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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Tailoring NIST Security Controls for the Ground System: Selection and Implementation -- Recommendations for Information System Owners

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).

GOVERNANCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Attack Scenarios Relating to Army Facility-Related Control Systems: Quantifying the Cost to Secure and Cost Savings of the Army’s FRCS Program

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) analyzed the cyber-threat environment to U.S. Army facilities. This report describes three key factors in securing Army-owned facility-related control systems (FRCS). First, Section 1.0 provides background information about the project. Section 2.0 describes the various types of cyber-attacks. Section 3.0 provides a series of attack scenarios from real-world use cases are described in Section 3. These examples are relevant to the Army because the targeted systems or operating environments are like those used at Army installations. An estimated range for the cost to secure these systems is described in Section 4.0. Finally, the cost savings of preventing these kinds of attacks are described in Section 5.0.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

EISA (Energy Independence and Security Act) compliant ethanol fuel from corn stover in a depot-based decentralized system

Cellulosic biofuels face significant problems of feedstock aggregation and logistics leading to poor economies of scale. The current model is based on relatively small biorefineries using locally-gathered feedstocks. Here, we examine the potential capacity of a hypothetically distributed, depot-based, biorefinery system to produce cellulosic ethanol from corn stover in the United States Midwest. The local depots serve to aggregate, pretreat and densify biomass (via pellets), which are collected, transported, and fed to a few very large, cellulosic ethanol biorefineries. We found that a corn stover-based depot system would help establish one or two very large-scale biorefineries capable of processing about 8-12% of total corn stover available in the United States Midwest. About 55-153 depots could supply the pretreated pellets to each distributed biorefinery leading to an annual production of 1.02 - 2.91 billion liters of cellulosic ethanol. Most of the participating depots would be located in Illinois and Iowa. The ethanol selling price in this depot-based biorefinery system would varys between U$S 0.67 and U$S 0.72 liter-1. The estimated range of GHG savings from cellulosic ethanol in the depot system compared to gasoline was 3.35-4.84 Tg CO2 year-1. In addition of being economically competitive, a distributed, depot-based, biorefinery system could meet the 60% GHG reduction requirement of the U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA).

Biorefinery, Cellulosic biofuel, Corn stover, Dist↗
DOE OSTI2021

Security Vulnerability and Mitigation in Photovoltaic Systems

Software and firmware vulnerabilities pose security threats to photovoltaic (PV) systems. When patches are not available or cannot be timely applied to fix vulnerabilities, it is important to mitigate vulnerabilities such that they cannot be exploited by attackers or their impacts will be limited when exploited. However, the vulnerability mitigation problem for PV systems has received little attention. This paper analyzes known security vulnerabilities in PV systems, proposes a multi-level mitigation framework and various mitigation strategies including neural network-based attack detection inside inverters, and develops a prototype system as a proof-of-concept for building vulnerability mitigation into PV system design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2017

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1987

Security for safety critical space borne systems

The Space Station contains safety critical computer software components in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3 of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA-Johnson Space Center.

Legrand, Sue↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Blue Team: Determining Operational Security Posture of Critical Systems and Networks

Emergence of Cybersecurity has increased the focus on security risks to Information Technology (IT) assets going beyond traditional Information Assurance (IA) concerns: More sophisticated threats have emerged from increasing sources as advanced hacker tools and techniques have emerged and proliferated to broaden the attack surface available across globally interconnected networks.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2019

Multi–LDAP Dynamic User Management Tool Utilizing Oracle Application Express and PL/SQL

A Center for Infrastructure Security Analysis (CISA) client system required support of multiple Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directories for multiple, varied user communities. The LDAP directories were all based upon different technologies, i.e., Microsoft Active Directory (AD), Microsoft Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (ADLDS), and Oracle Internet Directory (OID), depending on system setup, security requirements, and legacy software. Research revealed that PL/SQL provided the capability to execute dynamic PL/SQL and SQL blocks. The dynamic capabilities were utilized along with several configuration tables to provide an object-oriented, polymorphic-like behavior. This architecture was chosen so that a top-level application programming interface (API) could be defined for all calls, no matter what type of LDAP was being manipulated, as each LDAP type has slightly different attributes and requirements. The dynamic nature of the user management system allowed for easy setup and utilization of any new LDAP directories, minimizing the time and effort expended on system changes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Data-based and secure switched cyber–physical systems

In this work, we develop a completely model-free moving target defense framework for the detection and mitigation of sensor and/or actuator attacks in cyber–physical systems with dynamics that evolve in discrete-time. We incorporate an intrusion detection mechanism based on an approximate dynamic programming technique that learns the policies for optimal regulation and optimal tracking while simultaneously defending against actuator and sensor attacks in a model-free fashion. Switching rules are leveraged to force proactive and reactive defense mechanisms as well as, guarantee the stability of the equilibrium point. Finally, as a case study, we apply the proposed moving target defense framework to a DC–DC converter that is used in electric vehicles.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2013

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.

computer information security↗
NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

security↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Retrospective Analysis of Distributed Solar Interconnection Timelines and Related State Mandates

