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At least 343 records · Page 19

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2018

Identification of Security related Bug Reports via Text Mining using Supervised and Unsupervised Classification

This paper is focused on automated classification of software bug reports to security and non-security related, using both supervised and unsupervised approaches. For both approaches, three types of feature vectors are used. For supervised learning, we experiment with multiple learning algorithms and training sets with different sizes. Furthermore, we propose a novel unsupervised approach based on anomaly detection. The evaluated is based on three NASA datasets. The results show that supervised classification is affected more by the learning algorithms than by feature vectors and using only 25% of the data for training provides as good results as if 90% of data are used for training. Both supervised and unsupervised learning can be used for identification of security bug reports; the former slightly outperforms the latter at the expense of labeling the testing set. In general, the performance differs across datasets, mainly due to the different amounts of security related information.

Goseva-Popstojanova, Katerina↗

NASA NTRS2019

Ensuring Flexibility and Security in SDN-Based Spacecraft Communication Networks Through Risk Assessment

Software-defined networking (SDN) has enabled elastic networking and resource distribution in cloud computing. The centralization and separation of the Control Plane also offers a high degree of network configurability and management, which can be used to mitigate and manage threats to the network. Space communication networks have historically been restricted and circuit switching in these networks has been a manual process. This study evaluates the potential role of SDN in space communication networks from a networking security standpoint. The evaluation covers the networking security needs of spacecraft missions and their associated assets. The results from the evaluation lead to a risk assessment that identifies vulnerabilities in an SDN-based communications architecture. Security challenges introduced into the network from integrating SDN are also considered. A risk register summarizes the severity of the attack outcomes, as well as occurrence likelihood. The study identifies Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as a new threat (presently unmitigated by existing security controls) that would be prevalent in an SDN-based space communication environment. A Mininet-based emulation testbed is built to demonstrate the susceptibility of spacecraft flight software to a flooding DoS attack when on an interconnected SDN-managed network. This type of attack would be highly consequential to mission assets, and therefore SDN-based space communications would need to be resilient to such attacks. Future work will need to be performed to fully characterize DoS attack methods that can apply to the space communication scenario, as well as to devise a comprehensive DoS-resilient solution.

Baker, Dylan Z.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Quantifying Human Behavior and Decision Errors in Security Screening Operations

The potential for human errors in conducting security related screening operations can lead to inadvertent and adverse decision outcomes. This paper overviews an initial mathematical framework designed to model and quantify the various human factors and decision outcomes that may occur in conducting security screening operations, such as U.S. port of entry radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) security screening. This framework is based on the Human Error Assessment and Reduction (HEART) technique. As applied here, the framework incorporates a set of rules for human engagement, including a prescribed concept of operations (CONOPS) and deviations that may occur from this established CONOPS due to inadvertent personnel decision errors. We also review some of the various factors that may adversely influence such decisions by security screening personnel. Some of these factors include current workload, environmental conditions, training, and various other intangible factors. Using the HEART methodology, we translate each of these factors into error producing conditions, their effects on error, an assessed proportion of effects, and finally the overall probability of human error at each stage of the screening process. We then include a small scale example to demonstrate the methodology and results based on an assumed set of input conditions at a notional port of entry.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Assembling a Cyber Range to Evaluate Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning (AI/ML) Security Tools

In this case study, we will describe the design and assembly of a cyber security test range we have built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN, USA. The range is designed to provide a flexible environment to evaluate cyber security tools—particularly those involving AI/ML—in a way that provides realistic environments and where we can control the experiments to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the tools. We have designed in the ability to repeat the evaluations, so additional tools can be evaluated and compared at a later time. The system is one that can be scaled up or down for experiment sizes. At the time of the conference we will have completed two full-scale, national, government challenges on this range. These challenges are evaluating the performance and operating costs for AI/ML-based cyber security tools for application into large, government-sized environments. These evaluations will be described, in order to provide motivation and context for various design decisions and adaptations we have made. The first challenge measured end-point security tools against 100K malware samples chosen across a range of types. The second is network detection of attempted penetration and exploitations with varying levels of covertness in a high-volume, business network. The scale of each of these challenges is requiring us to create automation systems to repeat the experiments identically for each tool. Preventing there being easy signs of malicious activity for the AI/ML tools to focus on has been a particularly interesting and challenging aspect of designing and executing these challenge events. After the events, the range continues to be used for other research such as adversarial machine learning where the repeatability, scale, and automation required for the national challenge events become essential elements for research.

