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AMS History from 1950 to 2020

Presentation illustrates over 60 years of aerial measurements and establishment of Aerial Measuring System asset by the DOE. The presentation will be used as part of the training new AMS personnel. Presentation illustrates over 60 years of aerial measurements and establishment of Aerial Measuring System asset by the DOE. The presentation will be used as part of the training new AMS personnel.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Natural Gas Fugitive Leak Detection Using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: Measurement System Description and Mass Balance Approach

Natural gas is an abundant resource across the United States, of which methane (CH4) is the main component. About 2% of extracted CH4 is lost through leaks. The Remote Methane Leak Detector (RMLD)-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system was developed to investigate natural gas fugitive leaks in this study. The system is composed of three major technologies: miniaturized RMLD (mini-RMLD) based on Backscatter Tunable Diode Laser Absorption Spectroscopy (TDLAS), an autonomous quadrotor UAV and simplified quantification and localization algorithms. With a miniaturized, downward-facing RMLD on a small UAV, the system measures the column-integrated CH4 mixing ratio and can semi-autonomously monitor CH4 leakage from sites associated with natural gas production, providing an advanced capability in detecting leaks at hard-to-access sites compared to traditional manual methods. Automated leak characterization algorithms combined with a wireless data link implement real-time leak quantification and reporting. This study placed particular emphasis on the RMLD-UAV system description and the quantification algorithm development based on a mass balance approach. Early data were gathered to test the prototype system and to evaluate the algorithm performance. The quantification algorithm derived in this study tended to underestimate the gas leak rates and yielded unreliable estimations in detecting leaks under 7 × 10 − 6 m3/s (~1 Standard Cubic Feet per Hour (SCFH)). Zero-leak cases can be ascertained via a skewness indicator, which is unique and promising. The influence of the systematic error was investigated by introducing simulated noises, of which Global Positioning System (GPS) noise presented the greatest impact on leak rate errors. The correlation between estimated leak rates and wind conditions were investigated, and steady winds with higher wind speeds were preferred to get better leak rate estimations, which was accurate to approximately 50% during several field trials. High precision coordinate information from the GPS, accurate wind measurements and preferred wind conditions, appropriate flight strategy and the relative steady survey height of the system are the crucial factors to optimize the leak rate estimations.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

AMS/CEA Joint Aerial Campaign Nevada Test Site AMS Data Analysis Procedure

The United States NNSA AMS (Aerial Measuring Systems) and the French Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) participated in joint aerial survey activities during the period November 6-19, 2007. Survey activities were conducted near Las Vegas, Nevada, and at selected areas of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under the auspices of the Accident Response Working Group (ARWG). The intent of the activities was to compare technologies, procedures, and data analysis techniques related to specific AMS and the CEA aerial radiation detection systems.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Utilization of Local Law Enforcement Aerial Resources in Consequence Management (CM) Response

During the past decade the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was instrumental in enhancing the nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in the highest risk cities. Under the DHS Securing the Cities initiative, nearly 13,000 personnel in the New York City region have been trained in preventive radiological and nuclear detection operations, and nearly 8,500 pieces of radiological detection equipment have been funded. As part of the preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) mission, several cities have received funding to purchase commercial aerial radiation detection systems. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Aerial Measuring System (AMS) program started providing Mobile Aerial Radiological Surveillance (MARS) training to such assets, resulting in over 150 HAZMAT teams’ officers and pilots from 10 law enforcement organizations and fire departments being trained in the aerial radiation detection. From the beginning, the MARS training course covered both the PRND and consequence management (CM) missions. Even if the law enforcement main focus is PRND, their aerial assets can be utilized in the collection of initial radiation data for post-event radiological CM response. Based on over 50 years of AMS operational experience and information collected during MARS training, this presentation will focus on the concepts of CM response using aerial assets as well as utilizing law enforcement/fire department aerial assets in CM. Also discussed will be the need for establishing closer relationships between local jurisdictions’ aerial radiation detection capabilities and state and local radiation control program directors, radiological health department managers, etc. During radiological events these individuals may become primary experts/advisers to Incident Commanders for radiological emergency response, especially in the early stages of a response. The knowledge of the existence, specific capabilities, and use of local aerial radiation detection systems would be critical in planning the response, even before federal assets arrive on the scene. The relationship between local and federal aerial assets and the potential role for the further use of the MARS training and expanded AMS Reachback capabilities in facilitating such interactions will be discussed.

