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At least 37 records · Page 2

Nepheline crystallization and the residual glass composition: Understanding waste glass durability

The vast majority of High-Level Waste (HLW) originating from defense nuclear programs is sequestered and immobilized in borosilicate glass. Borosilicate glass is universally accepted for immobilizing HLW, but its efficiency has limitations based on the compositional makeup of the waste stream. The chemical durability of the glass is the most important factor in determining the longevity and usefulness of the final glass waste form. The primary detriment to this durability in glasses containing high levels of aluminum is nepheline (NaAlSiO 4 ) crystallization, as it is generally accompanied by a measurable decrease in the glass's chemical durability. This work seeks to understand nepheline crystallization, within the context of thermal history, and to elucidate the influence of compositional shifts in the residual glass (after crystallization) on the measured durability. The results presented within show a distinct deviation in leaching behavior as a function of structural makeup (calculated Q units). This understanding will provide practical information required for broadening glass compositional regions needed to more efficiently vitrify HLW.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Feature Based Qualification (FBQ) of Wire Arc Additively Manufactured (WAAM) 17-4PH Martensitic Stainless Steels

The Department of Defense (DOD) programs of records desire to reduce the time and cost of the development and delivery loop in metal additive manufacturing (AM), including establishing forwarded AM capabilities. The success of these efforts relies on a robust and qualified process. To achieve this, the United States Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Ground Vehicle Systems Center Materials Engineering (GVME) needs to be able to quickly evaluate, test, and develop feedstocks, processes, and parts. This report is directed towards demonstrating the need for a framework for metal AM processes, defining and exploring geometries for metal AM process qualification, testing resultant deposition, and delivering actionable data.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Disulfonamide Ligands as f-Element Extractants from Alkaline High-Level Waste

Almost 100 million gallons of high level waste (HLW) has been generated from defense reprocessing programs to support nuclear weapons production. HLW is currently stored at the Hanford and Savannah River Sites (SRS) [1]. It contains radioactive components, such as {sup 137}Cs, {sup 99}Tc and {sup 90}Sr, as well as large amounts of non-radioactive species, including solvated cations and insoluble metal hydroxides. HLW has high concentration of soluble hydroxides ([OH{sup -}] = 2 M at SRS [2]), complexing inorganic anions ([NO{sub 3}{sup -}] ∼ 0.65 - 3.7 M at SRS [2]) and a high ionic strength. Even though the majority of actinide component in alkaline HLW is precipitated, studies of An(III) and Ln(III) complexation in highly alkaline solutions in the presence of high nitrate concentrations have showed that soluble nitrate complexes can be formed [3]. The current treatment of HLW at SRS currently consists of two processes: The Actinide Removal Process (ARP) and the Next-Generation Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction process (NG-CSSX). Strontium and actinides are removed by sorption on monosodium titanate through the Actinide Removal Process (ARP) commonly referred to as the alpha-strike step [4]. Then, cesium is selectively extracted from the alkaline media via the Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) process [5]. The CSSX solvent consists of a calix[4]arene-crown-6 extractant dissolved in an inert hydrocarbon matrix containing i) a solvent modifier (alkylphenoxy alcohol) which increases extractant solubility and prevents third phase formation, and ii) a suppressor (trioctylamine or guanidine) - that mitigates surfactant effects. The CSSX process removes {sup 137}Cs selectively and rapidly, yet the post- CSSX aqueous stream may still contain high amounts of An, thus requiring a second ARP treatment (referred to as 'alpha-finishing') for some tanks. Despite the success of the ARP process in removing Sr and An, it often represents the kinetic bottleneck of integrated processing, as it is slower than solvent extraction. Understanding the complexation of actinides by organic ligands that are compatible with the CSSX process could eventually lead to a combined caustic-side Cs/Sr/actinide extraction process with better economics due to a reduced amount of monosodium titanate and/or a shorter required contact time with titanate during ARP. This would ensure a low-activity waste (LAW) stream with no actinides without additional ARP processing post-CSSX. Disulfonamides were studied for extraction of Sm(III) from alkaline aqueous media of pH 10-14 into dichloromethane. Up to 82% of Sm(III) was extracted from solutions of pH 12.5 -13.5 and up to 84% from solutions of pH 10.5 - 11.5. These results show some resemblance with Am extraction results by calixarene ligands previously reported [10]. Kinetic studies demonstrated that even 5 min is enough to complete stripping, whereas extraction is time-limiting process and requires up to 20 h for efficient removal of Sm(III) from alkaline aqueous media. Determination of composition of complexes in solution after extraction by the equilibrium shift method showed a 1:1 Sm(III):dsa-2 complexation ratio for the extracted species.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Building Blocks for Secure and Prosperous Defense Critical Supply Chains: A Case Study from Microelectronics