Nichols, Jeff↗

DOE OSTI2021

2021 ROMANIA TRANSPORT SECURITY TABLE-TOP EXERCISE (TTX) – LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

During the period of 15-18 March 2021, the IAEA conducted a national workshop addressing the security of radioactive material in transport. The workshop was jointly hosted by the Romanian regulatory authority and the General Inspectorate of Romanian Gendarmerie. The workshop assisted Romania in improving its capability to evaluate the ability of response forces to counter a malicious act against radioactive material in transport. The event consisted of briefings, exercises, a demonstration of transport security equipment, and a transport security table-top exercise (TTX). The workshop was conducted in a virtual-hybrid format in such a way as to meet the COVID-19 related requirements in compliance with Romania’s guidelines. This paper provides an overview of the workshop’s activities, lessons-learned, and good practices related to the transport security TTX exercises.

Maican, Catalin↗

DOE OSTI2021

Implementing Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: An Exercise in ICS Security Application

Distributed wind is unique and fast-growing component of the energy production mix, but cybersecurity for distributed wind is not well developed. In this presentation, we will introduce distributed wind as an example of difficult-to-secure critical infrastructure. We will first provide background on distributed wind architectures, applications, and stakeholder roles. We will explain the need and challenges for cybersecurity for distributed wind, pointing to both academic studies and real-world events. The key component of the presentation will discuss recommendations for different aspects of security, such as risk assessments, communications, and access control, that specifically call out considerations that apply uniquely to distributed wind. We will discuss what sets distributed wind apart from other ICS and energy applications, and how to account for these features in a comprehensive security plan. This process is demonstrative of the type of analysis needed to adapt traditional security guidelines and standards to narrow and focused applications.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

A National Secure-by-Design Strategy

The US National Cybersecurity Strategy published March 2, 2023 uses plain language to communicate that the US is calling for a major change in how we prioritize the security of software systems used in critical infrastructure. It acknowledges that our current approach, which is essentially, “let the buyer beware,” leaves entities who are least able to assess or defend vulnerable software responsible for the impacts of designed-in weaknesses while the makers of the technology bear no liability. The strategy recommends a security-by-design approach, recommending that software vendors be held liable to uphold a “duty of care” to consumers and for systems to be designed to “fail safely and recover quickly” . For energy infrastructure, the strategy calls out the need to implement the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy to achieve higher confidence security for energy infrastructures. The Idaho National Laboratory, a pioneer in cyber-informed engineering concepts, is at the forefront of organizations educating others in industry, academia, and government on how to apply these concepts to real-world challenges. In this brief, we'll outline some of the basic principles of security-by-design and offer examples of how, in a water sector context, they're being put into successful practice.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience? Preprint

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗

DOE OSTI2024

Securing Future Energy Supplies: From Renewables to Microreactors

This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Comprehensive Assessment of the Viability of Small Modular Reactors in Africa: A Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Perspective

In response to escalating global energy demands driven by industrialization and the pressing need for decarbonization, this paper explores the potential of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) as a sustainable energy solution in Africa. Focusing on nuclear security and non-proliferation concerns, the study assesses Africa's energy landscape, emphasizing the need for diverse and reliable power sources. While highlighting the scalability and cost-effectiveness of SMRs, the analysis acknowledges potential challenges associated with their introduction, particularly concerning nuclear security and non-proliferation. Given the recommendation to use High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) in some SMRs, it is important to critically consider the security implications of transporting nuclear materials, the proximity of the public to the plant, and the time taken to respond to planned assaults. The possibility of using HALEU makes the nuclear material more prone to adversaries such as sabotage, theft, and terrorism. Utilizing PESTLE analysis, this research seeks to outline the detailed political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal readiness of Africa to embrace the first-of-a-kind technology (SMR) while fulfilling its mandate to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Examining regulatory frameworks, international cooperation, and safety protocols, the study underscores the importance of regional collaboration to prevent the misuse of nuclear technology for military and malicious intent. Drawing insights from successful case studies, the paper concludes by synthesizing key findings and proposing recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders. These recommendations encompass regulatory enhancement, capacity building, technology transfer, and diplomatic efforts to strengthen nuclear security, non-proliferation, and safeguards in Africa.