consequence management, CM, local law enforcement,↗

AMS/CEA Joint Aerial Campaign: Nevada Test Site AMS Data Analysis Procedure

The United States NNSA AMS (Aerial Measuring Systems) and the French Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) participated in joint aerial survey activities during the period November 6-19, 2007. Survey activities were conducted near Las Vegas, Nevada, and at selected areas of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under the auspices of the Accident Response Working Group (ARWG). The intent of the activities was to compare technologies, procedures, and data analysis techniques related to specific AMS and the CEA aerial radiation detection systems.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

An Aerial Survey of the 200 East and 200 West Areas of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation - October 2016

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS), based at the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) in Las Vegas, Nevada, performed an aerial survey of the 200 West and 200 East Areas of the DOE Hanford Site during September 2015. The survey was performed using the RSL Bell 412 helicopter equipped with twelve 2"x4"x16" thallium-activated sodium iodide (NaI) logs with their spectra summed to form a single detector and a mechanically-cooled high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector. Both detectors collected gamma ray spectra from naturally-occurring radioactive materials and from anthropogenic radioactive materials present due to activities at the site. Data was collected over the site during the 30 hours of survey flight time, resulting in approximately 100,000 one-second spectra collected by both the NaI array and the HPGe detector. These data have been analyzed to map the distribution of anthropogenic radioactivity and identify the isotopes responsible for that activity.

200 East↗

AMS Data Analysis Overview

This presentation discusses standard techniques and processes used for radiation mapping (RM) via an AMS, Aerial Measurement System. The advantages and shortcomings of standard AMS-based RM are presented, along with some suggested areas for improvement. Issues touched on include what gets counted, data quality, background correction, data processing, altitude correction, isotope extraction, contouring, and time shift.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

From Count Rates to Quantifying Isotopic Activities – Field Analysis of Radiation Monitoring Data

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a comprehensive bicoastal radiological and nuclear emergency response to United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. A major part of the support is to provide systematic radiological search for lost or stolen sources, Radiological search is a core competency of the NNSS with its origin dating back to nuclear weapons test era. Search operations from multiple platforms is the common thread among the various NNSS assets, which include Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Maritime Support Team (MST), National Capitol Response (NCR), National Search Team (NST) and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Information collected and analyzed during search operations add to the actionable intelligence for the law enforcement agencies and provide valuable guidance for the tactical resolution of a nuclear or radiological crisis. Search is an intelligence and situational awareness driven operation and most often called upon during a radiological emergency, however it can be brought into play to thwart a potential threat by providing monitoring and surveillance support. The Office of Nuclear Incident Response (NA-84) serves as the technical leader in responding to and resolving nuclear and radiological threats worldwide and integrates its efforts with other NNSA stakeholders (e.g., NNSA office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation NA-22). The response includes expertise in the areas of radiological search, render safe, and consequence management. This article will discuss the methodologies, tools, procedures, and techniques to extract maximum radiological characterization information (isotopic composition, activities for individual isotopes, threat assessment etc.) from field monitoring or Search operation data.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Deconvolution for Aerial Measurements

Avery Guild-Bingham will present these slides during the 9th Annual AMS Technical Exchange meeting (virtual) held on Oct 6-7, 2021. Attendees include Aerial Measuring System staff and partners from US laboratories, as well as Aerial Radiation detection scientists from partner countries such as the UK, Germany, Switzerland, etc. Overall support provided by NA-81, Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

