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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Role of Transport and Kinetics in Growth of Renal Stones

Renal stone disease is not only a concern on earth but could conceivably pose as a serious risk to the astronauts health and safety in Space. In this paper, a combined transport-kinetics model for growth of calcium oxalate crystals is presented. The model is used to parametrically investigate the growth of renal calculi in urine with a focus on the coupled effects of transport and surface reaction on the ionic concentrations at the surface of the crystal and their impact on the resulting growth rates. It is shown that under nominal conditions of low solution supersaturation and low Damkohler number that typically exist on Earth, the surface concentrations of calcium and oxalate approach their bulk solution values in the urine and the growth rate is most likely limited by the surface reaction kinetics. But for higher solution supersaturations and larger Damkohler numbers that may be prevalent in the microgravity environment of Space, the calcium and oxalate surface concentrations tend to shift more towards their equilibrium or saturation values and thus the growth process may be limited by the transport through the medium. Furthermore, parametric numerical studies suggest that changes to the renal biochemistry of astronauts due in space may promote development of renal calculi during long duration space expeditions.

Kassemi, Mohammad↗
NASA NTRS2016

Effect of Dietary Countermeasures and Impact of Gravity on Renal Calculi Size Distributions Predicted by PBE-System and PBE-CFD Models

Renal stone disease is not only a concern on earth but can conceivably pose a serious risk to the astronauts health and safety in Space. In this work, two different deterministic models based on a Population Balance Equation (PBE) analysis of renal stone formation are developed to assess the risks of critical renal stone incidence for astronauts during space travel. In the first model, the nephron is treated as a continuous mixed suspension mixed product removal crystallizer and the PBE for the nucleating, growing and agglomerating renal calculi is coupled to speciation calculations performed by JESS. Predictions of stone size distributions in the kidney using this model indicate that the astronaut in microgravity is at noticeably greater but still subcritical risk and recommend administration of citrate and augmented hydration as effective means of minimizing and containing this risk. In the second model, the PBE analysis is coupled to a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model for flow of urine and transport of Calcium and Oxalate in the nephron to predict the impact of gravity on the stone size distributions. Results presented for realistic 3D tubule and collecting duct geometries, clearly indicate that agglomeration is the primary mode of size enhancement in both 1g and microgravity. 3D numerical simulations seem to further indicate that there will be an increased number of smaller stones developed in microgravity that will likely pass through the nephron in the absence of wall adhesion. However, upon reentry to a 1g (Earth) or 38g (Mars) partial gravitational fields, the renal calculi can lag behind the urinary flow in tubules that are adversely oriented with respect to the gravitational field and grow agglomerate to large sizes that are sedimented near the wall with increased propensity for wall adhesion, plaque formation, and risk to the astronauts.

Renal Stones↗
NASA NTRS2017

Review of Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight from a Human Factors Perspective

This project aims to identify poor human factors design decisions that led to error-prone systems, or did not facilitate the flight crew making the right choices; and to verify that NASA is effectively preventing similar incidents from occurring again. This analysis was performed by reviewing significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight identified by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance Flight Safety Office. The review of incidents shows whether the identified human errors were due to the operational phase (flight crew and ground control) or if they initiated at the design phase (includes manufacturing and test). This classification was performed with the aid of the NASA Human Systems Integration domains. This in-depth analysis resulted in a tool that helps with the human factors classification of significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight, which can be used to identify human errors at the operational level, and how they were or should be minimized. Current governing documents on human systems integration for both government and commercial crew were reviewed to see if current requirements, processes, training, and standard operating procedures protect the crew and ground control against these issues occurring in the future. Based on the findings, recommendations to target those areas are provided.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

Research results have shown that more than half of aviation, aerospace and aeronautics mishaps/incidents are attributed to human error. As a part of Safety within space exploration ground processing operations, the identification and/or classification of underlying contributors and causes of human error must be identified, in order to manage human error. This research provides a framework and methodology using the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as an analysis tool to identify contributing factors, their impact on human error events, and predict the Human Error probabilities (HEPs) of future occurrences. This research methodology was applied (retrospectively) to six (6) NASA ground processing operations scenarios and thirty (30) years of Launch Vehicle related mishap data. This modifiable framework can be used and followed by other space and similar complex operations.

human error↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

Research results have shown that more than half of aviation, aerospace and aeronautics mishaps incidents are attributed to human error. As a part of Safety within space exploration ground processing operations, the identification and/or classification of underlying contributors and causes of human error must be identified, in order to manage human error. This research provides a framework and methodology using the Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as an analysis tool to identify contributing factors, their impact on human error events, and predict the Human Error probabilities (HEPs) of future occurrences. This research methodology was applied (retrospectively) to six (6) NASA ground processing operations scenarios and thirty (30) years of Launch Vehicle related mishap data. This modifiable framework can be used and followed by other space and similar complex operations.

mishaps↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Going beyond reliability to robustness and resilience in space systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience, are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environments is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes are usually unanticipated. They often invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging events. These three are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems, the ability to perform after unanticipated events, would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness can be done by dealing with known sources of problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. Two contrasting approaches are reducing system complexity and adding supervisory control. The need for resilience has been claimed for decades but little has been accomplished. Systems designers assume that they understand requirements, technologies, designs, architectures, integration, testing, operations, and environments. The potential problems of changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns are ignored. Systems designers are typically overconfident and ignore the need for robustness and resilience.

Harry W Jones↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA's Wireless Augmented Reality Prototype (WARP)

The objective of Wireless Augmented Reality Prototype (WARP) effort is to develop and integrate advanced technologies for real-time personal display of information relevant to the health and safety of space station/shuttle personnel.

