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R-Value Measurements Performed on Actinide Targets Irradiated using the GODIVA IV Critical Assembly in FY22

The separation and characterization of two irradiated uranium targets, a depleted uranium (DU) and a highly enriched uranium (HEU) target as well as a plutonium (Pu) target, was conducted in April of 2022. The three targets were assembled at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and irradiated using the GODIVA critical assembly at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Splits of the dissolved targets were received by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) after which the PNNL and LANL teams chemically separated the solutions using independent separation schemes and analyzed the separated fractions for short lived actinides and fission products. Chemical separations were traced with stable or radioactive tracers to allow for the determination of chemical yields, analyzing using either inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy (ICP-OES), inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) or gamma emission analysis (GEA) depending on the nature of the tracer. The Pu target solution was traced with stable elements at LANL to follow elemental fractionation during a Pu removal step. Many analytical techniques were used by PNNL including kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), ICP-OES, ICP-MS, GEA, and thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) depending on the analyte’s need.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A novel protocol to recycle zirconium from zirconium alloy cladding from used nuclear fuel rods

A potential new zirconium recycling protocol has been demonstrated using unirradiated Zircaloy-based claddings and depleted uranium oxide for the chemical removal of zirconium alloy cladding in used nuclear fuel (UNF) rods from light water reactors. This protocol is based on the application of three new scientific findings. First, a new lower temperature chlorination reaction of zirconium with sulfur monochloride is described. Second, the high solubility of zirconium chloride in thionyl chloride is used to separate it from uranium oxide fuel and fission and activation contaminants. Finally, in the third step, the zirconium chloride is purified by simple recrystallization from thionyl chloride. Utilizing sulfur chloride solvents for a lower temperature liquid-based chemical digestion and purification of zirconium alloy claddings reduces technical complications experienced by current high temperature gas phase chlorination strategies, such as contamination of product streams. This novel protocol has been demonstrated on a 3–50 g scale of unirradiated zirconium alloy, with no significant change in the time required for complete chlorination (3–4 h). This zirconium chlorination protocol has also been performed in the presence of depleted uranium oxide pellets. The depleted fuel pellets do not affect zirconium chlorination, and the chlorination protocol does not chemically or physically alter the fuel pellets. Finally, a preliminary description of an industrial protocol to recycle nuclear grade zirconium from UNF rods is presented.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 90: US DOE Mixed Waste: Proposals for Dealing with Problematic Waste Streams and Policy Changes

This panel focused on generation and management of low level and mixed low-level radioactive wastes, challenges for disposition, innovative solutions applied at DOE sites, and collaboration among sites to ensure that waste disposition pathways are understood. In addition, potential policy initiatives were discussed including depleted uranium, elemental mercury, and treatment of legacy mixed waste components. As part of the introduction, Theresa Kliczewski provided an overview of why this panel is relevant: problematic mixed waste streams still exist across the DOE cleanup complex. Theresa noted that the DOE EM Headquarters Office of Waste and Materials Management (EM-4.2), for which she is employed with, continues to work with the DOE cleanup sites on a path forward for these problematic mixed waste streams. As part of this effort, EM-4.2 requested that the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) perform a review of all the DOE sites problematic mixed waste streams. Panelists with presentations: Challenging Waste Streams: Disposition of Depleted Uranium Oxide Conversion Product (Douglas Tonkay); EFCOG WMWG Challenging Waste Subgroup (Tammy Monday); Mercury Waste Challenges (John Wrapp); Legacy Large Mixed Waste Components (Kalli Shupe)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Uranium Solubility and Supernate Enrichment Testing for Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Discards to Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities

After future Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) enriched uranium discards into sludge batches (SB), portions of supernate decants during SB preparation will be blended into salt batches (StB) and the resulting feeds must meet the nuclear safety requirements for the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). During previous SB10 sampling and testing, which involved H-Canyon material containing enriched uranium being mixed with Tank 51 sludge shortly after the H-Canyon stream was neutralized, it was identified that the uranium isotopic enrichment in the supernate deviated from the uranium isotopic enrichment in the slurry. The higher uranium isotopic enrichment in the supernate introduced the risk of challenging the feed requirements of SWPF. The ABD material added to SB11 was isotopically diluted with depleted uranium, mitigating any downstream impacts. However, H-Canyon desires to eliminate or minimize future depleted uranium additions in order to meet the mission schedule.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Active Interrogation of the Snyder Shells using a SEA-7 Betatron

The shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU) problem is one that still needs to be addressed. As a first step towards a solution, the Snyder shells (depleted uranium) were actively interrogated with a SEA-7 betatron in various configurations using an MC15 as a detector. These configurations include masses from 0.55 to 5.1 kg, as well as 5.1 kg in a steel container. A strong electromagnetic field (EMF) background was identified in previous work, but the results in this work show all configurations produce a signal well above the background. An initial simulation capability was developed that produces the expected flux profile from the SEA-7 betatron, but further work needs to be done to determine the magnitude of the flux via a combination of experiment and simulation validation. Depleted uranium generally produces more neutrons than HEU, so additional future work will need to include similar measurements of HEU to confirm similar performance of the technique. Additionally the EMF background needs to be better characterized as a function of distance and angle from the SEA-7 source and mitigation techniques explored.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

U Metal Oxidation with Steam (U)

The Savannah Rive National Laboratory 9SRNL) is evaluating a method to produce uranium oxide (UO 2 ) from uranium metal using steam. The typical methods for making UO 2 yield powders with particle-size ranges of 1 to 50 micron. The goal of the steam oxidation is to produce a depleted uranium (DU) product with a larger particle size that can be used as a surrogate for testing physical and mechanical process techniques to refine uranium and/or plutonium bearing residues. Several studies in the literature indicated that reactions between uranium metal and steam will yield UO 2 as fine powders in the 160 to 500 °C range, but granular materials form above 500°C. Above 880 °C, a hard compact scale forms on the U metal. Furthermore, sintering of UO 2 occurs at about 1300 °C, but it has been stated that the presence of steam enhances the sintering characteristics of UO 2 . Initial studies into the oxidation of DU metal in an atmosphere of argon and steam have been completed. Oxidation of depleted uranium metal in Ar/steam at 600, 710, 700, and 830 °C yielded at UO 2 product with little or no impurity at each temperature. Although not enough sample was available to perform sieve analysis for particle size distribution, SEM images reveal that a significant volume fraction of the products at 710, 770, and 830 °C exceeds 100 microns. The material produced at 600 °C was too fine for programmatic needs. Questions associated with the UO 2 include morphology of product, mechanical strength of the particles, and performance in milling operations. The size of the samples produced in these tests did not allow for quantitative assessment of particle size of mechanical strength. A qualitative assessment of the particles formed at 710, 770, and 830 °C was that the samples produced at 710 and 770 °C were friable, and the sample produced 830 °C had more mechanical strength. Sintering of the samples in Ar/steam at 970 °C appeared to increase the strength of the particles without changing their general particle size characteristics. Due to the small sample sizes, the increase in strength could not be quantified. If the sintering at 970 °C is inadequate, higher sintering temperatures in Ar/steam can be evaluated. Future work will increase scale of the steam oxidation conditions which yield the most-favorable particle-size distributions with sufficient mechanical strength for programming usage. Further consideration will be given to oxidation temperature, steam addition to the reaction vessel, U metal pretreatment, and sintering conditions after oxidation. The UO 2 production could involve a two-step process where particles are formed in steam at lower temperatures (700-850 °C) and then sintered in Ar/steam at elevated temperatures (950-1200 °C). Larger samples (50-100 g each) will provide sufficient UO 2 product for sieve analysis and assessment of mechanical strength relatives to subsequent milling operations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

