SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The present paper describes author's work in the field of teleoperated equipment for inspection and maintenance of the RBML technological channels and graphite laying, emergency operations. New technological and design solutions of teleoperated robotic systems developed for Leningradsky Power Plant are discussed.
Orbital observations have detected the phyllosilicate smectite in layered material hundreds of meters thick, intracrater depositional fans, and plains sediments on Mars; however, the detection of carbonate deposits is limited. Instead of neutral/alkaline conditions during the Noachian, early Mars may have experienced mildly acidic conditions derived from volcanic acid-sulfate solutions that allowed Fe/Mg smectite formation but prevented widespread carbonate formation. The detection of acid sulfates (e.g., jarosite) associated with smectite in Mawrth Vallis supports this hypothesis. Previous work demonstrated smectite (saponite) formation in closed hydrologic systems (batch reactor) from basaltic glass at pH 4 and 200°C (Peretyazhko et al., 2016 GCA). This work presents results from alteration of basaltic glass from alkaline to acidic conditions in open hydrologic systems (flow-through reactor). Preliminary experiments exposed basaltic glass to deionized water at 190°C at 0.25 ml/min where solution pH equilibrated to 9.5. These initial high pH experiments were conducted to evaluate the flow-through reactor system before working with lower pHs. Smectite at this pH was not produced and instead X-ray diffraction results consistent with serpentine was detected. Experiments are in progress exposing basaltic glass from pH 8 down to pH 3 to determine what range of pHs could allow for smectite formation in this experimental opensystem. The production of smectite under an experimental open-system at low pHs if successful, would support a significant paradigm shift regarding the geochemical evolution of early Mars: Early Mars geochemical solutions were mildly acidic, not neutral/alkaline. This could have profound implications regarding early martain microbiology where acid conditions instead of neutral/alkaline conditions will require further research in terrestrial analogs to address the potential for biosignature preservation on Mars.
Irradiation experiments are a prerequisite for evaluating nuclear reactor system designs, analyzing the performance of these systems, and obtaining licenses. Likewise, irradiation facilities are necessary for producing the radioisotopes used in industrial and medical applications. Recent developments in modeling and simulation capabilities and advancements in computational resources have further enabled the design of irradiation experiments for evaluating radiation-induced phenomena and determining nuclear fuel, material, and system design and safety criteria pertaining to both normal and accident scenarios. These computational tools and models require comprehensive experimental datasets acquired under prototypic radiation conditions—for exploring material and system performance under the uniquely harsh environments found in nuclear reactors—to enable verification and validation for qualification and licensing purposes. However, qualification of irradiation experimental facilities, primarily research and test reactors (RTRs), necessitates that their performance be evaluated based on the irradiation environment (e.g. flux, power, testing capabilities) using an appropriate scoring matrix. Although many university campus RTRs are available for research and development (R&D) activities and initiatives, this study focuses on evaluating and qualifying the irradiation facilities (mostly RTRs) within the United States that are suitable for advanced nuclear fuel, material, and system irradiation experiments aimed at establishing operational-performance limits and informing component and fuel designs so as to improve operational efficiencies and mitigate proliferation vulnerabilities, as well as for radioisotope production aimed at multipurpose applications. As a result, the findings of the present study support the acceleration of nuclear fuel and material qualifications, thus hastening new and advanced nuclear energy system demonstrations and radioisotope production efforts by using extended R&D.
Space nuclear propulsion systems are capable of enabling future crewed missions to Mars. Two primary options of these systems exist: nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) and nuclear electric propulsion (NEP). NTP systems use a reactor as a heat exchanger to heat a hydrogen propellant to produce high specific impulse (≥ 900 s) and thrust (10 - 100 klbf). A NTP materials challenge is development of nuclear fuel capable of operating for short durations (hours) under high power densities (≥ 5 MW/L) and temperatures (> 2700 K) in a corrosive hydrogen environment. In NEP systems, the reactor heats a working fluid which transfers heat to a power conversion system to power electric thrusters. NEP is capable of higher specific impulse (≥ 2000 s) but limited to low thrust (10s lbf). Light weight vessel and in-core structural materials that are radiation-resistant, creep-resistant, and dimensionally stable while operating at ~1500 K over mission times up to several years are needed for NEP. Both systems can benefit from high temperature neutron moderators. Through the Space Nuclear Propulsion project, NASA, supported by the DOE, is developing NTP and NEP systems. Technology maturation planning and risk reduction activities related to fabrication and testing of reactor material candidates is ongoing. This presentation overviews NTP and NEP materials needs and current ceramic and composite development activities.
It is pointed out that the energy needs of spacecraft over the last 25 years have been met by photovoltaic arrays with batteries, primary fuel cells, and radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG). However, it might be difficult to satisfy energy requirements for the next generation of space missions with the currently used energy sources. Applications studies have emphasized the need for a lighter, cheaper, and more compact high-energy source than the scaling up of current technologies would permit. These requirements could be satisfied by a nuclear reactor power system. The joint NASA/DOD/DOE SP-100 program is to explore and evaluate this option. Critical elements of the technology are also to be developed, taking into account space reactor systems of the 100 kW class. The present paper is concerned with some of the civil mission categories and concepts which are enabled or significantly enhanced by the performance characteristics of a nuclear reactor energy system.
Not Available
Not provided.
