation history and compare these data to spatially resolved reactor simulations. Here, we observed positive correlations between fluence sensitive isotopic ratios and burnup and between a flux sensitive ratio and power, although some discrepancies are observed between the measured data and model predictions. These differences may be due to simplifications in the model and/or inaccuracies in the cross sections. A much broader measurement to model comparison is required to better understand the discrepancies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Semi-empirical simulation of in-motion radiation detection systems

The Replicative Assessment of Spectroscopic Equipment (RASE) is an open-source software that uses experimental data as the basis to simulate the response of commercial radiation detectors to sources in various situations, particularly in the context of nuclear security and safeguards applications. Dynamic RASE introduces the capability to simulate scenarios where sources and detector are in relative motion. Position-dependent experimentally acquired gamma spectra are ingested by Dynamic RASE to build maps that describe the detector response over all space. These response maps are used to replicate the time-dependent energy spectra collected as sources move on a path near the detector. Here, a Gaussian process is used to build each map, incorporating a novel kernel adapted to the special case of radiation detection. The approach has been validated against experimental data acquired using a NaI-based detector for 137 Cs and 54 Mn sources. The capability to create accurate simulations using either long-dwell static measurements or dynamic pass-by measurements as source data has been demonstrated. Quantitative relative performance, benefits, and shortcomings are discussed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