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326 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Combined Cycle Integrated Thermal Energy Storage “CiTES” (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The Phase I of this project confirmed the technical feasibility of a Combined Cycle integrated Thermal Energy Storage “CiTES” system, calculated the key performance parameters like power efficiency and costs, and proved its commercial value with full-year simulations for several US electricity markets with high degree of variable renewable generation and volatile hourly electricity prices. The core element of this project is the Electro Thermal Energy Storage (ETES) technology from Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy GmbH, using thermally stable and inexpensive volcanic rocks as storage material and air as heat transfer medium. This technology is backed by more than 10 years of experience and a 440MMBTU (130MWh-th) pilot plant in Hamburg, Germany, which is in operation since 2019. The integration of this thermal storage in an existing combined cycle power plant (CCPP) is typical power plant technology without any major technology risks. It allows the storage of inexpensive renewable energy during times of surplus renewable generation and the discharge of this energy in times of high energy demand when the fossil plant is in operation. This supplements the fossil power generation with CO2-emission-free energy. The secondary effect of the CiTES system is that a small part of the stored thermal energy is used to keep the heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) and steam turbine (ST) of the combined cycle power plant in hot and ready-to-start condition. This enables the plant to start rapidly when fossil generation is required to satisfy demand as soon variable generation drops off in the evenings or during cloud cover and calm wind periods. Without pre-warming of the HRSG and ST, the CCPP would need several hours for a cold or warm start, burn a lot of gas and release high NOx emissions during start and wouldn’t be able to use the short times of high energy prices in an efficient or economical manner. The economic parameters of CiTES were determined by a full year “8760” simulation using a data set calculation for each of the hours of the year, and historical electricity and gas prices. For consistency, the simulations were focused on the pre-COVID year 2019. The financially most attractive markets were in the Energy Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) region, which allowed substantial value generation with arbitrage (charge with cheap energy during renewable surplus times and discharge when energy is needed and expensive). The improvement of flexibility with the CiTES system by pre-heating and warm-keeping of the CCPP allowed for additional power generation during short time periods when demand is high but renewable generation is down; when the hourly energy prices are highest in these markets. The simulations are based on 2019 data, when ERCOT had 27GW of installed photovoltaic (PV) and wind generation. They showed that the created revenue with the prototypically sized CiTES system of 1,000MMBTU (300MWh-th) falls a little bit short of what is expected from a commercially viable investment. The system has optimization opportunities for cost reduction and increased effectiveness which will be realized during a potential Phase II Pre-FEED study following this project. Furthermore, it is safe to assume that a lot of renewable generation capacity will be added all over the US in the coming years. As an example, ERCOT is predicting to more than double its renewable generation from 27GW in 2019 to a forecasted 63GW in 2023. This will increase the amount of renewable overproduction exponentially. This rapid increase of local overproduction and the need to curtail renewable generation is well documented by the California ISO (www.CAISO.com / managing oversupply). However, the simulations also revealed a weakness in the structure of the electricity markets in the US. More specifically, when electricity prices are very low and approaching negative levels, the owners of Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) will curtail a part of their facility to stabilize the price by reducing supply. This results in a situation in which storage facilities, which are integrated in existing fossil assets and don’t have the behind-the-meter benefit of a VRE, won’t be able to purchase low cost – otherwise curtailed – renewable energy off the grid. A special tariff, which motivates VRE owners to sell otherwise curtailed renewable energy to storage facilities (Hydrogen, thermal, pumped hydro, etc.) can solve this issue. The implementation of such a regulating tariff by Independent System Operators, thus avoiding renewable curtailment, is a pre condition for successful commercialization for renewable energy storage technologies. With this advancement of design and technology and improvements in the market environment, it can be expected that the Combined Cycle integrated Thermal Energy Storage proves itself as an important innovation to keep highly efficient, natural gas-based power generation economically successful and relevant for the power industry in the United States of America.

Wolf, Thorsten↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