Performance of FeCrAl Accident Tolerant Fuel Cladding under Reactivity Insertion Accident Condition Testing
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Abstract not provided.
A study of rotorcraft accidents was conducted to identify safety issues and research areas that might lead to a reduction in rotorcraft accidents and fatalities. The primary source of data was summaries of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports. From 1990 to 1996, the NTSB documented 1396 civil rotorcraft accidents in the United States in which 491 people were killed. The rotorcraft data were compared to airline and general aviation data to determine the relative safety of rotorcraft compared to other segments of the aviation industry. In depth analysis of the rotorcraft data addressed demographics, mission, and operational factors. Rotorcraft were found to have an accident rate about ten times that of commercial airliners and about the same as that of general aviation. The likelihood that an accident would be fatal was about equal for all three classes of operation. The most dramatic division in rotorcraft accidents is between flights flown by private pilots versus professional pilots. Private pilots, flying low cost aircraft in benign environments, have accidents that are due, in large part, to their own errors. Professional pilots, in contrast, are more likely to have accidents that are a result of exacting missions or use of specialized equipment. For both groups judgement error is more likely to lead to a fatal accident than are other types of causes. Several approaches to improving the rotorcraft accident rate are recommended. These mostly address improvement in the training of new pilots and improving the safety awareness of private pilots.
Various advanced reactor developers are exploring the potential for reductions in the size of physical security forces and emergency planning zones. These reductions are based on robust fuel forms and inherently safe reactor designs. However, such reductions in physical protection measures could increase the risk of sabotage. To assess the possibility of reducing these measures, sabotage-induced radiological consequence analyses were carried out. These analyses considered accident scenarios that were beyond design basis accidents and overly conservative (Shah, 2025a; Shah, 2025b; Shah and Hartanto, 2026), yielding very large release fractions. These fractions, which can be used to evaluate physical protection and emergency planning requirements, have been crudely determined and applied as demonstrations for a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025a), a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025b), a heat pipe–cooled reactor (HPR) (Shah and Hartanto, 2025c), and a molten salt–cooled reactor (MSR) (Shah et al., 2026). A Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) team used MELCOR—a fully integrated severe accident analysis code—to demonstrate the code’s capability to analyze advanced (i.e., not light water–cooled) reactors (including a fluoride salt–cooled high-temperature reactor [FHR]) and calculate radiological releases to the environment during severe accidents (Wagner et al., 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2023a, and 2023b). Although the analyses were carried out to demonstrate MELCOR’s growing capability, the release source terms were estimated for advanced reactors, providing valuable insights into the accident progression and radiological releases. These findings from prior SNL studies, including estimated source terms and related sensitivity studies, were leveraged to derive source terms for postulated sabotage-induced accidents. Insights from these sensitivity studies informed the scaling of SNL’s estimated source terms for the defined accident scenarios. The derived release fractions for the severe accident scenarios for the respective reactor designs can be used to perform more nuanced dose consequence analyses to evaluate the reactors’ physical protection and emergency planning zone requirements. These analyses are in accordance with the risk-informed, performance-based approach proposed under 10 CFR Part 53. This study builds on the prior source term analyses and associated sensitivity studies by SNL to derive time-dependent and design-informed release fractions. Section 2 describes the diverse advanced reactor designs analyzed by the SNL team. Section 3 discusses the severe accident analyses, the release fractions calculated, and the limitations and assumptions of the demonstration project. Section 4 presents the release percentages derived for the hypothetical sabotage-induced severe accidents at the advanced reactors. Section 5 summarizes the study’s findings and conclusions.
