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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Criticality Accident Alarm System Modeling for the Uranium Processing Facility

The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) provides coverage for two primary processing facilities. For UPF, detailed documentation and drawings of the design are readily available. While this design information allows for some CAAS modeling features to match the actual design with a high level of accuracy, assumptions and simplifications are necessary as it is unrealistic and unnecessary to replicate many aspects of the design. A set of modeling guidelines and techniques were used to develop consistency between the MCNP6 models. While ensuring conservatism, overly conservative choices must be avoided to demonstrate the minimum accident of concern can be detected. To ensure proper modeling choices were made for the final models, a group of parametric studies were performed to evaluate the impact on the dose rates detected at the individual detectors. Some of these modeling choices and/or associated parametric studies include: - Modeling the grid steel area above the detectors as homogeneous stainless steel and determining the impact on detectability with an increasing density. - Modeling the presence of equipment in close proximity to the CAAS detectors. - Determining an appropriate material density to represent miscellaneous items not specifically modeled. - Evaluating the impact of sprinkler activation. The results of UPF CAAS analyses show that the modeling assumptions made based on the detailed design and parametric studies are appropriate and demonstrate accurate yet conservative models have been developed for detecting minimum accident of concern within the UPF.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Criticality Alarm Systems at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) has a number of criticality alarm systems (CAS) in the various facilities. The complexity of the plant creates some unique CAS problems. A detailed review of the CAS has been made to determine the level of compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. A major CAS upgrade project is currently in the design stage which will expand coverage and bring all CAS monitoring unshielded areas into full compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. Because DOE Orders do not contain an exclusion that exempts the need for CAS coverage in shielded areas as provided in ANSI 8.3-1986, a future CAS upgrade project is in the planning stage which will also upgrade the CAS coverage in shielded portions of the plant.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Technical Basis for the Uranium Processing Facility Criticality Accident Alarm System

The technical basis for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) 90% design has been completed. The CAAS design was evaluated for two primary processing facilities, the Main Processing Building (MPB) and the Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB), and for connected facilities known as the Personnel Support Building (PSB) and the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials facility (HEUMF) Connector (HCON), which connects UPF to existing Y-12 facilities. The evaluation focused on three primary areas to address requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.3: (1) detectability of the minimum accident of concern; (2) determination of areas where total dose could exceed 12 rad for the maximum anticipated accident yield; and (3) evaluation of the radiation tolerance of the detectors and associated control cabinets. The design was based on extensive analyses performed in MCNP6.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2013

Guide to Performing Computational Analysis of Criticality Accident Alarm Systems

This document provides guidance on performing computational analyses of Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS). A brief overview of ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997 (R2012), the standard that the United States Department of Energy uses to guide the placement of CAAS detectors, is provided with a focus on the parts of the standard that are most applicable to calculating CAAS detector responses and evaluating CAAS detector coverage. This is followed by a brief discussion of how CAAS detector response calculations differ from eigenvalue calculations that criticality safety practitioners perform regularly. The remainder of the document provides computational examples of how to determine the minimum accident of concern according to ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997 (R2012), how to calculate the response of a CAAS detector due to a specific criticality accident, and how to evaluate the coverage of a CAAS detector for criticality accidents. These practical examples are solved applying SCALE 6.1 and MCNP5, but the methodologies can be applied to other radiation transport codes with similar capabilities, including deterministic codes.

Miller, Thomas Martin↗
NASA NTRS1987

Visual display and alarm system for wind tunnel static and dynamic loads

A wind tunnel balance monitor and alarm system developed at NASA Ames Research Center will produce several beneficial results. The costs of wind tunnel delays because of inadvertent balance damage and the costs of balance repair or replacement can be greatly reduced or eliminated with better real-time information on the balance static and dynamic loading. The wind tunnel itself will have enhanced utility with the elimination of overly cautious limits on test conditions. The microprocessor-based system features automatic scaling and 16 multicolored LED bargraphs to indicate both static and dynamic components of the signals from eight individual channels. Five individually programmable alarm levels are available with relay closures for internal or external visual and audible warning devices and other functions such as automatic activation of external recording devices, model positioning mechanisms, or tunnel shutdown.

