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The presentation reviews the dependability and safety effort of NASA's Independent Verification and Validation Facility. Topics include: safety engineering process, applications to non-space environment, Phase I overview, process creation, sample SRM artifact, Phase I end result, Phase II model transformation, fault management, and applying Phase II to individual projects.
In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced or heritage systems and the system environment identifies unanticipated issues that result in cost overruns or schedule impacts. The Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays resulting from advanced technology or heritage assumptions for 6 D&NF missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that the cost and schedule growth did not result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. Instead, systems engineering processes did not identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement the heritage or advanced technology. This presentation summarizes the study s findings and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the risks inherent in the technology and heritage design solution.
Numerous lessons have been documented from the Space Shuttle Propulsion elements. Major events include loss of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) on STS-4 and shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) during ascent on STS-51F. On STS-112 only half the pyrotechnics fired during release of the vehicle from the launch pad, a testament for redundancy. STS-91 exhibited freezing of a main combustion chamber pressure measurement and on STS-93 nozzle tube ruptures necessitated a low liquid level oxygen cut off of the main engines. A number of on pad aborts were experienced during the early program resulting in delays. And the two accidents, STS-51L and STS-107, had unique heritage in history from early program decisions and vehicle configuration. Following STS-51L significant resources were invested in developing fundamental physical understanding of solid rocket motor environments and material system behavior. And following STS-107, the risk of ascent debris was better characterized and controlled. Situational awareness during all mission phases improved, and the management team instituted effective risk assessment practices. The last 22 flights of the Space Shuttle, following the Columbia accident, were characterized by remarkable improvement in safety and reliability. Numerous problems were solved in addition to reduction of the ascent debris hazard. The Shuttle system, though not as operable as envisioned in the 1970's, successfully assembled the International Space Station (ISS). By the end of the program, the remarkable Space Shuttle Propulsion system achieved very high performance, was largely reusable, exhibited high reliability, and was a heavy lift earth to orbit propulsion system. During the program a number of project management and engineering processes were implemented and improved. Technical performance, schedule accountability, cost control, and risk management were effectively managed and implemented. Award fee contracting was implemented to provide performance incentives. The Certification of Flight Readiness and Mission Management processes became very effective. A key to the success of the propulsion element projects was related to relationships between the MSFC project office and support organizations with their counterpart contractor organizations. The teams worked diligently to understand and satisfy requirements and achieve mission success.
Excavation will hold a key role for future lunar missions. NASA has stated that "advances in lunar regolith mining have the potential to significantly contribute to our nation's space vision and NASA space exploration operations." [1]. The Lunabotics Mining Competition is an event hosted by NASA that is meant to encourage "the development of innovative lunar excavation concepts from universities which may result in clever ideas and solutions which could be applied to an actual lunar excavation device or payload." [2]. Teams entering the competition must "design and build a remote controlled or autonomous excavator, called a lunabot, that can collect and deposit a minimum of 10 kilograms of lunar simulant within 10 minutes." [2]. While excavation will play an important part in lunar missions, there will still be many other tasks that would benefit from robotic assistance. An excavator might not be as well suited for these tasks as other types of robots might be. For example a lightweight rover would do well with reconnaissance, and a mobile gripper arm would be fit for manipulation, while an excavator would be comparatively clumsy and slow in both cases. Even within the realm of excavation it would be beneficial to have different types of excavators for different tasks, as there are on Earth. The Alabama Lunabotics Team at the University of Alabama has made it their goal to not only design and build a robot that could compete in the Lunabotics Mining Competition, but would also be a multipurpose tool for future NASA missions. The 2010-2011 resulting robot was named the Modular Omnidirectional Lunar Excavator (MOLE). Using the Systems Engineering process and building off of two years of Lunabotics experience, the 20ll-2012 Alabama Lunabotics team (Team NASACAR) has improved the MOLE 1.0 design and optimized it for the 2012 Lunabotics Competition rules [I]. A CAD model of MOLE 2.0 can be seen below in Fig. 1.
The Yamato mission to the lunar South Pole-Aitken Basin returns samples that enable dating of lunar formation and the lunar bombardment period. The design of the Yamato mission is based on a systems engineering process which takes an advanced consideration of cost and mission risk to give the mission a high probability of success.
