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NASA Safety Standard: Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris
Collision with orbital debris is a hazard of growing concern as historically accepted practices and procedures have allowed man-made objects to accumulate in orbit. To limit future debris generation, NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 1700.8, 'Policy to Limit Orbital Debris Generation,' was issued in April of 1993. The NMI requires each program to conduct a formal assessment of the potential to generate orbital debris. This document serves as a companion to NMI 1700.08 and provides each NASA program with specific guidelines and assessment methods to assure compliance with the NMI. Each main debris assessment issue (e.g., Post Mission Disposal) is developed in a separate chapter.
Uncertainty Quantification of Expected Time-of-Arrival in UAV Flight Trajectory
One of the foremost requirements for accurate in-flight safety monitoring of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is tracking of their flight trajectory. Existing UAVs leverage autonomous flight functionalities based on trajectory generation algorithms developed in robotic applications such as polynomial or spline curves in order to facilitate kinematic smoothness, minimum vibrations and fuel efficiency. However in practice, the actual path may be subjected to unexpected local weather conditions, unexpected obstacles along the path or abrupt traffic changes in the low-altitude airspace resulting in large errors of the predicted time-of-arrival at way-points. In this study, an approach to quantify and propagate uncertainty in 4D trajectories is proposed. The paper presents a simple error interval propagation method based on the expected cruise speed of the UAV and its associated uncertainty. The uncertainty is then propagated in time to estimate reasonable confidence intervals on the times-of-arrival of the vehicle at each way-point as well as along the entire flight-path. The uncertainty propagation is demonstrated on a state-of-the-art trajectory generation algorithm based on non-uniform rational B-spline (NURBS) curves. Further, the effect of a stationary wind field is incorporated in the uncertainty propagation approach. The proposed method is implemented on synthetic and real data obtained from flight experiments with a small UAV.
Assessment of Some IASMS-relevant Data Sources for Aviation Safety
An In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) [1,2] is a set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) necessary for monitoring known hazards and emergent risks, assessing safety data for anomalies, precursors, and trends, mitigating hazards that reach safety thresholds, and assuring efficacy of controls in mitigating hazards. An IASMS will continually monitor the NAS to collect data on the status of aircraft, air traffic management systems, weather, and airports. Within the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project’s technical challenge called In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) for Commercial Aviation Operations, which we often refer to as Technical Challenge 6 (TC-6), we have performed an assessment of several aviation data sources we have found that are relevant to assessing the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) in the context of an IASMS. This assessment includes understanding the nature of the data themselves and using some data analytics tools on these data to show how they can be used to identify potential safety issues. We also describe how the data and analytics are part of a system that can allow for other data and analytics to be performed and for the results to be visualized for use by appropriate operators to identify potential safety issues and develop mitigations. This report is a step toward the ultimate goal of TC-6, which is to develop a prototype IASMS system that demonstrates the potential of an IASMS and inspire operators to build analogous systems to make the best possible use of the significant investments that they make in collecting, storing, and managingdata related to their operations.
Probability of Loss of Crew Achievability Studies for NASA's Exploration Systems Development
Over the last few years, NASA has been evaluating various vehicle designs for multiple proposed design reference missions (DRM) beyond low Earth orbit in support of its Exploration Systems Development (ESD) programs. This paper addresses several of the proposed missions and the analysis techniques used to assess the key risk metric, probability of loss of crew (LOC). Probability of LOC is a metric used to assess the safety risk as well as a design requirement. These assessments or studies were categorized as LOC achievability studies to help inform NASA management as to what "ball park" estimates of probability of LOC could be achieved for each DRM and were eventually used to establish the corresponding LOC requirements. Given that details of the vehicles and mission are not well known at this time, the ground rules, assumptions, and consistency across the programs become the important basis of the assessments as well as for the decision makers to understand.
"Making Safety Happen" Through Probabilistic Risk Assessment at NASA
NASA is using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as one of the tools in its Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) tool belt to identify and quantify risks associated with human spaceflight. This paper discusses some of the challenges and benefits associated with developing and using PRA for NASA human space programs. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, while some have implemented PRA from the start of the program. It has been observed that the earlier a design change is made in the concept or design phase, the less impact it has on cost and schedule. Not finding risks until the operation phase yields much costlier design changes and major delays, which can result in discussions of just accepting the risk. Risk contributors identified by PRA are not just associated with hardware failures. They include but are not limited to crew fatality due to medical causes, the environment the vehicle and crew are exposed to, the software being used, and the reliability of the crew performing required actions. Some programs have entered operation prior to developing a PRA, and while PRA can still provide a benefit for operations and future design trades, the benefit of implementing PRA from the start of the program provides the added benefit of informing design and reducing risk early in program development. Currently, NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) program is in its 20th year of on-orbit operations around the Earth and has several new programs in the design phase preparing to enter the operation phase all of which have active (or living) PRAs. These programs incorporate PRA as part of their Risk-Informed, Decision-Making (RIDM) process. For new NASA human spaceflight programs discussion begins with mission concept, establishing requirements, forming the PRA team, and continues through the design cycles into the operational phase. Several examples of PRA related applications and observed lessons are included.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
An assessment of NASA's safety performance for 1983 affirms that NASA Headquarters and Center management teams continue to hold the safety of manned flight to be their prime concern, and that essential effort and resources are allocated for maintaining safety in all of the development and operational programs. Those conclusions most worthy of NASA management concentration are given along with recommendations for action concerning; product quality and utility; space shuttle main engine; landing gear; logistics and management; orbiter structural loads, landing speed, and pitch control; the shuttle processing contractor; and the safety of flight operations. It appears that much needs to be done before the Space Transportation System can achieve the reliability necessary for safe, high rate, low cost operations.
