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Topics covered include: Defining Deterrence, And Why it Matters; Deterrence Today - Challenges of Great Power, Competition and Multi-Polar Nuclear Interaction; Deterrence and Our Mission -- Science underpins Deterrence; and, Questions and Answers.
Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.
In the post-World War II era, nuclear deterrence and arms control established a strategic equilibrium between the superpowers that has come under increasing threat as cyber conflict becomes more prevalent. This study seeks to assist policymakers and scholars build a theoretical, policy, and technical framework to address cyber conflict. Based on an analysis of deterrence theory and application and prior arms control regimes, the study presents a toolkit of policies and actions for national governments based on elements of deterrence and arms control that is applicable to cyber conflict. The study illustrates how these could be prospectively applied in a treaty framework to facilitate attribution of hostile cyber actions.
This paper was written by the Cyber Deterrence and Resilience Strategic Initiative in partnership with the Resilience Energy Systems Strategic Initiative. Resilience and deterrence are both part of a comprehensive cyber strategy where tactics may overlap across defense, resilience, deterrence, and other strategic spaces. This paper explores how building resiliency in cyberspace can not only serve to strengthen the defender's posture and capabilities in a general sense but also deter adversaries from attacking.
Outline: 1) What is Capability Based Deterrence and its implementation in policy; 2) Assessment of Capability Based Deterrence compared to other options; 3) Characteristics of an effective Capability Based Deterrent
In 2018 Sandia National Laboratories launched the Civilian Cyber Strategic Initiative, an ongoing multi-year effort to characterize future threats to civilian cyber infrastructures, to inform research and development efforts to detect, attribute, counter, and recover from cyber attacks, and to inform program and capability investment decisions across the Energy and Homeland Security portfolio at Sandia. One of the primary objectives of the Civilian Cyber Strategic initiative is to leverage Sandia's systems analysis capabilities to characterize future threats and to support a new theory of deterrence. Towards the goal of supporting a new theory of deterrence in cyberspace, the purpose of this study was to understand how new and existing deterrence paradigms can be applied to cyberspace, to identify unique challenges and pitfalls associated with deterring adversaries in cyberspace, and to develop preliminary ideas for how our ability to deter cyber adversaries might be improved. Our approach combined literature reviews of relevant policy documents and the academic literature with interviews of experts both at Sandia and beyond.
Over the last decade, a deteriorating security environment has brought into sharp focus the atrophy of strategic thought that occurred after the Cold War. At a time of intensifying major power rivalry, renewed urgency about the effectiveness of deterrence and the reliability of strategic stability, and mounting threats by nuclear armed and -arming “rogue states,” the need for new intellectual capital has become more pressing. But the U.S. analytical community shed a great deal of capability and capacity in the 1990s and after the 9/11 attacks was long focused on other problems. In recent years, the United States has slowly begun to rebuild institutional capacity and to reinvest in the development of the necessary human capital and analytical tools. One symptom of past atrophy was the near-complete collapse of transatlantic dialogue on these matters. One indicator of the nascent renewal is the reemergence of transatlantic collaboration, especially among early career professionals. In recent years it has also become clear that European institutions too are beginning to rebuild capacity and reinvest in human capital. This small volume is the result of a collective effort by four institutions to take stock of the state of strategic thought in Europe as it relates to deterrence and to advance transatlantic dialogue on deterrence. As a co-organizer of this process, CGSR is pleased to produce this edited collection of papers on behalf of the group. I am especially grateful to Amelia Morgan and Anna Péczeli for their role as coeditors. Please note that the views expressed here are the personal views of the authors and should not be attributed to the Laboratory, its sponsors, or any of the institutions with which the authors are or have been affiliated. Please also note that the Laboratory assumes no responsibility for the validity of the information used by the authors, who have drawn on information in common usage in Europe to inform their thinking.
The emerging multipolar international security environment represents a fundamental restructuring of global nuclear balance of power to include two nuclear peer competitors, growing non-peer nuclear threats, and concerns of nuclear latency from both allies and adversaries. Conflicts in the grey zone, cyber operations, mis- and disinformation campaigns, and emerging disruptive technologies like drones, and hypersonic missiles are becoming more prevalent. These present a risk of cross-domain and multi-domain conflicts that may not follow known escalatory patterns. In order to prepare for the new deterrence environment, it is critical to have quantitative and qualitative understandings of these cross-domain conflicts, their potential for escalation, and which systems they may impact. To that end, our team created a Multi-Layer Network (MLN) model of ‘integrated deterrence’ where instruments of national power are modeled as individual network graph layers that include efforts from all domains. We then evaluate the potential for escalation against escalation scenarios. Analysis of the escalation scenarios is then used to identify insights of potential risk and escalation within integrated deterrence.
