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DOE OSTI2020

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2020

The Annual Assessment Reporting Process

On 11 August 1995, President Clinton announced that the United States intended to enter negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To address concerns that the cessation of nuclear testing would introduce uncertainty about the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, he also announced the concurrent establishment of six Safeguards as conditions of entry. Safeguard A prescribed “. . . a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile.” Safeguard B required “The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure . . . human scientific resources.” These two Safeguards led to the establishment of the physical and intellectual capabilities to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2021

Assessing Cognitive Impacts of Errors from Machine Learning and Deep Learning Models: Final Report

Due to their recent increases in performance, machine learning and deep learning models are being increasingly adopted across many domains for visual processing tasks. One such domain is international nuclear safeguards, which seeks to verify the peaceful use of commercial nuclear energy across the globe. Despite recent impressive performance results from machine learning and deep learning algorithms, there is always at least some small level of error. Given the significant consequences of international nuclear safeguards conclusions, we sought to characterize how incorrect responses from a machine or deep learning-assisted visual search task would cognitively impact users. We found that not only do some types of model errors have larger negative impacts on human performance than other errors, the scale of those impacts change depending on the accuracy of the model with which they are presented and they persist in scenarios of evenly distributed errors and single-error presentations. Further, we found that experiments conducted using a common visual search dataset from the psychology community has similar implications to a safeguards- relevant dataset of images containing hyperboloid cooling towers when the cooling tower images are presented to expert participants. While novice performance was considerably different (and worse) on the cooling tower task, we saw increased novice reliance on the most challenging cooling tower images compared to experts. These findings are relevant not just to the cognitive science community, but also for developers of machine and deep learning that will be implemented in multiple domains. For safeguards, this research provides key insights into how machine and deep learning projects should be implemented considering their special requirements that information not be missed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) has an interest in applying machine learning to safeguards problems. However, the lack of machine training data for outside researchers is a significant impediment for progress in including advanced algorithms in safeguards practices. Information about a State’s inventory and movements of nuclear material is highly sensitive, both from a commercial perspective and from a security perspective. States (and commercial entities) do not freely divulge this information, and the IAEA–which receives detailed information from States as accounting reports–considers all information concerning nuclear materials location and composition to be Safeguards Confidential. Even within the Agency, information marked as safeguards confidential can be accessed only on a direct need-to-know basis by those who analyze and summarize the information for that particular State.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Passive and active neutron signatures of 233 U for nondestructive assay

The thorium fuel cycle is emerging as an attractive alternative to conventional nuclear fuel cycles, as it does not require the enrichment of uranium for long-term sustainability. The operating principle of this fuel cycle is the irradiation of 232 Th to produce 233 U, which is fissile and sustains the fission chain reaction. 233 U poses unique challenges for nuclear safeguards, as it is associated with a uniquely extreme γ-ray environment from 232 U contamination, which limits the feasibility of the γ-ray-based assay, as well as more conservative accountability requirements than for 235 U set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Consequently, instrumentation used for safeguarding 235 U in traditional fuel cycles may be inapplicable. It is essential that the nondestructive signatures of 233 U be characterized so that nuclear safeguards can be applied to thorium fuel-cycle facilities as they come online. In this work, a set of 233 U 3 O 8 plates, containing 984 g 233 U, was measured at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center. A high-pressure 4 He gaseous scintillation detector, which is insensitive to γ-rays, was used to perform a passive fast neutron spectral signature measurement of 233 U 3 O 8 , and was used in conjunction with a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator to demonstrate the differential die-away signature of this material. Furthermore, an array of 3 He detectors was used in conjunction with the same neutron generator to measure the delayed neutron time profile of 233 U, which is unique to this nuclide. These measurements provide a benchmark for future nondestructive assay instrumentation development, and demonstrate a set of key neutron signatures to be leveraged for nuclear safeguards in the thorium fuel cycle.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2020

System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS): 3S Risk Analysis for Portable Nuclear Reactors (Volume II) -- Conclusions and Implications