Success Path Method: Introduction to the Success Path Method Software Tool©
As part of its commitment to advancing safety and reliability assessment methodologies, Argonne National Laboratory pioneered the use of an evaluation method called the Success Path Method (SPM) to improve risk management for offshore oil and gas operations. The development of the SPM at Argonne has been driven by the need to improve existing risk assessment methodologies by focusing on the steps necessary for success rather than failure modes alone. This is particularly important for industrial environments like offshore facilities that perform multiple functions under a continuously evolving set of operational conditions – such as water depth and temperature, currents, and weather conditions. In these dynamic environments, the traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) approach is far too complex as it focuses on what can go wrong – which comprises an infinite failure space that must be fully explored and understood. By shifting the focus to a finite space of success paths, the SPM enables operators and decision makers to prioritize a manageable number of steps that must go right to ensure success. Building on its five decades of experience in safety assessments for the nuclear industry, Argonne made major adaptations to existing risk assessment methods utilizing features similar to fault trees that are traditionally used in PRA to map all pathways in which the system can malfunction. In contrast, SPM identifies the components and processes that must function correctly to achieve specific outcomes – such as preventing the uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons during drilling operations. The SPM framework integrates equipment, procedures, software, processes, and human actions to ensure that physical barriers meet critical safety functions in dynamic operational conditions. This approach helps identify failure modes and improve operational risk management by narrowing the focus to key success elements, which in turn reduces uncertainty and helps users understand, manage, and respond to failures.
Probability of Loss of Crew Achievability Studies for NASA's Exploration Systems Development
Over the last few years, NASA has been evaluating various vehicle designs for multiple proposed design reference missions (DRM) beyond low Earth orbit in support of its Exploration Systems Development (ESD) programs. This paper addresses several of the proposed missions and the analysis techniques used to assess the key risk metric, probability of loss of crew (LOC). Probability of LOC is a metric used to assess the safety risk as well as a design requirement. These risk assessments typically cover the concept phase of a DRM, i.e. when little more than a general idea of the mission is known and are used to help establish "best estimates" for proposed program and agency level risk requirements. These assessments or studies were categorized as LOC achievability studies to help inform NASA management as to what "ball park" estimates of probability of LOC could be achieved for each DRM and were eventually used to establish the corresponding LOC requirements. Given that details of the vehicles and mission are not well known at this time, the ground rules, assumptions, and consistency across the programs become the important basis of the assessments as well as for the decision makers to understand.
Probability of Loss of Crew Achievability Studies for NASA's Exploration Systems Development
Over the last few years, NASA has been evaluating various vehicle designs for multiple proposed design reference missions (DRM) beyond low Earth orbit in support of its Exploration Systems Development (ESD) programs. This paper addresses several of the proposed missions and the analysis techniques used to assess the key risk metric, probability of loss of crew (LOC). Probability of LOC is a metric used to assess the safety risk as well as a design requirement. These risk assessments typically cover the concept phase of a DRM, i.e. when little more than a general idea of the mission is known and are used to help establish "best estimates" for proposed program and agency level risk requirements. These assessments or studies were categorized as LOC achievability studies to help inform NASA management as to what "ball park" estimates of probability of LOC could be achieved for each DRM and were eventually used to establish the corresponding LOC requirements. Given that details of the vehicles and mission are not well known at this time, the ground rules, assumptions, and consistency across the programs become the important basis of the assessments as well as for the decision makers to understand.
Probability of Loss of Crew Achievability Studies for NASA's Exploration Systems Development
Over the last few years, NASA has been evaluating various vehicle designs for multiple proposed design reference missions (DRM) beyond low Earth orbit in support of its Exploration Systems Development (ESD) programs. This paper addresses several of the proposed missions and the analysis techniques used to assess the key risk metric, probability of loss of crew (LOC). Probability of LOC is a metric used to assess the safety risk as well as a design requirement. These risk assessments typically cover the concept phase of a DRM, i.e. when little more than a general idea of the mission is known and are used to help establish "best estimates" for proposed program and agency level risk requirements. These assessments or studies were categorized as LOC achievability studies to help inform NASA management as to what "ball park" estimates of probability of LOC could be achieved for each DRM and were eventually used to establish the corresponding LOC requirements. Given that details of the vehicles and mission are not well known at this time, the ground rules, assumptions, and consistency across the programs become the important basis of the assessments as well as for the decision makers to understand.
A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System
In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation functionspresent in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).