Our project goal was to design a novel mechanical ultrasonic deterrent for use on wind turbines in order to reduce bat fatalities around these structures. Our proposed deterrent design would be composed of a series of ultrasonic pulse generators, or whistles, affixed to a wind turbine blade, which produce ultrasound through mechanical means. The whistles would produce sounds mimicking the spectrotemporal patterns of bat echolocation pulses, thereby enhancing the bats’ ability to detect, localize and avoid the moving blades. These whistles are intended to be operated passively, blown by the wind, and to be positioned at intervals along a turbine blade. Because the source of sound generation will be mechanical in nature, these devices will require no external power source, should require little maintenance, and will be small and cost-effective.
The idea of a “Euro-deterrent”—a nuclear arsenal under European control and mandated to protect multiple European countries—has been proposed many times as a means for European self-defense independent of United States security guarantees under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper examines not only the concept’s multiple guises, but the reasons for their failure. It will address the idea of a Franco-British umbrella, a French umbrella, a European “pool”, and the nuclear arsenal of a hypothetical “united Europe”. Reasons for rejection largely fall into three categories: sovereignty concerns, credibility gaps, and a desire to preserve existing norms and structures. This paper concludes that the Euro-deterrent will likely remain only hypothetical unless the US unequivocally signals its intent to withdraw its nuclear umbrella from Europe, thereby forcing European countries to build a new defense arrangement.
In North America, several bat species commonly collide with operating turbines. Though the ultimate driver of collisions is unknown, studies suggest that bats may be attracted to turbines because they often approach and spend extended periods of time (seconds to minutes) interacting with turbine structures. To reduce bat mortality at wind farm operators, seek to reduce mortality rates by reducing the amount of time that bats interact with spinning turbine blades (or exposure). Current approaches to reduce exposure include curtailment, whereby turbine operators stop turbine rotors from spinning during periods when bats are expected to be at the highest risk of collision, and deterrent technologies that seek to discourage bats from entering/ limit the amount of time spent within the rotor swept area. We briefly describe the state of the science on ultrasonic deterrent technology, highlight potential drivers of variable efficacy for bat mortality reduction, and suggest next steps focus on identifying the driver(s) of such variability.
This was the fourth in a series of annual events convened at Livermore to exploring the emerging place of the “new domains” in U.S. deterrence strategies. The purposes of the series are to facilitate the emergence of a community of interest that cuts across the policy, military, and technical communities and to inform laboratory strategic planning. U.S. allies have also been drawn into the conversation, as U.S. deterrence strategies are in part about their protection. Discussion in these workshops is on a not-for-attribution basis. It is also makes no use of classified information. On this occasion, there were nearly 100 participants from a dozen countries.
The list of readings below provides some overview and background for the topics covered in the workshop. While some references are to book or materials not available online, where possible references include links to accessible versions of articles. Key questions posed for the workshop: 1. How are the U.S. and its allies adapting their deterrence strategies to the evolving security environment? Are they converging or diverging? 2. Is the balance of strategic influence shifting favourably or unfavourably in Europe and Asia? 3. What can be done to accelerate deterrence transformation and improved strategic competitiveness
The purpose of the workshop was to compare how U.S. extended deterrence in Europe and the Asia-Pacific has been adapting to growing security challenges, explore what U.S. allies from both regions can learn from each other, and examine how U.S. security guarantees in both regions are interrelated. The event brought together almost 60 government and nongovernmental experts from the United States, NATO member states, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This was the second workshop on cross-regional perspectives on U.S. extended deterrence sponsored by CGSR. The first event, co-organized by the CGSR, took place in October 2015.
To address the challenges of the emerging security environment and its impact on extended deterrence and assurance, there has been an effort in the United States to ensure it maintains capabilities for extended deterrence, to enhance assurances and to continue to pursue with allies non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorism - including defenses and consequence management-as priorities. These and other activities are important to the US and its allies, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain. As the developments leading to the ban treaty suggest, the political requirement for dealing with calls for disarmament in the NPT context is indisputable. This may not have been the understanding of the negotiators of the treaty, but it is today's reality.
On February 26-27, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop to examine extended deterrence in a transregional perspective the challenges of the “compete, deter, and win” strategy set out in the U.S. National Defense Strategy. This was the Center’s third annual workshop on extended deterrence. This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities. Among the 65 participants, 10 were from allied countries in Europe and 12 from allied countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
The 13th annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21) workshop brought together a mixture of senior officials from the laboratory, policy, military, and expert communities to promote a high-level focus and well-informed discussion on key deterrence challenges for the U.S. nuclear deterrent over the coming decade and beyond. It brought together interested stakeholders from the national security laboratories, federal government, military, think tank, and academic communities, as well as allied counterparts, to share perspectives in an unclassified setting.
A series of flight maneuvers were developed to cover the range of flight conditions and to define the repeatability and hysteresis of the sensors. Initial flights were made with two sensors at the + or - 68 percent span and 60 percent and 70 percent chord stations. The primary effort in simulation program development was to modify the LRC General Aviation Simulator (GAS) Fortran programs to allow execution on the MSU UNIVAC 1106. A simple model of the sensor-servo stall deterrent system was developed. A one degree of freedom model of pitch dynamics of the airplane and stall deterrent system was developed to make initial estimates of the control system gains. A position error plus rate damping control algorithm was found to have acceptable characteristics.