An assessment of the frequency and severity of carburetor/induction icing in general-aviation accidents was performed. The available literature and accident data from the National Transportation Safety Board were collected. A computer analysis of the accident data was performed. Between 65 and 90 accidents each year involve carburetor/induction system icing as a probable cause/factor. Under conditions conducive to carburetor/induction icing, between 50 and 70 percent of engine malfunction/failure accidents (exclusive of those due to fuel exhaustion) are due to carburetor/induction system icing. Since the evidence of such icing may not remain long after an accident, it is probable that the frequency of occurrence of such accidents is underestimated; therefore, some extrapolation of the data was conducted. The problem of carburetor/induction system icing is particularly acute for pilots with less than 1000 hours of total flying time. The severity of such accidents is about the same as any accident resulting from a forced landing or precautionary landing. About 144 persons, on the average, are exposed to death and injury each year in accidents involving carburetor/induction icing as a probable cause/factor.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the tragic February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months and involved 13 Board members, approximately 120 Board investigators, and thousands of NASA and support personnel. Because the events that initiated the accident were not apparent for some time, the investigation's depth and breadth were unprecedented in NASA history. Further, the Board determined early in the investigation that it intended to put this accident into context. We considered it unlikely that the accident was a random event; rather, it was likely related in some degree to NASA's budgets, history, and program culture, as well as to the politics, compromises, and changing priorities of the democratic process. We are convinced that the management practices overseeing the Space Shuttle Program were as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the left wing. The Board was also influenced by discussions with members of Congress, who suggested that this nation needed a broad examination of NASA's Human Space Flight Program, rather than just an investigation into what physical fault caused Columbia to break up during re-entry. Findings and recommendations are in the relevant chapters and all recommendations are compiled in Chapter 11. Volume I is organized into four parts: The Accident; Why the Accident Occurred; A Look Ahead; and various appendices. To put this accident in context, Parts One and Two begin with histories, after which the accident is described and then analyzed, leading to findings and recommendations. Part Three contains the Board's views on what is needed to improve the safety of our voyage into space. Part Four is reference material. In addition to this first volume, there will be subsequent volumes that contain technical reports generated by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA, as well as volumes containing reference documentation and other related material.
Traffic accidents have tremendous impact on society. Annually approximately 6.4 million vehicle accidents are reported by police in the US and nearly half of them result in catastrophic injuries. Visualizations of traffic accidents using geographic information systems (GIS) greatly facilitate handling and analysis of traffic accidents in many aspects. Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc. is the world leader in GIS research and development. ArcGIS, a software package developed by ESRI, has the capabilities to display events associated with a road network, such as accident locations, and pavement quality. But when event locations related to a road network are processed, the existing algorithm used by ArcGIS does not utilize all the information related to the routes of the road network and produces erroneous visualization results of event locations. This software bug causes serious problems for applications in which accurate location information is critical for emergency responses, such as traffic accidents. This paper aims to address this problem and proposes an improved method that utilizes all relevant information of traffic accidents, namely, route number, direction, and mile post, and extracts correct event locations for accurate traffic accident visualization and analysis. The proposed method generates a new shape file for traffic accidents and displays them on top of the existing road network in ArcGIS. Visualization of traffic accidents along Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel is included to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Quick and reliable automatic detection of traffic accidents is of paramount importance to save human lives in transportation systems. However, automatically detecting when accidents occur has proven challenging, and minimizing the time to detect accidents (TTDA) by using traditional features in machine learning (ML) classifiers has plateaued. We hypothesize that accidents affect traffic farther from the accident location than previously reported. Therefore, leveraging traffic signatures from neighboring sensors that are adjacent to accidents should help improve their detection. We confirm this hypothesis by using verified ground-truth accident data, traffic data from radar detection system sensors, and light and weather conditions and show that we can minimize the TTDA while maximizing classification performance by considering spatiotemporal features of traffic. Specifically, we compare the performance of different ML classifiers (i.e, logistic regression, random forest, and XGBoost) when controlling for different numbers of neighboring sensors and TTDA horizons. We use data from interstates 75 and 24 in the metropolitan area that surrounds Chattanooga, TN. Our results show that the XGBoost classifier produces the best results by detecting accidents as quickly as 1.0 min after their occurrence with an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of up to 83% and an average precision of up to 49%. We describe limitations, open challenges, and how the proposed framework can be used for quicker operational accident detection.
