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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 343 records · Page 19
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NASA NTRS1992

Phase III Integrated Water Recovery Testing at MSFC - Closed hygiene and potable loop test results and lesson learned

A series of tests has been conducted at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to evaluate the performance of a Space Station Freedom (SSF) pre-development water recovery system. Potable, hygiene, and urine reclamation subsystems were integrated with end-use equipment items and successfully operated for a total of 35 days, including 23 days in closed-loop mode with man-in-the-loop. Although several significant subsystem physical anomalies were encountered, reclaimed potable and hygiene water routinely met current SSF water quality specifications. This paper summarizes the test objectives, system design, test activities/protocols, significant results/anomalies, and major lessons learned.

Holder, Donald W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1992

STGT program: Ada coding and architecture lessons learned

STGT (Second TDRSS Ground Terminal) is currently halfway through the System Integration Test phase (Level 4 Testing). To date, many software architecture and Ada language issues have been encountered and solved. This paper, which is the transcript of a presentation at the 3 Dec. meeting, attempts to define these lessons plus others learned regarding software project management and risk management issues, training, performance, reuse, and reliability. Observations are included regarding the use of particular Ada coding constructs, software architecture trade-offs during the prototyping, development and testing stages of the project, and dangers inherent in parallel or concurrent systems, software, hardware, and operations engineering.

Usavage, Paul↗
NASA NTRS1993

Five biomedical experiments flown in an Earth orbiting laboratory: Lessons learned from developing these experiments on the first international microgravity mission from concept to landing

There are numerous problems associated with accommodating complex biological systems in microgravity in the flexible laboratory systems installed in the Orbiter cargo bay. This presentation will focus upon some of the lessons learned along the way from the University laboratory to the IML-1 Microgravity Laboratory. The First International Microgravity Laboratory (IML-1) mission contained a large number of specimens, including: 72 million nematodes, US-1; 3 billion yeast cells, US-2; 32 million mouse limb-bud cells, US-3; and 540 oat seeds (96 planted), FOTRAN. All five of the experiments had to undergo significant redevelopment effort in order to allow the investigator's ideas and objectives to be accommodated within the constraints of the IML-1 mission. Each of these experiments were proposed as unique entities rather than part of the mission, and many procedures had to be modified from the laboratory practice to meet IML-1 constraints. After a proposal is accepted by NASA for definition, an interactive process is begun between the Principal Investigator and the developer to ensure a maximum science return. The success of the five SLSPO-managed experiments was the result of successful completion of all preflight biological testing and hardware verification finalized at the KSC Life Sciences Support Facility housed in Hangar L. The ESTEC Biorack facility housed three U.S. experiments (US-1, US-2, and US-3). The U.S. Gravitational Plant Physiology Facility housed GTHRES and FOTRAN. The IML-1 mission (launched from KSC on 22 Jan. 1992, and landed at Dryden Flight Research Facility on 30 Jan. 1992) was an outstanding success--close to 100 percent of the prelaunch anticipated science return was achieved and, in some cases, greater than 100 percent was achieved (because of an extra mission day).

Winget, C. M.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Kennedy Space Center's NASA/Contractor Team-Centered Total Quality Management Seminar: Results, methods, and lessons learned

It is apparent to everyone associated with the Nation's aeronautics and space programs that the challenge of continuous improvement can be reasonably addressed only if NASA and its contractors act together in a fully integrated and cooperative manner that transcends the traditional boundaries of proprietary interest. It is, however, one thing to assent to the need for such integration and cooperation; it is quite another thing to undertake the hard tasks of turning such a need into action. Whatever else total quality management is, it is fundamentally a team-centered and team-driven process of continuous improvement. The introduction of total quality management at KSC, therefore, has given the Center a special opportunity to translate the need for closer integration and cooperation among all its organizations into specific initiatives. One such initiative that NASA and its contractors have undertaken at KSC is a NASA/Contractor team-centered Total Quality Management Seminar. It is this seminar which is the subject of this paper. The specific purposes of this paper are to describe the following: Background, development, and evolution of Kennedy Space Center's Total Quality Management Seminar; Special characteristics of the seminar; Content of the seminar; Meaning and utility of a team-centered design for TQM training; Results of the seminar; Use that one KSC contractor, EG&G Florida, Inc. has made of the seminar in its Total Quality Management initiative; and Lessons learned.

