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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2012

Efforts to Reduce International Space Station Crew Maintenance Time in the Management of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit Transport Loop Water Quality

The EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) contains a semi-closed-loop re-circulating water circuit (Transport Loop) to absorb heat into a LCVG (Liquid Coolant and Ventilation Garment) worn by the astronaut. A second, single-pass water circuit (Feed-water Loop) provides water to a cooling device (Sublimator) containing porous plates, and that water sublimates through the porous plates to space vacuum. The cooling effect from the sublimation of this water translates to a cooling of the LCVG water that circulates through the Sublimator. The quality of the EMU Transport Loop water is maintained through the use of a water processing kit (ALCLR - Airlock Cooling Loop Remediation) that is used to periodically clean and disinfect the water circuit. Opportunities to reduce crew time associated with ALCLR operations include a detailed review of the historical water quality data for evidence to support an extension to the implementation cycle. Furthermore, an EMU returned after 2-years of use on the ISS (International Space Station) is being used as a test bed to evaluate the results of extended and repeated ALCLR implementation cycles. Finally, design, use and on-orbit location enhancements to the ALCLR kit components are being considered to allow the implementation cycle to occur in parallel with other EMU maintenance and check-out activities, and to extend the life of the ALCLR kit components. These efforts are undertaken to reduce the crew-time and logistics burdens for the EMU, while ensuring the long-term health of the EMU water circuits for a post- Shuttle 6-year service life.

Etter,David↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Down-Selection of Four Common Habitat Variants

The Common Habitat is a large habitat developed as an alternative architecture study, not part of the current NASA baseline, that uses the SLS core stage liquid oxygen tank as its primary structure. It has a gravity-independent internal architecture, such that identical units can be used on the lunar surface, Mars surface, and in microgravity. In developing the habitat, two key architectural questions emerged. Should the internal layout use a vertical or horizontal orientation of the tank? Should the crew size be four or eight? This led to the design of four variants: a four-crew horizontal, four-crew vertical, eight-crew horizontal, and eight-crew vertical. The four-crew variants use a shortened version of the tank while the eight-crew variants use the entire tank. The primary consideration applied for down-selection is the crew experience living and working in the habitat, inclusive of crew productivity, well-being, and survivability. Based on this consideration, a series of seven assessments were performed to compare the variants. This analysis was performed as an unfunded, volunteer activity leveraging civil servants across multiple field centers, most with expertise working in various Artemis teams. Additionally, the evaluation was limited to the use of CAD models, images, and spreadsheet data, with no resources available for mockups or Virtual Reality. A logistics analysis developed a standard logistics module and then estimated how much stowage could be carried onboard each Common Habitat and how many logistics modules are required by each variant for a given mission duration. It also considered the amounts of water to be stored in each variant. A functional analysis identified and compared the living and working functions across the habitats, ranking them relative to each other. A crew time assessment first estimated the total crew time, building a weekly crew timeline for both four and eight-person crews. It then allocated time to activities linked to living and working functions, comparing how much time was available for each function in each variant. A science productivity assessment developed a relative metric using crew time, science stowage, and assumed rates of experiment consumables use to analytically compare the four variants. It also comparatively ranked the habitats with respect to a number of subjective parameters and a workstation acceptability rating. A maintenance capacity assessment identified and compared eleven generic maintenance capabilities across the variants and also ranked them for their predicted ability to complete twelve fabrication, maintenance, and repair scenarios. A contingency responsiveness analysis examined twelve serious in-flight contingencies. For each scenario, the number of crew needed to respond were predicted and acceptability of various aspects of contingency response were evaluated, comparing the variants against each other. Finally, in a habitability assessment, 120 habitability characteristics reflecting 13 major categories were evaluated for each habitat. These results were compared to identify the most acceptable habitat in each category. Ultimately, the data favored the horizontal orientation over the vertical and an eight-person crew over four. Implications of selecting this variant are discussed, including specific architectural challenges that result from the use of the full tank.