Risk management for the Space Exploration Initiative
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a quantitative engineering process that provides the analytic structure and decision-making framework for total programmatic risk management. Ideally, it is initiated in the conceptual design phase and used throughout the program life cycle. Although PRA was developed for assessment of safety, reliability, and availability risk, it has far greater application. Throughout the design phase, PRA can guide trade-off studies among system performance, safety, reliability, cost, and schedule. These studies are based on the assessment of the risk of meeting each parameter goal, with full consideration of the uncertainties. Quantitative trade-off studies are essential, but without full identification, propagation, and display of uncertainties, poor decisions may result. PRA also can focus attention on risk drivers in situations where risk is too high. For example, if safety risk is unacceptable, the PRA prioritizes the risk contributors to guide the use of resources for risk mitigation. PRA is used in the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) Program. To meet the stringent requirements of the SEI mission, within strict budgetary constraints, the PRA structure supports informed and traceable decision-making. This paper briefly describes the SEI PRA process.
A Risk Assessment Model for Reduced Aircraft Separation: A Quantitative Method to Evaluate the Safety of Free Flight
As new technologies and procedures are introduced into the National Airspace System, whether they are intended to improve efficiency, capacity, or safety level, the quantification of potential changes in safety levels is of vital concern. Applications of technology can improve safety levels and allow the reduction of separation standards. An excellent example is the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM). By taking advantage of the surveillance and display advances of PRM, airports can run instrument parallel approaches to runways separated by 3400 feet with the same level of safety as parallel approaches to runways separated by 4300 feet using the standard technology. Despite a wealth of information from flight operations and testing programs, there is no readily quantifiable relationship between numerical safety levels and the separation standards that apply to aircraft on final approach. This paper presents a modeling approach to quantify the risk associated with reducing separation on final approach. Reducing aircraft separation, both laterally and longitudinally, has been the goal of several aviation R&D programs over the past several years. Many of these programs have focused on technological solutions to improve navigation accuracy, surveillance accuracy, aircraft situational awareness, controller situational awareness, and other technical and operational factors that are vital to maintaining flight safety. The risk assessment model relates different types of potential aircraft accidents and incidents and their contribution to overall accident risk. The framework links accident risks to a hierarchy of failsafe mechanisms characterized by procedures and interventions. The model will be used to assess the overall level of safety associated with reducing separation standards and the introduction of new technology and procedures, as envisaged under the Free Flight concept. The model framework can be applied to various aircraft scenarios, including parallel and in-trail approaches. This research was performed under contract to NASA and in cooperation with the FAA's Safety Division (ASY).
A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System
In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation function present in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).
The Effects of Arcing Ejecta on Space Suit Materials from ISS RPCM Hot Mate/Demate During EVA
Onboard ISS, taking systems off-line when powering down to perform servicing on Remote Power Control Modules (RPCMs) introduces operational risk. An investigation lead by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was performed by a multi-center team to assess the safety of performing on-orbit replacement of RPCMs without powering down. This investigation revealed the potential for molten metal particulate generation in the event of an arcing occurrence. As RPCM replacement can be performed outside ISS during an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA), it is necessary to assess the effects of this molten metal ejecta contact with the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) Space Suit Assembly (SSA) during an arcing event. A test was devised to mimic arcing ejecta contact with samples representing various SSA cross-sections. Four areas of the SSA were chosen for test to represent the majority of the SSA cross-sections. Testing was conducted by the University of California, Riverside that generated the molten metal particles, included varying composition, size and temperature, and dropped them onto the surface of the various SSA cross-sections. Exposed SSA materials were then evaluated for degree of damage, penetration, and thermal conductance through the cross-section by ILC Dover. Results showed that the SSA Glove is most susceptible to damage from arcing events. This data will be used to make risk management decisions for future RPCM servicing operations. This testing also demonstrated the durability of the SSA design and materials to exposure to extreme environments
The Effects of Arcing Ejecta on Space Suit Materials from ISS RPCM Hot Mate/Demate During EVA
Onboard ISS, taking systems off-line when powering down to perform servicing on Remote Power Control Modules (RPCMs) introduces operational risk. An investigation lead by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was performed by a multi-center team to assess the safety of performing on-orbit replacement of RPCMs without powering down. This investigation revealed the potential for molten metal particulate generation in the event of an arcing occurrence. As RPCM replacement can be performed outside ISS during an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA), it is necessary to assess the effects of this molten metal ejecta contact with the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) Space Suit Assembly (SSA) during an arcing event. A test was devised to mimic arcing ejecta contact with samples representing various SSA cross-sections. Four areas of the SSA were chosen for test to represent the majority of the SSA cross-sections. Testing was conducted by the University of California, Riverside that generated the molten metal particles, included varying composition, size and temperature, and dropped them onto the surface of the various SSA cross-sections. Exposed SSA materials were then evaluated for degree of damage, penetration, and thermal conductance through the cross-section by ILC Dover. Results showed that the SSA Glove is most susceptible to damage from arcing events. This data will be used to make risk management decisions for future RPCM servicing operations. This testing also demonstrated the durability of the SSA design and materials to exposure to extreme environments.
Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Array of Transuranic Waste Containers after Compaction by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.