The Shuttle Case Study Collection (SCSC) has been developed using lessons learned documented by NASA engineers, analysts, and contractors. The SCSC provides educators with a new tool to teach real-world engineering processes with the goal of providing unique educational materials that enhance critical thinking, decision-making and problem-solving skills. During this third phase of the project, responsibilities included: the revision of the Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) source code to ensure all pages follow World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standards, and the addition and edition of website content, including text, documents, and images. Basic HTML knowledge was required, as was basic knowledge of photo editing software, and training to learn how to use NASA's Content Management System for website design. The outcome of this project was its release to the public.
While technology has made astounding advances in the last century, problems are confronting the engineering community that must be solved. Cost and schedule of producing large systems are increasing at an unsustainable rate and these systems often do not perform as intended. New systems are required that may not be achieved by current methods. To solve these problems, NASA is working to infuse concepts from Complexity Science into the engineering process. Some of these problems may be solved by a change in design philosophy. Instead of designing systems to meet known requirements that will always lead to fragile systems at some degree, systems should be designed wherever possible to be antifragile: designing cognitive cyberphysical systems that can learn from their experience, adapt to unforeseen events they face in their environment, and grow stronger in the face of adversity. Several examples are presented of on ongoing research efforts to employ this philosophy.
The goal of this project was to design, model, build, and test a flat panel speaker and frame for a spherical dome structure being made into a simulator. The simulator will be a test bed for evaluating an immersive environment for human interfaces. This project focused on the loud speakers and a sound diffuser for the dome. The rest of the team worked on an Ambisonics 3D sound system, video projection system, and multi-direction treadmill to create the most realistic scene possible. The main programs utilized in this project, were Pro-E and COMSOL. Pro-E was used for creating detailed figures for the fabrication of a frame that held a flat panel loud speaker. The loud speaker was made from a thin sheet of Plexiglas and 4 acoustic exciters. COMSOL, a multiphysics finite analysis simulator, was used to model and evaluate all stages of the loud speaker, frame, and sound diffuser. Acoustical testing measurements were utilized to create polar plots from the working prototype which were then compared to the COMSOL simulations to select the optimal design for the dome. The final goal of the project was to install the flat panel loud speaker design in addition to a sound diffuser on to the wall of the dome. After running tests in COMSOL on various speaker configurations, including a warped Plexiglas version, the optimal speaker design included a flat piece of Plexiglas with a rounded frame to match the curvature of the dome. Eight of these loud speakers will be mounted into an inch and a half of high performance acoustic insulation, or Thinsulate, that will cover the inside of the dome. The following technical paper discusses these projects and explains the engineering processes used, knowledge gained, and the projected future goals of this project
This paper presents a 2014 status of the Society of Allied Weight Engineers' process towards becoming an Accredited Standards Developer (ASD) under certification by the United States American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Included is material from the committee's 2013 International presentation, current status, and additional general background material. The document strives to serve as a reference point to assist SAWE Recommended Practice and Standards developers in negotiating United States Standards Strategy, international standards strategy, and the association of SAWE standards and recommended practices to those efforts. Required procedures for SAWE to develop and maintain Recommended Practices and ANSI/SAWE Standards are reviewed.
The SIM Lite Astrometric Observatory will be the first space-based Michelson interferometer operating in the visible wavelength, with the ability to perform ultra-high precision astrometric measurements on distant celestial objects. SIM Lite data will address in a fundamental way questions such as characterization of Earth-mass planets around nearby stars. To accomplish these goals it is necessary to rely on a model-based systems engineering approach - much more so than most other space missions. This paper will describe in further detail the components of this end-to-end performance model, called "SIM-sim", and show how it has helped the systems engineering process.
Autonomous fault management (FM) is critical for deep space and planetary missions where the limited communication opportunities may prevent timely intervention by ground control. Evidence of pervasive architecture, design, and verification/validation problems with NASA FM engineering has been revealed both during technical reviews of spaceflight missions and in flight. These problems include FM design changes required late in the life-cycle, insufficient project insight into the extent of FM testing required, unexpected test results that require resolution, spacecraft operational limitations because certain functions were not tested, and in-flight anomalies and mission failures attributable to fault management. A recent NASA initiative has characterized the FM state-of-practice throughout the spacecraft development community and identified common NASA, DoD, and commercial concerns that can be addressed in the near term through the development of a FM Practitioner's Handbook and the formation of a FM Working Group. Initial efforts will focus on standardizing FM terminology, establishing engineering processes and tools, and training.
