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NASA STMD Cryogenic Fluid Management Portfolio Project Office 'Towards a CFM Flight Demo'
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Cryogenic Fluid Management Portfolio Project EXPL-05: NASA CFM Portfolio Project - 2023 Accomplishments and Highlights Progress on Flight Demos and Large CFM Demonstration (LCD)
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ATM-X Air Traffic Management eXploration Project Overview
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Cryogenic Fluid Management Portfolio Project (CFMPP)
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Cryogenic Fluid Management Portfolio Project (CFMPP) CFMPP Office Overview and 2024 Highlights
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EPOXI and Stardust NExT: The Management Challenges of Two Comet Flybys in Three Months
The EPOXI and Stardust NExT missions were missions of opportunity utilizing the Deep Impact and Stardust spacecraft, respectively. These new missions took advantage of the cost savings of utilizing spacecraft that were already flying for new science investigations. Both were retargeted to fly by an additional comet. EPOXI visited Hartley 2, significantly smaller than the other Jupiter family comets visited previously. Stardust NExT flew by Tempel 1, providing a second look at the comet previously studied by Deep Impact in 2005. Both projects were part of NASA's Discovery Program. In order to further save costs, the projects were combined into a single project office at JPL. This provided some efficiencies due to the similarity of the missions, but having the flybys space only three months apart posed challenges for the project management team to ensure each project was ready for its critical event and ensuring each received the proper support from the management team. The project office relied on an integrated calendar for tracking and scheduling meetings, reviews, and other key events. The project management team also coordinated their availability for both projects to maintain involvement with each team to ensure effective risk identification and management.
Mission Operations and Command Assurance: Flight Operations Quality Improvements
Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM) task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission operations. From a system engineering view, MO&CA facilitates communication and problem-solving among flight teams and provides continuous process improvement to reduce risk in mission operations by addressing human factors. The MO&CA task has evolved from participating as a member of the spacecraft team to an independent team reporting directly to project management and providing system level assurance. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.
Mission operations and command assurance: Instilling quality into flight operations
Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM) task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission operations. From a system engineering view, MO&CA facilitates communication and problem-solving among flight teams and provides continuous process improvement to reduce the probability of radiating incorrect commands to a spacecraft. The MO&CA task has evolved from participating as a member of the spacecraft team to an independent team reporting directly to flight project management and providing system level assurance. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.
Mission operations and command assurance: Flight operations quality improvements
Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM) task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission operations. From a system engineering view, MO&CA facilitates communication and problem-solving among flight teams and provides continuous solving among flight teams and provides continuous process improvement to reduce risk in mission operations by addressing human factors. The MO&CA task has evolved from participating as a member of the spacecraft team, to an independent team reporting directly to flight project management and providing system level assurance. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.
Earth Sciences Data and Information System (ESDIS) program planning and evaluation methodology development
An Earth Sciences Data and Information System (ESDIS) Project Management Plan (PMP) is prepared. An ESDIS Project Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) consistent with the developed PMP is also prepared. ESDIS and related EOS program requirements developments, management and analysis processes are evaluated. Opportunities to improve the effectiveness of these processes and program/project responsiveness to requirements are identified. Overall ESDIS cost estimation processes are evaluated, and recommendations to improve cost estimating and modeling techniques are developed. ESDIS schedules and scheduling tools are evaluated. Risk assessment, risk mitigation strategies and approaches, and use of risk information in management decision-making are addressed.
