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DOE OSTI2022

A Trilevel Model for Segmentation of the Power Transmission Grid Cyber Network

Network segmentation of a power grid's communication system can make the grid more resilient to cyberattacks. Here we develop a novel trilevel programming model to optimally segment a grid communication system, taking into account the actions of an information technology (IT) administrator, attacker, and grid operator. The IT administrator is allowed to segment existing networks, and the attacker is given a budget to inflict damage on the grid by attacking the segmented communication system. Finally, the grid operator can redispatch the grid after the attack to minimize damage. The resulting problem is a trilevel interdiction problem that we solve using a branch and bound algorithm for bilevel problems. We demonstrate the benefits of optimal network segmentation through case studies on the 9-bus Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) system and the 30-bus IEEE system. These examples illustrate that network segmentation can significantly reduce the threat posed by a cyberattacker.

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DOE OSTI2021

Tri-Level Scheduling Model Considering Residential Demand Flexibility of Aggregated HVACs and EVs Under Distribution LMP

Residential loads, especially heating, ventilation and air conditioners (HVACs) and electric vehicles (EVs), have great potentials to provide demand flexibility which is an attribute of grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEB). Under this new paradigm, first, EV and HVAC aggregator models are developed in this paper to represent the fleet of GEBs, in which the aggregated parameters are obtained based on a new approach of data generation and least squares parameter estimation (DG-LSPE), which can deal with heterogeneous HVACs. Then, a tri-level bidding and dispatching framework is established based on competitive distribution operation with distribution locational marginal price (DLMP). Furthermore, the first two levels form a bilevel model to optimize the aggregators’ payment and to represent the interdependency between load aggregators and the distribution system operator (DSO) using DLMP, and the third level is to dispatch the optimal load aggregation to all residents by the proposed priority list-based demand dispatching algorithm. Finally, case studies on a modified IEEE 33-Bus system illustrate three main technical reasons of payment reduction due to demand flexibility: load shift, DLMP step changes, and power losses. They can be used as general guidelines for better decision-making for future planning and operation of demand response programs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

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