Template is a requirement of the funding source
Nuclear reactor/thermoelectric power system design for manned orbiting space station, discussing station integration and operation
The feasibility of using Brayton power systems for nuclear electric spacecraft was investigated. The primary performance parameters of systems mass and radiator area were determined for systems from 100 to 1000 kW sub e. Mathematical models of all system components were used to determine masses and volumes. Two completely independent systems provide propulsion power so that no single-point failure can jeopardize a mission. The waste heat radiators utilize armored heat pipes to limit meteorite puncture. The armor thickness was statistically determined to achieve the required probability of survival. A 400 kW sub e reference system received primary attention as required by the contract. The components of this system were defined and a conceptual layout was developed with encouraging results. An arrangement with redundant Brayton power systems having a 1500 K (2240 F) turbine inlet temperature was shown to be compatible with the dimensions of the space shuttle orbiter payload bay.
The work done by Thermacore, Inc., Lancaster, Pennsylvania, for the Phase 1, 1992 SBIR National Aeronautics and Space Administration Contract, 'Insoluble Coatings for Stirling Engine Heat Pipe Condenser Surfaces' is described. The work was performed between January 1992 and July 1992. Stirling heat engines are being developed for electrical power generation use on manned and unmanned earth orbital and planetary missions. Dish Stirling solar systems and nuclear reactor Stirling systems are two of the most promising applications of the Stirling engine electrical power generation technology. The sources of thermal energy used to drive the Stirling engine typically are non-uniform in temperature and heat flux. Liquid metal heat pipe receivers are used as thermal transformers and isothermalizers to deliver the thermal energy at a uniform high temperature to the heat input section of the Stirling engine. The use of a heat pipe receiver greatly enhances system efficiency and potential life span. One issue that is raised during the design phase of heat pipe receivers is the potential solubility corrosion of the Stirling engine heat input section by the liquid metal working fluid. This Phase 1 effort initiated a program to evaluate and demonstrate coatings, applied to nickel based Stirling engine heater head materials, that are practically 'insoluble' in sodium, potassium, and NaK. This program initiated a study of nickel aluminide as a coating and developed and demonstrated a heat pipe test vehicle that can be used to test candidate materials and coatings. Nickel 200 and nickel aluminide coated Nickel 200 were tested for 1000 hours at 800 C at a condensation heat flux of 25 W/sq cm. Subsequent analyses of the samples showed no visible sign of solubility corrosion of either coated or uncoated samples. The analysis technique, photomicrographs at 200X, has a resolution of better than 2.5 microns (.0001 in). The results indicate that the heat pipe environment is not directly comparable to liquid metal pumped loop data, that nickel aluminide is still a leading candidate for solubility corrosion protection, and that longer duration tests are required to reach a definitive conclusion whether coatings are required at all. Should further testing be required, the test vehicle and analytical tools were developed.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
A computer simulation and optimization code that has been developed for nuclear space power systems is described. The results of using this code to analyze two reactor-thermoelectric systems are presented.
Integration of advanced nuclear reactors to industrial processes in an integrated energy system (IES) has many potential advantages. The coupling of nuclear power to varied industrial processes introduces additional accident scenarios unique to the specific systems included in the IES. Similarly, noise in one system of the IES could potentially create negative effects in the other systems. Because of the limited amount of comparable nuclear IES operating experience, there is added value in scoping the inherent behavior of these systems in response to these transients. Here, this paper investigates the safety-related behavior of an open-source IES dynamic model of a fast spectrum molten salt reactor (MSR) powering a regenerative Rankine cycle for electricity production and a hybrid sulfur (HyS) cycle for hydrogen production. The simulations include a loss of cooling water to the Rankine cycle, a loss of sulfur in the HyS cycle, and the frequency characteristics of the entire IES across six orders of magnitude of frequency. The results show safe behavior in response to the two accident scenarios, wherein a disruption in heat transfer leads to increased salt temperatures and a decrease in reactor power. The frequency analysis shows that at higher frequencies, temperature changes propagating through an IES are increasingly damped to the point of negligibility.
The Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) is a bold new mission under development by the Office of Space Science at NASA Headquarters. ITMO is examining the potential of Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) technology to efficiently deliver scientific payloads to three Jovian moons: Callisto, Ganymede, and Europa. A critical element of the NEP vehicle is the reactor power system, consisting of the nuclear reactor, power conversion, heat rejection, and power management and distribution (PMAD). The emphasis of this paper is on the non-nuclear elements of the reactor power system.
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
The results of a study to identify potential hazards arising from nuclear reactor power systems for use on the lunar and Martian surfaces, related safety issues, and resolutions of such issues by system design changes, operating procedures, and other means are presented. All safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems from prelaunch ground handling to eventual disposal were examined consistent with the level of detail for SP-100 reactor design at the 1988 System Design Review and for launch vehicle and space transport vehicle designs and mission descriptions as defined in the 90-day Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) study. Information from previous aerospace nuclear safety studies was used where appropriate. Safety requirements for the SP-100 space nuclear reactor system were compiled. Mission profiles were defined with emphasis on activities after low earth orbit insertion. Accident scenarios were then qualitatively defined for each mission phase. Safety issues were identified for all mission phases with the aid of simplified event trees. Safety issue resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were compiled. Resolution approaches for those safety issues not covered by the SP-100 program were identified. Additionally, the resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were examined in light of the moon and Mars missions.
A preliminary study to determine the total mass and power requirements of a manned Mars rover is presented. Estimates of the power requirements for the nuclear reactor power system are determined as functions of the number of crew members, the emergency return trip scenario in case of a total malfunction of the reactor system, the cruising speed and range of the vehicle, and the specific mass of the power system. It is shown that the cruising speed of the vehicle and the soil traction factor significantly affect the traversing power requirement and therefore the mass of the nuclear power system. The cruising speed of the vehicle must be limited to 14.5 and 24 km/hr for power system specific masses of 150 kg/kWe and 50 kg/kWe, respectively, for the nuclear power system mass not to exceed 50 percent of the total mass of the rover.