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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1985

Space Station crew safety alternatives study. Volume 2: Threat development

The first 15 years of accumulated space station concepts for initial operational capability (IOC) during the early 1990's were considered. Twenty-five threats to the space station are identified and selected threats addressed as impacting safety criteria, escape and rescue, and human factors safety concerns. Of the 25 threats identified, eight are discussed including strategy options for threat control: fire, biological or toxic contamination, injury/illness, explosion, loss of pressurization, radiation, meteoroid penetration, and debris.

Raasch, R. F.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Artificial intelligence for Space Station automation: Crew safety, productivity, autonomy, augmented capability

Artificial intelligence (AI) R&D projects for the successful and efficient operation of the Space Station are described. The book explores the most advanced AI-based technologies, reviews the results of concept design studies to determine required AI capabilities, details demonstrations that would indicate the existence of these capabilities, and develops an R&D plan leading to such demonstrations. Particular attention is given to teleoperation and robotics, sensors, expert systems, computers, planning, and man-machine interface.

Firschein, O.↗
NASA NTRS1988

The Flight Telerobotic Servicer Program

The Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) Program, initiated by NASA to provide new capabilities for task accomplishment in the space environment, is described. The FTS Program includes the following: a series of test flights, a ground-based supporting infrastructure, and a technology utilization and transfer process. The FTS Program strives to reduce Space Station dependence on crew EVA, improve crew safety, enhance crew utilization, provide remote servicing capabilities for platforms, and accelerate technology transfer from research to U.S. industry.

Townsend, John W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1990

NASA's first dexterous space robot

NASA is developing the Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS), a robotic device that can be teleoperated under constant command of a human operator or run by itself under human supervision. Plans call for the FTS to assist the astronauts in the assembly, maintenance, servicing, and inspection of Space Station Freedom. The FTS project is driven by five major objectives: to reduce Space Station dependence on crew EVA, improve crew safety, enhance crew utilization, promote remote servicing capabilities for platforms, and accelerate technology transfer from research to U.S. industry. Another part of the FTS project is a ground system that will support operations and system evolution. Not only will the FTS provide a needed operational capability during the assembly and operation of Space Station Freedom, it will also provide an expanding foundation for proving more advanced robotic and telepresence concepts in space.

Mccain, Harry G.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Airport ramp safety and crew performance issues

This study examined 182 ramp operations incident reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database, to determine which factors influence ramp operation incidents. It was found that incidents occurred more often during aircraft arrival operations than during departure operations; incidents occurred most often at the gate stop area, less so at the gate entry/exit areas, and least on the ramp fringe areas; and reporters cited fewer incidents when more ground crew were present. The authors offer suggestions for both airline management and flight crews to reduce the rate of ramp incidents.

Chamberlin, Roy↗
NASA NTRS2007

Crew Exploration Vehicle Ascent Abort Coverage Analysis

An important element in the design of NASA's Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is the consideration given to crew safety during various ascent phase failure scenarios. To help ensure crew safety during this critical and dynamic flight phase, the CEV requirements specify that an abort capability must be continuously available from lift-off through orbit insertion. To address this requirement, various CEV ascent abort modes are analyzed using 3-DOF (Degree Of Freedom) and 6-DOF simulations. The analysis involves an evaluation of the feasibility and survivability of each abort mode and an assessment of the abort mode coverage using the current baseline vehicle design. Factors such as abort system performance, crew load limits, thermal environments, crew recovery, and vehicle element disposal are investigated to determine if the current vehicle requirements are appropriate and achievable. Sensitivity studies and design trades are also completed so that more informed decisions can be made regarding the vehicle design. An overview of the CEV ascent abort modes is presented along with the driving requirements for abort scenarios. The results of the analysis completed as part of the requirements validation process are then discussed. Finally, the conclusions of the study are presented, and future analysis tasks are recommended.

