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Abstract In this work, we report a method that enables a standard electrostatic MEMS device to perform complex sensing functionalities, such as detecting the presence of helium without a sensing material or a conditioning circuit. Helium is a noble, odorless, non-reactive gas that is very challenging to detect. It is used in critical applications such as storing nuclear fuel waste inside a dry cask. In these applications, its leakage from the dry cask may indicate the cask's safe operation's degradation. A departure from the common practice of exciting the MEMS around its mechanical resonance, the method is based on exciting the MEMS around its electrical resonance circuit. This method shows that the tiny difference between the air dielectric constant (1.00059) and helium (1.000067) corresponding to only a few Femtofarad level capacitances produces a 25 mV difference without a conditioning circuit. Simulation results confirmed those findings and explored the sensor response at different operation conditions. This method eliminates the need for a heated microstructure and the need for absorption material. This method is not limited to gas sensing. It can be applied to other sensing mechanisms, such as acceleration and pressure measurements, and eliminate the complex circuit to read small capacitance in these applications.
Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is evaluated for structural failure during storage and transportation scenarios. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program has sponsored significant research in quantifying mechanical loads on SNF during storage and transportation scenarios using experimental and modeling methods. The SFWST program has also performed significant research on measuring the mechanical behavior of irradiated SNF as defueled cladding segments and cladding with fuel pellets to measure composite behavior. This paper considers some of the key material data from the Sibling Pin testing and uses structural modeling and analysis methods that have been informed by testing to consider post-yield acceptance criteria for SNF cladding structural analysis. Test data published by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) are the foundation for informing the material behavior of the models developed in this study. In particular, four-point bend (4PB) tests of fueled and defueled cladding segments provide significant information about the bending failure mode of SNF. ORNL’s 4PB test data is on fueled cladding segments, so the composite behavior of SNF is demonstrated. This paper describes PNNL’s coincident beam model that was developed to approximate the composite behavior of SNF. This paper also presents PNNL’s structural dynamic finite element models of a cask tip-over scenario, which is predicted to cause the strongest mechanical loads on SNF of all postulated storage and transportation scenarios. SNF bending loads predicted in the cask tip-over scenario and cladding acceptance criteria beyond yield are considered, with justification based on the Sibling Pin test data. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code stress intensity limits are also considered. The ultimate goal of this work is to aid in the justification of structural acceptance criteria for SNF cladding beyond the cladding’s irradiated yield strength for use in structural analysis of all storage and transportation scenarios.
The US is among seven partner nations in a collaborative effort to design, build, and demonstrate fusion’s ability to be a large-scale carbon free energy source. Each country has its own Domestic Agencies (DA) that contribute directly to the ITER project. US ITER, which is a DOE Office of Science project managed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, is developing world class engineering solutions to the design, construction, and assembly of the burning plasma experiment that can demonstrate the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion. US ITER’s scope includes completing the preliminary and final design, qualifying materials and processes for manufacture and testing, executing manufacturing, and delivering the Fueling Pellet Injection System (FPIS) to the ITER site for assembly. The US-ITER FPIS system is designed to inject cryogenically frozen pellets of deuterium-tritium (D-T) into the plasma. The FPIS has two main functions: 1. Provide a steady supply of deuterium and tritium fuel, 2. Mitigating the impact of edge localized modes on the plasma facing components. The FPIS will have the capability to reside in three port cells within a tritium second barrier containment cask. Each pellet cask contains three flight tubes linking with penetrations on the torus cryopump housing and vacuum vessel (VV): two for the magnetic high field side (HFS) pellet injection and one for the magnetic low field side (LFS) pellet injection. This paper presents results of the thermal-structural analyses of the FPIS flight tube structural components when subjected to various loads such as electromagnetic (EM) loads, nuclear heating, seismic, and operational, and dynamic shock events. The resulting temperatures and stresses under combined conditions have been found to satisfy the design criteria to ensure safe and reliable operation of the FPIS flight tubes within the vacuum vessel.