Uncertainty in severe accident evolution and outcome is driven by event bifurcations that represent distinctive challenges to defensive layers and tend to promote the emergence of discrete classes of core damage and accident risk. This discrete set of "attractor" states arise from the complex networks of competing physical phenomena and conditional event cascades occurring as the overall system degrades – a process that yields increasing degrees of freedom and accident progression pathways. Characterization of these event spaces has proven elusive to more traditional data interrogation methods, but proves tractable by application of more advanced data collection and machine learning approaches. Through application of these approaches we demonstrate a conceptual framework that enables real-time/robust, risk-informed decision-making support to improve accident mitigation and encourage “graceful exits” during low probability, extreme events limiting accident consequences. In this analysis, we simulated over 8,000 short-term station blackout (STSBO) accidents with the state-of-the-art integral severe accident code, MELCOR, and demonstrate the potential for ML approaches to predict simulation outcomes. We chose to pair ML tools with interpretable and mechanistic event trees for the considered STSBO accident space to predict the likelihood of future event paths along the tree. In addition to the current state of the system, we use information from recent trajectories of temperature, pressure, and other physical features, combining both the current state and past trajectories to forecast future event paths. Finally, we simulate the random injection of variable amounts of water to quantify the efficacy of available actions at reducing risks along the many branches in the event tree. We identify scenarios and windows of opportunity to mitigate risk as well as scenarios in which such actions are unlikely to alter the accident end-state.
A review of records maintained by the National Transportation Safety Board showed that 16,054 civil aviation accidents occurred in the United States during the 3-year period ending December 31, 1969. Material failure was an important factor in the cause of 942 of these accidents. Fatigue was identified as the mode of the material failures associated with the cause of 155 accidents and in many other accidents the records indicated that fatigue failures might have been involved. There were 27 fatal accidents and 157 fatalities in accidents in which fatigue failures of metal components were definitely identified. Fatigue failures associated with accidents occurred most frequently in landing-gear components, followed in order by powerplant, propeller, and structural components in fixed-wing aircraft and tail-rotor and main-rotor components in rotorcraft. In a study of 230 laboratory reports on failed components associated with the cause of accidents, fatigue was identified as the mode of failure in more than 60 percent of the failed components. The most frequently identified cause of fatigue, as well as most other types of material failures, was improper maintenance (including inadequate inspection). Fabrication defects, design deficiencies, defective material, and abnormal service damage also caused many fatigue failures. Four case histories of major accidents are included in the paper as illustrations of some of the factors invovled in fatigue failures of aircraft components.
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recorded 8,436 rotorcraft accidents during the period mid - 1963 through the end of 1997. Review and analysis of the NTSB summary narrative for each accident has been completed. In addition, FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) counts of the growing registered rotorcraft fleet over this period has obtained. Taken together, a large and informative data base is now available, which indicates that the accident rate (on a per airframe basis) has changed very little since the mid 1970s. The data base, even in the summary form provided by this paper, offers suggestions for safer designs and improved flight operations. For analysis purposes, each accident has been placed in one of 21 top level categories as defined by the NTSB. Analysis of this grouping shows that 70 percent of rotorcraft accidents are associated with four categories. The accident count in these top four categories are: (1) 2,408 Loss of engine power (2) 1,322 In flight collision with object (3) 1,114 Loss of control (4) 1,083 Airframe/component/system failure or malfunction. Single engine rotorcraft dominate these accident statistics because of their sheer numbers over the study period. One-third of the loss of engine power accidents with these aircraft is fuel/air mixture related and fuel exhaustion is a common event. This appears to be the case whether a piston or turbine engine is installed. This paper provides similar study results in the other major mishap categories. It shows that both minor and major design and flight operations changes can -- and should -- be made to reduce rotorcraft accidents in the future. The paper outlines these changes and suggests how they may be made.
As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the investigation, medico-legal issues, the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team report and training for accident response.
Civilian aircraft are available in a variety of sizes, engine types, construction materials and instrumentation complexity. For the analysis reported here, eleven aircraft categories were developed based mostly on aircraft size and engine type, and these categories were applied to twenty consecutive years of civil aviation accidents. Differences in various factors were examined among these aircraft types, including accident severity, pilot characteristics and accident occurrence categories. In general, regional jets and very light sport aircraft had the lowest rates of adverse outcomes (injuries, fatal accidents, aircraft destruction, major accidents), while aircraft with twin (piston) engines or with a single (piston) engine and retractable landing gear carried the highest incidence of adverse outcomes. The accident categories of abnormal runway contact, runway excursions and non-powerplant system/component failures occur frequently within all but two or three aircraft types. In contrast, ground collisions, loss of control - on ground/water and powerplant system/component failure occur frequently within only one or two aircraft types. Although accidents in larger aircraft tend to have less severe outcomes, adverse outcome rates also differ among accident categories. It may be that the type of accident has as much or more influence on the outcome as the type of aircraft.