High-fidelity photoneutron detection via neutron activation analysis

To interdict illicit radioactive sources and prevent nuclear terror, governments have deployed portal monitor systems at ports of entry. Such portal monitors rely upon the detection of spontaneously-emitted radiation signatures, however, detection scenarios become more challenging for highly enriched uranium, which emits relatively few spontaneous radiation signatures. Photon active interrogation techniques can augment current cargo inspection scenarios and improve detection capabilities for illicit nuclear material. A high-energy photon interrogation source can induce photofission in nuclear material, producing strong radiation signatures for detection. Prompt fission signals are of specific interest because prompt neutrons are greater than 99% of the fission signal. When using detectors capable of spectroscopy, e.g., pulse shape discrimination-capable organic scintillators, the intense interrogating source often will cause pulse pile-up, degrading particle classification. In this work, we demonstrate photoneutron detection via neutron activation of aluminum and iron. The experiments rely upon nuclear reactions that can only be induced by neutrons, and are robust against pile-up, thereby providing high-confidence neutron rates. In this work, we apply neutron activation analysis for the detection of high-energy neutrons produced by high-energy photon irradiation; the depleted uranium sample was irradiated with a 9-MeV bremsstrahlung beam. We find that the irradiated depleted uranium produced an aluminum activation flux of 1.77 × 10 5 n cm –2 s –1 and an iron-56 activation flux of 1.05 × 10 5 n cm –2 s –1 . Furthermore, the ability to detect radioactivity induced by neutrons created in (, n) and photofission reactions demonstrates a new approach for photon active interrogation to identify nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Optimizing a detection system for fissile material in nuclear disarmament verification

In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.

Active neutron interrogation↗

Replacing photomultiplier tubes with silicon photomultipliers for nuclear safeguards applications

Photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) have been used for decades as the default light detection technology for scintillator-based radiation monitors. PMTs come with a handful of disadvantages, however, including large volume usage, fragility, high-voltage requirements, and susceptibility to magnetic fields. Arrays of silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) are a possible alternative to PMTs providing similar performance while offering improvements in the areas listed. We focus on straightforward “drop-in replacement” evaluations by imposing a single channel output of the SiPM signal and a backend electronics data acquisition and analysis routine identical to that used for PMTs. In the realm of nuclear safeguards, the primary performance metric for gamma spectroscopy is detector resolution, and for neutron detection it is pulse shape discrimination (PSD) to separate neutron and gamma signals. In this work we present the results of replacing a PMT with a 2” x 2” SiPM array mounted, in turn, to the same 2” x 2” cylindrical sodium iodide (NaI) crystal. The ultimate comparison for this gamma spectrometry is confirmation of uranium enrichment standards, ranging from depleted uranium to 93% highly enriched uranium (HEU), by analyzing the resulting spectra with both a simple integral scaling in key energy regions of the spectrum, as well as with the NaIGEM software package. In addition to the gamma spectroscopy work, we will present the latest results on comparing the PSD capabilities of a 4” x 4” SiPM array to a 5” PMT. As with the gamma spectroscopy evaluations, the light detectors are mounted in turn to the same liter-scale organic scintillators. This neutron-focused work includes evaluation of prototype SiPM readout boards with a single output signal summed over 256 individual SiPM pixels, and evident tradeoffs between PSD capability and fast response.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Replacing photomultiplier tubes with silicon photomultipliers for nuclear safeguards applications

Photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) have been used for decades as the default light detection technology for scintillator-based radiation monitors. PMTs come with a handful of disadvantages, however, including large volume usage, fragility, high-voltage requirements, and susceptibility to magnetic fields. Arrays of silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) are a possible alternative to PMTs providing similar performance while offering improvements in the areas listed. We focus on straightforward “drop-in replacement” evaluations by imposing a single channel output of the SiPM signal and a backend electronics data acquisition and analysis routine identical to that used for PMTs. In the realm of nuclear safeguards, the primary performance metric for gamma spectroscopy is detector resolution, and for neutron detection it is pulse shape discrimination (PSD) to separate neutron and gamma signals. In this work we present the results of replacing a PMT with a 2” x 2” SiPM array mounted, in turn, to the same 2” x 2” cylindrical sodium iodide (NaI) crystal. The ultimate comparison for this gamma spectrometry is confirmation of uranium enrichment standards, ranging from depleted uranium to 93% highly enriched uranium (HEU), by analyzing the resulting spectra with both a simple integral scaling in key energy regions of the spectrum, as well as with the NaIGEM software package. In addition to the gamma spectroscopy work, we will present the latest results on comparing the PSD capabilities of a 4” x 4” SiPM array to a 5” PMT. As with the gamma spectroscopy evaluations, the light detectors are mounted in turn to the same liter-scale organic scintillators. This neutron-focused work includes evaluation of prototype SiPM readout boards with a single output signal summed over 256 individual SiPM pixels, and evident tradeoffs between PSD capability and fast response.

Engineering - Instrumentation related to nuclear s↗

Analysis of Using a Hybrid ZIRCEX Process to Generate High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) - 20158

Idaho National Lab (INL) is investigating the feasibility of providing High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) by recovering Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and downblending the HEU with natural, low-enriched, or depleted uranium (NU, LEU, or DU). That investigation identified that significant quantities of HALEU could be produced with a Hybrid ZIRCEX process to further advanced reactor research while reducing INL's environmental liability. Many new advanced reactor designs are being developed with improved safety, efficiency, and economics. Most require nuclear fuel with U-235 enrichment between 5% and 20%, which is defined as HALEU. Although technically feasible, there is no current domestic capability to make HALEU in the US. While it is anticipated that industry will provide HALEU through commercial enrichment once advanced reactors mature, until a market is established, an interim source of HALEU is needed to enable research and demonstration. An interim source of HALEU could be provided by recovering the HEU in some DOE-managed SNF and downblending it to between 5% and 20% using the Hybrid ZIRCEX Process. ZIRCEX is a dry head-end process to remove cladding (zirconium or aluminum) from SNF. Drying of the SNF is needed prior to introduction to ZIRCEX. After cladding removal, uranium and fission products in the bed material are oxidized and elutriated. In a Hybrid ZIRCEX process, the HEU process stream is sent to a very compact, modular solvent extraction process for uranium purification. The uranyl nitrate from solvent extraction is denitrated and calcined to produce a HALEU product ready for fuel fabrication. The long-lived fission products from solvent extraction are immobilized in glass using a small in-can melt. By removing the cladding before dissolution, the volume of glass waste is reduced by a factor of up to 300 times (when compared to not removing the cladding from the fuel). Other radioactive wastes from the process could be disposed of as Class A or Class B low-level waste. In addition to producing HALEU for advanced reactors, consumption of SNF would reduce DoE's environmental liability. Incorporating low-enriched spent fuel (versus exclusive use of LEU, DU, or NU) into the downblending scheme could reduce the SNF inventory even further. Several downblending and enrichment scenarios using INL fuels were investigated in this study. The results of this analysis show that the Hybrid ZIRCEX process could make a significant contribution to needed HALEU feedstock and reduce the environmental liability of managing SNF at INL. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A theoretical investigation of the hydrolysis of uranium hexafluoride: the initiation mechanism and vibrational spectroscopy

Depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ), a stockpiled byproduct of the nuclear fuel cycle, reacts readily with atmospheric humidity, but the mechanism is poorly understood. Here we compare several potential initiation steps at a consistent level of theory, generating underlying structures and vibrational modes using hybrid density functional theory (DFT) and computing relative energies of stationary points with double-hybrid (DH) DFT. A benchmark comparison is performed to assess the quality of DH-DFT data using reference energy differences obtained using a complete-basis-limit coupled-cluster (CC) composite method. The associated large-basis CC computations were enabled by a new general-purpose pseudopotential capability implemented as part of this work. Dispersion-corrected parameter-free DH-DFT methods, namely PBE0-DH-D3(BJ) and PBE-QIDH-D3(BJ), provided mean unsigned errors within chemical accuracy (1 kcal mol -1 ) for a set of barrier heights corresponding to the most energetically favorable initiation steps. The hydrolysis mechanism is found to proceed via intermolecular hydrogen transfer within van der Waals complexes involving UF 6 , UF 5 OH, and UOF 4 , in agreement with previous studies, followed by the formation of a previously unappreciated dihydroxide intermediate, UF 4 (OH) 2 . The dihydroxide is predicted to form under both kinetic and thermodynamic control, and, unlike the alternate pathway leading to the UO 2 F 2 monomer, its reaction energy is exothermic, in agreement with observation. Finally, harmonic and anharmonic vibrational simulations are performed to reinterpret literature infrared spectroscopy in light of this newly identified species.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Rapid isotopic analysis of uranium microparticles via SP-ICP-TOF-MS

Inductively coupled plasma – time-of-flight – mass spectrometry (ICP-TOF-MS) was employed for the isotopic analysis of uranium particles of varying 235 U enrichment levels. Here, a single particle (SP)-based introduction scheme was employed such that individual particles, in a suspension, were analyzed. The uranium oxide microparticles were comprised of depleted uranium (DU, 235 U/ 238 U of 0.0017316(14)), natural uranium (NU, 235 U/ 238 U of 0.0072614(39)), and low enriched uranium (LEU, 235 U/ 238 U of 0.051025(15)). The percent relative difference of the SP-ICP-TOF-MS measured isotopic ratios compared to the expected values for the DU, NU, and LEU particle populations were 8.75, 0.12, and 1.23 %, respectively. After characterization, the DU and NU particles were doped within a complex sample matrix (Arizona Test Dust) containing Fe, Ti, Al, and Si particles, among others. Then, the suspension was analyzed via SP-ICP-TOF-MS and the detected particles were classified as DU or NU based on their measured 235 U/ 238 U ratio. In the same analysis, the matrix particles (i.e., Al, Fe, and Ti) were detected, demonstrating the simultaneous nuclide detection provided by the measurement platform. The presented SP-ICP-TOF-MS methodology for uranium particle characterization proved to be a high throughput method for detecting and isotopically discerning uranium particles with varying enrichment levels, in a complex matrix.

Stanberry, Jordan S. [Oak Ridge National Laborator↗

Operations and Recent Upgrades to a Tritium Recycling Facility - 20375

Nuclear Sources and Services Inc. (NSSI) is a waste handling treatment company that has been operating since 1971. In 2000, NSSI began building a 1,000 m{sup 2} (∼10,000 sqft) tritium recycling facility on the Houston, Texas premises to address a growing need in the waste disposal market. Over the years, the capability of the facility grew to address many different waste streams with the goal of recycling > 99.9% of all tritium activity back into the fusion community. This is achieved by maintaining an effluent stack release well below the 150 GBq/year (C Ci/year) operating limit and maintaining all liquid and solid waste disposal below the low-level radioactive release limit of 0.C MBq/kg (10 μCi/kg). The unique processing systems in the facility attracts many challenging contracts. Within the past two years, NSSI has engaged with customers to treat; organic mixed wastes that simultaneously contain tritium and carbon-14, safely extract tritium from large quantities of exit sign lights, and remove tritium from uncharacterised legacy depleted uranium beds from a superfund site. This paper will outline the initial testing, the system upgrades to treat these varied streams, and the progress in processing the feedstocks provided by these projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Session 077 - Panel: Wednesday US DOE Featured Site: Lexington, KY Office (Portsmouth and Paducah Sites) (R1.14)