Growing interest in compact, easily transportable sources of baseload electricity has manifested in the proposal and early deployment of portable nuclear reactors (PNRs). PNRs are sought because they are scalable, efficient, and cost-effective for meeting energy demands in unique, remote, or contested areas. For example, Russia's KLT-40S Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) that successfully reached the Arctic coastal city of Pevek. It began providing power to the local grid in December 2019. While providing such key advantages as having a highly flexible power generation mechanism, FNPPs appear to directly challenge international norms and conventions for nuclear safety, safeguards, and security. FNPPs are neither a purely fixed nuclear fuel cycle activity nor a purely transportation-based nuclear fuel cycle activity. In response, Sandia's Mitigating International Nuclear Enogy Risks (MINER) research perspective frames this discussion in terms of risk complexity and the interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security in FNPPs, and PNRs more generally. This systems study is a technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of FNPP technologies. This research's aims are three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to PNRs and FNPPs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems- theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to show Sandia's ability for prompt, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex MINER mission objectives.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Applicability of the Milestones Approach to Deployments of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs)

Transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs) can provide potential benefits to countries embarking on nuclear programs, offering reduced infrastructure requirements, shorter timeframes for implementation, cost savings and greater deployment flexibility than larger conventional reactors. However, the deployment of a TNPP in a Host State comes with the obligation to establish sufficient regulatory, institutional, and technical infrastructure, which, among others, includes a legal and regulatory framework and a competent regulatory body to implement a State’s safeguards obligations. This paper considers how the unique technical and deployment features of TNPPs may affect the process of preparing for and implementing safeguards in nuclear newcomer countries. Evaluating this issue through the lens of the IAEA’s Milestones Approach, this paper discusses some potential implications arising from the shortening of some milestones phases due to reduced construction or licensing time for TNPPs, and the need for increased cooperation between Host States and Supplier States in preparing for and meeting certain safeguards obligations. These considerations are potentially relevant to various stakeholders: newcomer States considering TNPP deployment; the States and companies that supply such reactors; as well as organizations that support international safeguards capacity building.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗

DOE OSTI2025

Developing Digital Twin Visualizations: A Methodology and Case Study on Chemical Separation Processing

As advances in digital engineering continue to push the technological boundaries, digital twin (DT) visualizations for diagnostics and safeguards advancement become much more feasible and practical. DTs generate large and complex data streams that require effective user interfaces to provide monitoring and diagnostic capabilities. Unfortunately, while these frameworks exist, there is not much research on the systematic documentation of human–computer interaction (HCI) for DT visualization. This work presents a dual-mode visualization methodology (two dimensional [2D] graphical user interface dashboard and 3D mixed reality) designed to support diagnostic tasks in DT systems and building on a validated framework and applying established HCI principles. The methodology is demonstrated through a case study of aqueous processing at Idaho National Laboratory, using experimental data from the chemical solvent extraction runs. Our interfaces display real-time alerts and monitoring to inform users of safeguards anomalies. The interfaces use immersive 3D mixed-reality visualization for further system and experiment investigation. This work demonstrates how the systematic application of HCI principles can inform DT visualization design for diagnostic and safeguards applications. While formal user evaluation studies remain as future work, this paper documents the systematic design methodology and demonstrates a proof-of-concept implementation.

3D visualization↗

DOE OSTI2020

Voltammetry measurements in lithium chloride-lithium oxide (LiCl–Li 2 O) salt: An evaluation of working electrode materials