Habitability↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Down-Selection of Four Common Habitat Variants

The Common Habitat is a large habitat that uses the Space Launch System core stage liquid oxygen tank as its primary structure. It has a gravity-independent internal architecture, such that identical units can be used on the lunar surface, Mars surface, and in microgravity. In developing the habitat, two key architectural questions emerged. Should the internal layout use a vertical or horizontal orientation of the tank? Should the crew size be four or eight? This led to the design of four variants: a four-crew horizontal, four-crew vertical, eight-crew horizontal, and eight-crew vertical. The primary consideration applied for down-selection was the crew experience living and working in the habitat, inclusive of crew productivity, well-being, and survivability. Based on this consideration, a series of seven assessments was performed to compare the four variants. A stowage assessment developed a standard logistics module and then considered the amounts of water to be stored in each variant. It then estimated how much stowage could be carried onboard each Common Habitat and how many logistics modules are required by each variant for a given mission duration. A functional analysis identified and compared the living and working functions across the four habitat, ranking them relative to each other. A crew time assessment first estimated the total crew time, building a weekly crew timeline for both four and eight-person crews. It then allocated time to activities linked to living and working functions, comparing how much time was available for each function in each variant. A science productivity assessment developed a relative metric using crew time, science stowage, and assumed rates of experiment consumables use to analytically compare the four variants. It also comparatively ranked the habitats with respect to a number of subjective parameters and a workstation acceptability rating. A maintenance capacity assessment identified and compared eleven generic maintenance capabilities across the four variants and also ranked the variants for their predicted ability to complete twelve fabrication, maintenance, and repair scenarios. A contingency responsiveness analysis examined twelve serious in-flight contingencies. For each scenario, the number of crew needed to respond was predicted and acceptability of various aspects of contingency response was evaluated, comparing the four variants against each other. Finally, in a habitability assessment, 120 habitability characteristics reflecting 13 major categories were evaluated for each habitat. These results were compared to identify the most acceptable habitat in each category. Ultimately, the data was shown to favor the horizontal orientation over the vertical and an eight-person crew over four. Implications of selecting this variant are discussed, including specific architectural challenges that result from the use of the full SLS liquid oxygen tank.

Habitability↗
NASA NTRS2017

Integration of an Earth-Based Science Team During Human Exploration of Mars

NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) is an underwater spaceflight analog that allows a true mission-like operational environment and uses buoyancy effects and added weight to simulate different gravity levels. A mission was undertaken in 2016, NEEMO 21, at the Aquarius undersea research habitat. During the mission, the effects of varied oper-ations concepts with representative communication latencies as-sociated with Mars missions were studied. Six subjects were weighed out to simulate partial gravity and evaluated different operations concepts for integration and management of a simulated Earth-based science team (ST) who provided input and direction during exploration activities. Exploration traverses were planned in advance based on precursor data collected. Subjects completed science-related tasks including presampling surveys and marine-science-based sampling during saturation dives up to 4 hours in duration that simulated extravehicular activity (EVA) on Mars. A communication latency of 15 minutes in each direction between space and ground was simulated throughout the EVAs. Objective data included task completion times, total EVA time, crew idle time, translation time, ST assimilation time (defined as time available for the science team to discuss, to review and act upon data/imagery after they have been collected and transmitted to the ground). Subjective data included acceptability, simulation quality, capability assessment ratings, and comments. In addition, comments from both the crew and the ST were captured during the post-mission debrief. Here, we focus on the acceptability of the operations concepts studied and the capabilities most enhancing or enabling in the operations concept. The importance and challenges of designing EVA time-lines to account for the length of the task, level of interaction with the ground that is required/desired, and communication latency, are discussed.

Chappell, Steven P.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Component-Level Electronic-Assembly Repair (CLEAR) Synthetic Instrument Capabilities Assessment and Test Report

The role of synthetic instruments (SIs) for Component-Level Electronic-Assembly Repair (CLEAR) is to provide an external lower-level diagnostic and functional test capability beyond the built-in-test capabilities of spacecraft electronics. Built-in diagnostics can report faults and symptoms, but isolating the root cause and performing corrective action requires specialized instruments. Often a fault can be revealed by emulating the operation of external hardware. This implies complex hardware that is too massive to be accommodated in spacecraft. The SI strategy is aimed at minimizing complexity and mass by employing highly reconfigurable instruments that perform diagnostics and emulate external functions. In effect, SI can synthesize an instrument on demand. The SI architecture section of this document summarizes the result of a recent program diagnostic and test needs assessment based on the International Space Station. The SI architecture addresses operational issues such as minimizing crew time and crew skill level, and the SI data transactions between the crew and supporting ground engineering searching for the root cause and formulating corrective actions. SI technology is described within a teleoperations framework. The remaining sections describe a lab demonstration intended to show that a single SI circuit could synthesize an instrument in hardware and subsequently clear the hardware and synthesize a completely different instrument on demand. An analysis of the capabilities and limitations of commercially available SI hardware and programming tools is included. Future work in SI technology is also described.