This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating, and testing an integrated security and safety monitoring system (ISSMS) for railcars used to transport spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in the United States. The system will comply with the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Order 460.2B “Departmental Materials Transportation Management” and the Association of American Railroads’ (AAR) standard S-2043 “Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High-level Radioactive Material” [1] developed specifically for railcars used to transport high-level radioactive material (HLRM). DOE is in the process of developing and testing an ISSMS that will satisfy both DOE requirements and AAR standards. DOE has already developed railcar designs for transportation of HLRM. In 2024, DOE’s Atlas railcar project completed the design, fabrication and testing of three railcar types: transportation cask-carrying, buffer, and security escort, resulting in AAR conditional approval to operate on freight rail networks in North America. DOE decided to combine the required security and safety systems into one system, and this combined system is the subject of the current effort. DOE is developing and proposes to implement the ISSMS for these railcars as part of the build out of the railcar fleet. DOE began planning for development of the ISSMS in February 2020. The project is divided into seven phases starting with conceptual design and continuing through production design, as shown in Figure 1. An earlier version of the system was tested as part of the Atlas railcar consist demonstration test run in 2023. This paper describes the design features and system testing using the Atlas project railcars, and laboratory testing completed to date. The paper will also describe the activities planned to support the DOE project to ship the High Burn-Up Research Cask (HBRC) in 2027.
This artifact is a slide presentation about spent HEU core removal of a Chinese-built Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). The presentation describes the Skoda VPVR/M cask in detail and the auxiliary equipment needed to safely remove the spent HEU and transport it. Removal activities of MNSR spent HEU from Ghana and Nigeria MNSRs, and air transport from these countries to China are discussed. The International MNSR Training Facility in Ghana is also mentioned.
Nuclear energy is among the cleanest and most efficient energy sources currently available. The operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) produces large amounts of high-level radioactive waste known as spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently, large amounts of SNF is stored in dry cask storage systems (DCSSs) for extended interim storage until a permanent disposal solution becomes available. During the extended interim storage, the DCSS, particularly the SNF canisters, may degrade and abnormal conditions may occur. Therefore, non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and machine learning (ML) approaches are necessary for inspection of SNF canisters. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of literature by summarizing recent progress made on the applications of NDE and ML for inspection of SNF canisters. Sixteen NDE methods are examined and compared: visual inspection, ultrasonic guided waves (UGWs), laser-based approaches, acoustic emission (AE), eddy current testing (ECT), non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, cosmic ray muons tomography, neutron imaging, gamma rays detection, fiber optical sensors, through-wall communications, X-ray computed tomography (CT), vibrothermography, monoenergetic photon sources, and surface acoustic wave (SAW) sensors. The technology readiness level (TRL) for each method is assessed and compared. Recent publications on ML-enhanced visual inspection, AE, non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, and neutron imaging for SNF canisters are summarized and future research needs are identified. In conclusion, this review article provides a convenient reference on the state-of-the-art applications of NDE and ML methods for inspection of SNF canisters.
The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The remaining unrecovered material will be discarded to the high activity drain (HAD) system in SRNL. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets will be loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 lengths) will then be processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration; acidic dissolution and filtration, Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) cation exchange; and DGA calcination. This processing will result in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which will be removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which will be removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials will be packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). All equipment to carry out this process was designed, procured or fabricated, and installed in a mock-up facility (716-4A) at SRS to allow for simulation testing in a non-radioactive area. This equipment was then dismantled and transferred from 716-4A to 773-A and installed in the SRNL Shielded Cells. After installation in the shielded cells facility testing was performed using water followed by surrogates and cold chemicals. Issues were identified during these evaluations, including equipment issues as well as technical challenges. Many of the issues were rectified during performance of the cold runs, and the remaining have a resolution identified. Table ES-1 provides a summary of all issues identified during the cold run operations, as well as the status and identified resolutions to outstanding issues.
