Results for “ACAS Xu” — Page 2

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

UAS Pilot Assessments of Display and Alerting for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XU

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) must comply with specific standards to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Among the requirements are the detect and avoid (DAA) capabilities, which include display, alerting, and guidance specifications. Previous studies have queried pilots for their subjective feedback on these display elements on earlier systems; the present study sought pilot evaluations with an initial iteration of the unmanned variant of a Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS XU). Sixteen participants piloted simulated aircraft with both standalone and integrated DAA displays. Their opinions were gathered using post-block and post-simulation questionnaires as well as guided debriefs. The data showed pilots had better understanding and comfort with the system when using an integrated display. Pilots also rated ACAS Xu alerting and guidance as generally acceptable and effective. Implications for further development of ACAS XU and DAA displays are discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

UAS Pilot Assessments of Display and Alerting for the Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xu

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) must comply with specific standards to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Among the requirements are the detect and avoid (DAA) capabilities, which include display, alerting, and guidance specifications. Previous studies have queried pilots for their subjective feedback on these display elements on earlier systems; the present study sought pilot evaluations with an initial iteration of the unmanned variant of a Next Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS XU). Sixteen participants piloted simulated aircraft with both standalone and integrated DAA displays. Their opinions were gathered using post-block and post-simulation questionnaires as well as guided debriefs. The data showed pilots had better understanding and comfort with the system when using an integrated display. Pilots also rated ACAS Xu alerting and guidance as generally acceptable and effective. Implications for further development of ACAS XU and DAA displays are discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Helicopter Pilot Assessments of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XR With Automated Maneuvering

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current study was a human-in-the-loop simulation that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in a fixed-base eVTOL simulator with varying levels of automation. Objective results showed that pilots complied with all RAs within the expected 5-second time window and responded to DAA alerts quicker than in earlier studies with ACAS XU. Pilots often made larger horizontal deviations during Manual RAs, but often favored vertical and blended maneuvers. No NMACs occurred, and losses of well clear were mainly attributed to the obligation of the pilots and system to maneuver only after the CA phase of the encounter had begun. Other losses were due to pilots’ noncompliance or disregard for ACAS XR’s alerting and guidance. Noncompliance with RAs most frequently occurred when pilots determined they were too close to the terrain to continue to follow Descend RAs, performing vertical maneuvers instead of following Horizontal RAs, or rejecting Horizontal RA updates because they felt that enough maneuvering had been performed. Subjectively, pilots found the DAA and RA alerting and guidance intuitive and useful for VFR helicopter operations. Slightly more pilots preferred the Automated RA condition to the Manual RA condition. Lastly, they also felt that ACAS led to occasional unsafe Descend RAs. Caveats and future implications are discussed.

eVTOL↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Helicopter Pilot Assessments of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XR With Automated Maneuvering

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current study was a human-in-the-loop simulation that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in a fixed-base eVTOL simulator with varying levels of automation. Objective results showed that pilots complied with all RAs within the expected 5-second time window and responded to DAA alerts quicker than in earlier studies with ACAS XU. Pilots often made larger horizontal deviations during Manual RAs, but often favored vertical and blended maneuvers. No NMACs occurred, and losses of well clear were mainly attributed to the obligation of the pilots and system to maneuver only after the CA phase of the encounter had begun. Other losses were due to pilots’ noncompliance or disregard for ACAS XR’s alerting and guidance. Noncompliance with RAs most frequently occurred when pilots determined they were too close to the terrain to continue to follow Descend RAs, performing vertical maneuvers instead of following Horizontal RAs, or rejecting Horizontal RA updates because they felt that enough maneuvering had been performed. Subjectively, pilots found the DAA and RA alerting and guidance intuitive and useful for VFR helicopter operations. Slightly more pilots preferred the Automated RA condition to the Manual RA condition. Lastly, they also felt that ACAS led to occasional unsafe Descend RAs. Caveats and future implications are discussed.

eVTOL↗

NASA NTRS2015

Flight Test Series 3: Flight Test Report

This document is a flight test report from the Operational perspective for Flight Test Series 3, a subpart of the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. Flight Test Series 3 testing began on June 15, 2015, and concluded on August 12, 2015. Participants included NASA Ames Research Center, NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center, NASA Glenn Research Center, NASA Langley Research center, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., and Honeywell. Key stakeholders analyzed their System Under Test (SUT) in two distinct configurations. Configuration 1, known as Pairwise Encounters, was subdivided into two parts: 1a, involving a low-speed UAS ownship and intruder(s), and 1b, involving a high-speed surrogate ownship and intruder. Configuration 2, known as Full Mission, involved a surrogate ownship, live intruder(s), and integrated virtual traffic. Table 1 is a summary of flights for each configuration, with data collection flights highlighted in green. Section 2 and 3 of this report give an in-depth description of the flight test period, aircraft involved, flight crew, and mission team. Overall, Flight Test 3 gathered excellent data for each SUT. We attribute this successful outcome in large part from the experience that was acquired from the ACAS Xu SS flight test flown in December 2014. Configuration 1 was a tremendous success, thanks to the training, member participation, integration/testing, and in-depth analysis of the flight points. Although Configuration 2 flights were cancelled after 3 data collection flights due to various problems, the lessons learned from this will help the UAS in the NAS project move forward successfully in future flight phases.