Abadie, Marc J.↗
NASA NTRS2017

An Alternative Approach to Human Servicing of Crewed Earth Orbiting Spacecraft

As crewed spacecraft have grown larger and more complex, they have come to rely on spacewalks, or Extravehicular Activities (EVA), for assembly and to assure mission success. Typically, these spacecraft maintain all of the hardware and trained personnel needed to perform an EVA on-board at all times. Maintaining this capability requires up-mass, volume for storage of EVA hardware, crew time for ground and on-orbit training, and on-orbit maintenance of EVA hardware. This paper proposes an alternative methodology, utilizing either launch-on-need hardware and crew or regularly scheduled missions to provide EVA capability for space stations in low Earth orbit after assembly complete. Much the same way that one would call a repairman to fix something at their home these EVAs are dedicated to maintenance and upgrades of the orbiting station. For crew safety contingencies it is assumed the station would be designed such the crew could either solve those issues from inside the spacecraft or use the docked Earth to Orbit vehicles as a return lifeboat, in the same manner as the International Space Station (ISS) which does not rely on EVA for crew safety related contingencies. This approach would reduce ground training requirements for long duration crews, save Intravehicular Activity (IVA) crew time in the form of EVA hardware maintenance and on-orbit training, and lead to more efficient EVAs because they would be performed by specialists with detailed knowledge and training stemming from their direct involvement in the development of the EVA. The on-orbit crew would then be available to focus on the immediate response to any failures such as IVA systems reconfiguration or jumper installation as well as the day-to-day operations of the spacecraft and payloads. This paper will look at how current unplanned EVAs are conducted on ISS, including the time required for preparation, and offer an alternative for future spacecraft. As this methodology relies on the on-time and on-need launch of spacecraft, any space station that utilized this approach would need a robust transportation system, possibly including more than one launch vehicle capable of carrying crew. In addition, the fault tolerance of the future space station would be an important consideration in how much time was available for EVA preparation after the failure. Ideally the fault tolerance of the station would allow for the maintenance tasks to be grouped such that they could be handled by regularly scheduled maintenance visits and not contingency launches. Each future program would have to weigh the risk of on-time launch against the increase in available crew time for the main objective of the spacecraft. This is only one of several ideas that could be used to reduce or eliminate a station's reliance on rapid turnaround EVAs using on-board crew. Others could include having shirt-sleeve access to critical systems or utilizing low pressure temporarily pressurized equipment bays.

Mularski, John R.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Human aspects of mission safety

Recent discussions of psychology's involvement in spaceflight have emphasized its role in enhancing space living conditions and incresing crew productivity. While these goals are central to space missions, behavioral scientists should not lose sight of a more basic flight requirement - that of crew safety. This paper examines some of the processes employed in the American space program in support of crew safety and suggests that behavioral scientists could contribute to flight safety, both through these formal processes and through less formal methods. Various safety areas of relevance to behavioral scientists are discussed.

Connors, Mary M.↗
NASA NTRS1993

An Initial Mars Habitat (IMH)

As long duration, manned missions to Mars are studied for feasibility, the requirements to maintain a crew for two years in hostile environments while allowing productive and necessary work to occur, quickly becomes a driving force. Based on a mission scenario developed in the Explorations Program Office at the Johnson Space, the Initial Mars Habitat (IMH) explores one solution to providing a six person crew with the necessary hardware, logistics and environment to support a 500 day Martian surface stay. Many key issues drove the development of this initial concept; crew safety, logistics resupply, crew productivity and several critical mission element assumptions such as the limitations of a surface lander. Consideration of expansion beyond the first mission to an enhanced capability base was also integrated into the development of the IMH.

Gutierrez, D. J.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014 presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews. This poster presents an outline of Loss of Signal contents and highlights from each of five sections - the mission and mishap, the response, the investigation, the analysis and the future.

Stepaniak, Phillip C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

Patlach, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2008

Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Design in a Mass Reduction Exercise

Early Orion GN&C system designs optimized for robustness, simplicity, and utilization of commercially available components. During the System Definition Review (SDR), all subsystems on Orion were asked to re-optimize with component mass and steady state power as primary design metrics. The objective was to create a mass reserve in the Orion point of departure vehicle design prior to beginning the PDR analysis cycle. The Orion GN&C subsystem team transitioned from a philosophy of absolute 2 fault tolerance for crew safety and 1 fault tolerance for mission success to an approach of 1 fault tolerance for crew safety and risk based redundancy to meet probability allocations of loss of mission and loss of crew. This paper will discuss the analyses, rationale, and end results of this activity regarding Orion navigation sensor hardware, control effectors, and trajectory design.

