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NASA NTRS1992

Survival of epiphytic bacteria from seed stored on the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF)

Microbial contamination in American spacecraft has previously been documented, however, potential risks to plants and humans in future space based controlled ecological life support systems (CELSS) have yet to be addressed directly. The current study was designed to determine the survival of microorganisms exposed to the relatively harsh conditions found in low Earth orbit (LEO). Total mean dosage for flight and ground control seeds were 210.2 and 0.9 rads, respectively. Bacteria were isolated by plating samples of seedwashings onto dilute tryptic soy agar. Pure isolates of morphologically distinct bacteria were obtained by standard microbiological procedures. Bacteria were grouped according to colony type and preliminary identification was completed using a fatty acid analysis system. Bacillus spp. were the primary microorganisms that survived on seed during the experiment. Results support the hypothesis that terrestrial microorganisms can survive long periods of time in relatively harsh LEO environments.

Schuerger, Andrew C.↗

NASA NTRS1994

X-ray-provoked non-Mendelian transgenerational oncodeterminants

Cancer is the most important risk of radiation exposure. There is a definite lack of suitable test systems, human epidemiological data are only available for certain radiation types, especially not for charged particles. We use the Xiphophorus model which is genetically well characterized. As a prelude to experiments with heavy ions we report here on results obtained with x-rays to establish the necessary baseline for future studies. Apart from this direct aim we hope to obtain also a better insight in the genetical determination of cancer formation.

Anders, A.↗

NASA NTRS2002

In vitro cell irradiation systems based on 210Po alpha source: construction and characterisation

One way of studying the risk to human health of low-level radiation exposure is to make biological experiments on living cell cultures. Two 210Po alpha-particle emitting devices, with 0.5 and 100 MBq activity, were designed and constructed to perform such experiments irradiating monolayers of cells. Estimates of dose rate at the cell surface were obtained from measurements by a PIPS alpha-particle spectrometer and from calculations by the SRIM 2000, Monte Carlo charged particle transport code. Particle fluence area distributions were measured by solid state nuclear track detectors. The design and dosimetric characterisation of the devices are discussed. c2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Alpha Particles↗

NASA NTRS2001

2001 Research Reports NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

This document is a collection of technical reports on research conducted by the participants in the 2001 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Research areas are broad. Some of the topics addressed include: project management, space shuttle safety risks induced by human factor errors, body wearable computers as a feasible delivery system for 'work authorization documents', gas leak detection using remote sensing technologies, a history of the Kennedy Space Center, and design concepts for collabsible cyrogenic storage vessels.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2008

Validation of Procedures for Monitoring Crewmember Immune Function - Short Duration Biological Investigation

Validation of Procedures for Monitoring Crew Member Immune Function - Short Duration Biological Investigation (Integrated Immune-SDBI) will assess the clinical risks resulting from the adverse effects of space flight on the human immune system and will validate a flightcompatible immune monitoring strategy. Immune system changes will be monitored by collecting and analyzing blood, urine and saliva samples from crewmembers before, during and after space flight.

Sams, Clarence↗

NASA NTRS2012

Decision Gate Process for Assessment of a NASA Technology Development Portfolio

The NASA Dust Management Project (DMP) was established to provide technologies (to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6) required to address adverse effects of lunar dust to humans and to exploration systems and equipment, to reduce life cycle cost and risk, and to increase the probability of sustainable and successful lunar missions. The technology portfolio of DMP consisted of different categories of technologies whose final product was either a technology solution in itself, or one that contributes toward a dust mitigation strategy for a particular application. A Decision Gate Process (DGP) was developed to assess and validate the achievement and priority of the dust mitigation technologies as the technologies progress through the development cycle. The DGP was part of continuous technology assessment and was a critical element of DMP risk management. At the core of the process were technology-specific criteria developed to measure the success of each DMP technology in attaining the technology readiness levels assigned to each decision gate. The DGP accounts for both categories of technologies and qualifies the technology progression from technology development tasks to application areas. The process provided opportunities to validate performance, as well as to identify non-performance in time to adjust resources and direction. This paper describes the overall philosophy of the DGP and the methodology for implementation for DMP, and describes the method for defining the technology evaluation criteria. The process is illustrated by example of an application to a specific DMP technology.