Oeftering, Richard C.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Risk and Performance Assessment of Generic Mission Architectures: Showcasing the Artemis Mission

A has initiated a strong push to return face. In this work, we astronaut assess performance and risk for proposed mission architectures using a new Mission Architecture Risk Assessment (MARA) tool. The MARA tool can produce statistics about the availability of components and overall performance of the mission considering potential failures of any of its components. In a Monte Carlo approach, the tool repeats the mission simulation multiple times while a random generator lets modules fail according to their failure rates. The results provide statistically meaningful insights into the overall performance of the chosen architecture. A given mission architecture can be freely replicated in the tool, with the mission timeline and basic characteristics of employed mission modules (habitats, rovers, power generation units, etc.) specified in a configuration file. Crucially, failure rates for each module need to be known or estimated. The tool performs an event-driven simulation of the mission and accounts for random failure events. Failed modules can be repaired, which takes crew time but restores operations. In addition to tracking individual modules, MARA can assess the availability of predefined functions throughout the mission. For instance, the function of resource collection would require a rover to collect the resources, a power generation unit to charge the rover, and a resource processing module. Together, the modules that are required for a given function are called a functional group. Similarly, we can assess how much crew time is available to achieve a mission benefit (e.g. research, building a base, etc) as opposed to spending crew time on repairs. Here we employ the method on the proposed NASA Artemis mission. Artemis aims to return United States astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024. Results provide insights into mission failure probabilities, up- and downtime for individual modules and crew-time resources spent on the repair of failed modules. The tool also allows us to tweak the mission architecture in order to find setups that produce more favorable mission performance. As such, the tool can be an aid in improving the mission architect abling cost-benefit analysis for mission improvement.

Rumpf, Clemens M.↗
NASA NTRS1988

The US space station and its electric power system

The United States has embarked on a major development program to have a space station operating in low earth orbit by the mid-1990s. This endeavor draws on the talents of NASA and most of the aerospace firms in the U.S. Plans are being pursued to include the participation of Canada, Japan, and the European Space Agency in the space station. From the start of the program these was a focus on the utilization of the space station for science, technology, and commercial endeavors. These requirements were utilized in the design of the station and manifest themselves in: pressurized volume; crew time; power availability and level of power; external payload accommodations; microgravity levels; servicing facilities; and the ability to grow and evolve the space station to meet future needs. President Reagan directed NASA to develop a permanently manned space station in his 1984 State of the Union message. Since then the definition phase was completed and the development phase initiated. A major subsystem of the space station is its 75 kW electric power system. The electric power system has characteristics similar to those of terrestrial power systems. Routine maintenance and replacement of failed equipment must be accomplished safely and easily and in a minimum time while providing reliable power to users. Because of the very high value placed on crew time it is essential that the power system operate in an autonomous mode to minimize crew time required. The power system design must also easily accommodate growth as the power demands by users are expected to grow. An overview of the U.S. space station is provided with special emphasis on its electrical power system.

Thomas, Ronald L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Fifteen-minute Extravehicular Activity Prebreathe Protocol Using NASA's Exploration Atmosphere (8.2 psia/ 34% 02)

A TBDM DCS probability model based on an existing biophysical model of inert gas bubble growth provides significant prediction and goodness-of-fit with 84 cases of DCS in 668 human altitude exposures. 2. Model predictions suggest that 15-minute O2 prebreathe protocols used in conjunction with suit ports and an 8.2 psi, 34% O2, 66% N2 atmosphere may enable rapid EVA capability for future exploration missions with the risk of DCS ≤ 12%.  EVA could begin immediately at 6.0 psi, with crewmembers decreasing suit pressure to 4.3 psi after completing the 15-minute in-suit prebreathe. 3. Model predictions suggest that intermittent recompression during exploration EVA may reduce decompression stress by 1.8% to 2.3% for 6 hours of total EVA time. Savings in gas consumables and crew time may be accumulated by abbreviating the EVA suit N2 purge to 2 minutes (20% N2) compared with 8 minutes (5% N2) at the expense of an increase in estimated decompression risk of up to 2.4% for an 8-hour EVA.  Increased DCS risk could be offset by IR or by spending additional time at 6 psi at the beginning of the EVA.  Savings of 0.48 lb of gas and 6 minutes per person per EVA corresponds to more than 31 hours of crew time and 1800 lb of gas and tankage under the Constellation lunar architecture. 6. Further research is needed to characterize and optimize breathing mixtures and intermittent recompression across the range of environments and operational conditions in which astronauts will live and work during future exploration missions. 7. Development of exploration prebreathe protocols will begin with definition of acceptable risk, followed by development of protocols based on models such as ours, and, ultimately, validation of protocols through ground trials before operational implementation.

