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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1988

Exploration Studies Technical Report - Volume 3: Special Reports, Studies, and Indepth Systems Assessments

Interplanetary flight↗

NASA NTRS1988

Exploration Studies Technical Report - Volume 1: Technical Summary

The Office of Exploration (OEXP) at NASA Headquarters has been tasked with defining and recommending alternatives for an early 1990's national decision on a focused program of human exploration of the solar system. The Mission Analysis and System Engineering (MASE) group, which is managed by the Exploration Studies Office at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, is responsible for coordinating the technical studies necessary for accomplishing such a task. This technical report, produced by the MASE, describes the process that has been developed in a case study approach. The four case studies developed in FY88 include: 1. Human Expedition to Phobos 2. Human Expedition to Mars 3. Lunar Observatory 4. Lunar Outpost to Early Mars Evolution The final outcome of this effort is a set of programmatic and technical conclusions and recommendations for the following year's work.

Lunar Mining & Oxygen Production↗

NASA NTRS1988

Exploration Studies Technical Report - Volume 2: Studies Approach and Results

The NASA Office of Exploration has been tasked with defining and recommending alternatives for an early 1990's national decision on a focused program of human exploration of the solar system. The Mission Analysis and System Engineering (MASE) group, which is managed by the Exploration Studies Office at the Johnson Space Center, is responsible for coordinating the technical studies necessary for accomplishing such a task. This technical report describes the process that has been developed in a case study approach. The four case studies that were developed in FY88 include: 1. Human expedition to Phobos 2. Human expeditions to Mars 3. Lunar observatory 4. Lunar outpost to early Mars evolution The final outcome of this effort is a set of programmatic and technical conclusions and recommendations for the following year's work. Volume 2 describes the case study process, the technical results of each of the case studies, and opportunities for additional study. Included in the discussion of each case study is a description of the mission key features and profile. Mission definition and manifesting are detailed, followed by a description of the mission architecture and infrastructure. Systems concepts for the required orbital nodes, transportation systems, and planetary surface systems are discussed. Prerequisite implementation plans resulting from the synthesized case studies are described and in-depth assessments are presented.

Interplanetary flight↗

NASA NTRS1988

A methodology for automation and robotics evaluation applied to the space station telerobotic servicer

The efforts of a recent study aimed at identifying key issues and trade-offs associated with using a Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) to aid in Space Station assembly-phase tasks is described. The use of automation and robotic (A and R) technologies for large space systems would involve a substitution of automation capabilities for human extravehicular or intravehicular activities (EVA, IVA). A methodology is presented that incorporates assessment of candidate assembly-phase tasks, telerobotic performance capabilities, development costs, and effect of operational constraints (space transportation system (STS), attached payload, and proximity operations). Changes in the region of cost-effectiveness are examined under a variety of systems design assumptions. A discussion of issues is presented with focus on three roles the FTS might serve: (1) as a research-oriented testbed to learn more about space usage of telerobotics; (2) as a research based testbed having an experimental demonstration orientation with limited assembly and servicing applications; or (3) as an operational system to augment EVA and to aid the construction of the Space Station and to reduce the programmatic (schedule) risk by increasing the flexibility of mission operations.

Smith, Jeffrey H.↗

NASA NTRS1987

System engineering techniques for establishing balanced design and performance guidelines for the advanced telerobotic testbed

Novel system engineering techniques have been developed and applied to establishing structured design and performance objectives for the Telerobotics Testbed that reduce technical risk while still allowing the testbed to demonstrate an advancement in state-of-the-art robotic technologies. To estblish the appropriate tradeoff structure and balance of technology performance against technical risk, an analytical data base was developed which drew on: (1) automation/robot-technology availability projections, (2) typical or potential application mission task sets, (3) performance simulations, (4) project schedule constraints, and (5) project funding constraints. Design tradeoffs and configuration/performance iterations were conducted by comparing feasible technology/task set configurations against schedule/budget constraints as well as original program target technology objectives. The final system configuration, task set, and technology set reflected a balanced advancement in state-of-the-art robotic technologies, while meeting programmatic objectives and schedule/cost constraints.

Zimmerman, W. F.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Computational requirements for hypersonic flight performance estimates

The computational requirements for hypersonic flight performance estimates are discussed and a procedure for fulfilling these requirements is presented. In order to effectively use computational fluid dynamics in design, especially for estimating performance quantities, consideration should be given to the credibility of CFD, design sensitivities, test uncertainties, risk assessment, and consistency in determination. It is found that a design-specific computational technology developed with programmatic research can be used in the design of hypervelocity vehicles.