Hanly, Richard D.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Visual display and alarm system for wind tunnel static and dynamic loads

A wind tunnel balance monitor and alarm system developed at NASA Ames Research Center will produce several beneficial results. The costs of wind tunnel delays because of inadvertent balance damage and the costs of balance repair or replacement can be greatly reduced or eliminated with better real-time information on the balance static and dynamic loading. The wind tunnel itself will have enhanced utility with the elimination of overly cautious limits on test conditions. The microprocessor-based system features automatic scaling and 16 multicolored LED bargraphs to indicate both static and dynamic components of the signals from eight individual channels. Five individually programmable alarm levels are available with relay closures for internal or external visual and audible warning devices and other functions such as automatic activation of external recording devices, model positioning mechanism, or tunnel shutdown.

Hanly, Richard D.↗
DOE OSTI2013

Guidance Detailing Methods to Calculate Criticality Accident Alarm System Detector Response and Coverage

This paper is an extended summary of a guidance document that was produced by Oak Ridge National Laboratory on the subject of computational analyses of Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS). This full guidance document reviews ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997 and provides examples on how to calculate the fission rate that produces the minimum accident of concern, how to calculate the response of a CAAS detector, and how to evaluate the coverage of a CAAS detector. Discussing a strategy on how to perform CAAS placement analysis concludes the full guidance document. All of the examples in the full guidance document are performed with SCALE 6.1 and MCNP5, and the full input files for both are provided. This extended summary of the full guidance document only reviews ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997, calculates the fission rate that produces the minimum accident of concern for a simple example, and provides an example for one of the approaches suggested in the CAAS placement analysis strategy that uses a forward Monte Carlo transport calculation.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Event Response and Criticality Alarm Systems [Slides]

The smallest accident, in terms of fission yield and dose rate, that a criticality alarm system is required to detect. Need for a CAS shall be evaluated for all activities in which the inventory in individual unrelated areas exceeds 700g U-235, 500g U-233, 450 g Pu-239 OR 450g of any combination of these three isotopes. Unique configurations exist such that critical mass requirements may be less than the limits noted above.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Health Physics Research Reactor Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Overview [Slides]

This presentation discusses the Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) or Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) and how available data from Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) operation to can be used to create a benchmark report for inclusion in the ICSBEP, as a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmark. The evaluation of experimental data is also presented, specifically four experimental candidates are considered of potential value for the benchmark: 1. Neutron source estimation from a HPRR pulse (energy spectrum, fission yield), 2. Threshold Detector Unit (TDU) measurements at different distances from a HPRR pulse, shielded and unshielded, 3. Sulfur pellet activation at different distances from a HPRR pulse, shielded and unshielded, and 4. Total neutron fluence from a HPRR pulse measured by Bonner Sphere Spectrometry, shielded and unshielded. Additionally, a benchmark model overview is discussed as are sample calculation results.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Final Report for the Testing of the Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor (IER-443)

This report documents the experimental conditions and final results for the performance testing of the Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experimental Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The testing followed a previously issued test plan and was conducted during the week of July 17, 2017, with completion on Thursday July 20. The test subjected CAAS detectors supplied by Y-12 to very intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields to establish compliance to maximum radiation and minimum pulse width requirements. ANSI/ANS- 8.3.1997 states that the “system shall be sufficiently robust as to actuate an alarm signal when exposed to the maximum radiation expected”, which has been defined at Y-12, in Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs), to be a dose rate of 10 Rad/s. ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997 further states that “alarm actuation shall occur as a result of a minimum duration transient” which may be assumed to be 1 msec. The pulse widths and dose rates provided by each burst during the test exceeded those requirements. The CAAS detectors all provided an immediate alarm signal and remained operable after the bursts establishing compliance to the requirements and fitness for re-deployment at Y-12.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2011