Most distributed residential photovoltaic (PV) systems must secure an interconnection agreement prior to operation that ensures the local electrical system will operate safely within the broader electrical grid. PV installers generally submit an interconnection application to the local utility that provides all the necessary details the utility needs to evaluate the proposed system. To encourage timely execution of this process, many states’ utility commissions have established mandates that limit the maximum number of days allowed for utility review and approval of interconnection for certain small, often residential applications. In this paper, we derive the median and range of cycle times for the pre-installation approval phase of the interconnection process (i.e., from application submission to approval by the utility) across 24 U.S. states, using a data set of approximately 170,000 projects. We evaluate the percentage of projects that are approved within respective state-mandated timelines from 2017– 2019. We further evaluate how timelines have evolved since 2012 for a subset of five states: Arizona, California, Colorado, New Jersey, and New York. The analyses are divided into two size ranges: systems that are ≤10 kilowatts (kW), and systems that are 11–50 kW.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS2015

Applying a Space-Based Security Recovery Scheme for Critical Homeland Security Cyberinfrastructure Utilizing the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) Based Space Network

Protection of the national infrastructure is a high priority for cybersecurity of the homeland. Critical infrastructure such as the national power grid, commercial financial networks, and communications networks have been successfully invaded and re-invaded from foreign and domestic attackers. The ability to re-establish authentication and confidentiality of the network participants via secure channels that have not been compromised would be an important countermeasure to compromise of our critical network infrastructure. This paper describes a concept of operations by which the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) constellation of spacecraft in conjunction with the White Sands Complex (WSC) Ground Station host a security recovery system for re-establishing secure network communications in the event of a national or regional cyberattack. Users would perform security and network restoral functions via a Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS) from the TDRS constellation. The BSS enrollment only requires that each network location have a receive antenna and satellite receiver. This would be no more complex than setting up a DIRECTTV-like receiver at each network location with separate network connectivity. A GEO BSS would allow a mass re-enrollment of network nodes (up to nationwide) simultaneously depending upon downlink characteristics. This paper details the spectrum requirements, link budget, notional assets and communications requirements for the scheme. It describes the architecture of such a system and the manner in which it leverages off of the existing secure infrastructure which is already in place and managed by the NASAGSFC Space Network Project.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2018

Design Considerations for Secure Wireless Sensor Communication Systems in Harsh Electromagnetic Environments of Nuclear Reactor Facilities

Wireless sensors can potentially play a significant role in safety, efficiency, and reliability of the instrumentation and control process in current and next generation nuclear power reactors. While conventional narrowband wireless sensors have shown a certain level of success in some nuclear power plants (NPPs), the radio frequency (RF) propagation challenges posed by the heavy metallic and cluttered environment of NPPs has prevented their widespread use in such operations. Furthermore, these challenges include RF wave propagation in harsh (reflective, absorptive, cluttered) environments, data security issues, and RF interference to and from other devices in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor core. In this paper, first we address how ultrawideband (UWB) RF technology can complement the narrowband (i.e., WiFi) solutions that have been used in some NPPs by providing an alternative solution in addressing the signal propagation issues in such electromagnetically harsh environments. Second, we discuss and present the UWB software simulation results on multipath harsh environments, and then address the data security issues. In the final sections of the paper, we present the experimental results of using UWB signaling in a representative harsh environment conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology research reactor site. We plan to develop the UWB communications hardware based on the results of this paper and report on its performance in the field with emphasis on the security aspects of the system in a subsequent paper.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Security of Mobile Radiological Sources: Overview of Industry Applied Technologies

Small radiological sources used in industrial settings recurrently require transit between job sites. Securing these sources, while stationary, can be addressed with standard security approaches and equipment. Transport of these sources increases the risk and complexity of managing and maintaining control of these sources. Implementing methodologies to securely monitor and locate sources improves response and resolution of anomalous events during transit. The Mobile Source Transit Security (MSTS) system was developed to improve security and provide situational awareness of these mobile sources throughout their job cycle. The MSTS development effort focused on creating a set of systems that could be successfully implemented in industrial radiography and well-logging applications. The MSTS team worked to address source presence and location through use and storage. The MSTS system monitors radiological sources as they move from the base of operations to the job site and back. The system provides near-real-time monitoring of the mobile source location and status and early notification of source loss or theft by transmitting operational status and alerting anomalous conditions over telematic links worldwide. The MSTS system can trigger an armed response or initiation of search and recovery operations and will automatically alert management and responsible staff if a radioactive source is lost or stolen whether it is on-site, in transport, or in storage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

A coupled human–natural system analysis of freshwater security under climate and population change

Limited water availability, population growth, and climate change have resulted in freshwater crises in many countries. Jordan’s situation is emblematic, compounded by conflict-induced population shocks. Integrating knowledge across hydrology, climatology, agriculture, political science, geography, and economics, we present the Jordan Water Model, a nationwide coupled human–natural-engineered systems model that is used to evaluate Jordan’s freshwater security under climate and socioeconomic changes. The complex systems model simulates the trajectory of Jordan’s water system, representing dynamic interactions between a hierarchy of actors and the natural and engineered water environment. A multiagent modeling approach enables the quantification of impacts at the level of thousands of representative agents across sectors, allowing for the evaluation of both systemwide and distributional outcomes translated into a suite of water-security metrics (vulnerability, equity, shortage duration, and economic well-being). Model results indicate severe, potentially destabilizing, declines in freshwater security. Per capita water availability decreases by approximately 50% by the end of the century. Without intervening measures, >90% of the low-income household population experiences critical insecurity by the end of the century, receiving <40 L per capita per day. Widening disparity in freshwater use, lengthening shortage durations, and declining economic welfare are prevalent across narratives. To gain a foothold on its freshwater future, Jordan must enact a sweeping portfolio of ambitious interventions that include large-scale desalinization and comprehensive water sector reform, with model results revealing exponential improvements in water security through the coordination of supply- and demand-side measures.

42 ENGINEERING↗