Kinlaw, Dennis C.↗
NASA NTRS1993

User observations on information sharing (corporate knowledge and lessons learned)

The sharing of 'corporate knowledge' and lessons learned in the NASA aerospace community has been identified by Johnson Space Center survey participants as a desirable tool. The concept of the program is based on creating a user friendly information system that will allow engineers, scientists, and managers at all working levels to share their information and experiences with other users irrespective of location or organization. The survey addresses potential end uses for such a system and offers some guidance on the development of subsequent processes to ensure the integrity of the information shared. This system concept will promote sharing of information between NASA centers, between NASA and its contractors, between NASA and other government agencies, and perhaps between NASA and institutions of higher learning.

Montague, Ronald A.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Magellan spacecraft and memory state tracking: Lessons learned, future thoughts

Numerous studies have been dedicated to improving the two main elements of Spacecraft Mission Operations: Command and Telemetry. As a result, not much attention has been given to other tasks that can become tedious, repetitive, and error prone. One such task is Spacecraft and Memory State Tracking, the process by which the status of critical spacecraft components, parameters, and the contents of on-board memory are managed on the ground to maintain knowledge of spacecraft and memory states for future testing, anomaly investigation, and on-board memory reconstruction. The task of Spacecraft and Memory State Tracking has traditionally been a manual task allocated to Mission Operations Procedures. During nominal Mission Operations this job is tedious and error prone. Because the task is not complex and can be accomplished manually, the worth of a sophisticated software tool is often questioned. However, in the event of an anomaly which alters spacecraft components autonomously or a memory anomaly such as a corrupt memory or flight software error, an accurate ground image that can be reconstructed quickly is a priceless commodity. This study explores the process of Spacecraft and Memory State Tracking used by the Magellan Spacecraft Team highlighting its strengths as well as identifying lessons learned during the primary and extended missions, two memory anomalies, and other hardships encountered due to incomplete knowledge of spacecraft states. Ideas for future state tracking tools that require minimal user interaction and are integrated into the Ground Data System will also be discussed.

Bucher, Allen W.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Synthetic vision system flight test results and lessons learned

Honeywell Systems and Research Center developed and demonstrated an active 35 GHz Radar Imaging system as part of the FAA/USAF/Industry sponsored Synthetic Vision System Technology Demonstration (SVSTD) Program. The objectives of this presentation are to provide a general overview of flight test results, a system level perspective that encompasses the efforts of the SVSTD and Augmented VIsual Display (AVID) programs, and more importantly, provide the AVID workshop participants with Honeywell's perspective on the lessons that were learned from the SVS flight tests. One objective of the SVSTD program was to explore several known system issues concerning radar imaging technology. The program ultimately resolved some of these issues, left others open, and in fact created several new concerns. In some instances, the interested community has drawn improper conclusions from the program by globally attributing implementation specific issues to radar imaging technology in general. The motivation for this presentation is therefore to provide AVID researchers with a better understanding of the issues that truly remain open, and to identify the perceived issues that are either resolved or were specific to Honeywell's implementation.

Radke, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS1994

Lessons learned from selecting and testing spaceflight potentiometers

A solar array drive (SAD) was designed for operation on the TOPEX/POSEIDON spacecraft that was launched in August, 1992. The experience gained in selecting, specifying, testing to failure, and redesigning its position sensor produced valuable lessons for future component selection and qualification. Issues of spaceflight heritage, cost/benefit/risk assessment, and component specification are addressed. It was found that costly schedule and budget overruns may have been avoided if the capability of the candidate sensors to meet requirements had been more critically examined prior to freezing the design. The use of engineering models and early qualification tests is also recommended.

Iskenderian, T.↗
NASA NTRS1994

X-29 flight control system: Lessons learned

Two X-29A aircraft were flown at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center over a period of eight years. The airplanes' unique features are the forward-swept wing, variable incidence close-coupled canard and highly relaxed longitudinal static stability (up to 35-percent negative static margin at subsonic conditions). This paper describes the primary flight control system and significant modifications made to this system, flight test techniques used during envelope expansion, and results for the low- and high-angle-of-attack programs. Through out the paper, lessons learned will be discussed to illustrate the problems associated with the implementation of complex flight control systems.

Clarke, Robert↗
NASA NTRS1993

Profile of NASA software engineering: Lessons learned from building the baseline

It is critically important in any improvement activity to first understand the organization's current status, strengths, and weaknesses and, only after that understanding is achieved, examine and implement promising improvements. This fundamental rule is certainly true for an organization seeking to further its software viability and effectiveness. This paper addresses the role of the organizational process baseline in a software improvement effort and the lessons we learned assembling such an understanding for NASA overall and for the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in particular. We discuss important, core data that must be captured and contrast that with our experience in actually finding such information. Our baselining efforts have evolved into a set of data gathering, analysis, and crosschecking techniques and information presentation formats that may prove useful to others seeking to establish similar baselines for their organization.