SILENE Benchmark Critical Experiments for Criticality Accident Alarm Systems

In October 2010 a series of benchmark experiments was conducted at the Commissariat a Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA) Valduc SILENE [1] facility. These experiments were a joint effort between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the French CEA. The purpose of these experiments was to create three benchmarks for the verification and validation of radiation transport codes and evaluated nuclear data used in the analysis of criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs). This presentation will discuss the geometric configuration of these experiments and the quantities that were measured and will present some preliminary comparisons between the measured data and calculations. This series consisted of three single-pulsed experiments with the SILENE reactor. During the first experiment the reactor was bare (unshielded), but during the second and third experiments it was shielded by lead and polyethylene, respectively. During each experiment several neutron activation foils and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were placed around the reactor, and some of these detectors were themselves shielded from the reactor by high-density magnetite and barite concrete, standard concrete, and/or BoroBond. All the concrete was provided by CEA Saclay, and the BoroBond was provided by Y-12 National Security Complex. Figure 1 is a picture of the SILENE reactor cell configured for pulse 1. Also included in these experiments were measurements of the neutron and photon spectra with two BICRON BC-501A liquid scintillators. These two detectors were provided and operated by CEA Valduc. They were set up just outside the SILENE reactor cell with additional lead shielding to prevent the detectors from being saturated. The final detectors involved in the experiments were two different types of CAAS detectors. The Babcock International Group provided three CIDAS CAAS detectors, which measured photon dose and dose rate with a Geiger-Mueller tube. CIDAS detectors are currently in use at Y-12 in the newly constructed Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility. The second CAAS detector used a 6 LiF TLD to absorb neutrons and a silicon detector to count the charge particles released by these absorption events. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory provided four of these detectors, which had formerly been used at the Rocky Flats facility in the United States.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Evaluation of the concrete shield compositions from the 2010 criticality accident alarm system Benchmark experiments at the CEA VALDUC silene facility - 14454

In October 2010, a series of benchmark experiments were conducted at the French Commissariat a l'energie Atomique et aux energies Alternatives (CEA) Valduc SILENE facility. These experiments were a joint effort between the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and the CEA. The purpose of these experiments was to create three benchmarks for the verification and validation of radiation transport codes and evaluated nuclear data used in the analysis of criticality accident alarm systems. This series of experiments consisted of three single-pulsed experiments with the SILENE reactor. For the first experiment, the reactor was bare (unshielded), whereas in the second and third experiments, it was shielded by lead and polyethylene, respectively. The polyethylene shield of the third experiment had a cadmium liner on its internal and external surfaces, which vertically was located near the fuel region of SILENE. During each experiment, several neutron activation foils and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were placed around the reactor. Nearly half of the foils and TLDs had additional high-density magnetite concrete, high-density barite concrete, standard concrete, and/or BoroBond shields. CEA Saclay provided all the concrete, and the US Y-12 National Security Complex provided the BoroBond. Measurement data from the experiments were published at the 2011 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC 2011) and the 2013 Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD 2013) topical meeting. Preliminary computational results for the first experiment were presented in the ICNC 2011 paper, which showed poor agreement between the computational results and the measured values of the foils shielded by concrete. Recently the hydrogen content, boron content, and density of these concrete shields were further investigated within the constraints of the previously available data. New computational results for the first experiment are now available that show much better agreement with the measured values. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Health Physics Research Reactor Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Overview

From the countless critical experiments performed in the world during the past century, high-quality integral benchmarks experiments have been collected and gathered into the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook), managed by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Working Group. This information preservation and dissemination effort is crucial for reactor licensing as well as criticality and radiation transport modeling validation. This summary reports on the status of a tentative benchmark addition to the ICSBEP Handbook. The proposed benchmark arises from legacy operation data of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR). The HPRR was a small, unmoderated, unshielded fast burst reactor that was used for research in health physics and radiobiology as well as teaching and training. As part of a comprehensive investigation of the available HPRR operation data and characteristics, different possibilities for use of the valuable results were studied. A critical experiment benchmark evaluation was performed, analyzing data coming from sub-critical and critical operation of the HPRR during operator training, steady-state irradiation of samples and before critical bursts. The results of the evaluation do not satisfy for the ICSBEP standards as the benchmark relative standard uncertainty is of about 4% for k eff , and the relative difference between sample calculations and expected k eff results is of about 1.5%. Due to those unsatisfactory results, it was decided not to pursue critical experiments evaluation of the HPRR presently and to focus instead on shielding type data for the creation of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) and shielding category benchmark, which is currently very scarce in the ICSBEP handbook—especially concerning critical, pulsed assembly, or reactor operation data. Several dosimetry and shielding experiments from HPRR burst operation were evaluated, with different benchmark metrics as sulfur fluence, Element 57 dose, or neutron fluence at different distances and under different shield materials conditions. An evaluation focusing on the Element 57 neutron dose as a benchmark metric was submitted to the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) meeting in October 2021, and the inclusion of the evaluation in the ICSBEP Handbook was deferred. The main change proposed by the international experiment evaluation experts is to use the neutron fluence measured by Bonner spheres as a benchmark metric. This represents a quantity closer to that actually measured by the experimentalists of the HPRR compared to the Element 57 dose, which adds another step of data transformation, thus potentially adding uncertainty to the benchmark. The evaluation has been updated and will be submitted to the 2022 ICSBEP TRG meeting for inclusion in the 2023 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. The evaluation is performed using the KENO and MAVRIC combination from the SCALE 6.2.4 code suite which was previously used in similar CAAS benchmarks to allow for the use of variance reduction techniques.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