Securing defense-critical supply chains, built on resilient and sustainable microelectronics fabrication and deployment, is a national imperative and one that requires an investment in basic and applied research, development, and deployment into industries in (and out of) the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Critical next steps include the development of pilots for revolutionary concepts in a new formal verification model and the Cyber-Physical Passport (CPP) concept for chain of custody. Critical infrastructure leadership should take action with a sense of urgency. Working in conjunction with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should establish pilot programs with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the service labs to build and test both concepts in legacy and new system development.. Additionally, the Pentagon may be aware that an existing Manufacturing Innovation Institute is piloting, with the semiconductor industry, cyber innovations to provide verifiable security properties and guarantees of physical functions to build a more cyber secure, resilient and efficient micro-electronics supply chain.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US

The characterization and quantification of nuclear deposits, or residual nuclear material retained in process equipment, generally referred to as holdup, continues to challenge nuclear processing facilities in DOE program areas such as nuclear criticality safety, material control and accountability, environmental management. The efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear operations in these facilities depends heavily on the results from nondestructive techniques designed to measure nuclear materials in situ. The traditional methods used to measure holdup were established more than 30 years ago and assume unrealistic conditions for most measurement cases. These blind, in situ measurements present unique challenges due to the following attributes: unique, non-ideal geometries; unknown deposit thicknesses; lack of representative calibration standards; large number of holdup deposit locations; and poor accessibility for many measurement locations. These difficulties and the poor assumptions made to handle them have resulted in measurement uncertainties that are often too large for many programs to effectively utilize. In an effort to address and identify solutions to the current holdup challenges facing the US nuclear industry, Oak Ridge National Laboratory hosted the Technical Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US. The two-day workshop held August 21–22, 2019, was attended by 35 holdup measurement practitioners, program managers, stakeholders from US Department of Energy sites, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and representatives from commercial industry. The primary objectives were to identify critical elements of a successful and defensible holdup measurement program; identify technical challenges, needs, and potential improvements associated with measurement of holdup; and share best practices and lessons learned from recent accumulation events. Fourteen presentations were delivered on holdup topics including necessary elements for effective program management, measurement needs, emerging technologies and other measurement solutions, and lessons learned from recent events. These presentations highlighted best practices related to accumulation monitoring, considerations and proactive steps to facilitate holdup in new facility designs, imaging solutions to improve holdup assumptions, and new software developed in support of holdup measurements. Breakout sessions were also employed to determine additional needs and identify potential solutions to common holdup challenges. The primary discussions focused on causes and prevention of material accumulations, needs for uranium and plutonium measurements, and reduction of measurement uncertainty, all of which were explicitly identified as critical needs during the 2018 Workshop on Technical and Programmatic Needs for a Sustainable NDA Program for the US DOE.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radio Frequency Transients Correlated with Electron Flux Measured On-Board the STP-Sat6