Abercromby, Andrew F. J.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Factors in International Space Station Integration Feasibility Assessments

The International Space Station, ISS, is a growing vehicle. The ISS configuration changes internally and externally with each ISS flight. Each flight adds resources and capabilities such as docking/berthing ports, power, stowage volume, heat rejection, and data processing capability. The configuration, capabilities and performance characteristics of the vehicle will be in flux until assembly complete. At the same time the knowledge about what is required to support humans involved in long duration space flight is also being greatly expanded. In addition to the changes occurring on-orbit, the situation on the ground is also very dynamic. Proposals for new ISS elements, proposed deletions of elements, changes to the ISS requirements, and changes to the planned configuration are always under evaluation. Furthermore, budgetary issues have driven the need to explore alternative options for the ISS . This environment has made the role of the technical integrator in the ISS program unique in that the baseline against which proposals are evaluated is always changing. The nature of the International Space Station Program adds another dimension to the integrators task. ISS program activities are spread across several centers: KSC, MSFC, GRC, DFRC, ARC and JSc. There are six International Partners/participants each with their own unique organizations. The prime contractor is in Texas, California and Alabama. And, the Space Shuttle Program as the launch vehicle provider is another major interface. In spite of the fluidity of the technical baseline, projections and organizational complexity, in the course of evaluating proposals and producing feasibility assessments there are factors, which frequently emerge as significant. These factors tend to be the limiting conditions when they come into play. The finite resources, which tend to limit the options for ISS are: upmass, life support and crew rescue capability, crew time, utilities, exercise equipment, and docking/berthing ports. Upmass requirements need to be developed for each option proposed. Short term and long term impacts to upmass are the result of the implementation and long term operations. The upmass requirements need to be met by the existing launch vehicles and any change in flight rate will be a significant cost driver. In addition, when any item is brought to the ISS careful consideration must be given to the on-board stowage and crew time available to unpack, transfer, stow and use these items. If stowage is not available then something must be returned, use of non-standard stowage negotiated or the item in question stays on the ground. Additional crew time requirements will impact available utilization time or crew off-duty time. When the human element is affected, such as, by increasing the number of crew members or changing the duration of the crew stay (longer or shorter) there is an additional set of factors that come into play. The main considerations are: rescue capability, exercise requirements and availability of equipment, resupply, and life support capability.

Watson, Patricia M.↗
NASA NTRS1988

A robotic system for automation of logistics functions on the Space Station

Spacecraft inventory management is currently performed by the crew and as systems become more complex, increased crew time will be required to perform routine logistics activities. If future spacecraft are to function effectively as research labs and production facilities, the efficient use of crew time as a limited resource for performing mission functions must be employed. The use of automation and robotics technology, such as automated warehouse and materials handling functions, can free the crew from many logistics tasks and provide more efficient use of crew time. Design criteria for a Space Station Automated Logistics Inventory Management System is focused on through the design and demonstration of a mobile two armed terrestrial robot. The system functionally represents a 0 gravity automated inventory management system and the problems associated with operating in such an environment. Features of the system include automated storage and retrieval, item recognition, two armed robotic manipulation, and software control of all inventory item transitions and queries.

Martin, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Demonstration of an Ultra-Short Channel Metal Monolith Catalytic Reactor for Trace Contaminant Control Applications

The International Space Station (ISS) Trace Contaminant Control Subassembly (TCCS) design is based upon proven, highly reliable technology. However, because its core unit operations rely upon expendable activated charcoal and an indirectly heated high temperature catalyst, annual logistics mass, crew time, and power consumption requirements are significant. To address this situation, a unique catalytic reactor design has been developed which is suitable for retrofit into the TCCS's high temperature catalytic oxidizer (HTCO) assembly. The unique design, which employs a metallic, ultra-short channel length monolith (USCM) catalyst substrate, was tested in a flight-like TCCS HTCO assembly to investigate its performance characteristics. Test results indicate that retrofitting the TCCS with a USCM-based catalytic reactor is feasible and that it may provide significant reductions in logistics mass, crew time, and power consumption. Savings indicated by test results are up to 81% for annual logistics, 56% for crew time, and 77% for startup transient duration. In addition, its demonstrated ability to operate in a power saving mode provides up to a 43% savings in average power consumption. A summary of the USCM demonstration test objectives, approach, results, and specific benefits to the TCCS's process economics are presented,