AS9100 has little to say about how to apply a Quality Management System (QMS) to aerospace test programs. There is little in the quality engineering Body of Knowledge that applies to testing, unless it is nondestructive examination or some type of lab or bench testing. If one examines how the systems engineering processes are implemented throughout a test program; and how these processes can be mapped to AS9100, a number of areas for involvement of the quality professional are revealed.
Link analysis is a system engineering process in the design, development, and operation of communication systems and networks. Link models that are mathematical abstractions representing the useful signal power and the undesirable noise and attenuation effects (including weather effects if the signal path transverses through the atmosphere) that are integrated into the link budget calculation that provides the estimates of signal power and noise power at the receiver. Then the link margin is applied which attempts to counteract the fluctuations of the signal and noise power to ensure reliable data delivery from transmitter to receiver. (Link margin is dictated by the link margin policy or requirements.) A simple link budgeting approach assumes link parameters to be deterministic values typically adopted a rule-of-thumb policy of 3 dB link margin. This policy works for most S- and X-band links due to their insensitivity to weather effects. But for higher frequency links like Ka-band, Ku-band, and optical communication links, it is unclear if a 3 dB link margin would guarantee link closure. Statistical link analysis that adopted the 2-sigma or 3-sigma link margin incorporates link uncertainties in the sigma calculation. (The Deep Space Network (DSN) link margin policies are 2-sigma for downlink and 3-sigma for uplink.) The link reliability can therefore be quantified statistically even for higher frequency links. However in the current statistical link analysis approach, link reliability is only expressed as the likelihood of exceeding the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) threshold that corresponds to a given bit-error-rate (BER) or frame-error-rate (FER) requirement. The method does not provide the true BER or FER estimate of the link with margin, or the required signalto-noise ratio (SNR) that would meet the BER or FER requirement in the statistical sense. In this paper, we perform in-depth analysis on the relationship between BER/FER requirement, operating SNR, and coding performance curve, in the case when the channel coherence time of link fluctuation is comparable or larger than the time duration of a codeword. We compute the "true" SNR design point that would meet the BER/FER requirement by taking into account the fluctuation of signal power and noise power at the receiver, and the shape of the coding performance curve. This analysis yields a number of valuable insights on the design choices of coding scheme and link margin for the reliable data delivery of a communication system - space and ground. We illustrate the aforementioned analysis using a number of standard NASA error-correcting codes.
A SmallSat using a small Radioisotope Power System for deep space destinations could potentially fit into a Discovery class mission cost cap and perform significant science with a timely return of data. Only applicable when the Discovery 12 guidelines were applied. Commonality of hardware and science instruments among identical spacecraft enabled to meet the Discovery Class mission cost cap. Multiple spacecraft shared the costs of the Launch Approval Engineering Process. Assumed a secondary science instrument was contributed. Small RPS could provide small spacecraft with a relatively high power (approx. 60 We) option for missions to deep space destinations (> 10 AU) with multiple science instruments. Study of Centaur mission demonstrated the ability to achieve New Frontiers level science. Multiple spacecraft possible with small RPS, allowing for multiple targets, science from multiple platforms, and/or redundancy.
A review of two papers on improving the International Space Station (ISS) Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) shows that it would not save substantial mass on a Mars transit. The ISS OGA requires redesign for satisfactory operation, even for the ISS. The planned improvements of the OGA for ISS would not be sufficient to make it suitable for Mars, because Mars transit life support has significantly different requirements than ISS. The OGA for Mars should have lower mass, better reliability and maintainability, greater safety, radiation hardening, and capability for quiescent operation. NASA's methodical, disciplined systems engineering process should be used to develop the appropriate system.
The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.