Hall, Dana↗
NASA NTRS1994

An overview of the EOSDIS V0 information management system: Lessons learned from the implementation of a distributed data system

The EOSDIS Version 0 system, released in July, 1994, is a working prototype of a distributed data system. One of the purposes of the V0 project is to take several existing data systems and coordinate them into one system while maintaining the independent nature of the original systems. The project is a learning experience and the lessons are being passed on to the architects of the system which will distribute the data received from the planned EOS satellites. In the V0 system, the data resides on heterogeneous systems across the globe but users are presented with a single, integrated interface. This interface allows users to query the participating data centers based on a wide set of criteria. Because this system is a prototype, we used many novel approaches in trying to connect a diverse group of users with the huge amount of available data. Some of these methods worked and others did not. Now that V0 has been released to the public, we can look back at the design and implementation of the system and also consider some possible future directions for the next generation of EOSDIS.

Ryan, Patrick M.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Composite chronicles: A study of the lessons learned in the development, production, and service of composite structures

A study of past composite aircraft structures programs was conducted to determine the lessons learned during the programs. The study focused on finding major underlying principles and practices that experience showed have significant effects on the development process and should be recognized and understood by those responsible for using of composites. Published information on programs was reviewed and interviews were conducted with personnel associated with current and past major development programs. In all, interviews were conducted with about 56 people representing 32 organizations. Most of the people interviewed have been involved in the engineering and manufacturing development of composites for the past 20 to 25 years. Although composites technology has made great advances over the past 30 years, the effective application of composites to aircraft is still a complex problem that requires experienced personnel with special knowledge. All disciplines involved in the development process must work together in real time to minimize risk and assure total product quality and performance at acceptable costs. The most successful programs have made effective use of integrated, collocated, concurrent engineering teams, and most often used well-planned, systematic development efforts wherein the design and manufacturing processes are validated in a step-by-step or 'building block' approach. Such approaches reduce program risk and are cost effective.

Vosteen, Louis F.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Lessons learned supporting onboard solid-state recorders

With the advance of semiconductor technology, Solid-State Recorders (SSR) have matured and been accepted as primary onboard data storage devices. Their high reliability, simpler interface and control, and high flexibility have made the SSR's a superb choice in today's spacecraft design. While there are many benefits, the use of SSR's may also add significant complexity to ground data systems. For instance, real-time and playback data may be interleaved into the same data stream, making data sequencing and time ordering difficult. Stored data may be played back out of time order, increasing processing load significantly. Data may also be played back after being sorted by Virtual Channels in the SSR, potentially creating bursts in packet rates that exceed the real-time processing capabilities of the ground systems. This paper presents a summary of lessons learned through the efforts in supporting a number of NASA's missions that employ SSR's. It describes various problems encountered through the design process, and their potential impact on ground system performance, resources, and cost. Recommended approaches to minimizing the impact are demonstrated by examples. The discussion leads to the conclusion that the use of SSR's demands an even higher level of cooperation between spacecraft and ground system designers in order to build the most cost effective end-to-end system.

Shi, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS1994

Customizing the JPL Multimission Ground Data System: Lessons learned

The Multimission Ground Data System (MGDS) at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory has brought improvements and new technologies to mission operations. It was designed as a generic data system to meet the needs of multiple missions and avoid re-inventing capabilities for each new mission and thus reduce costs. It is based on adaptable tools that can be customized to support different missions and operations scenarios. The MGDS is based on a distributed client/server architecture, with powerful Unix workstations, incorporating standards and open system architectures. The distributed architecture allows remote operations and user science data exchange, while also providing capabilities for centralized ground system monitor and control. The MGDS has proved its capabilities in supporting multiple large-class missions simultaneously, including the Voyager, Galileo, Magellan, Ulysses, and Mars Observer missions. The Operations Engineering Lab (OEL) at JPL has been leading Customer Adaptation Training (CAT) teams for adapting and customizing MGDS for the various operations and engineering teams. These CAT teams have typically consisted of only a few engineers who are familiar with operations and with the MGDS software and architecture. Our experience has provided a unique opportunity to work directly with the spacecraft and instrument operations teams and understand their requirements and how the MGDS can be adapted and customized to minimize their operations costs. As part of this work, we have developed workstation configurations, automation tools, and integrated user interfaces at minimal cost that have significantly improved productivity. We have also proved that these customized data systems are most successful if they are focused on the people and the tasks they perform and if they are based upon user confidence in the development team resulting from daily interactions. This paper will describe lessons learned in adapting JPL's MGDS to fly the Voyager, Galileo, and Mars Observer missions. We will explain how powerful, existing ground data systems can be adapted and packaged in a cost effective way for operations of small and large planetary missions. We will also describe how the MGDS was adapted to support operations within the Galileo Spacecraft Testbed. The Galileo testbed provided a unique opportunity to adapt MGDS to support command and control operations for a small autonomous operations team of a handful of engineers flying the Galileo Spacecraft flight system model.