AMS / BARC Joint Survey Addendum Technical Report

This report details the data analysis results from data collected during the September-October 2019 joint survey series between the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS) asset, and the Government of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). This joint survey series took place at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), areas of public land in Southern Nevada, and at the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Large Area Calibration Pads (LACP) at the Grand Junction Regional Airport in Grand Junction, CO. The data detailed in this report were gathered at the LACP. More details regarding the setup of these surveys and personnel involvement can be found in the AMS / BARC Joint Survey Summary Report. The data from the LACP collected by AMS are consistent with past data collection campaigns at the LACP. The AMS Bell 412 (B412) helicopter, equipped with both the standard AMS thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) 2"x4"x16" 12-detector system and a subset of the BARC Aerial Gamma Spectroscopy System (AGSS) consisting of two independent 3"x3"cylindrical NaI(Tl) detectors, measured each of the five calibration pads for a minimum of 10 minutes. After the helicopter measurements, a pressurized ion chamber (PIC) was used to directly measure radiation exposure rates on each of the pads for a period 5 minutes. The geophysical calibration procedure published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Erdi-Krausz et al. 2003) was used to determine the spectral stripping sensitivity matrix for naturally occurring radiological material (NORM). The sensitivity matrix is consistent with the AMS long term average. Additionally, the PIC data was used to calibrate the AMS system for exposure rate. The results of the exposure rate analysis are also consistent with AMS long-term averages.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

An Aerial Radiological Survey of Selected Areas of Area 18 - Nevada Test Site

As part of the proficiency training for the Radiological Mapping mission of the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), a survey team from the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis) conducted an aerial radiological survey of selected areas of Area 18 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for the purpose of mapping man-made radiation deposited as a result of the Johnnie Boy and Little Feller I tests. The survey area centered over the Johnnie Boy ground zero but also included the ground zero and deposition area of the Little Feller I test, approximately 7,000 feet (2133 meters) southeast of the Johnnie Boy site. The survey was conducted in one flight. The completed survey covered a total of 4.0 square miles. The flight lines (with the turns) over the surveyed areas are presented in Figure 1. One 2.5-hour-long flight was performed at an altitude of 100 ft above ground level (AGL) with 200 foot flight-line spacing. A test-line flight was conducted near the Desert Rock Airstrip to ensure quality control of the data. The test line is not shown in Figure 1. However, Figure 1 does include the flight lines for a ''perimeter'' flight. The path traced by the helicopter flying over distinct roads within the survey area can be used to overlay the survey data on a base map or image. The flight survey lines were flown in an east-west orientation perpendicular to the deposition patterns for both sites. This technique provides better spatial resolution when contouring the data. The data were collected by the AMS data acquisition system (REDAR V) using an array of twelve 2-inch x 4-inch x 16-inch sodium iodide (NaI) detectors flown on-board a twin-engine Bell 412 helicopter. Data, in the form of gamma energy spectra, were collected every second over the course of the survey and were geo-referenced using a differential Global Positioning System. Spectral data allows the system to distinguish between ordinary fluctuations in natural background radiation levels and the signature produced by man-made radioisotopes. Spectral data can also identify specific radioactive isotopes. Based on the results of the RSL NTS 1994 surveys, this area was chosen for a resurvey to improve the spatial resolution of the reported depositions for the Johnnie Boy and Little Feller I events. In addition, the survey was expected to confirm the absence of detectable concentrations of Americium-241 (Am-241) at the Johnnie Boy site and attempt to confirm the presence of Uranium-235 (U-235).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

AMS/NRCan Joint Survey Report: Aerial Campaign

In January 2014 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS) and the Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) Nuclear Emergency Response project conducted a series of joint surveys at a number of locations in Nevada including the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The goal of this project was to compare the responses of the two agencies’ aerial radiation detection systems and data analysis techniques. This test included varied radioactive surface contamination levels and isotopic composition experienced at the NNSS and the differing data processing techniques utilized by the respective teams. Because both teams used the commercial aerial radiation detection systems from Radiation Solutions, Inc., the main focus of the campaign was to investigate the data acquisition techniques, data analysis, and ground-truth verification. The NRCan system consisted of four 4" × 4" × 16" NaI(Tl) scintillator crystals of which two were externally mounted in a modified commercial cargo basket certified for the Eurocopter AS350; the NNSA AMS system consisted of twelve 2" × 4" × 16" NaI(Tl) crystals in externally mounted dedicated pods. For NRCan, the joint survey provided an opportunity to characterize their system’s response to extended sources of various fission products at the NNSS. Since both systems play an important role in their respective countries’ national framework of radiological emergency response and are subject to multiple mutual cooperation agreements, it was important for each country to obtain more thorough knowledge of how they would employ these important assets and define the roles that they would each play in an actual response.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Background Radiation Survey of the Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Center