In 2012, NUREG/CR-7109 reported on the validation of burnup credit calculations involving major and minor actinides and major fission products which was investigated for pressurized and boiling water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel enrichments up to 5 wt% 235 U and assembly-average burnups up to 60 GWd/MTU. Recently, there has been interest in increasing the maximum enrichment used in PWR fuel as high as 8 wt% 235 U and correspondingly increasing the maximum assembly-average burnups to approximately 75 GWd/MTU. These proposed increases in enrichment and burnup necessitate reinvestigation of the validation basis for k eff calculations for this expanded application space. Additionally, the 2012 study was performed by using the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF)/B-VII.0 nuclear data with the SCALE 6 covariance library, and the effects of using the newly released ENDF/B-VII.1 and ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data and covariance libraries should be evaluated. In this work, published in NUREG/CR-7309 in 2025, the validation assessment was performed consistently with NUREG/CR-7109: modeling irradiated fuel assemblies in the Generic Burnup Credit (GBC)-32 cask defined in NUREG/CR-6747. The TSUNAMI-3D sequence was used to generate sensitivity data for the application model, and the data were compared with sensitivity data from select benchmark models. The integral parameter c k is the metric of similarity used in this study and is consistent with NUREG/CR-7109, where a c k value in excess of 0.8 indicates sufficient similarity for use in validation. A new set of benchmark experiments with sensitivity data has been assembled for this effort. The number of experiments with available sensitivity data is now 2,104, compared to 474 in NUREG/CR-7109. This increase was facilitated by the efforts of the Nuclear Energy Agency to generate sensitivity data for a majority of the experiments in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook to supplement the data available in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID). The complete set of benchmarks considered here includes experiments for low-enriched uranium (LEU), intermediate enriched uranium (IEU), and a mixture of uranium and plutonium (MIX) from the ICSBEP Handbook and VALID, as well as ORNL models of the Haut Taux de Combustion (HTC) experiments and other potentially relevant models not included in VALID. The updated similarity study shows that none of the extended burnup and higher enrichment combinations considered show a significant decrease in the number of potentially applicable experiments, meaning sufficient critical experiments exist for the validation of BUC criticality safety calculations, with initial enrichments up to 8 wt% 235 U and burnups up to 80 GWd/MTU. Additionally, both the ENDF/B-VII.1 and ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data libraries can be used for validation since the number of critical experiments applicable for validation increases for most cases with the most recent nuclear data compared to the previous one. As in previous BUC validation studies, the French HTC experiments are the most similar in a majority of the application cases studied, especially from representative discharge burnups ranging from 40 to 80 GWd/MTU. In conclusion, these results match the conclusions presented in NUREG/CR-7109 regarding validation of the primary actinides in BUC analyses.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is leading the National effort to manage the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, encompassing the safe transportation, storage/staging, and/or eventual disposal of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and high-level radioactive waste. The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is DOE’s discrete-event, agent-based simulation tool designed to model the full life cycle of UNF from reactor discharge to final disposal. NGSAM supports the DOE Office of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition by enabling a detailed, scenario-based analysis of logistics, infrastructure, and shipping strategies. NGSAM replaces legacy models with a modern, flexible platform built on Repast Simphony and enhanced by the Process Analysis Tool. NGSAM simulates the movement and interaction of individual fuel assemblies with system components such as canisters, casks, railcars, and facilities. The model integrates with the Java Transportation Operations Model to plan and execute transportation scenarios, supporting both constrained and unconstrained resource allocation. Key features include customizable allocation and acceptance algorithms, detailed facility-level operations, and a Quick Edit tool for rapid scenario adjustments. NGSAM supports multimodal transportation modeling (e.g. rail, road, barge) and provides comprehensive cost, schedule, and infrastructure data. NGSAM utilizes data from sources such as DOE’s STANDARDS UNF database and DOE’s Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation, while also allowing user-defined inputs for scenario customization. NGSAM enables stakeholders to evaluate complex UNF management strategies, assess system performance under varying assumptions, and inform decision making for future infrastructure investments. Its modular architecture and integration with other Integrated Waste Management System tools make it a critical asset for planning the safe and efficient disposition of the Nation’s growing UNF inventory.