Mehta, Unmeel B.↗

NASA NTRS1988

A manned Mars artificial gravity vehicle

Data are presented on an artificial-gravity vehicle that is being designed for a manned Mars mission, using a 'split-mission' concept, in which an unmanned cargo vehicle is sent earlier and stored in a Mars orbit for a rendezvous with a manned vehicle about 1.5 years later. Special attention is given to the vehicle trajectory and configuration, the tether design, and the vehicle weight and launch requirements. It is shown that an artificial-G vehicle for a manned Mars missions is feasible technically and programmatically. Using an artificial-G vehicle instead of a zero-G vehicle for the piloted portion of a split mission provides physiological and human-factor-related benefits, does not eliminate requirements for zero-G countermeasures research (since zero-G is an abort mode), and could possibly reduce some life science activities. Diagrams are included.

Schultz, David N.↗

NASA NTRS1989

NASA's Chemical Transfer Propulsion Program for Pathfinder

Pathfinder is a research and technology project, initiated by NASA in 1989 to support the U.S. civil space program studies for the preparation for future space exploration missions. This paper describes the goals and objectives, the management, the technical plan, and technology transfer for the Chemical Transfer Propulsion program, which is a key element of one of the four programmatic thrusts (the Space Transfer) of the Pathfinder. The Chemical Transfer Propulsion will provide the technology for high-performance liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen expander cycle engines for space-based transfer vehicles as well as for lunar and Mars landers.

Hannum, Ned P.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Unmanned and manned Mars missions - Aeroassist technology needs and issues

The critical aeroassist technologies are considered, with consideration given to the manned and unmanned Mars missions. Attention is given to the aerothermal characterization, the thermal-protection system (TPS), the guidance navigation and control systems, and atmospheric uncertainties. Particular consideration is given to the aerobrake assembly concepts for an unmanned Mars mission, and to programmatics.

Willcockson, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Recommendations for the future

The workshop explored four major areas of concern to solar-terrestrial science. Looking across the discipline reports given previously, it is possible to find common threads that can contribute to the development of NASA's programmatic strategy for the solar-terrestrial sciences. The following areas are outlined: scientific balance; previously gathered information; imaging; impact of the space station and related platforms; vitality and relevance; and future studies.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1989

ARISTOTELES: A European approach for an Earth gravity field recovery mission

Under contract of the European Space Agency a system study for a spaceborne gravity field recovery mission was performed, covering as a secondary mission objective geodetic point positioning in the cm range as well. It was demonstrated that under the given programmatic constraints including dual launch and a very tight development schedule, a six months gravity field mission in a 200 km near polar, dawn-dusk orbit is adequate to determine gravity anomalies to better than 5 mgal with a spatial resolution of 100 x 100 km half wavelength. This will enable scientists to determine improved spherical harmonic coefficients of the Earth gravity field equation to the order and degree of 180 or better.

Benz, R.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Final environmental impact statement for the Galileo Mission (Tier 2)

This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the proposed action of completing the preparation and operation of the Galileo spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1989, and the alternative of canceling further work on the mission. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal launch vehicle operation, and are treated in published National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle (NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the KSC Environmental Resources Document (NASA 1986) and the Galileo Tier 1 EIS (NASA 1988a). The environmental impacts of a normal launch were deemed insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations. Environmental impacts may also result from launch or mission accidents that could release plutonium fuel used in the Galileo power system. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents associated with the proposed action reveal small health or environmental risks. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative. The remote possibility of environmental impacts of the proposed action must be weighed against the large adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts inherent in the no-action alternative.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1990

Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2)

This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the environmental impacts which may be caused by implementation of the Ulysses mission, a space flight mission to observe the polar regions of the Sun. The proposed action is completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses spacecraft, including its planned launch at the earliest available launch opportunity on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1990 or in the backup opportunity in November 1991. The alternative is canceling further work on the mission. The Tier 1 EIS included a delay alternative which considered the Titan 4 launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991 or later. This alternative was further evaluated and eliminated from consideration when, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan 4, notified that it could not provide a Titan 4 vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. The Titan 4 launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) for the November 1991 launch opportunity. The only expected environment effects of the proposed action are associated with normal launch vehicle operation and are treated elsewhere. The environmental impacts of normal Shuttle launches were addressed in existing NEPA documentation and are briefly summarized. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects were judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches. There could also be environmental impacts associated with the accidental release of radiological material during launch, deployment, or interplanetary trajectory injection of the Ulysses spacecraft. Intensive analysis indicates that the probability of release is small. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative; however, the U.S. Government and the European Space Agency would suffer adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts if this alternative were adopted. The scientific benefits of the mission would be delayed and possibly lost. There could be significant impacts on the ability of the U.S. to negotiate international agreements for cooperative space activities.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1990