Kohli, Rajiv↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Has ExMC Systems Engineering Been Up To Since Last IWS?

Long duration Lunar and Martian missions will change the way NASA currently practices medicine. The missions will require more autonomous capability compared to current low Earth orbit operations. For the medical system, lack of consumable resupply, evacuation opportunities, and real-time ground support are key drivers toward greater autonomy. Recognition of the limited mission and vehicle resources available to carry out exploration missions motivates the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element’s approach to enabling the necessary autonomy. This element promotes human health and performance in space by advancing medical systems design and risk-informed decision-making for long-duration deep-space exploration missions (LDEMs). ExMC is using system engineering processes and Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) tools to identify the user needs and requirements of LDEM medical systems. The MBSE approach to medical system design offers a paradigm shift toward greater integration between the vehicle and the medical system, and directly supports the transition of Earth-reliant International Space Station operations to the Earth-independent operations envisioned for LDEMs. This talk will provide a high-level overview of what the ExMC SE team has accomplished since the last IWS, an introduction to upcoming SE talks, and the ongoing systems engineering work.

K. McGuire↗

NASA NTRS2013

Human Spaceflight Technology Needs - A Foundation for JSC's Technology Strategy

Human space exploration has always been heavily influenced by goals to achieve a specific mission on a specific schedule. This approach drove rapid technology development, the rapidity of which adds risks as well as provides a major driver for costs and cost uncertainty. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is now approaching the extension of human presence throughout the solar system by balancing a proactive yet less schedule-driven development of technology with opportunistic scheduling of missions as the needed technologies are realized. This approach should provide cost effective, low risk technology development that will enable efficient and effective manned spaceflight missions. As a first step, the NASA Human Spaceflight Architecture Team (HAT) has identified a suite of critical technologies needed to support future manned missions across a range of destinations, including in cis-lunar space, near earth asteroid visits, lunar exploration, Mars moons, and Mars exploration. The challenge now is to develop a strategy and plan for technology development that efficiently enables these missions over a reasonable time period, without increasing technology development costs unnecessarily due to schedule pressure, and subsequently mitigating development and mission risks. NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC), as the nation s primary center for human exploration, is addressing this challenge through an innovative approach in allocating Internal Research and Development funding to projects. The HAT Technology Needs (TechNeeds) Database has been developed to correlate across critical technologies and the NASA Office of Chief Technologist Technology Area Breakdown Structure (TABS). The TechNeeds Database illuminates that many critical technologies may support a single technical capability gap, that many HAT technology needs may map to a single TABS technology discipline, and that a single HAT technology need may map to multiple TABS technology disciplines. The TechNeeds Database greatly clarifies understanding of the complex relationships of critical technologies to mission and architecture element needs. Extensions to the core TechNeeds Database allow JSC to factor in and appropriately weight JSC Center Core Technology Competencies, and considerations of Commercialization Potential and Partnership Potential. The inherent coupling among these, along with an appropriate importance weighting, has provided an initial prioritization for allocation of technology development research funding for JSC. The HAT Technology Needs Database, with a core of built-in reports, clarifies and communicates complex technology needs for cost effective human space exploration such that an organization seeking to assure that research prioritization supports human spaceflight of the future can be successful.

Stecklein, Jonette M.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Assessment and Management of the Risks of Debris Hits During Space Station EVAs