Implementing Earned Value Management in the CxP EVA Systems Project Office
Earned Value Management (EVM), like project management, is as much art as it is science to develop an implementation plan for a project. This presentation will cover issues that were overcome and the implementation strategy to deploy Earned Value Management (EVM) within the Constellation Program (CxP), EVA Systems Project Office (ESPO), as well as discuss additional hurdles that currently prevent the organization from optimizing EVM. Each organization and each project within an organization needs to mold an EVM implementation plan around existing processes and tools, while at the same time revising those existing processes and tools as necessary to make them compatible with EVM. The ESPO EVM implementation covers work breakdown structure, organizational breakdown structure, control account, work/planning package development; integrated master schedule development using an integrated master plan; incorporating reporting requirements for existing funding process such as Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and JSC Internal Task Agreements (ITA); and interfacing with other software tools such as the Systems Applications and Products (SAP) accounting system and the CxP wInsight EVM analysis tool. However, there are always areas for improvement and EVM is no exception. As EVM continues to mature within the NASA CxP, these areas will continue to be worked to resolution to provide the Program Managers, Project Managers, and Control Account Managers the best EVM data possible to make informed decisions.
Understanding the Manager of the Project Front-End
Historical data and new findings from interviews with managers of major National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) projects confirm literature reports about the criticality of the front-end phase of project development, where systems engineering plays such a key role. Recent research into the management of ten contemporary NASA projects, combined with personal experience of the author in NASA, provide some insight into the relevance and importance of the project manager in this initial part of the project life cycle. The research findings provide evidence of similar approaches taken by the NASA project manager.
Mars Observer Press Conference JPL
The Mars Observer mission spacecraft was primarily designed for exploring Mars and the Martian environment. The Mars Observer was launched on September 25, 1992. The spacecraft was lost in the vicinity of Mars on August 21, 1993 when the spacecraft began its maneuvering sequence for Martian orbital insertion. This videotape shows a press briefing, held after the spacecraft had not responded to attempts to communicate with it, to explain to the press the problems and the steps that were being taken to re-establish communication with the spacecraft. The communications had been shutdown prior to the orbital insertion burn to protect the instruments. At the time of the press conference, the communications system was still not operational, and attempts were being made to re-establish communication. Bob McMillan of the Public Affairs Office at JPL gives the initial announcement of the continuing communication problem with the spacecraft. Mr. McMillan introduces William Piotrowski, acting director of solar system exploration, who reiterates that there is indeed no communication with the Observer spacecraft. He is followed by Glenn Cunningham, the Project Manager of the Mars Observer who speaks about the attempts to re-establish contact. Mr. Cunningham is followed by Satenios Dallas, the Mission Manager for the Mars Observer Project, who speaks about the sequence of events leading up to the communication failure, and shows an animated video presenting the orbital insertion maneuvers. The briefing was then opened up for questions from the assembled press, both at JPL and at the other NASA Centers. The questions are about the possible reasons for the communication failure, and the attempts to restore communications with the spacecraft. Dr. Arden L. Albee, chief scientist for the Mars Observer Mission, joins the other panel members to answer questions. At the end of the press briefing the animation of the Mars orbital insertion is shown again.
Starfire 1 Consort III Launch
The Consort 3 is a commercial suborbital rocket that carried 12 microgravity experiments. It was launched on a Starfire rocket on May 16, 1990, from the Naval Ordnance Missile Test Station facilities at the U.S. Army's White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM. The videotape opens with approximately 2 minutes of a man speaking into a microphone but there is no sound. This is followed by a brief summary of the payload, and the expected trajectory, a view of the launch vehicle, the countdown and the launch. The videotape then shows a film clip from the University of Alabama, with Dr. Francis Wessling, project manager for the Consort 3 project, speaking about the mission goals in the materials sciences experimentation. The video shows footage of the payload being assembled. The next section is a discussion by Dr. Roy Hammustedt, of Pennsylvania State University, who reviews the Penn State Bio Module,and the goal of learning about the effects of gravity on physiology. This is followed by George Maybee, from McDonald Douglas, who spoke about the payload integration process while the video shows some of the construction. The last section of the videotape shows a press conference at the launch site. Ana Villamil answers questions from the press about the flight.
NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process
NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.
Underestimation of Project Costs
Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, overoptimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because "This time it's different." Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.
A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions
The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.