Crain, Timothy↗
NASA NTRS1992

Orbital debris risk analysis and survivability enhancement for Freedom Station manned modules

This paper briefly reviews how 'probability of penetration' analyses are currently performed at NASA, and discusses extension of this procedure to a 'probability of loss' analysis through identifying penetration hazards and failure modes. It goes on to discuss alternatives for increasing crew safety through redesign and/or augmentation of interior manned module systems, and describes an elementary analysis maximizing crew safety considering one identified penetration-induced failure mode (depressurization) and one interior design factor (number of hatches open).

Williamsen, Joel E.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Project Artemis

The goals of Project Artemis are designed to meet the challege of President Bush to return to the Moon, this time to stay. The first goal of the project is to establish a permanent manned base on the Moon for the purposes of scientific research and technological development. The knowledge gained from the establishment and operations of the lunar base will then be used to achieve the second goal of Project Artemis, the establishment of a manned base on the Martian surface. Throughout both phases of the program, crew safety will be the number one priority. There are four main issues that have governed the entire program: crew safety and mission success, commonality, growth potential, and costing and scheduling. These issues are discussed in more detail.

Birchenough, Shawn↗
NASA NTRS2019

Risk Analysis Associated with Loss of Toxic Gases During Orion Landing and Recovery Operations

Mission, landing and recovery operations for the Orion crew module involve reentry into the Earth's atmosphere and the deployment of three Nomex parachutes to slow the descent before landing along the west coast of the United States. Orion may have residual fuel (hydrazine, N2H4) or coolant (ammonia, NH3) on board which are both highly toxic to crew in the event of exposure. These risks were evaluated using a first principles analysis approach through fluid dynamics modeling. Plume calculations were first performed with the ANSYS Fluent computational fluid dynamics code. Data were then extracted at locations relevant to crew safety such as the snorkel fan inlet and the egress hatch. Mixing calculations were performed to quantify exposure concentrations within the crew bay before and during egress and departure. Finally, results included herein were used to inform the Orion post-landing Concept of Operations (ConOps) so that strategies could be formulated to maintain crew safety in the event of the loss of fuel or coolant.

Orion↗
NASA NTRS2019

Orion Heat Shield Manufacturing Producibility Improvements for the EM-1 Flight Test Program

This paper describes how the Orion program is incorporating improvements in the heat shield design and manufacturing processes reducing programmatic risk and ensuring crew safety in support of NASA’s Exploration Missions. The Orion program successfully completed the EFT-1 flight test in 2014 and is currently developing the EM-1 spacecraft to meet the test objectives of an orbital mission to the moon and return to earth in 2019. Lessons learned from the EFT-1 manufacturing and flight test experience are being incorporated into a wide variety of vehicle systems and manufacturing processes to reduce risk to the Orion missions and flight crew. A critical contributor to crew safety is the heat shield that protects the crew capsule during re-entry through the earth’s atmosphere for return from deep space. The first flight test vehicle, EFT-1, was manufactured and tested in the Neil Armstrong Operations and Checkout (O&C) facility at KSC to demonstrate early risk reduction including the functionality of the Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) for capsule safe return to earth. The approach for the EFT-1 heat shield utilized a low risk approach using Apollo heritage design and manufacturing processes using an Avcoat TPS ablator with a honeycomb substrate to provide a one piece heat shield to meet the mission re-entry heating environments. The manufacturing processes used honeycomb cell injection guns which were redeveloped from the Apollo Lunar Program processes to build the EFT-1 heat shield. The completed heat shield was transported across the country by aircraft to the O&C at KSC for installation onto the capsule. The EFT-1 heat shield successfully performed its mission and experienced ~80% of the re-entry velocity (50% heating rate) for a lunar return for an Exploration Mission. The second flight test vehicle is the EM-1 mission which will have additional flight systems installed to fly to the moon and return. Heat shield design and producibility improvements have been incorporated in the EM-1 vehicle to meet deep space mission and programmatic requirements. The design continues to use the Avcoat material, but in a “block” configuration to enable improvements in the application processes as well as additional improvements in the carrier structure design and manufacturing operations. Incorporating flight test results and producibility improvements from EFT-1 for the heat shield system design and processes have improved the thermal protection capability, improved the producibility, and cost for EM-1 flight test.

Producibility↗