Results for “Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment” — Page 2

DOE OSTI2021

HP in Cybersecurity: CyOTE

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) Program, worked with energy sector asset owners and operators (AOOs), partners, and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop capabilities for AOOs to independently detect adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) within their operational technology (OT) environments. Unlike the approach taken with commercial security solutions, CyOTE seeks to tie anomalies in cyber operations to a cyber-attack. By stringing together multiple techniques in the OT environment, AOOs can identify attack campaigns with ever decreasing impacts. The CyOTE methodology applies fundamental concepts of perception and comprehension to a universe of knowns and unknowns increasingly disaggregated into observables, anomalies, and triggering events. MITRE’s ATT&CK® Framework for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is used as a common lexicon to identify a set of triggering events related to three Use Cases – Alarm Logs, Human-Machine Interface (HMI), and Remote Logins – which together account for 87 percent of the techniques commonly used by adversaries. The CyOTE methodology is also appropriate for OT-related anomalies perceived outside the three Use Cases, such as through the energy system itself.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

CyOTE ASSET OWNER ENGAGEMENT – SIDE CHANNEL POWER ANALYSIS PROTOTYPE

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) Program, worked with energy sector asset owners and operators (AOOs), partners, and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop capabilities for AOOs to independently identify adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) within their operational technology (OT) environments. The CyOTE methodology seeks to identify adversarial techniques within an AOO OT environment that could result in physical disruptions to energy flow or damage to equipment. CyOTE provides a general roadmap for AOOs, starting from a triggering event, or the point in time and space they perceive an anomalous event or condition meriting investigation, and culminating when the AOO has sufficient confidence to make a business risk decision on the appropriate resolution. This paper outlines the results of one such engagement with the New York Power Authority (NYPA), where the CyOTE program partnered with an AOO to develop a design specification for a power side channel detector to identify anomalous changes to device load. It describes the goal of developing this capability, the development process, the challenges the technical teams faced and the future steps an AOO will need to take to install and use this detector in its OT environment.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Identifying Adversarial Cyber-Activity in Operational Technology Environments Using Bayesian Networks

Critical infrastructure and other operational technology (OT) environments face increasing cybersecurity risks from adversarial behavior. This paper describes the development of a risk model using a Bayesian network to enhance the comprehension of observable cyber events caused by malicious activity in OT environments. The core of the Bayesian network is a process model that describes the stages of adversary behavior. The remainder of the model is based on the MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) taxonomy, which includes tactics and techniques that may be used by the adversary. The observables provide evidence for adversary behavior through the intermediary technique and tactic nodes. One challenge in constructing this model is a lack of open-source data from cyber-attacks on OT systems. This paper discusses learning from limited data, the elicitation of expert opinion to construct the conditional probability tables when data is scarce, and the refinement of the most difficult conditional probabilities tables using several forms of sensitivity analyses. Finally, the Bayesian network is demonstrated using two historical case studies: the DarkSide ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline and the destructive cyberattack targeting the ThyssenKrupp blast furnace. Index Terms—Cybersecurity, industrial control systems, operational technology

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Bayesian Attack Model (BAM)

The Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) is an analytical tool designed to enhance the comprehension of adversarial activity in OT environments. BAM leverages both expert cybersecurity insights and historical data to characterize the likelihood of adversarial behavior given anomalous observable events.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Collection and Analysis of Telemetry for CyOTE Heuristics (CATCH)

The Collection and Analysis of Telemetry for CyOTE Heuristics (CATCH) provides a framework for augmenting an organization’s existing security controls with CyOTE developed analyses. CATCH collects, stores, analyzes, and creates STIX reports on anomalous data. CATCH connects the CyOTE analysis framework together with the MITRE ICS ATT&CK® patterns and highlights areas of improvement and further research. This tool is designed to enhance an organization’s security controls by providing a structured approach to collecting, storing, analyzing, and reporting anomalous data.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2023

User Guide to the Facility Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (F-C2M2) Assessment

The Facility Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (F-C2M2) assessment was designed to help facilities address their unique cybersecurity challenges. Building upon the foundational principles of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), the F-C2M2 was explicitly tailored for federal facilities to help evaluate, benchmark, and enhance the cybersecurity capabilities of both their information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) environments. This user guide was developed to facilitate a thorough understanding of the tool. Whether users are familiar with the original C2M2 or are new to the maturity model concept, this guide was designed to offer clarity, direction, and support.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2018

Embedded Hardware Solution for Cybersecurity in Industrial Control Systems

Industrial Control Systems are the backbone of manufacturing, power, and critical infrastructure. These systems are made up of electronic and mechanical devices that operate on complex feedback systems that allow the production of consumer products, electricity, clean water, and nuclear industries. This broad reach of cybersecurity has earned it a place in the strategic roadmaps for many government agencies, including the Department of Energy. Their efforts stem from two general initiatives which are to improve cybersecurity in the energy sector and to strengthen effectiveness of Department of Energy incident management capabilities. Particular emphasis is in improving learning and preservations of knowledge at the labs, and to encourage collaboration between the labs. This project aims to develop Savannah River National Laboratory’s knowledge of industrial control systems cybersecurity by providing our engineers the opportunity to learn and execute advanced concepts in cybersecurity to real problems in industrial control systems. Successful execution of this project will enhance Savannah River National Laboratory’s knowledge and capability in the realm of Industrial Control System and Operational Technology cybersecurity as well as advance understanding of defensive needs in these environments. This will directly impact Savannah River National Laboratory’s capability to contribute and collaborate with Department of Energy, other Labs, and commercial partners in meeting Department of Energy national industrial control systems/Operations Technology cybersecurity goals.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Review of Electric Vehicle Charger Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, Potential Impacts, and Defenses