Unmanned↗

NASA NTRS2016

Integrated Test and Evaluation (ITE) Flight Test Series 4

The integrated Flight Test 4 (FT4) will gather data for the UAS researchers Sense and Avoid systems (referred to as Detect and Avoid in the RTCA SC 228 ToR) algorithms and pilot displays for candidate UAS systems in a relevant environment. The technical goals of FT4 are to: 1) perform end-to-end traffic encounter test of pilot guidance generated by DAA algorithms; 2) collect data to inform the initial Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Detect and Avoid systems. FT4 objectives and test infrastructure builds from previous UAS project simulations and flight tests. NASA Ames (ARC), NASA Armstrong (AFRC), and NASA Langley (LaRC) Research Centers will share responsibility for conducting the tests, each providing a test lab and critical functionality. UAS-NAS project support and participation on the 2014 flight test of ACAS Xu and DAA Self Separation (SS) significantly contributed to building up infrastructure and procedures for FT3 as well. The DAA Scripted flight test (FT4) will be conducted out of NASA Armstrong over an eight-week period beginning in April 2016.

ITE↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

On the Probabilistic Analysis of Neural Networks

Neural networks are powerful tools for automated decision-making,seeing increased application in safety-critical domains, such as autonomous driving. Due to their black-box nature and large scale,reasoning about their behavior is challenging. Statistical analysis is often used to infer probabilistic properties of a network, such as its robustness to noise and inaccurate inputs. While scalable, statistical methods can only provide probabilistic guarantees on the quality of their results and may underestimate the impact of low probability inputs leading to undesired behavior of the network.We investigate here the use of symbolic analysis and constraint solution space quantification to precisely quantify probabilistic properties in neural networks. We demonstrate the potential of the proposed technique in a case study involving the analysis of ACAS-Xu, a collision avoidance system for unmanned aircraft control.

neural nets↗

NASA NTRS2019

Automatic Execution of Collision Avoidance and Return to Course Analysis (D.6.20) Experiment Review

This presentation details the experimental design for an upcoming engineering analysis of a mock version of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), specifically the 'Xu' variant, which is designed for unmanned aircraft platforms. As a component of the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) project, this engineering analysis intends to study aspects of ACAS Xu in two parts. In the first phase of the study, the display and alerting guidance for collision avoidance (CA) resolution advisories (RA) shown to pilots at a ground control station will be manipulated, varying in level of RA transparency and presentation of safe maneuver parameters. The second phase of the engineering analysis will examine pilots' response to increasing levels of automation in the tasks of collision avoidance and return-to-course (RTC).

Sadler, Garrett↗

DOE OSTI2025

Shell Thickness and Heterogeneity Dependence of Triplet Energy Transfer between Core–Shell Quantum Dots and Adsorbed Molecules

Quantum dot (QD)-sensitized triplet energy transfer (TET) has found promising applications in photon upconversion and photocatalysis. However, the underlying mechanism of TET in the QD-acceptor complex remains unclear despite the well-developed TET theory for the molecular donor–acceptor systems. Herein, the coupling strength of TET from CdSe/CdS core–shell QDs to 9-anthracene carboxylic acid (ACA) was studied by measuring the TET rate as a function of shell thickness with time-resolved photoluminescence. The change of TET-coupling strength with increasing shell thickness was further compared to those of electron and hole transfers from QDs so that we could test whether QD-sensitized TET is mediated by the charge transfer virtual state and can be considered as simultaneous electron and hole transfers as in molecular donor–acceptor systems. The measured coupling strength of TET from the CdSe/CdS QD decreases exponentially with the CdS shell thickness r: |V|(r) = |V|(0)e –βr , with an exponential decay factor β of 0.19 Å –1 , which is smaller than the sum of the measured decay factors for electron transfer to methyl viologen (0.18 Å –1 ) and hole transfer to phenothiazine (0.29 Å –1 ) from the same QD. This inconsistency is explained by the broadening of QD shell thicknesses in the distance dependence study, which significantly modifies the TET-coupling strength and driving force, resulting in a shallower distance dependence of the TET rate constants. This study sheds light on the fundamental mechanisms of QD-sensitized TET reactions.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