Instrumentation to provide process monitoring (PM) and safeguards for the oxide reduction (OR) step in the electrochemical processing of used oxide nuclear fuel is necessary to ensure equipment is operated as declared. Cyclic voltammetry (CV) has been proposed for real-time monitoring of the operation of an OR process for safeguards purposes. In this study, different materials including 316 stainless steel (SS), tantalum (Ta), molybdenum (Mo), tungsten (W), platinum (Pt), and iridium (Ir) were evaluated as potential working electrode (WE) materials based on their chemical inertness, corrosion resistance, and sensitivity in detecting Li 2 O and other chloride salts in the OR electrolyte. Of the electrodes evaluated, 316 SS, Ir, and Pt all performed reasonably well in the LiCl-Li 2 O electrolyte. Here, stainless steel was operated in the cathodic potential and had reasonable corrosion resistance and is relatively inexpensive. Iridium could be operated in both the cathodic and anodic potentials and was the most corrosion resistant of those evaluated. Platinum is limited to the anodic potential range, had reasonable corrosion resistance, and was the most sensitive to Li 2 O concentrations in the salt. In the development of a stand-alone safeguards instrumentation, our recommendation is a CV sensor fitted with both Ir and Pt WEs. The results in this study may also be helpful for anode material selection in other electrometallurgy industries, such as molten salt electrolysis.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Select Proliferation Studies on TRISO-fueled, Heat-Pipe-cooled Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors carry the potential to open up new markets for the nuclear industry, as their expected cost competitiveness in non-traditional market segments (e.g., mines, military bases, extraterrestrial surfaces, and remote areas), and their inherent safety features make them deployable when other power sources are unavailable or difficult to exploit. For countries that have not traditionally participated in nuclear power, microreactors represent a clean energy solution [1]. However, their use, especially in non-weapons states, may entail challenges in terms of maintaining international nuclear safeguards [2]. Furthermore, the deployment locations where microreactors may prove most cost competitive would be difficult to access by state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [3]. In addition to the isolated nature of potential deployment sites, the low-power characteristic of microreactors suggests that numerous microreactors would need to be deployed to meet energy demands. That, coupled with the unique physics of many current microreactor designs, opens up a new area of research with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards concerns [2]. Whereas traditional facilities are inspected as isolated cases when looking for signs of diversion or misuse; microreactors may need to be assessed in the context of the entire fleet to which they belong. International safeguards necessitate timely detection of any significant quantities (SQs) of material that are being diverted (e.g., 1 SQ of special nuclear material diverted over the course of a 1-year period) [4]. For low-enriched uranium, the IAEA defines 1 SQ as corresponding to 75 kg of 235U. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the detectability threshold for material diversion in microreactors by relying on critical control drum angles, excess reactivity, and the reactor lifetime as the selected operational parameters. For this assessment, a heat-pipe-cooled microreactor was regarded as the base design. While the conclusions reached in this paper are not readily extendable to the design of actual microreactors, the analysis herein enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the level of accuracy needed for reference calculations in order to detect diversion scenarios by utilizing the selected operational parameters (i.e., mainly control drum angles, critical insertion angle, and the reactor lifetime).

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Monte Carlo characterization of the cosmic ray muon flux in shallow subsurface geological repositories intended for disposal of radioactive materials

Recent challenges in monitoring subsurface geological repositories intended for disposal of radioactive materials such as spent nuclear fuel call for new, innovative concepts that are facility independent, cost-effective, passive, and reliable. Once nuclear material is in place at these facilities, reverifying the inventory may no longer be feasible if continuity of knowledge is lost or unavailable to the inspectors. Using cosmic ray muons may present several potential advantages over conventional photon/neutron signatures, and their use in safeguards applications have only received attention in the past decade. However, there have been limited efforts to explore the integration of cosmic ray muons into repository safeguards and study potential gains, risks, and costs. This paper presents a Monte Carlo-based methodology to characterize the cosmic ray muon flux, including muon angular and energy differential distributions at depths representative of subsurface geological repositories. Since there have been limited measurements at these sites and a measurement made in one site is not always transferable to another site, the objective is to develop an efficient simulation method and useful parametrizations to provide a convenient tool for enabling muon simulations at any geological repository site. It is expected these results will provide a better understanding of how muons can be integrated into an existing geological repository safeguards framework.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Magnetic Microcalorimeter (MMC) Gamma-Ray Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution. Comprehensive Technology Readiness Assessment