Here in this analysis, the two material interaction models available in the MELCOR code are benchmarked for a severe accident at a BWR under representative Fukushima Daiichi boundary conditions. This part of the benchmark investigates the impact of each material interaction model on accident progression through a detailed single case analysis. It is found that the eutectics model simulation exhibits more rapid accident progression for the duration of the accident. The slower accident progression exhibited by the interactive materials model simulation, however, allows for a greater degree of core material oxidation and hydrogen generation to occur, as well as elevated core temperatures during the ex-vessel accident phase. The eutectics model simulation exhibits more significant degradation of core components during the late in-vessel accident phase – more debris forms and relocates to the lower plenum before lower head failure. The larger debris bed observed in the eutectics model simulation also reaches higher temperatures, presenting a more significant thermal challenge to the lower head until its failure. At the end of the simulated accident scenario, however, core damage is comparable between both simulations due to significant core degradation that occurs during the ex-vessel phase in the interactive materials model simulation. A key difference between the two models’ performance is the maximum temperatures that can be reached in the core and therefore the maximum ΔT between any two components. When implementing the interactive materials model, users have the option to modify the liquefaction temperature of the ZrO 2 -interactive and UO 2 -interactive materials as a way to mimic early fuel rod failure due to material interactions. Through modification of the liquefaction of high melting point materials with significant mass, users may inadvertently limit maximum core temperatures for fuel, cladding, and debris components.
This publication presents an annotated accident dataset which fuses traffic data from radar detection sensors, weather condition data, and light condition data with traffic accident data (as illustrated in Fig. 1) in a format that is easy to process using machine learning tools, databases, or data workflows. The purpose of this data is to analyze, predict, and detect traffic patterns when accidents occur. Each file contains a timeseries of traffic speeds, flows, and occupancies at the sensor nearest to the accident, as well as 5 neighboring sensors upstream and downstream. It also contains information about the accident type, date, and time. In addition to the accident data, we provide baseline data for typical traffic patterns during a given time of day. Overall, the dataset contains 6 months of annotated traffic data from November 2020 to April 2021. During this timeframe, and 361 accidents occurred in the monitored area around Chattanooga, Tennessee. This dataset served as the basis for a study on topology-aware automated accident detection for a companion publication [1].
One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident is strengthening the station blackout (SBO) mitigation capabilities by enhancing defense in depth for all existing and new NPPs. One of the possible remedies is diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). The objective of this study is to address the benefits of FLEX in various accident scenarios in terms of both risk and cost. FLEX was originally devised against SBO accidents. In this research, we investigate the fundamental plant responses against accidents considering two fundamentally different cases: accidents that lead to high pressure on the primary side and accidents that lead to low pressure on the primary side. Several uncertainties are associated with the characteristics of the FLEX portable equipment. Specifically, the time for FLEX deployment may depend on several factors such as type of accident, point of injection, availability of safety systems, battery backup timings, and human actions. This study utilizes a dynamic risk assessment framework to analyze accident scenarios and suggests a novel importance measure, which is a cumulative distribution function– based importance metric that characterizes the influence of input distribution on complete output distribution. The importance of the existing and newly developed FLEX strategy based on risk significance is illustrated with examples. The suggested measure provides clear insight into how FLEX affects risk of the whole system and additional risk margins thanks to new safety systems.
The Emergency Local Transmitter (ELT) is a radio transmitter with a self-contained power source designed to provide notification of and homing to aircraft accident sites. The Crash Research Institute has monitored general aviation fixed-wing accidents in the United States and in Canada and has found that: (1) the ELT was destroyed in approximately 25% of all fatal accidents; (2) the ELT activated in about 62% of the fatal accidents, 69% of the fatal with survivors accidents, almost 80% of the serious accidents and about 57% of the minor accidents; (3) in fatal accidents the aircraft sections least likely to be destroyed are the vertical and horizontal tail surfaces; (4) antenna cable disconnection and antenna breakage caused failure to transmit usable signals; and (5) initial alerting control occurred in nearly half of the situations where the ELT aided in search.