The risk of EVAs is critical to the decision of whether or not to automate a large part of the construction of the International Space Station (ISS). Furthermore, the choice of the technologies of the space suit and the life support system will determine (1) the immediate safety of these operations, and (2) the long-run costs and risks of human presence in space, not only in lower orbit (as is the case of the ISS) but also perhaps, outside these orbits, or on the surface of other planets. The problem is therefore both an immediate one and a long-term one. The fundamental question is how and when to shift from the existing EMU system (suit, helmet, gloves and life support system) to another type (e.g. a hard suit), given the potential trade-offs among life-cycle costs, risks to the astronauts, performance of tasks, and uncertainties about new systems' safety inherent to such a shift in technology. A more immediate issue is how to manage the risks of EVAs during the construction and operation of the ISS in order to make the astronauts (in the words of the NASA Administrator) "as safe outside as inside". For the moment (June 1997), the plan is to construct the Space Station using the low-pressure space suits that have been developed for the space shuttle. In the following, we will refer to this suit assembly as EMU (External Maneuvering Unit). It is the product of a long evolution, starting from the U.S. Air Force pilot suits through the various versions and changes that occurred for the purpose of NASA space exploration, in particular during the Gemini and the Apollo programs. The Shuttle EMU is composed of both soft fabrics and hard plates. As an alternative to the shuttle suit, at least two hard suits were developed by NASA: the AX5 and the MRKIII. The problem of producing hard suits for space exploration is very similar to that of producing deep-sea diving suits. There was thus an opportunity to develop a suit that could be manufactured for both purposes with the economies of scale that could be gained from a two-branch manufacturing line (space and deep sea). Of course, the space suit would need to be space qualified. Some of the problems in adopting one of the hard suits were first that the testing had to be completed, and second that it required additional storage space. The decision was made not to develop a hard suit in time for the construction and operation of the ISS. Instead, to improve the safety of the current suit, it was decided to reinforce the soft parts of the shuttle EMU with KEVLAR linings to strengthen it against debris impacts. Test results, however, show that this advanced suit design has little effect on the penetration characteristics.

Pate-Cornell, Elisabeth↗

NASA NTRS2024

Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events

This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.

SLS↗

NASA NTRS1994

Mission operations and command assurance: Flight operations quality improvements

Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM) task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission operations. From a system engineering view, MO&CA facilitates communication and problem-solving among flight teams and provides continuous solving among flight teams and provides continuous process improvement to reduce risk in mission operations by addressing human factors. The MO&CA task has evolved from participating as a member of the spacecraft team, to an independent team reporting directly to flight project management and providing system level assurance. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.

Welz, Linda L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Comparison of ARTEMIS Data with the Lunar Plasma Design Environment for NASA Crewed Missions

NASA’s Gateway will provide the capability for sustaining a human presence in cis-lunar space. Operations of the Gateway will include spacecraft dockings, extra vehicular activities (EVA), and high-power solar arrays. NASA’s experience with the International Space Station highlighted the importance of evaluating spacecraft charging effects for such operations. For crewed spacecraft, which tend to employ the use of dielectric surfaces in this dynamic plasma environment, reliance on spacecraft charging simulation packages, such as the NASA/Air Force Spacecraft Charging Analyzer Program (Nascap-2k) [Mandell et al., 2006] and Spacecraft Plasma Interaction System (SPIS) [Roussel et al., 2008], is required to understand the risks to hardware and humans. The variability in the lunar plasma environment as the Moon revolves around the Earth, lunar wake effects, and a strong dependency on photoemission and secondary electron emission creates challenges for spacecraft charging analysis. The Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) [NASA, MSFC] is the primary resource for space environments affecting NASA’s crewed missions, and the DSNE provides plasma environments in a standard form for input into simulation packages. NASA developed the existing lunar plasma environment using data from Geotail [Nishida, 1994] along with published lunar plasma wake models [Halekas et al., 2005] based on Lunar Prospector. Since 2011, NASA’s twin Acceleration Reconnection Turbulence & Electrodynamics of Moon’s Interaction with the Sun (ARTEMIS) satellites [Angelopoulos, 2010] have been collecting high resolution plasma and fields observations within the lunar plasma environment providing a much larger dataset of the plasma properties in cislunar space. This research compares the existing lunar plasma environment definition with ARTEMIS data and makes recommendations on the refinement of the environment definition for future lunar missions.

