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NASA NTRS2018

Assessing C2 Communications for UAS Traffic Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.

air traffic control↗

NASA NTRS2018

Assessing C2 Communications

aircraft communications↗

DOE OSTI2024

Essence2.0 Development and Deployment (Final Report)

The objective of the project was to take two core technologies that have been developed under the Recipient’s solid laboratory products and integrate them into a single CyberPhysical awareness platform and complete development on current field-tested prototypes that will extend the integrated capability of the platform. During the final development phase, the Recipient development team and its selected industry partners tested and hardened the platform to ensure resilient and secure operation of the integrated platform. The team also executed substantial field testing and established the framework for defining the organization and/or commercial infrastructure needed to sustain operations and provide readiness for a national scale deployment. The focus of the project was (1) the improvement, refinement, and deployment of technology for the detection of cyber-attacks on utility operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) networks and assets, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) systems; and (2) support for containment and remediation of adversarial threats and actions against those systems and environments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Immutable Secure Data Exchange and Storage for Urban Air Mobility Environments

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environment is derived from the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) concept of operations. Within the environment, UAM operators work independently to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers provide services to support flight operations within the UAM environment. The intent of this work is to leverage a permissioned blockchain approach, to, simulate secure data exchange and storage for UAM environments. Blockchain technologies can be used for identity management of vehicles, people, and systems.

Blockchain↗

DOE OSTI2024

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - Asimily Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (TM) (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

5G integrated edge computing platform for efficient component monitoring in coal-fired power plants

This project developed a cutting-edge 5G-integrated edge computing framework to enhance operational efficiency and reliability in coal-fired power plants through real-time component monitoring and anomaly detection. The initiative focused on leveraging distributed machine learning, federated learning, and 5G-based dynamic network slicing to support scalable, fault-tolerant monitoring environments to meet the operational requirements in industrial control systems. With a Distributed Edge Computing Service (DECS) orchestration, this project enabled federated learning at edge for condition monitoring and introduced adaptive client selection strategies to minimize communication overhead. Scalable distributed training was achieved using the Horovod framework, thus enhancing performance across edge nodes. In the realm of 5G networking, the project designed and deployed reconfigurable, QoS-aware network slicing tailored for operational technology (OT) environments, integrating software-defined networks to bolster cyber-resilience and enabling dynamic slicing for federated learning workloads. A significant milestone was the development of a virtualized ICS environment with 5G core integration—which allowed elastic and fault tolerant distributed training on real-world datasets such as NASA Bearings, Hydraulic Systems, and TEP. To broaden the impact of the project, a TRL-3 virtualized ICS testbed for research and education was designed. This project engaged several graduate and undergraduate students to conduct research on the cutting-edge technology, and it resulted in one PhD dissertation, one MS thesis, and over 14 peer-reviewed publications. With the support of this project students also participated in national cybersecurity competitions to improve their professional development skills.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment)

SAND2025-11780O ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment) software performs cybersecurity experiments on Defensive Cyber Security Architectures (DCSA) for Distributed Control Systems (DCSs). The application is integrated into a cohesive environment that performs cyber risk analyses and reduces costs. ARCADE can investigate the entire cyber-attack surface of a DCS from the physics of control, down to the firmware of individual components with automated efficiency. ARCADE has five major functional components: the Data Broker system, the virtualization environment, the cyber-attack simulator, the cyber-physical analysis system, and the physics simulator. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Valme, Romuald↗

NASA NTRS2017

Requirements for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service. Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) requirements must be developed in order to establish a CNS architecture supporting Unmanned Air Systems integration in the National Air Space (UAS in the NAS). These requirements must address cybersecurity, future communications, satellite-based navigation APNT, and scalable surveillance and situational awareness. CNS integration, consolidation and miniaturization requirements are also important to support the explosive growth in small UAS deployment. Air Traffic Management (ATM) must also be accommodated to support critical Command and Control (C2) for Air Traffic Controllers (ATC). This document therefore presents UAS CNS requirements that will guide the architecture.

Templin, Fred↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate System Security Engineering Approaches

System security engineering (SSE) is a set of formal engineering methods and is considered a subset of systems engineering. It is a relatively new development in systems engineering with the initial NIST (National Institute of Standards) standard published in November of 2016 with updates in 2018, and 2022. The guiding principles in our methodology are based in NIST Special Publication 800-160 Vol. 1 “Systems Security Engineering: Considerations For A Multidisciplinary Approach In The Engineering Of Trustworthy Secure Systems” and integrate methodologies from common IT (Information Technology) threat modeling approaches utilizing MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering). The presentation will discuss how our teams utilize SSE and MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering) to develop secure architectures for systems under development in our NASA aeronautics research environment. This includes the activities to develop Protection Needs (PN) that, in turn result in security requirements in the design context and policies for the future state operational context for system protection. The process of applying SSE to analyze project architectures and ConOps (Concept of Operations) is intended to ensure the transferred research is both secure and securable in a “real-world” setting.