Criticality safety analyses are conducted to show compliance with regulatory standards and to demonstrate safe operational conditions during the storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel. Given the increased interest in the industry in low-enriched uranium plus (LEU+) and higher-burnup fuel, it is important to study the impact of such fuels’ use on criticality safety analyses and the resulting nuclear data–induced uncertainties. Here, in this work, nominal pressurized water reactor assemblies with LEU+ fuel enrichments up to 8 wt% 235 U and high burnups up to 80 GWd/tonne U were studied. The assemblies were placed in a generic burnup credit cask GBC-32. As a result of the different covariance libraries, using the ENDF/B-VII.1 nuclear data library consistently resulted in lower nuclear data uncertainties than did the use of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 data library. The highest contribution in the nuclear data–induced uncertainties resulted from the major actinides, and their contribution increased with increasing burnup and enrichment.
The U.S. Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is planning to conduct a series of full-scale shake table tests to simulate hypothetical earthquake conditions and record the response of surrogate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in a dry canister storage system mockup. The shake table motions will represent a range of hypothetical earthquake conditions at hypothetical locations in the continental U.S. to generally define the range of mechanical loads that SNF can be expected to experience during extended dry storage periods. This paper describes the pretest predictions made with LS-DYNA models of the mockup storage systems. The test will use two dry storage system configurations, a mockup vertical concrete cask (VCC) and a mockup horizontal storage module (HSM). The test will use a production-quality canister and basket. Within the canister will be four instrumented fuel assemblies with fuel rods containing surrogate mass and 28 instrumented dummy assemblies that are intended to match the mass and outer dimension of a fuel assembly. The finite element models include models of the VCC and HSM on the shake table to calculate the system level dynamic responses and separate single fuel assembly models to calculate stress and strain in fuel assembly components. Both types of models include nonlinear behavior like rod-to-rod contact and the ability for VCC’s to rock and slide. This paper presents the expected response of the VCC, HSM, and fuel assemblies to the shake table testing that is planned to start in April of 2024. The earthquake conditions represent seismic hazards in the 2,000-to-20,000-year return period range. The test data is expected to confirm the expectation that fuel rod cladding will remain intact, fuel assembly structural components like guide tubes will remain intact, and no significant VCC sliding or tipping will occur in the range of conditions to be tested with the shake table.
A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model was built to simulate planned testing of heater assemblies within a canister and overpack for the Hanford Lead Canister (HLC) project. The HLC is a canister storage system that will contain heaters to simulate the decay heat of nuclear material and provide the canister storage system with environmental conditions equivalent to the operating conditions on a dry storage pad. The HLC will be equipped with long-term data collection and monitoring systems to provide an early warning of corrosion, pitting, cracking, or other signs of canister degradation that might threaten the integrity of the containment boundary over the potentially long term of dry storage. An important part of the HLC development is to make pretest numerical predictions for the behavior of the heated canister during the simulated radiolytic decay heat testing, which simulates the dry storage system during loading operations. The simulated radiolytic decay heat test is planned for mid-2024 in a configuration that includes the heater assembly, overpack, and canister, but with the lids removed to allow loading cesium and strontium capsules into the canister. One of the goals of the test is to evaluate the thermal behavior of the canister and overpack assembly in the ambient air of the test facility, which will provide data critical to validating the thermal models and understanding how the HLC will perform as a system once deployed. To best approximate real-world conditions, the CFD model includes the full air volume of the mock-up truck bay the heated canister test will be performed in, enabling detailed investigation of how the heated canister affects airflow around it. Rigorous pre-deployment testing of the complete HLC cask and canister system is intended to be completed before the HLC is deployed in the 2028 timeframe. This study presents the pre-test temperature predictions of the simulated radiolytic decay heat test. A description of the heater assembly, canister, and overpack system is presented. The model was developed with the commercial CFD software STAR-CCM+. An uncertainty analysis was run with the CFD model to determine the uncertainty in the temperature predictions and provide a range over which the predicted temperatures are expected to vary. The uncertainty analysis was preformed by coupling STAR-CCM+ with the software Dakota, which provides advanced parametric analyses, including quantification of margins and uncertainty with computational models. This work is expected to provide insight into SNF canister behavior.