Prah, Christina↗

DOE OSTI2024

Distributed and Secure Spectrum Sharing for 5G and 6G Networks

Secure spectrum sharing or spectrum co-existence of multiple 5G networks and future 6G networks is a powerful enabler technology. The National Spectrum Strategy (NSS) published by the White House in November, 2023, and the subsequent NSS implementation plan led by the National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) is the driver of a national effort to enable co-existence of government incumbents and commercial networks in selected spectrum bands. Cellular networks such as 5G & 6G and non-cellular Wi-Fi 6E & 7 are the prominent wireless technologies considered for co-existence with incumbent wireless links. Security of the spectrum sharing solutions is a must to make this transformation of spectrum use possible, specially for mission critical communications. However, current spectrum sharing solutions rely on centralized data bases with inherent vulnerabilities. This paper focuses on secure spectrum sharing among multiple 5G networks using unlicensed and shared frequency bands. It presents an innovative AI/ML based distributed spectrum sharing approach that can be autonomously used by multiple networks. Each sharing network uses its own observation of the Radio Frequency (RF) environment, which consists of RF measurements reported from the 5G User Equipment (UE), to adjust the transmission power levels for secure co-existence. Data is presented to illustrate the superior performance of this solution compared to other spectrum sharing solutions where each network can utilize usage data of the other networks. Finally it discusses how this efficient spectrum sharing solution can evolve in the future for the 6G networks.

5G↗

DOE OSTI2025

Harnessing the Power of AI: Status and Expansion of Current Domestic Transport Security Through Flexible Embedded Hardware

As applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continue to expand, there are increasing opportunities to leverage applied AI methodologies with mobile transportation focused embedded systems. Current applications of AI in transportation focus on a variety of areas, including fuel efficiency, safety, security, and other broad fields of optimization or detection. To leverage these AI workflows and methodologies in the field, teams must utilize complex embedded systems capable of implementing these AI-enabled algorithms in real-time. In this paper, we will investigate how these algorithms can be integrated into existing technologies leveraging vehicle data - such as the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting Unit (C-STAR). The C-STAR technology is an embedded platform with onboard computation capable of running next generation algorithms in vehicle systems AI, such as preventative maintenance, driver authentication, and transport security. As deployed in the field, the C-STAR has a limited AI functionality –this paper will directly discuss how a device like C-STAR can be utilized and the advantages of integrating these new technologies. We will open with relevant background information and transportation projects that leverage AI, focusing specifically on those around transport security such as vehicle identification, anomaly detection, and deterrence. We will then extend this into potential opportunities and scaling for AI methodologies using platforms like the C-STAR. Finally, we will speak directly to the challenges of deploying AI-powered workflows, such as computing power needs, bandwidth, hallucinations, and other regulatory considerations.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗

DOE OSTI2025

Secure Route: Roadway Risk Mapping for Transportation Planners

The secure transport of sensitive materials across U.S. road networks pose unique challenges for local, state, and federal agencies. Threats range from random events (e.g., accidents, medical emergencies, mechanical failures) to opportunistic or organized tactical assaults. Although the probability of such attacks is very low, the consequences of material loss to foreign states or terrorists can be catastrophic, qualifying these scenarios as “grey swan” events—low-probability, high-impact occurrences that are predictable but difficult to quantify. Traditional risk assessments struggle in these contexts, necessitating a shift toward subjective risk perception to inform planning. Risk perception in transport planning is shaped by various factors, including knowledge of adversarial capabilities, vehicle defenses, manifest details, and geographic features along the route. Geographic features such as bridges, tunnels, roadside elevation, and gaps in cellular coverage introduce vulnerabilities, while mitigative features include safe havens, police stations, and medical services. Temporal variables such as congestion, accidents, and weather further complicate route planning. Despite their importance, existing routing tools like Google Maps and commercial software do not explicitly account for geographic risk features, requiring planners to rely on personal familiarity with routes—a time-intensive, non-scalable approach. This work addresses these gaps by: (1) developing datasets that catalog geographic risk features along U.S. roadways, (2) eliciting risk perceptions from experienced transportation security experts, and (3) linking these perceptions to roadway conditions and geographic data. We implement these capabilities within Secure Route a novel mapping tool for classifying route segment risks associated with roadway conditions. This system provides transportation planners with an intuitive interface to assess and contextualize risk along potential routes, improving decision-making for secure transport. We present current progress in this effort and identify next steps.