Systems Security Engineering↗

DOE OSTI2026

Risks to the DOW Mission From Global Advanced Energy Adoption

Advanced energy technologies have the potential to enhance energy security and resilience; however, they can introduce new vulnerabilities even as they mitigate existing ones. This dichotomy highlights that both action and inaction carry strategic risks in a contested and logistically complex operating environment. Regardless of U.S. civilian or military adoption of such technologies, key allies and adversaries are on adoption paths that will impact the U.S. military at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. The global adoption of advanced energy technologies presents the potential for both positive and negative consequences for U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) missions in the next 10-20 years. Three categories of risk drivers are presented in this analysis: infrastructure-related, adoption-related, and response-related. Each risk type can generate consequences for DOD, including power disruptions, suboptimal DOD mission performance and operational effectiveness, higher costs and shortages for both legacy and advanced energy technologies, and loss of U.S. influence and strategic deterrent value. Specific impacts could include tactical impacts, operational impacts, and strategic impacts. Mitigation strategies could include energy resource and technology planning, cybersecurity, supply chain resilience, workforce development, exercises and simulations, investments in commercialized technology, operational testing and pilot programs, research into emerging technologies, partnerships and working groups, common standards, budget planning, and repurposing infrastructure.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Securing Future Energy Supplies: From Renewables to Microreactors

This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Developing a Cybersecurity Architecture for Extensible Traffic Management (xTM)

This paper explores the development of a cybersecurity architecture tailored for Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) to address emerging challenges in managing diverse aerial vehicles within the National Airspace System (NAS). Driven by technological advances and the rise of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), urban air mobility (UAM), and high-altitude traffic (ETM), the NAS is undergoing a paradigm shift. Traditional air traffic management, reliant on traditional Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control, will give way to decentralized coordination among autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. The proposed xTM Security Architecture, designed as a high-level framework, focuses on ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and operations in this evolving ecosystem. Utilizing threat modeling, the research identifies potential risks across key flight phases, operations and use cases to offer security control recommendations. Key objectives include analyzing interactions between novel airspace entrants and existing NAS traffic, cataloging vulnerabilities, and developing mitigative strategies to ensure safety, operational stability, and secure data exchanges. This research lays the groundwork for regulatory and industry adaptation, providing critical insights into managing cybersecurity risks in this complex, multi-domain environment.

UAM↗

DOE OSTI2026

Oakland University Cybersecurity Center (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the outcomes of Award DE-CR0000023, “Oakland University Cybersecurity Center,” a 31-month project funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). The project addressed cybersecurity risks facing small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) transitioning to Industry 4.0. The project integrated customer discovery, applied research, and cybersecurity training development. A total of 51 cybersecurity assessments identified significant gaps in baseline practices, incident response, and workforce capability. Research efforts produced a scalable mitigation framework tailored to SMM environments, and workforce analysis identified persistent talent gaps. Eight cybersecurity training modules were developed and deployed via Oakland University’s Professional and Continuing Education (PACE) platform. All objectives were completed, with 98.93% federal budget utilization and cost share exceeding requirements. The project establishes a scalable model for strengthening cybersecurity resilience and workforce capacity across U.S. manufacturing supply chains.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Blockchain Case Study for Urban Air Mobility Operational Intent

The next generation of aerial passenger and cargo transportation may leverage the concept of Urban Air Mobility (UAM). UAM is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) or short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion [1]. The UAM concept leverages a decentralized service-based architecture for airspace solutions. Within the environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within the UAM environment. Also, various views of UAM flight information are provided to the public and public safety entities [2]. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can coordinate flight information between the FAA controlled National Airspace System (NAS) and the UAM environments through the FAA-Industry Data Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). To realize the potential of UAM, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Cybersecurity has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. As these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well [3]. This research focuses on the secure data exchange and storage of this decentralized UAM environment to address these challenges. This research intends to leverage a permissioned blockchain approach to address cybersecurity threats that may impact a UAM environment. Blockchain technologies can be used for tracking transactions and verifying negotiated agreements between stakeholders in the NAS environment. For example, the record of the submitted flight plan and the approved flight plan could be verified using the Blockchain-based immutable ledger.

UAM↗

DOE OSTI2026

EVs-at-RISC: A Secure and Resilient Interoperable SCM Control System Architecture for Electric Vehicle’s-at-Scale (Final Technical Report)

The EVs-at-RISC project was a five-year research, development, and demonstration initiative to create foundational tools for utility-scale fleet aggregation and Smart Charge Management (SCM) of Electric Vehicles (EV), Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI), and related Distributed Energy Resources (DER). Rather than seeking to develop and demonstrate highly perfected SCM algorithms and control strategies, this project instead focused on creating foundational software solutions that enable unprecedented digital interoperability across the communications technologies and vendor platforms used to manage EV , EVCI, and DER, as well as existing energy management infrastructure operated by utilities, grid operators, and aggregators. This project then extends these novel interoperability capabilities to develop and deploy powerful middleware abstractions across grid edge networks and EVCI/DER fleet aggregations incorporating modern software tools and best practices, such as CI/CD, to bring the immense capabilities of infrastructure-as-code and policy-as-code to modern grid edge network environments. This addresses the foremost systemic issues preventing realization of any net operational benefits from scaled deployment of behind-the-meter EV, EVCI, and DER assets in electric power grids and markets today. The results of this approach and project unlock massive potential for new SCM capabilities to be easily prototyped, evaluated, and deployed at-scale within the existing grid edge network infrastructure and EVCI/DER technology ecosystem. The EVs-at-RISC project achieves this by extending Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB), a conceptual model for digital interoperability and distributed intelligence in traditional front-of-meter utility SCADA networks, validating our hypothesis that OpenFMB could be similarly used to solve systemic digital interoperability issues in behind-the-meter environments and unlock real-world utility-scale SCM capabilities without requiring any new proprietary vendor solutions or significant infrastructure reconfiguration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