In preparation for operations at the Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (Rad/NucCTEC), the Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DHS/DNDO) requested that personnel from the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) conduct a survey of the present radiological conditions at the facility. The measurements consist of the exposure rate from a high-pressure ion chamber (HPIC), high-resolution spectra from a high-purity germanium (HPGe) system in an in situ configuration, and low-resolution spectra from a sodium iodide (NaI) detector in a radiation detection backpack. Measurements with these systems were collected at discrete locations within the facility. Measurements were also collected by carrying the VECTOR backpack throughout the complex to generate a map of the entire area. The area was also to be surveyed with the Kiwi (an array of eight-2-inch x 4-inch x 16-inch NaI detectors) from the Aerial Measuring Systems; however, conflicts with test preparation activities at the site prevented this from being accomplished.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NA-42 TI Shared Software Component Library FY2011 Final Report

The NA-42 TI program initiated an effort in FY2010 to standardize its software development efforts with the long term goal of migrating toward a software management approach that will allow for the sharing and reuse of code developed within the TI program, improve integration, ensure a level of software documentation, and reduce development costs. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been tasked with two activities that support this mission. PNNL has been tasked with the identification, selection, and implementation of a Shared Software Component Library. The intent of the library is to provide a common repository that is accessible by all authorized NA-42 software development teams. The repository facilitates software reuse through a searchable and easy to use web based interface. As software is submitted to the repository, the component registration process captures meta-data and provides version control for compiled libraries, documentation, and source code. This meta-data is then available for retrieval and review as part of library search results. In FY2010, PNNL and staff from the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) teamed up to develop a software application with the goal of replacing the aging Aerial Measuring System (AMS). The application under development includes an Advanced Visualization and Integration of Data (AVID) framework and associated AMS modules. Throughout development, PNNL and RSL have utilized a common AMS code repository for collaborative code development. The AMS repository is hosted by PNNL, is restricted to the project development team, is accessed via two different geographic locations and continues to be used. The knowledge gained from the collaboration and hosting of this repository in conjunction with PNNL software development and systems engineering capabilities were used in the selection of a package to be used in the implementation of the software component library on behalf of NA-42 TI. The second task managed by PNNL is the development and continued maintenance of the NA-42 TI Software Development Questionnaire. This questionnaire is intended to help software development teams working under NA-42 TI in documenting their development activities. When sufficiently completed, the questionnaire illustrates that the software development activities recorded incorporate significant aspects of the software engineering lifecycle. The questionnaire template is updated as comments are received from NA-42 and/or its development teams and revised versions distributed to those using the questionnaire. PNNL also maintains a list of questionnaire recipients. The blank questionnaire template, the AVID and AMS software being developed, and the completed AVID AMS specific questionnaire are being used as the initial content to be established in the TI Component Library. This report summarizes the approach taken to identify requirements, search for and evaluate technologies, and the approach taken for installation of the software needed to host the component library. Additionally, it defines the process by which users request access for the contribution and retrieval of library content.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The Evolution of the Federal Monitoring and Assessment Center

The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is a federal emergency response asset whose assistance may be requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and state and local agencies to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. It is an interagency organization with representation from the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other federal agencies. FRMAC, in its present form, was created in 1987 when the radiological support mission was assigned to the DOE’s Nevada Operations Office by DOE Headquarters. The FRMAC asset, including its predecessor entities, was created, grew, and evolved to function as a response to radiological incidents. Radiological emergency response exercises showed the need for a coordinated approach to managing federal emergency monitoring and assessment activities. The mission of FRMAC is to coordinate and manage all federal radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities during a nuclear or radiological incident within the United States in support of state ,local, tribal governments, DHS, and the federal coordinating agency. Radiological emergency response professionals with the DOE’s national laboratories support the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). These teams support the FRMAC to provide: Atmospheric transport modeling; Radiation monitoring; Radiological analysis and data assessments; and Medical advice for radiation injuries In support of field operations, the FRMAC provides geographic information systems, communications, mechanical, electrical, logistics, and administrative support. The size of the FRMAC is tailored to the incident and is comprised of emergency response professionals drawn from across the federal government. State and local emergency response teams may also integrate their operations with FRMAC, but are not required to.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