UPF and Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Radiation Testing Report

This report documents the experimental conditions and results for the testing of the Mirion Technologies CAAS-3S Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The testing was conducted at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) during the week of January 11, 2021. The testing was conducted in accordance with 25774-QL-POA-JR00-00002-VDE-27.0, CAAS-3S Radiation Testing of Cabinet Components Test Plan. The tests subjected the CAAS-3S system to intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields and to high integrated radiation doses. The purpose of the test was to environmentally qualify various CAAS-3S components in a radiation environment. Successful completion of the tests was predicated on the collaborative efforts of several organizations. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided dosimetry to estimate photon and neutron dose. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) manages the NCERC facility, operated the Godiva IV reactor, and provided field support for CAAS-3S placement and communications interface for data acquisition systems supplied by Mirion Technologies. Throughout the test campaign, Y-12 and UPF personnel provided technical support in determining changes to the test schedule, as needed, interpretation of the results, and comparison between the measured dosimetry data and predicted results. Throughout the test campaign, Mirion personnel provided technical support in the operation of the CAAS-3S system itself.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2012

MCNP6 for Criticality Accident Alarm Systems – A Primer

MCNP6 is a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) developed, general-purpose Monte Carlo radiation transport simulation package. The code is capable of transporting a broad range of particles for numerous applications. MCNP6 has continuous-energy neutron and photon physics that make it suitable for both criticality and shielding problems. The analysis of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) combines methodologies and techniques for both classes of problems, and the requisite knowledge for both is quite different in some areas. For this reason, a primer has been created with the focus on teaching criticality safety practitioners the Monte Carlo techniques needed to analyze a CAAS. This primer specifically focuses on the Monte Carlo transport techniques for CAAS design. The use of radiation transport codes is a small portion of the overall design process, which is preceded and followed by many other design calculations and decisions. Those readers unfamiliar with the design of CAAS systems are directed to a PNNL report by Greenfield, which gives a thorough overview of the CAAS design process. This document gives reference to applicable standards and regulatory requirements and how to meet them, which is not the subject of this primer. The PNNL report explains where radiation transport codes such as MCNP play a role in this process, and this primer is meant to provide a more in-depth set of lessons for this portion of the design process.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Evaluation of the concrete shield compositions from the 2010 criticality accident alarm system benchmark experiments at the CEA Valduc SILENE facility

In October 2010, a series of benchmark experiments were conducted at the French Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA) Valduc SILENE facility. These experiments were a joint effort between the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and the CEA. The purpose of these experiments was to create three benchmarks for the verification and validation of radiation transport codes and evaluated nuclear data used in the analysis of criticality accident alarm systems. This series of experiments consisted of three single-pulsed experiments with the SILENE reactor. For the first experiment, the reactor was bare (unshielded), whereas in the second and third experiments, it was shielded by lead and polyethylene, respectively. The polyethylene shield of the third experiment had a cadmium liner on its internal and external surfaces, which vertically was located near the fuel region of SILENE. During each experiment, several neutron activation foils and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were placed around the reactor. Nearly half of the foils and TLDs had additional high-density magnetite concrete, high-density barite concrete, standard concrete, and/or BoroBond shields. CEA Saclay provided all the concrete, and the US Y-12 National Security Complex provided the BoroBond. Measurement data from the experiments were published at the 2011 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC 2011) and the 2013 Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD 2013) topical meeting. Preliminary computational results for the first experiment were presented in the ICNC 2011 paper, which showed poor agreement between the computational results and the measured values of the foils shielded by concrete. Recently the hydrogen content, boron content, and density of these concrete shields were further investigated within the constraints of the previously available data. New computational results for the first experiment are now available that show much better agreement with the measured values.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