Stewart, Robert [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000281867559)↗

DOE OSTI2025

Detecting Unclassified Electromagnetic Signals for Secure Wireless Communication Using Open Set Recognition

We developed multiple machine learning methods for the detection and classification of new wireless communication waveforms, which is critical for targeted attacks in wireless networks and electronic warfare. Our machine learning models are capable of dynamically detecting security threats in near real time through our advanced open set recognition (OSR) approach. This model has demonstrated significant improvements in the detection of unknown waveforms, thereby enhancing the security and reliability of mission critical communications. Our approach to detecting uncertain security threats is novel; we advanced OSR techniques by incorporating domain knowledge of wireless signals. Specifically, we combined time and frequency domain model features to enhance the model’s performance. Utilizing an OSR approach eliminates the need for training data to be distributed similarly to the deployment environment and removes the requirement for the training set to contains all possible threat classes. This is crucial because it is often infeasible to determine and characterize all potential security threats in advance. Our model were trained on simulated data, generated in partnership with the University at Albany, State of New York. The data set contained a diverse array of wireless signals, including those with additive white Gaussian noise and multipath signals, with and without line of sight. This comprehensive training set allowed us to optimize our models to detect unknown waveforms under various challenging scenarios, such as low signal-to-noise ratios. By training on various waveforms, varying signal-to-noise ratio, and different sample sizes under normal conditions, our models were fine tuned to perform effectively in challenging environments.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary 2025

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the ARC-100, a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) being developed by ARC Clean Technology, Inc (ARC). The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, used fuel assembly wash station, cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks, used fuel dry storage facility, damaged fuel storage facility, and radioactive waste building. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

DOE OSTI2026

A Framework for Building Security into the Design Process

This report presents guidance to support the implementation of security objectives during the design process for nuclear facilities using an organization’s quality management system. The guidance in this document is intended for design vendors and operators of nuclear power facilities. Additionally, this guidance document can be beneficial to regulatory bodies, industry partners, customers, and other stakeholders within the nuclear power market. This report aims to ensure security consequences are identified before designs are completed, which may lead to reduced costs and higher security effectiveness and efficiency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NASA NTRS2005

Application of Lightweight Formal Methods to Software Security

Formal specification and verification of security has proven a challenging task. There is no single method that has proven feasible. Instead, an integrated approach which combines several formal techniques can increase the confidence in the verification of software security properties. Such an approach which species security properties in a library that can be reused by 2 instruments and their methodologies developed for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) are described herein The Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) is a model based verijkation instrument that uses Promela and the SPIN model checker. The Property Based Tester (PBT) uses TASPEC and a Text Execution Monitor (TEM). They are used to reduce vulnerabilities and unwanted exposures in software during the development and maintenance life cycles.

security↗

DOE OSTI2024

Operation and Security Considerations for Heat Pipe Cooled Microreactors

Microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) are anticipated to be key elements in the United States' carbon-free energy portfolio, serving as reliable power sources for remote communities, disaster relief zones, extraterrestrial deployments, and backup power needs. Microreactors employ technologies that are substantially more advanced and recent compared to conventional reactors. Furthermore, they are of a drastically smaller scale and are designed to be operated in a diverse set of locations, offering operational flexibility and mobility. In addition, the autonomous or semi-autonomous operation of microreactors with minimal or no on-site staff is anticipated. These factors give rise to specific challenges with regards to their safety and security. The present work investigates considerations related to heat pipe operation, reactor transport, and cyber/cyberphysical security to ensure the indirect and direct consequences of nefarious actors’ actions are understood and can be mitigated by design or through physical security measures. In addition, future directions are proposed for consideration by both HPMR designers and for regulators.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