Magnetic Microcalorimeter (MMC) gamma ray detectors have demonstrated very high energy resolution of 38 eV FWHM for gamma ray energies below 100 keV. This is an order or magnitude better than conventional HPGe detector and can remove most line-overlap problems in NDA by gamma spectroscopy below ~130 keV. Unlike superconducting transition edge sensors (TESs), MMCs have a reproducible and almost perfectly linear response, which greatly simplifies adding spectra from different detector pixels and reduces systematic errors in quantitative assays. The instrument is currently at TRL-5 but could advance to TRL-6 by improving the signal processing software and using the system for the quantitative analysis of a safeguards sample provided by e.g. the IAEA. Making MMC detectors commercially viable and used more widely then depends on making the technology more reliable, specifically by increasing the device uniformity and yield, and by developing commercial software. This situation is often only half-jokingly referred to as the “valley of death” and could be addressed though the SBIR program. Our collaborators at STAR Cryoelectronics LLC are well qualified to further advance MMC development, and XIA LLC is well-positioned to develop the data acquisition system and write the software for MMC readout. In addition, the advance to TRL-6 would be desirable to increase the visibility and showcase the value of MMC spectrometers, e.g. by placing one of them into the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at the IAEA, whose NDA experts have recently started to show interest in cryogenic detector technology. As a result of this LCP, we also now have an instrument at LLNL that we will use for various applications of MMCs in nuclear safeguards and science. We are confident that as the number of high-profile results increases, so will the interest in and commercial viability of this technology.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Magnetic Microcalorimeter (MMC) Gamma-Ray Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution. Comprehensive Technology Readiness Assessment

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

In compliance with their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), States Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are obligated to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all changes in their nuclear material inventory as well as movement of the material across boundaries of IAEA recognized material balance areas (MBA), inventories and nuclear material balances. This project addresses capabilities to detect irregularities in State reports, thus ensuring their accuracy and completeness, and in the broader context, States’ compliance with safeguards obligations of the NPT. A recent study (Henzl et al., 2022) (lead by this project’s PI) demonstrated how analysis of dynamic correlations in nuclear material movement within the entire fuel cycle of a State (viewed as a single system) can reveal variances consistent with and indicative of “irregular” activities. Expanding on this concept, novel ways to analyze State declarations themselves—again, for the State as a whole entity—will help the IAEA draw accurate safeguards conclusions and trust the validity and authenticity of Stategenerated declaration reports. Introducing new declaration analyses capabilities explored in this project will help to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State in general.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Flow-Enhanced Electrochemical Sensor Testing and Deployments for MSRs

This report serves as the deliverable for Milestone M3RS-23AN0401061 that is part of Work Package RS-23AN040106 (Flow Enhanced Sensors for MSRs – ANL). The goal of this milestone was to determine performance of the flow enhanced electrochemical sensor (FEES) and modular flow instrumentation testbed (MFIT) in safeguards relevant scenarios. Flow enhanced electrochemical sensors are a type of electroanalytical sensor that has been developed at Argonne National Laboratory to be installed directly into MSR flow conduits to make measurements of the salt composition. These sensors represent a significant improvement in capabilities compared to earlier electroanalytical sensors that instead can only be operated in quiescent conditions. Previous work has focused on testing of the FEES in flowing conditions provided by the MFIT to assess the accuracy and precision of the sensor measurements. To further improve this capability, in FY23 we undertook a campaign of safeguards relevant scenarios in molten salt containing a range of uranium chloride concentrations (0 to 3 wt%). All the testing carried out in FY23 was aided by a control system designed to automatically actuate flow conditions and collect data. This new automation system is estimated to have increased experimental throughput by a factor of four and enabled testing in a variety of complex conditions. The advancements in throughput and repeatability led to improved quantification of actinide concentrations using the in-flow sensors, with a reduction of the mean absolute relative error from 5.6% in FY22 to 3.1% in FY23. In addition to safeguards scenarios run in the MFIT, FY23 work included deployment of a FEES at a partner institution where it will be tested in a flowing salt loop. The FEES was successfully integrated into that loop and is being tested prior to loop startup. In FY23, work also continued on the smaller flow system that we have named the mini-MFIT. This smaller system is capable of rapid prototyping of new sensor designs prior to installation in the larger MFIT radiological flow system. Work was carried out to test this new system in non-radiological molten salts in a separate glovebox. This work is helping us to enhance the accuracy of our salt monitoring capabilities through the integration of multiple types of sensors. The high degree of accuracy required by 10 CFR 74 represents a significant challenge, and further design evolution and integration of the sensors into multimodal sensing frameworks will be needed to further push the measurement accuracy to the needed level.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Systems Theory Principles and Complex Systems Engineering Concepts for Protection and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nuclear Sector