Worldwide growth in electric vehicle use is prompting new installations of private and public electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE). EVSE devices support the electrification of the transportation industry but also represent a linchpin for power systems and transportation infrastructures. Cybersecurity researchers have recently identified several vulnerabilities that exist in EVSE devices, communications to electric vehicles (EVs), and upstream services, such as EVSE vendor cloud services, third party systems, and grid operators. The potential impact of attacks on these systems stretches from localized, relatively minor effects to long-term national disruptions. Fortunately, there is a strong and expanding collection of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) cybersecurity best practices that may be applied to the EVSE environment to secure this equipment. In this paper, we survey publicly disclosed EVSE vulnerabilities, the impact of EV charger cyberattacks, and proposed security protections for EV charging technologies.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems-Part 1: Identifying Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Determining Risk

Technology innovation, market demand, and the potential impacts of a changing climate are driving the marine renewable energy (MRE) industry to develop market-ready systems to provide low-carbon electricity for emerging, off-grid markets. The advanced operational and information technology devices used in MRE systems create a pathway for a cyber threat actor to gain unauthorized access to data or disrupt operation. To improve the resiliency of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy from oceans and rivers, guidance was developed for an end users' organization that describes a framework for identifying and managing cybersecurity risk. The development of the cybersecurity guidance is based on standards described in the Risk Management Framework and Cybersecurity Framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This paper is the first of a two-part series that describes an approach to determine the cybersecurity risk for MRE systems based on assessing potential cyber threats, identifying vulnerabilities (people, processes, and technology, including physical and operational environment), and evaluating the consequences a cyberattack would have on operation of the MRE system and impact on end users' mission and business objectives. MRE developers and stakeholders can use this approach to assess their current cybersecurity risk posture to incorporate appropriate cybersecurity controls to reduce the consequences and impacts from a cyberattack on MRE systems. This approach can be refined further as MRE systems are deployed and operational configurations are available.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL: Preprint

The clean energy transformation led to the integration of distributed energy resources on a top of the grid, and so a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Operational technology environments are becoming a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are software/hardware intensive, have ever increasing demands to exploit advances in commodity of software/hardware infrastructures, and this for good reasons - improving energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, thus undesirable outcomes will surely happen. The use of formal methods will remove ambiguity, increase automation and provide high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗

DOE OSTI2025

I Can't Patch My OT Systems! A Look at CISA's KEVC Workarounds & Mitigations for OT

We examine the state of publicly available information about known exploitable vulnerabilities applicable to operational technology (OT) environments. Specifically, we analyze the Known Exploitable Vulnerabilities Catalog (KEVC) maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to assess whether currently available data is sufficient for effective and reliable remediation in OT settings. Our team analyzed all KEVC entries through July 2025 to determine the extent to which OT environments can rely on existing remediation recommendations. We found that although most entries in the KEVC could affect OT environments, only 13% include vendor workarounds or mitigations as alternatives to patching. This paper also examines the feasibility of developing such alternatives based on vulnerability and exploit characteristics, and we present early evidence of success with this approach.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review on Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities for Urban Air Mobility

Recent developments of high-powered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have allowed for urban air mobility (UAM) to become a reality. While these flying cars' propulsive technology has almost become economically viable, the infrastructure to allow these vehicles to operate in an urban environment is still lacking. With numerous known vulnerabilities in UAVs and commercial aircraft, manufacturers have not addressed cybersecurity in the scope of urban air mobility.

UAM↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review on Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities for Urban Air Mobility

Recent developments of high-powered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have allowed for urban air mobility (UAM) to become a reality. While these flying cars' propulsive technology has almost become economically viable, the infrastructure to allow these vehicles to operate in an urban environment is still lacking. With numerous known vulnerabilities in UAVs and commercial aircraft, manufacturers have not addressed cybersecurity in the scope of urban air mobility.

Urban Air Mobility↗

DOE OSTI2024

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL

The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗

DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Reactor Control Systems Authentication Methods and Recommendations

In the dynamic landscape of Operational Technology (OT), and specifically the emerging landscape for Advanced Reactors, the establishment of trust between digital assets emerges as a challenge for cybersecurity modernization. This report reviews existing approaches to authentication in Enterprise environments, and proposed methods for authentication in OT, and analyzes each for its applicability to future Advanced Reactor digital networks. Principles of authentication ranging from underlying cryptographic mechanisms to trust authorities are evaluated through the lens of OT. These facets emphasize the importance of mutual authentication in real-time environments, enabling a paradigm shift from the current approach of strong boundaries to a more malleable network that allows for flexible operation. This work finds that there is a need for evaluation and decision making by industry stakeholders, but current technologies and approaches can be adapted to fit needs and risk tolerances.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