Wireless↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Going Beyond Reliability to Robustness and Resilience in Space Life Support Systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environment is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to unanticipated damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes can invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging conditions. These three qualities are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from unanticipated disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness requires dealing with known problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. The need for robustness and resilience has been stated for decades but little has been done. Systems designers often assume that they understand everything they need to know. The potential failures caused by changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns can be ignored. Such overconfidence can lead to neglect of reliability, robustness, and resilience.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Going Beyond Reliability to Robustness and Resilience in Space Life Support Systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environment is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to unanticipated damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes can invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging conditions. These three qualities are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from unanticipated disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness requires dealing with known problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. The need for robustness and resilience has been stated for decades but little has been done. Systems designers often assume that they understand everything they need to know. The potential failures caused by changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns can be ignored. Such overconfidence can lead to neglect of reliability, robustness, and resilience.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Government Personnel Participation in Suborbital Space Flight

In 2020, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) from potential sources for Suborbital Crew (SubC) space transportation services. NASA recognizes the advancement of the commercial suborbital space flight industry and is currently working to develop suborbital transportation for Government personnel that could fly on commercially available suborbital vehicles and determine a systems qualification approach for flight risk acceptance. Prior examples of risk assessment such as the purchase of Soyuz missions serve as a foundation for how the US Government’s best technical experts can partner with a successfully flying industry provider to understand risks. More recently, NASA, the FAA, and industry have successfully demonstrated that a company-owned operation with government oversight can successfully launch Government Astronauts safely. This paper explores the challenges and opportunities presented with the use of suborbital vehicles by Government personnel and how industry might leverage the Government’s efforts to maximize the success of the suborbital space industry.

Risk Management↗
NASA NTRS2021

Role of Cyber-Physical Testing in Developing Resilient Extraterrestrial Habitats

Extraterrestrial long-term habitat systems (henceforth referred to as habitat systems) require groundbreaking technological advances to overcome the extreme demands introduced by isolation and challenging environments. A habitat system must operate as intended under continuous disruptive conditions. Designing for the demands that challenging environments will place on habitat systems (e.g., wild temperature fluctuations, galactic cosmic rays, destructive dust, meteoroid impacts, vibrations, and solar particle events) represents one of the greatest challenges in this endeavor. This engineering problem necessitates that we design and manage habitat systems to be resilient. System resilience requires a comprehensive approach that accounts for disruptions through the design process and adapts to them in operation. As the habitat system evolves—growing in physical size, complexity, population, and connectivity—and diversifies in operations, it must continue to be safe and resilient. In this endeavor, we should take advantage of lessons learned in developing civil infrastructure responsive to catastrophic natural hazards, autonomous robotics platforms, smart buildings, cyber-physical testing, complex systems, and diagnostics and prognostics for intelligent health management. This study highlights the importance of system resilience and cyber-physical testing to address the grand challenge of developing habitat systems.

Public health and safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Alteration of Optical Properties in Polymer Materials under Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Space and Simulated Exposure

This paper provides an overview of the 16th Materials International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) project, conducted by a multiorganizational team of researchers. The orbital environment during the mission, including environmental sensors data and unexpected occurrences, are discussed. The research further examines the spectral changes in selected material, Kapton TF, exposed to low Earth orbit conditions during the mission. Optical images of the material taken during the mission were analyzed using a machine learning approach. This process involved the use of a Radial Basis Function network to extract reflectance spectra from RGB/IR images. The findings were then compared with lab-based experiments of identical materials subjected to simulated space weather conditions. This comprehensive study aids in making accurate predictions about the performance of materials in space, thereby improving the reliability and safety of future space missions.

Insulators↗
NASA NTRS2008

Building on the Past - Looking to the Future: A Focus on Payload Safety

The history of the space industry stretches far and above lunar landings to the construction of the International Space Station. For years, humans have sought to understand the nature of the universe. As society grows in knowledge and curiosity of space, the focus of maintaining the safety of the crew and vehicle habitability is of utmost importance to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) community. Through the years, Payload Safety has developed not only as a Panel, but also as part of the NASA community, striving to enhance the efficiency and understanding of how business should be conducted as more International Partners become involved. This is the first in a series of papers and presentations in what is hoped to be an annual update that provides continuous challenges and lessons learned in the areas of communication, safety requirements and processes and other areas which have been vital to the Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP).

Nash, Sally K.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Advanced missions safety. Volume 3: Appendices. Part 1: Space shuttle rescue capability

The space shuttle rescue capability is analyzed as a part of the advanced mission safety study. The subjects discussed are: (1) mission evaluation, (2) shuttle configurations and performance, (3) performance of shuttle-launched tug system, (4) multiple pass grazing reentry from lunar orbit, (5) ground launched ascent and rendezvous time, (6) cost estimates, and (7) parallel-burn space shuttle configuration.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1990

Impacting Space Station Freedom design with operations and safety requirements - An availability process

The unusually long mission duration of Space Station Freedom leads to operations costs that have significant impacts on life-cycle cost relative to previous manned space programs. Maintaining an affordable program requires that operations costs be considered throughout the design process. An appropriate means of impacting the design with operations concerns is to specify requirements that ensure operational effectiveness when implemented. The Space Station Freedom Program has developed a process defining such requirements. It focuses on specifying functional profiles and allocating resources such that designers gain a better understanding of the operational envelope in which their systems must perform. This paper examines the details of the process, where it came from, and why it is effective.

Garegnani, Jerry J.↗