Romans to Mars

The key role played by technology advancement with respect to the anticipated era of discovery and exploration (in space) is illustrated: how bold new initiatives may or may not be enabled. A truly enabling technology not only renders the proposed missions technically feasible, but also makes them viable economically; that is, low enough in cost (relative to the economy supporting them) that urgent national need is not required for justification, low enough in cost that high risk can be programmatically tolerated. A fictional parallel is drawn to the Roman Empire of the second century A.D., shown to have possessed by that time the necessary knowledge, motivation, means, and technical capability of mounting, through the use of innovative mission planning, an initiative similar to Columbus' voyage. They failed to do so because they lacked the advanced technology necessary to make it an acceptable proposition economically. Speculation, based on the historical perspective, is made on the outcome of contemporary plans for future exploration showing how they will be subjected to the same historical forces, within limits imposed by the state of technology development, that shaped the timing of that previous era of discovery and exploration.

Bents, D. J.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Keeping the dream alive: Managing the Space Station Program, 1982 to 1986

The management is described and analyzed of the formative years of the NASA Space Station Program (1982 to 1986), beginning with the successful initiative for program approval by Administrator James M. Beggs through to the decision to bring program management to Reston, Virginia. Emphasis is on internal management issues related to the implementation of the various phases of the program. Themes examined are the problem of bringing programmatic and institutional interests together and focusing them to forward the program; centralized versus decentralized control of the program; how the history of NASA and of the individual installations affected the decisions made; and the pressure from those outside NASA. The four sections are: (1) the decision to build the space station, (2) the design of the management experiment, (3) the experiment comes to life, and (4) the decision reversal.

Lewin, Thomas J.↗

NASA NTRS1990

The lessons of Varsovian's reconnaissance

The role played by advanced technology is illustrated with respect to the anticipated era of discovery and exploration (in space): how bold new exploration initiatives may or may not be enabled. Enabling technology makes the mission feasible. To be truly enabling, however, the technology must not only render the proposed mission technically feasible, but also make it viable economically; that is, low enough in cost (relative to the economy supporting it) that urgent national need is not required for justification, low enough that risks can be programmatically tolerated. An allegorical parallel is drawn to the Roman Empire of the second century AD, shown to have possessed by that time the necessary knowledge, motivation, means, and technical capability of mounting, through the use of innovative mission planning, an initiative similar to Columbus' voyage. They failed to do so; not because they lacked the vision, but because their technology was not advanced enough to make it an acceptable proposition economically. Speculation, based on the historical perspective, is made on the outcome of contemporary plans for future exploration showing how they will be subjected to the same historical forces, within limits imposed by the state of technology development, that shaped the timing of that previous era of discovery and exploration.

Bents, D. J.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Establishing viable task domains for telerobot demonstrations

A suite of telerobotic tasks has been compiled and assessed for the purpose of selecting viable tasks for near and far term laboratory demonstrations. The primary intent of developing the task is to provide some technical guidelines, with supporting data, for focusing laboratory demonstrations toward application domains that address a wide array of potential telerobot tasks and required technologies. This wide application would then result in a rich technology development environment to meet the broad task requirements of a system such as the Flight Telerobot Servicer. The methodology and results of the telerobot task assessment are described, including a ranking of the final select suite of major tasks. The presented along with guidelines for both interpreting the task ranking results and setting programmatic objectives based on these results. Detailed data about the task candidates and their respective levels of complexity, task primitive actions, and the actual relative measures of task worth as associated with key tradeoff variables such as cost, available research resources, technology availability, and importance to the user community are also presented.

Zimmerman, Wayne↗

NASA NTRS1989

Space Station Freedom Program preliminary design review process

To conduct the Program Requirements Review of the Space Station Freedom, a Preliminary Design Review Board (PDR) has been established. The PDR will assess the preliminary design of the assembled manned base including the assembly process, the launch, and on-orbit stage configuration, the design approach, the on-orbit verification plans, supportability, reliability, safety, interfaces with the NASA infrastructure (the NSTS, TDRSS, and Ground operations) and international partners. Issues such as the coordination of a common interpretation of design requirements, coordination of interfaces, and convergence of design perspectives vs. proper allocation of resources are discussed. The impact of the resolution of the secondary ripple effect of design decisions which may cause programmatic difficulties is also addressed.

Carlise, R. F.↗