This report incorporates our work carried out during our 5-month internship at LANL under an internship agreement with EAMEA (École des Applications Militaires de l’Énergie Atomique). After outlining the context in which we worked, we present our work as aid to modeling and predicting the neutronic behavior of nuclear systems, with a view to carrying out criticality experiments qualifying the MCNP code as part of innovative projects. Fourth generation reactors will enable to tackle a lot of issues such as environmental crisis, affordable energy access, and nuclear waste management. They seem to be one of the keys for a sustainable future. Most of the projects that emerge nowadays include the use of HALEU (high assay low enriched uranium) or MOX recycled fuels. Our projects are part of this dynamic and addresses concrete scientific research issues in the nuclear field. Studies of HALEU package are essential to anticipate the need, therefore the Optimus L (OPTImal Modular Universal Shipping cask technology) designed by NAC (Nuclear Assurance Corporation) international but filled with 20 % enriched uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) will be studied to support safe transportation. However, it seems there is no benchmark with a high correlation with the combination of this fuel and this package to validate MCNP simulations. As such, the study will focus on the development of new criticality safety benchmarks for this case. On the other hand, there is a great need for critical benchmarks in the intermediate energy range with MOX fuel. An IER (Integral Experiment Request) has then be requested to answer it through a partnership between French institution IRSN and U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). This experience planned for 2025 requires to gather calculated data through a MCNP model to be realized safely. Finally, a presentation of our one-week experience at the DAF as part of our discovery of criticality experiments will be introduced in Appendix 1: Week at the DAF (Device Assembly Facility)
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) has tasked PNNL to address the regulatory challenges associated with confirming the safe transport of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs) containing irradiated nuclear fuel. A previous report—Proposed Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for Approval of Microreactor Transportation Packages (PNNL-31867)—determined that the expected radioactive inventory in the irradiated fuel of a TNPP would likely require shipment in an NRC-approved Type B package (or spent nuclear fuel cask) but that a TNPP “package” is unlikely to meet the entire suite of NRC requirements set forth in Part 71 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for a Type B package. It was therefore concluded that shipment of this initial TNPP transportation package, as well as possibly others, under existing regulations would likely require NRC approval using the 10 CFR 71.12 (“Specific exemptions”) process that relies on risk-informed decision making supported by quantitative risk assessment (i.e., Probabilistic Risk Assessment).
The Engineered Barrier System (EBS) plays an important role in ensuring the long-term safety and containment of high-level waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in deep geological repositories in salt formation. As part of a multi-barrier system, the EBS works alongside the natural barrier, which is the salt formation itself and the technical barrier comprising the disposal casks. The primary function of the EBS is to maintain containment during a defined period until the backfill used in the repository made of crushed salt, develops its sealing capacity through compaction. Over the time, the backfill eventually compacts to a state of low porosity and permeability, acting as a long-term seal. However, until this process is complete, the EBS must retain its structural and functional integrity. Regulatory guidelines in Germany currently require the EBS to remain effective for up to next ice age, that is expected in 50,000 years. The significant hydro-geological and topographic changes expected during an ice age could make it impossible to accurately predict the hydro-chemical conditions within the repository system at that time. In response to these challenges, BGE TECHNOLOGY GmbH (BGE TEC) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have jointly developed a comprehensive methodology for the design and safety assessment of engineered barrier systems within the scope of the RANGERS project. This methodology is tailored for repositories in salt formations. The developed methodology provides a structured approach for designing and assessing the performance of the EBS in salt-based repositories. It begins with defining a sealing concept based on the geological characteristics of the selected site and the overall repository design. The entire repository system, comprising the geological site, repository infrastructure, and EBS, is then subjected to a Features, Events, and Processes (FEP) analysis, focusing solely on those FEPs that affect the EBS. The derived FEPs help identify the loads and stresses acting on the EBS, which serve as the foundation for conducting an integrity assessment. This analysis helps predict the EBS’s evolution and performance over the regulatory time frame, feeding into integrated performance assessment simulations.