We analyzed transient electromagnetic signatures, referred to as spacecraft environment discharges (SEDs) or on-board discharges (OBDs), and the in-situ particle environment simultaneously measured by the Radio Frequency Sensor (RFS) and the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System Z-plasma spectrometer (SABRS-ZPS), respectively. These sensors are on-board the U.S. Department of Defense Space Test Program Satellite 6 (STP-Sat6) in geostationary orbit. Radio frequency signatures of SEDs on STP-Sat6 have relatively high peak amplitudes; they often caused amplitude-saturation in the so-called high band (120–140 MHz frequency range) of the RFS likely due to the proximity of their source to the RFS’s dipole antennas. We examined the occurrence rate of SEDs reported by the RFS and its temporal relationship to electron flux in the 7.9–12.2 keV range. Peaks in SED count rates were time-correlated with peaks in electron flux. The electron-flux peaks appeared to lead the SED count rate peaks by 24–45 min for the 7.9–12.2 keV energies. This indicates that incidence of electrons at this relatively low-energy range likely resulted in ramping up of the charging of the spacecraft leading to periods of high occurrence rates of discharges in and around the spacecraft.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Global Distribution of EMIC Waves and Its Association to Subauroral Proton Precipitation During the 27 May 2017 Storm: Modeling and Multipoint Observations

Recent simulation studies using the RAM-SCB model showed that proton precipitation contributes significantly to the total energy flux deposited into the subauroral ionosphere thereby affecting the magnetosphere-ionosphere coupling. Here, in this study, we use the BATS-R-US + RAM-SCB model to understand the evolution of ElectroMagnetic Ion Cyclotron (EMIC) waves in the inner magnetosphere, their correspondence to the proton precipitation into the subauroral ionosphere, and to assess the performance of the model in reproducing the EMIC wave-particle interactions. During the 27 May 2017 storm, Arase and RBSP-A satellites observed typical signatures of EMIC waves in the inner magnetosphere. Within this interval, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/MetOp satellites observed significant proton precipitation in the dusk-midnight sector. Simulation results show that H- and He-band EMIC waves are excited within regions of strong temperature anisotropy near the plasmapause. The simulated growth rates of EMIC waves show a similar trend to that of the EMIC wave power observed by the Arase and RBSP-A satellites, suggesting that the model can reproduce the EMIC wave activity qualitatively. The simulated H-band waves in the dusk sector are stronger than He-band waves possibly due to the presence of excess protons in the boundary conditions obtained from the BATS-R-US code. The precipitating proton fluxes reproduced by the simulation with EMIC waves are found to agree reasonably well with the DMSP and NOAA/MetOp satellite observations. It is suggested that EMIC wave scattering of ring current ions can account for proton precipitation observed by the DMSP and MetOp satellites during the 27 May 2017 storm.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

A harmonized global nighttime light dataset 1992–2018

Nighttime light (NTL) data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)/Operational Linescan System (OLS) and the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) on the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership satellite provide a great opportunity for monitoring human activities from regional to global scales. Despite the valuable records of nightscape from DMSP (1992–2013) and VIIRS (2012–2018), the potential of the historical archive of NTL observations has not been fully explored because of the severe inconsistency between DMSP and VIIRS. In this study, we generated an integrated and consistent NTL dataset at the global scale by harmonizing the inter-calibrated NTL observations from the DMSP data and the simulated DMSP-like NTL observations from the VIIRS data. The generated global DMSP NTL time-series data (1992–2018) show consistent temporal trends. This temporally extended DMSP NTL dataset provides valuable support for various studies related to human activities such as electricity consumption and urban extent dynamics.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Investigating the Influence of River Geomorphology on Human Presence Using Night Light Data: A Case Study in the Indus Basin