Murphy, Susan C.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Lessons learned from the introduction of autonomous monitoring to the EUVE science operations center

The University of California at Berkeley's (UCB) Center for Extreme Ultraviolet Astrophysics (CEA), in conjunction with NASA's Ames Research Center (ARC), has implemented an autonomous monitoring system in the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) science operations center (ESOC). The implementation was driven by a need to reduce operations costs and has allowed the ESOC to move from continuous, three-shift, human-tended monitoring of the science payload to a one-shift operation in which the off shifts are monitored by an autonomous anomaly detection system. This system includes Eworks, an artificial intelligence (AI) payload telemetry monitoring package based on RTworks, and Epage, an automatic paging system to notify ESOC personnel of detected anomalies. In this age of shrinking NASA budgets, the lessons learned on the EUVE project are useful to other NASA missions looking for ways to reduce their operations budgets. The process of knowledge capture, from the payload controllers for implementation in an expert system, is directly applicable to any mission considering a transition to autonomous monitoring in their control center. The collaboration with ARC demonstrates how a project with limited programming resources can expand the breadth of its goals without incurring the high cost of hiring additional, dedicated programmers. This dispersal of expertise across NASA centers allows future missions to easily access experts for collaborative efforts of their own. Even the criterion used to choose an expert system has widespread impacts on the implementation, including the completion time and the final cost. In this paper we discuss, from inception to completion, the areas where our experiences in moving from three shifts to one shift may offer insights for other NASA missions.

Lewis, M.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Lessons learned in deploying software estimation technology and tools

Developing a software product involves estimating various project parameters. This is typically done in the planning stages of the project when there is much uncertainty and very little information. Coming up with accurate estimates of effort, cost, schedule, and reliability is a critical problem faced by all software project managers. The use of estimation models and commercially available tools in conjunction with the best bottom-up estimates of software-development experts enhances the ability of a product development group to derive reasonable estimates of important project parameters. This paper describes the experience of the IBM Software Solutions (SWS) Toronto Laboratory in selecting software estimation models and tools and deploying their use to the laboratory's product development groups. It introduces the SLIM and COSTAR products, the software estimation tools selected for deployment to the product areas, and discusses the rationale for their selection. The paper also describes the mechanisms used for technology injection and tool deployment, and concludes with a discussion of important lessons learned in the technology and tool insertion process.

Panlilio-Yap, Nikki↗
NASA NTRS1993

Phase 3 integrated water recovery testing at MSFC: Single loop test results and lessons learned

A series of tests has been conducted at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to evaluate the performance of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) water recovery system. Potable and urine reclamation processors were integrated with waste water generation equipment and sucessfully operated for a total of 144 days. This testing marked the first occasion in which the waste feed sources for the previous potable and hygiene loops were combined into a single loop and processed to potable water quality. Reclaimed potable water from the combined waste waters routinely met the SSF water quality specifications.In the last stage of testing, data was obtained that indicated that the water processor (WP) presterilizer may not be required to meet the potable water quality specification. The removal of the presterilizer from the Water Processor design would provide a significant power savings, though an increase in the residence time of the catalytic oxidation reactor may be required to meet the potable microbial and total Organic Carbon specifications. This paper summarizes the test objectives, system design, test activities/protocols, significant results/anomalies and major lessons learned.

Carter, Donald Layne↗
NASA NTRS1995

Space Mechanisms Lessons Learned Study. Volume 1: Summary

Hundreds of satellites have been launched to date. Some have operated extremely well and others have not. In order to learn from past operating experiences, a study was conducted to determine the conditions under which space mechanisms (mechanically moving components) have previously worked or failed. The study consisted of: (1) an extensive literature review that included both government contractor reports and technical journals; (2) communication and visits (when necessary) to the various NASA and DOD centers and their designated contractors (this included contact with project managers of current and prior NASA satellite programs as well as their industry counterparts); (3) requests for unpublished information to NASA and industry; and (4) a mail survey designed to acquire specific mechanism experience. The information obtained has been organized into two volumes. Volume 1 provides a summary of the lessons learned, the results of a needs analysis, responses to the mail survey, a listing of experts, a description of some available facilities and a compilation of references. Volume 2 contains a compilation of the literature review synopsis.

Shapiro, Wilbur↗