This panel featured the DoE's Portsmouth Paducah Project Office (PPPO), which is responsible for the management and cleanup of at the Portsmouth, Ohio and Paducah, Kentucky former Gaseous Diffusion Plant sites. Portsmouth is primed for the first major skyline change at the site the upcoming demolition of the X-326 process building and initial operations of the Onsite Waste Disposal Facility. The Paducah site is working on the C-400 city block initiative allowing DOE to tackle the main source of groundwater contamination at the site, in conjunction with deactivation and demolition of the C-400 Cleaning Building. PPPO's DUF6 conversion plants have 7 lines in continuous operation at both sites providing the opportunity to ramp up cylinder processing. Panelists with presentations: DOE PPO Update (Robert Edwards, Joel Bradburne); Portsmouth/Paducah Project Office (PPPO) (Joel Bradburne, Robert Edwards); PADUCAH (Jennifer Woodard, Myrna Espinosa Redfield); Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Project (Reinhard Knerr, Zack Smith); Paducah Deactivation and Remediation Project (Myrna Espinosa Redfield); Mid-America Conversion Services - Seven Lines One Project (Zack Smith)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Recovery of Neptunium-236g from Photon and Proton-Irradiated Actinide Targets

Neptunium-236g is a rare radionuclide used as a tracer for neptunium-237 analyses. The availability of 236gNp is limited and the viable production routes are costly, time consuming, and only produce trace quantities of the desired product. For this work, two known production methods were tested to determine product recovery, purity, and viability for use as a tracer. The first method utilizes a photon-irradiated 237Np target to produce 236gNp by the 237Np(?,n)?236Np reaction. The second method utilizes the 238U(d,4n) ?236Np reaction. These production routes were evaluated previously, and the former was considered ineffective without isotope separation and the latter was not well-characterized for the 236mNp/236gNp production ratio. Recent resurgence of electromagnetic isotope separation technology has enabled at least partial recovery of 236gNp from part-per-million abundance feeds produced by the photonuclear reaction. To address the lack of production data for the second method, a deuteron-irradiated depleted uranium target was chemically processed to recover and purify the Np for abundance and ratio analyses. The status and current analytical results for each production method are presented.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Low Count and Background Radionuclides Analysis - 20488

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is often faced with the need to evaluate radionuclides at low concentrations. When site sample data are likely to be close to threshold activity concentrations of interest, then the means by which the radiochemical analysis is performed and reported is critical. This situation can occur when differentiating from zero (presence/absence) for radionuclides that do not occur naturally, close comparison with environmental background for naturally occurring radionuclides, close comparison with a risk- or dose-based threshold concentrations of interest, or even comparisons across studies. There are several analytical issues that are of concern, but the two that appear to cause incorrect decisions to be made most often involve establishing detection limits and subtracting ambient background conditions in the laboratory. These issues are not critical when radionuclide activity concentrations are large relative to thresholds of concern, but they seem to be poorly understood when it matters. When the comparisons are important and are likely to be close to a threshold of interest, then the general contract with the analytical laboratories needs to be changed so that the right or appropriate data are obtained. The concern is that important decisions are made incorrectly more often as greater scrutiny is placed on DoE's radionuclide cleanup or monitoring decisions by the public and other stakeholders. Examples are presented of problems that have been observed for different projects, both within and outside the realm of DOE and NRC remediation and radioactive waste disposal problems, and solutions are offered that should lead to better data from which important decisions need to be made. The first example is from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and involves radionuclide concentrations in soil and rock beneath LANL's Material Disposal Area (MDA) G. An initial review of the data led to a conclusion that americium and plutonium are a long way present beneath MDA G. A more thorough review of the data that accounted properly for ambient background and the detection limits that had been established led to the opposite conclusion. Another example is from the Nevada National Security Site where tritium results from one of the wells were unexpectedly high. Proper understanding and analysis of ambient background led to the conclusion that the increased concentrations were not so obvious, and that a different contract with the analytical laboratory was needed to provide more appropriate data to support a better determination. Other examples are used from regulatory review of projects in Nevada, where background levels and secular equilibrium for naturally occurring radionuclides are not established correctly because of analytical issues. The same basic issues have also been found to create difficulties analyzing historical data from the West Valley Demonstration Project. There is evidence in the data that the apparent lack of secular equilibrium where it is expected to exist is related to ambient background subtraction or other analytical issues. A final example is presented for analysis of Tc-99 in samples of depleted uranium. In this case, two different studies that were performed only three months apart provide quite different results. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the data quality objectives (DQO) process in the mid-1980's to establish decision performance criteria for data collection. EPA guidance (EPA G-4, for example) clearly distinguishes between DQOs and measurement performance objectives (MQOs) that should be addressed for laboratory analysis of samples. The language of DQOs and MQOs has become confused over time it seems, and the subsequent effects seem to include a lack of attention to decision performance and a routine approach to measurement quality. In order to better address radionuclide sample analysis when the concentrations are close to thresholds of concern, which might be zero for some radionuclides, background for others, and risk-based thresholds for yet others, it is important that routine laboratory analysis methods are adjusted, and that the project team and the laboratory work closely together to ensure that the data meets the MQO requirements of laboratory analysis and reporting of results, and that the MQOs effectively support project-specific DQOs. This basic approach will be applied in Los Alamos in the coming year to the collection of moisture data from underneath MDA T that will be analyzed for americium and neptunium isotopes. Proper understanding of the radiochemistry methods and reporting, and of appropriate statistical methods is critical to the success of such projects, ensuring that the right decisions are made. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