Human settlements have historically thrived near rivers due to enhanced navigation and trade, and the availability of water supply and resources. The use of night light data, representing economic activities, provides a novel approach to studying the interactions between human activity and rivers over time. Here, we use the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) stable night light data from 2000 to 2013 as a proxy for human presence and activities to quantify the statistical relationships between night light presence and intensity in the Indus Basin, Asia. We test how these data are affected by proximity to trunk channels and by channel type (single/multi-thread) in the study area. We find that night light presence is enhanced by 26% within a 0 to 5 km proximity range of the Indus River and its tributaries, relative to the basin as a whole. We interpret this to represent increased human presence and activity within this zone. However, the mean intensity is lower near the river and higher away from the river, signifying denser settlements, such as towns and cities, which are preferentially located away from the Indus and its tributaries. Moreover, the enhancement of lit pixels signifying human presence and activities is increased by 18% near single-thread sections of the Indus River, compared to segments of the Indus displaying multi-thread morphologies. We suggest that this is due to the enhanced stability of single-threaded channels, relative to mobile multi-threaded channel reaches. This study demonstrates how night lights are an important tool in studying the relationship between human presence and river dynamics in large catchments such as the Indus, and we suggest that these data will have an important role in assessing differential flood spatial and social vulnerability at a regional scale.

Environmental Sciences & Ecology↗

Women as a Force Multiplier for Bringing Nuclear Forensic Capabilities to the International Stage

In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Approach to Quality Assurance for Complex Environmental Modeling - 20407

A strong Quality Assurance (QA) program for complex environmental modeling is essential for regulatory and public acceptance and trust, but it does not have to be onerous. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) has developed a strong QA program that improves transparency, traceability, reproducibility, and therefore, defensibility and trust. Neptune's QA program has evolved over the past 27 years, transitioning from an ad hoc QA program, to a program that is currently Nuclear Quality Assurance-1 (NQA-1) compliant, and will soon be NQA-1/DOE approved for DOE EM modeling work. In addition, Neptune is a qualified laboratory assessor and qualified auditor for reference materials, a proficiency testing provider, and fully complies with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) QA program. Neptune's President and CEO, Kelly Black, was recently named the Chairperson of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee 69, Application of Statistical Methods. A strong QA program has been developed for Neptune's radiological performance assessment (PA) program. Although pieces of their QA program are currently in development, their current program includes document control using Subversion, issue tracking and work flow tracking using JIRA, and transparency and traceability via a system of 'calc sheets' for documentation of all data analysis and modeling combined with 'check print' documentation of QA checking, and rigorous model testing and configuration control. All work is reviewed by an independent subject matter expert who is not associated with the collection and assembly of information, for an internal peer review. The program is enforced with a handful of Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), Work Instructions, QA Project Plans (QAPPs), and Quality Management Plans (QMPs) that are updated frequently, with required annual training and acknowledgment. In addition, effective communication of modeling approaches and results to clients and stakeholders are integral to their QA program. Many of their models are built using the GoldSim modeling platform, for which their models are well-known for their level of transparency, documentation, and QA traceability. This level of QA is also applied to their process-level models. Neptune has taken some lessons learned from the extremely rigorous QA program required for the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP), and imposed the YMP requirements of complete traceability, transparency, and reproducibility, but avoided the inflexibility of a QA program that likely contributed to the suspect e-mails in 2005 that resulted in loss of trust in the YMP, and in nuclear waste disposal (and nuclear power) in general. There are far too many examples of loss of public trust due to poor QA that could have been easily avoided with a simple and straight-forward QA program combined with stakeholder engagement. The purpose of this paper is to share features of Neptune's Radiological Performance Assessment program QA program, and some of their QA related lessons learned over the past 27 years of QA for complex environmental modeling. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Microreactor Program Plan for The Department of Energy

The DOE Microreactor Program was established in FY 2019 to support research and development (R&D) of technologies related to the development, demonstration, and deployment of low-power, transportable reactors to provide power and heat for decentralized generation in civilian, industrial, and defense energy sectors. The program conducts both fundamental and applied R&D to de-risk technology performance and manufacturability readiness of microreactors. R&D projects and work packages are selected to support concept-neutral technology maturation. The intent is to ensure those concepts can be licensed and deployed by commercial entities to meet specific use case requirements. At the same time, the program will also support R&D specific to certain reactor technology groups (e.g., heat pipe reactors and gas-cooled reactors) to ensure relevancy and address the technology needs of commercial developers. The program will ensure coordination of work and activities across participating laboratories and universities, establish, and manage stakeholder interactions, and support program meetings. These stakeholders include, but are not limited to, industry developers, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, policymakers, and end users. This document provides an overview of the overall Microreactor Program, including its vision, key technical objectives, and scope of the current and proposed R&D portfolio. It covers a 5-year rolling currently from Fiscal year 2025 through Fiscal year 2030. This document will be revised at least biennially to reflect changing priorities.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office Visit: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Program at LANL [Slides]