Perry, J. L↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Medical Training to Progressively Enable EIMO

Background. Onboard medical capabilities have greatly expanded over the history of the US space program. Newly identified space-related medical conditions, technological advances, and longer mission durations have led to an increasing need for on-demand medical expertise. Lengthy communications delays, lack of resupply and evacuation opportunities on exploration-class missions place an ever-increasing burden on the crew to provide medical care. Having adequate knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) available is an essential component of successful Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO). Without appropriate crew training and KSA, cutting-edge medical equipment has little value. Presumably, the crew will include a qualified physician; however, if the physician is incapacitated, a non-physician crew medical officer (CMO) will be needed. While more crew time is needed for medical training, there will be concomitant increases in preflight training demands for vehicle system management, operations, science, and contingencies. In truly independent operations, onboard resources such as just-in-time training, mixed reality, decision support tools, and AI-enabled chatbot “consultants” will be needed to augment KSA. Overview. Because of crew time constraints, topical priorities must be determined for preflight training. Curricula should be developed that emphasize management of conditions with relatively high incidence and morbidity/mortality. Defining the required KSA levels to treat each condition is essential, but all crewmembers should have basic lifesaving skills. Procedural and diagnostic training on live patients and simulators should be prioritized over classroom lectures. Crews must be trained with onboard equipment, resources, mixed reality, and AI-based decision support tools. Mission simulations should include medical problems with/without ground support and with appropriate communication delays. Certification guidelines for each level of KSA must be established. Skills rapidly decay for non-physician CMO’s; both pre-flight and in-flight refresher training will be needed. During spaceflight just-in-time training, simulations, and onboard CME with crew physician can help retain skills. Discussion. Medical technology, simulation design, mixed reality, and AI are advancing at a dizzying rate. Recognizing the severe constraints on crew time, it is critical that astronaut training is highly efficient and adapted to keep pace with new innovations both pre-flight and during exploration missions. These challenges will be discussed during this panel session.

Jay Lemery↗
NASA NTRS2003

Equivalent Mass versus Life Cycle Cost for Life Support Technology Selection

The decision to develop a particular life support technology or to select it for flight usually depends on the cost to develop and fly it. Other criteria such as performance, safety, reliability, crew time, and technical and schedule risk are considered, but cost is always an important factor. Because launch cost would account for much of the cost of a future planetary mission, and because launch cost is directly proportional to the mass launched, equivalent mass has been used instead of cost to select advanced life support technology. The equivalent mass of a life support system includes the estimated mass of the hardware and of the spacecraft pressurized volume, power supply, and cooling system that the hardware requires. The equivalent mass of a system is defined as the total payload launch mass needed to provide and support the system. An extension of equivalent mass, Equivalent System Mass (ESM), has been established for use in the Advanced Life Support project. ESM adds a mass-equivalent of crew time and possibly other cost factors to equivalent mass. Traditional equivalent mass is strictly based on flown mass and reflects only the launch cost. ESM includes other important cost factors, but it complicates the simple flown mass definition of equivalent mass by adding a non-physical mass penalty for crew time that may exceed the actual flown mass. Equivalent mass is used only in life support analysis. Life Cycle Cost (LCC) is much more commonly used. LCC includes DDT&E, launch, and operations costs. For Earth orbit rather than planetary missions, the launch cost is less than the cost of Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDTBE). LCC is a more inclusive cost estimator than equivalent mass. The relative costs of development, launch, and operations vary depending on the mission destination and duration. Since DDTBE or operations may cost more than launch, LCC gives a more accurate relative cost ranking than equivalent mass. To select the lowest cost technology for a particular application we should use LCC rather than equivalent mass.

Jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Error and the International Space Station: Challenges and Triumphs in Science Operations

Any system with a human component is inherently risky. Studies in human factors and psychology have repeatedly shown that human operators will inevitably make errors, regardless of how well they are trained. Onboard the International Space Station (ISS) where crew time is arguably the most valuable resource, errors by the crew or ground operators can be costly to critical science objectives. Operations experts at the ISS Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC), located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, have learned that from payload concept development through execution, there are countless opportunities to introduce errors that can potentially result in costly losses of crew time and science. To effectively address this challenge, we must approach the design, testing, and operation processes with two specific goals in mind. First, a systematic approach to error and human centered design methodology should be implemented to minimize opportunities for user error. Second, we must assume that human errors will be made and enable rapid identification and recoverability when they occur. While a systematic approach and human centered development process can go a long way toward eliminating error, the complete exclusion of operator error is not a reasonable expectation. The ISS environment in particular poses challenging conditions, especially for flight controllers and astronauts. Operating a scientific laboratory 250 miles above the Earth is a complicated and dangerous task with high stakes and a steep learning curve. While human error is a reality that may never be fully eliminated, smart implementation of carefully chosen tools and techniques can go a long way toward minimizing risk and increasing the efficiency of NASA's space science operations.

Harris, Samantha S.↗
NASA NTRS1967

Onboard operations for rendezvous

An overall plan for onboard rendezvous operations for the Gemini missions was developed in parallel with the mission plan. The purpose of this plan was to make optimum use of crew time in orbit to maximize the probability of a successful rendezvous. The evolution of the plan began with a preliminary time line of events based upon the known guidance-equipment requirements and upon the estimated crew timing. A preliminary set of flight charts was developed to aid the crew with primary and backup procedures and to establish a backup guidance capability. These charts, which consisted of a few simple graphs and tabulation sheets, enabled the crew to calculate accurate solutions for the terminal maneuvers even with an inoperative guidance-equipment component. As such, the charts significantly contributed to the probability of mission success. Following the development of the charts, an engineering evaluation was conducted on a realistic man-in-the-loop simulation. During this evaluation, the procedures and charts were subjected to the expected equipment errors and trajectory dispersions, and revisions were made as necessary to improve effectiveness. The resulting plan was presented to the flight crew; the charts were evaluated during a period of training on the simulator. The crew spent several weeks training on both the primary procedures and on the various failure modes.

structural integrity↗
NASA NTRS2004

Waste Processing Research and Technology Development at NASA Ames Research Center

The current "store and return" approach for handling waste products generated during low Earth orbit missions will not meet the requirements for future human missions identified in NASA s new Exploration vision. The objective is to develop appropriate reliable waste management systems that minimize maintenance and crew time, while maintaining crew health and safety, as well as providing protection of planetary surfaces. Solid waste management requirements for these missions include waste volume reduction, stabilization and storage, water recovery, and ultimately recovery of carbon dioxide, nutrients and other resources from a fully regenerative food production life support system. This paper identifies the key drivers for waste management technology development within NASA, and provides a roadmap for the developmental sequence and progression of technologies. Recent results of research and technology development activities at NASA Ames Research Center on candidate waste management technologies with emphasis on compaction, lyophilization, and incineration are discussed.

Fisher, John↗
NASA NTRS2018

Payload Operations Center - Lessons from Commercial Engagement

The International Space Station (ISS) Payload Operations and Integration Center (POIC) at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, United States, has gone through an evolution from supporting exclusively government ISS users to providing 50% (or more) of their support to commercial users. At the same time, they have expanded ground and facility operations to support a United States Orbital Segment crew expansion from three to four astronauts allowing an additional of 34 hours crew time per week. These additional hours are dedicated to utilization and have already surpassed the 100 hour peak weekly milestone in July 2018. This paper discusses the Center's changes in planning, staffing, coordination, and operations while addressing topics from the addition of secondary flight control positions to dynamic operations product reviews. MSFC's Human Exploration and Development Operations Office, which manages payload operations, seeks through this paper to highlight the higher priority commercial users now receive in replanning and in additional crew time.

Watkins, Bobby J.↗
NASA NTRS2024

iMETRO (Integrated Mobile Evaluation Testbed for Robotics Operations) Facility

Crew time in space is precious – every hour could yield immense scientific discoveries and exploration milestones. However, overhead tasks such as logistics, maintenance, and assembly take a large portion of crew time. Remotely operated robotics capabilities offer a way to free the crew from many overhead tasks, but operating mobile dexterous robots in human-centered environments presents many unknowns and challenges for potential technology providers, limiting adoption for flight missions. iMETRO is a NASA JSC robotics test facility for terrestrial robotic technology adaptation to space exploration use cases, including logistics, maintenance, and science utilization. iMETRO focuses on Intra-Vehicular (IVA) environments, such as surface habitats, pressurized rover cabins, and space station modules (both Gateway & LEO). Its goal is to advance the Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) of integrated technologies for missions requiring remote space robotics operations.

iMETRO↗