When Every Drum is a Win - Tackling a Thirty-Five Thousand Drum Legacy - 20064

Cameco Corporation's (Cameco) Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) was previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, which held a significant inventory of legacy waste material at the time Cameco was formed in 1988. As a result, Cameco was granted an allocation of 150,000 cubic metres of space in the Long-Term Waste Management Facility (LTWMF) located in the Municipality of Port Hope (MPH), which opened to the receipt of Cameco material in June 2018. Cameco is currently undertaking a major site cleanup and renewal of its Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) which is known as the Vision in Motion (VIM) project. Over its operating history, Eldorado accumulated an inventory of over 35,000 drums of accumulated waste that was primarily stored at two offside warehouse locations. In 2017 and 2018, the project focused on repackaging two well characterized legacy wastes (magnesium fluoride slag and depleted uranium titanium oxide) from one of the two offsite locations. At the conclusion of this work, approximately 15,000 drums of these wastes had been repackaged and disposed of at the LTWMF. There remained approximately 1000 drums from this location that either could not be repackaged safely or were different waste types and required further verification and/or processing. The buildings at this location were scheduled for demolition in early 2019, which triggered the development of a process for triaging legacy drums in August 2018, which allowed for preparation and shipment of approximately half of these drums to the LTWMF by March 2019, with the remainder moved to the second offsite warehouse location in February 2019 for further characterization which is ongoing. This paper will discuss key lessons learned as the drummed legacy waste disposal inventory has been reduced to approximately half of the initial inventory. This will include the development of an alternate packaging process; prioritization of characterization activities and selection of techniques where minimal inventory information is available; determination of next step(s) for each drum as it is assessed; key safety considerations; and how to make inroads into an overwhelming task while under public and regulatory scrutiny. In a relatively short period of time, significant progress has been made to organize and gather information about the legacy waste, update the inventory records and determine the most appropriate pathways (i.e. LTWMF disposal, disposal at another appropriate facility, site storage until future processing and/or disposal). Since 2017 the volume of the decades-old legacy waste inventory has decreased significantly. With the majority of the known materials safely disposed of at the LTWMF, every drum removed from the endless rows of 20,000 pyramidally-stacked waste drums with limited history that is safely characterized, prepared and shipped is considered a win. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