Part of the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) (PPD 2013) mandate includes evaluating safety, security, and safeguards (or nonproliferation) mechanisms traditionally implemented within the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector of critical infrastructure—including a complex, dynamic set of risks and threats within an all-hazards approach. In response, research out of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) explores the ability of systems theory principles (hierarchy and emergence) and complex systems engineering concepts (multidomain interdependence) to better understand and address these risks and threats. Herein, this Sandia research explores the safety, safeguards, and security risks of three different nuclear sector-related activities—spent nuclear fuel transportation, small modular reactors, and portable nuclear power reactors—to investigate the complex and dynamic risk related to the PPD-21-mandated all-hazards approach. This research showed that a systems-theoretic approach can better identify inter-dependencies, conflicts, gaps, and leverage points across traditional safety, security, and safeguards hazard mitigation strategies in the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector. Resulting from this, mitigation strategies from applying systems theoretic principles and complex systems engineering concepts can be (1) designed to better capture interdependencies, (2) implemented to better align with real-world operational uncertainties, and (3) evaluated as a systems-level whole to better identify, characterize, and manage PPD-21's all hazards strategies.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Development and evaluation of a list mode neutron coincidence collar for spatial response measurements of fresh fuel assemblies

A traditional safeguards neutron coincidence counting system, the Neutron Coincidence Collar, has been modified to incorporate individual preamplifiers on each of its 18 3He tubes in active interrogation mode. When used with list mode data acquisition (LMDA) and analysis, a signal from each 3He tube can be recorded and analyzed to allow a spatial response measurement to be performed on an item based on count rate and 3He tube location within the system. The ultimate goal of this project is to demonstrate the capabilities of a list mode response matrix for the nondestructive assay of fresh nuclear fuel assemblies. To enable partial defect detection of fuel pin locations and absences within an assembly, the project aims to extend well-established correlated neutron analysis techniques on a preexisting Neutron Coincidence Collar by extracting a greater number of useful signatures from the system than are currently generated. LMDA, combined with the addition of multiple preamplifiers, facilitates this capability by increasing the number of simultaneous signals that can be measured; this allows an in-depth analysis of neutron coincidence events to determine a fissioning item’s location based on the measured doubles count rate in various channel logic coincidence combinations. All of this can be done from a single measurement pulse train in offline analysis, which is the major benefit provided by LMDA. Through various stages of development and testing, a Mirion Technologies model JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar has been successfully retrofit with modern electronics designed in-house at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, matching preexisting JAB-01 electronics performance, while maintaining the original system footprint. This paper presents these various stages of development and experimental evaluation of the proof of concept system.

Moore, Angela S.↗

DOE OSTI2023

Evaluation of uncertainty in antineutrino spectra normalization calculations for advanced nuclear reactor monitoring

Antineutrino detection systems have been envisioned as an important aspect of safeguarding the next generation of nuclear reactors, especially considering designs utilizing exotic fuel cycles. Deployment of antineutrino detection systems for safeguarding applications is hindered by the uncertainties associated with the calculations required for antineutrino spectra measurements and predictions. The focus of this work is to assess the impact of system components on antineutrino spectra normalization uncertainties and their significance in reactor power monitoring sensitivity. The dominant limitation in antineutrino detection calculations is typically the uncertainty associated with a cosmogenic background. This limitation becomes more pronounced when signals are weak, although the issue is mitigated in larger reactors due to their stronger source strength. Additionally, antineutrino emission uncertainties vary with the isotopic composition of the reactor fuel. Unconventional fuel cycles, featuring less common fissioning isotopes, such as Pu-240, introduce larger antineutrino yield uncertainties. The findings from this study suggest that future research on safeguard-targeted antineutrino detection should prioritize background mitigation, particularly when background simulation is necessary. Advanced nuclear reactor designs have a major influence on background understanding and successful system implementation.

Physics↗