The Laboratory’s nuclear nonproliferation and security portfolio is managed by the GS-NNS program office: NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office (DNN) makes up ~80% of our work. We also support State Dept activities closely aligned with our work for DNN and NASAprograms. Our work is executed across the entire Laboratory, approximately half in the Global Security directorate and a third in the Weapons Program.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Plant Disease Detection Technology Assessment

Visual inspections by US Customs and Border Protection agriculture specialists have identified approximately 20,000 regulated, quarantined pests each year in agricultural products entering the United States. Most of these pests identified in the Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) program are insects. Many pathogens are difficult to detect in agricultural products, particularly in early stages of infection. New technologies can help to detect plant pathogens and the diseases that they cause. This technology assessment was performed for the US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) through the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAV-D) program to identify emerging technologies that could address this hard problem. These emerging technologies differ in their diagnostic sensitivities and specificities, as well as in their measurement time and training requirements. New instruments that detect volatile organic compounds characteristic of plant disease or pathogens could provide a less invasive inspection method. Dogs, which can successfully detect many concealed agricultural products, have also been trained to detect some plant pests and pathogens. Simple immunological tests offer sensitive and specific detection of many pathogens at the point of use. Advanced imaging methods that use AI to sort fruits and vegetables and recognize anomalies at high speeds could be used in cooperation with exporters to improve food quality and reduce pests. Advances in nucleic acid–based detection methods that have become gold standards for confirmatory diagnostics are now making those methods available for faster, point-of-use detection. These new methods should be developed in the context of AQI operational requirements, which apply risk-based sampling protocols to protect agriculture and facilitate commerce and passenger transit.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Results of Re-evaluation of FEPs Related to Implementing the ABD Glass Program

The Savannah River Site plans to reprocess defense spent nuclear fuel currently stored in their L-Basin via the Accelerated Basin Deinventory (ABD) Program. The previous plan for the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel was to dispose of it directly in the federal repository without reprocessing. Implementing the ABD Program will result in final disposal of approximately 900 fewer canisters of defense spent nuclear fuel and the production of approximately 521 more canisters of vitrified high-level waste glass with some specific differences from the planned high-level waste glass. Because the 235U in the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel is not intended to be recovered, the fissile mass loading of the vitrified high-level glass waste form to be produced must be increased above the current value of 897 g/m 3 to a maximum of 2,500 g/m 3 . Therefore, implementing the ABD Program would produce a variant of high-level waste glass—the ABD glass—that needs to be evaluated for future repository licensing, which includes both preclosure safety and postclosure performance. This report describes the approach to and summarizes the results of an evaluation of the potential effects of implementing the ABD Program at the Savannah River Site on the technical basis for future repository licensing for a generic repository that is similar to Yucca Mountain and for one that is fully generic. This evaluation includes the effects on preclosure safety analyses and postclosure performance assessment for both repository settings. The license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository (DOE 2008), which is serving as a framework for this evaluation, concluded that the proposed Yucca Mountain repository would meet all applicable regulatory requirements. The evaluation documented in this report found that implementing the ABD Program is not expected to change that conclusion for a generic repository similar to Yucca Mountain or for a generic repository with respect to the preclosure safety analyses. With respect to the postclosure performance of a generic repository, no concerns were identified.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Women as a force multiplier for bringing nuclear forensic capabilities to the international stage

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009-2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the U.S. Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next six years, a small team comprised of a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercises documentation was developed in the 2009-2015 timeframe, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