ARTEMIS mission↗

NASA NTRS2023

A Pilot Project for Quantifying the Effect of Medical Provider Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities on Outcomes for Spaceflight Using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool

In order to enable the future of long-duration deep space exploration we must confront the uncertainty in medical risk. Limitations of communication, resupply, and evacuation in deep space will require a high degree of crew autonomy and accurate risk assessment will be critical to ensure adequate crew training and medical system design. To address this, NASA’s Human Research Program Exploration Medical Capability Element has developed the Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces Tool (IMPACT). IMPACT is a suite of tools that can provide evidence-based, data-driven trade space assessments between available medical resources in the mass- and volume-constrained environment of a deep space exploration vehicle. In the current model, medical conditions either can or cannot be treated based on the availability of medical system resources and equipment. However, medical outcomes often depend just as much on the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) of the provider operating the system. This paper presents a method for modeling and quantifying the effect of medical officer KSA on medically relevant mission risk outcomes during spaceflight.

capabilities↗

NASA NTRS2022

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

NASA NTRS2007

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗

NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Moving Beyond Apollo: Vacuum Ground Testing to Reduce Plume-Surface Interaction Risks to Lunar Landers

NASA’s Artemis Program will return humans to the surface of the Moon for the first time since Apollo using the Human Landing System (HLS). Plume-surface interactions (PSI) pose a potential hazard to all propulsive landing vehicles and future nearby assets that will be part of a sustained lunar architecture. Risks due to uncertainty in PSI predictions have challenged lunar landers since the 1960s, and understanding these phenomena further remains critical to enabling NASA’s lunar exploration goals. To this end, the HLS Program has funded a risk reduction ground test to obtain data relevant for application to environments produced by large landing systems. New data are needed to understand PSI and effects with the potential to differ from those experienced by the Apollo landers. This presentation will discuss the test concept, facility, research goals, methods, and planned data products.

Moon↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Analysis of Exploration Capability Gaps for Future Habitation Systems to Inform Risk Assessment and Development Priorities

Within NASA, exploration capability gaps are defined as the difference between the current state-of-the-art in capabilities and the anticipated needs of future human spaceflight architectures. As NASA and its partners’ capabilities for human exploration of deep space continue to mature, it is necessary to understand the capability gaps that require closure to support future habitation systems, such as the Lunar Surface Habitat (SH) and Mars Transit Habitat (TH) currently in concept development. This paper will identify high-priority capability gaps for exploration habitation and show potential options for gap closure through investment in technology, development, and testing. High-priority capability gaps are divided into the following general taxonomy areas: human health/life support/habitation systems, flight computing and avionics, power and energy storage, communications and navigation, thermal management systems, human exploration destination systems, autonomous systems, sensors and instruments, GNC (guidance, navigation, and control), robotic systems, ground and uncrewed surface systems, and materials/structures/mechanical systems/manufacturing. In the gap identification process, teams of discipline experts from across NASA reviewed the latest habitation architecture needs against current capabilities to understand where gaps may exist. The results of the assessment established a basis for the current state-of-the-art within each gap and identified the capability needs of the proposed exploration missions the gap links to. An assessment of how each test platform (e.g., Ground, International Space Station (ISS), Commercial Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Destinations, Gateway) may be leveraged to mature capabilities and potentially provide a route to gap closure will be discussed. The notional timeline for gap closure to support reference missions and impacts to overall schedule are also assessed where appropriate. Based on the capability gap analysis described above, the paper summarizes important technology maturation considerations for human exploration architectures, with a focus on the Mars TH. The previously published NASA habitation ground rules and assumptions document is used as the basis to classify gaps as enabling, enhancing, or “push” opportunities for a particular architecture. Stepwise technology maturation plans/considerations are presented for some selected critical gaps. Overall, the analysis in this paper is intended to help influence development priorities for habitation systems, where high-priority, critical gaps are those currently assessed as having a low probability of closure by the anticipated need date. Capability gap analysis also informs the risk register for exploration habitation systems and mitigation strategies to ensure readiness of key technologies to support future mission timelines. Linkage between capability gaps for Moon and Mars is noted, as closure of a gap at a Lunar destination may subsequently enable or enhance Mars TH architectures.

technology development↗