Our most distance spacecraft, Voyager 1 and Voyager 2, recently reached the boundary of the solar system known as the Heliopause. Beyond this boundary lies interstellar space, and, at tremendous distance, the stars. The Voyager spacecraft have shown us that the Heliopause is a dynamic, rapidly changing environment, varying greatly as the fields and effects emanating from the sun are met by a host of forces pushing in from our nearby galactic neighborhood. This is the region we aim to explore. Specifically we aim to develop a mission architecture and spacecraft concept capable of reaching the Heliopause (approximately100 AU (Astronomical Units)) region in multiple directions of interest, with a variety of scientific instrument suites, within a reasonable timeframe (about 15 years.) This report details our Phase 1 work including science goal definition, trajectory planning, technology research, mission planning, instrument selection, spacecraft design, and more. We present an architecture employing a 250-meter by 250-meter solar sail with a 175 kilogram spacecraft. This spacecraft could carry a variety of instrument suites depending on the destination, time, and other factors. The spin-stabilized spacecraft would powered by a small radioisotope power system (about 20 watts), makes use of an optical communication system, and carries 3 extensible booms for instrument accommodation as visible in the sketch and rendering below. We conclude that it would be reasonable to implement the architecture described herein in the 2020-2030 timeframe based on likely near-term technological and material advances. We are confident that cruise times of around 15 years could be achieved to science-rich destinations. This report details the approach we used to come to these conclusions and identifies some of the steps along the way. We utilized a variety of methodologies involving our full capability at JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) - from small point studies to large collaborative engineering processes. This paper also describes potential industry partnerships and costing information, and includes the methods used to account for our project’s significant deviation from any prior mission in the NASA costing tool database. Outreach and public engagement is an important part of NASA activities. We engaged in several different forms of this outreach and describe them in this report. We conclude with some open questions and a summary of activities we hope to engage in with Phase 2 funding. The entire team would like to thank the NIAC (NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts) program for the opportunity to investigate this fascinating and challenging concept. The Voyager program gives us tantalizing clues as to the nature and behavior of the Heliopause – the boundary between the sun’s influence and the interstellar medium. This information comes from forty-year old instruments designed to study the outer planets. A targeted Heliopause investigation would give insight into the formation of the solar system, the role of the sun in the local interstellar neighborhood, and contribute to human exploration planning by helping to predict periods of low galactic cosmic ray (GCR) penetration into the inner solar system.
Recycling waste has been an issue on Earth for decades. The OSCAR project seeks to find ways to make sure that it does not become an issue in space. The main focus of OSCAR is the combustion of waste and reclamation of gaseous products in microgravity. The first phase of testing relies on a ground rig that operates both under normal (Earth) gravity and in drop tower tests that briefly simulate a microgravity environment. In the second phase, a test will be performed during a suborbital flight were the experiment will be carried out in microgravity. Throughout the spring term, interns have played an integral part in continuing the progress made by the project. They performed work in upgrading the electrical and mechanical systems that make up OSCAR. They made multiple improvements to the test rig's operating software to improve readability and usability. They prepared and edited documents that were vital to the engineering process. And, they were responsible for performing lab tests and refining the lab operations document and procedure. The interns were a big help in maintaining the rigorous test schedule. OSCAR, which stands for Orbital Syngas Commodity Augmentation Reactor, is to find a way to turn astronaut waste into chemical energy. The two parts of this are important: finding a way to dispose of waste generated in space, and seeing if there is a way to recycle that waste into chemical energy. The importance of the disposal aspect is that there is currently no way to dispose of, or recycle, waste that is created in space other than jettisoning it (which is what the ISS does via empty supply capsules). As manned missions go deeper into space, that method will no longer be viable, as a craft would essentially be littering the space and planets that they visit. Energy reclamation is also important because of the high monetary and spatial costs of sending supplies on space missions. Every little bit extra that can be reused out of what is sent can save room and funds for other supplies. The facet of this problem that the OSCAR project is focusing on is how to combust waste in zero gravity. Combustion in the presence of gravity is one of those things that is taken for granted. When something burns on Earth, the flames rise above the fuel as oxygen flows from underneath. In microgravity, the flames surround the object completely, which restricts the amount of oxygen that can reach the fuel, and retards the combustion. OSCAR uses a vortex reaction chamber to counter this phenomenon. The OSCAR test rig will eventually be tested on a suborbital flight to see if it is an effective solution to the issue in real-world conditions. Currently, there is a prototype test rig that is fully functional. This rig has been previously tested in a 2 second drop test at Glenn Research Center’s (GRC) Zero Gravity Facility (ZGF). (The free-fall conditions of the drop mimic microgravity, if only for a brief period of time). This session’s focus was on upgrading the test rig and software, updating the paperwork, performing additional lab tests, and readying the rig for the five second drop test, again at GRC. II. Upgrades The state of the testing rig at the start of the session was in between its configurations for the two second drop tower and the five second drop tower. The rig needed upgrades to address various insufficiencies that either were discovered during the two second campaign or were a direct result of the differences between the two drop tower setups. The main differences that had to be handled were the increase in shock loads from 30g to 65g, a difference in drop indicating signal (on the falling edge of a pulse instead of a change from high to low), and the ambient pressure of the test apparatus (the two second tower dropped the rig in atmosphere, while the five second tower drops in vacuum).