Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Engineering Risk Assessment”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events: Update

Loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) can have a negative impact on a nuclear power plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. LOOP event frequencies and times required for subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study were based on the operating experience during calendar years 1987–2020, while the most recent 15-year data (i.e., from 2006–2020) were used for most analyses in this report. LOOP events during critical operation that did not result in a reactor trip are not included. Frequencies and durations were determined for four LOOP event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather related. Highly significant decreasing trends in the LOOP occurrence rates were identified for All-LOOPs during critical operation (p-value = 0.001) and switchyard-centered LOOPs during critical operation (p-value = 0.002) for the most recent 10-year period (2011–2020). Adverse trends in LOOP durations continue for switchyard-centered LOOPs (p-value = 0.005), All-LOOPs (p-value = 0.019), as well as All-LOOPs during shutdown operation (p-value = 0.003). Statistical tests show the LOOP counts are not uniformly distributed across the 12 months, and variation among the months exists for plant-centered LOOPs (p-value = 0.028), grid-related LOOPs (p-value = 0.021), All-LOOPs (p-value = 0.003), and All-LOOPs during critical operation (p-value = 0.008). The engineering analysis of LOOP data showed for the period of 2006–2020, the equipment failure events were dominated by failures of circuits and relay; human errors have been less frequent and occurred primarily in maintenance; and weather events were dominated by tornadoes and lightning.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events: 2021 Update

Loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) can have a negative impact on a nuclear power plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. LOOP event frequencies and times required for subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study were based on the operating experience during calendar years 1987–2021, while the most recent 15-year data (i.e., from 2007–2021) were used for most analyses in this report. LOOP events during critical operation that did not result in a reactor trip are not included. Frequencies and durations were determined for four LOOP event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. These categories (and the All-LOOPs group which contains all LOOPs without regarding of the four categories) could be further grouped by whether a LOOP event occurred during critical operation, during shutdown operation, or during all operations. The following decreasing trends in the LOOP occurrence rates were identified for the most recent 10-year period (2012–2021): All-LOOPs during critical operation, switchyard-centered LOOPs during critical operation, and grid-related LOOPs during critical operation. Adverse trends in LOOP durations continue for switchyard-centered LOOPs during all operations, All-LOOPs during all operations, and All-LOOPs during shutdown operation for the 1997–2021 period. Statistical tests show the LOOP counts for the period of 2007–2021 are not uniformly distributed across the 12 months, and variation among the months exists for grid-related LOOPs during all operations, All-LOOPs during all operations, and All-LOOPs during critical operation. The engineering analysis of LOOP data showed for the period of 2007–2021, the equipment failure events were dominated by failures of relay and other; human errors have been less frequent and occurred primarily in maintenance and switching; and weather were dominated by tornadoes then by lightning and hurricane. Weather was the cause for 45% of LOOPs for the last fifteen years (2007– 2021) but only for 20% of LOOPs for the previous 20 years (1987–2006) .

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

R&D DC Electrical Safety [Slides]

Objectives: Recognize DC and pulsed electrical hazards; Improve risk assessment skills; Concepts to improve worker safety; Engineered vs. administrative controls; tools of the trade.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity for Digital Energy Infrastructure : Trends, Threats, and Cyber-Informed Engineering

This presentation discusses the rise in digital energy infrastructure and associated threats. It covers an in-depth risk assessment of digital energy equipment and provides real world examples of threats, vulnerabilities, and known incidents. Research conducted by INL assessing and addressing these risks follows, concluding with a dive into Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and it's application to digital energy infrastructure, using battery energy storage systems (BESS) as an example.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Workbook: End-of-Train (EoT) / Head-of-Train (HoT) Communications

This workbook presents a vulnerability (CVE-2025-1727 ) found in train applications and guides a digital risk assessment and mitigation analysis and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering principles to mitigate the potential consequences and ultimately the hazard through the engineering discipline because of exploiting this vulnerability. Workshop participants are encouraged to use the workbook to capture insights and lessons learned. The workbook guides the participant to: • Understand the HE communication vulnerability • Map digital threats to physical consequences • Use bowtie analysis to illustrate both “security” and “engineering” barriers • Apply CIE principles to ensure that even if communications are compromised, the physical engineered system still behaves safely. • Produce an actionable set of engineered and infosec controls for implementation

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM+) (Technical Reference Manual V.4)

The HyRAM+ software toolkit provides a basis for conducting quantitative risk assessment and consequence modeling for hydrogen, methane, and propane infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM+ is designed to facilitate the use of state-of-the-art science and engineering models to conduct robust, repeatable assessments of safety, hazards, and risk. HyRAM+ includes generic probabilities for equipment failures, probabilistic models for the impact of heat flux on humans and structures, and experimentally validated first-order models of release and flame physics. HyRAM+ integrates deterministic and probabilistic models for quantifying accident scenarios, predicting physical effects, and characterizing hazards (thermal effects from jet fires, overpressure effects from delayed ignition), and assessing impact on people and structures. HyRAM+ is developed at Sandia National Laboratories to support the development and revision of national and international codes and standards. HyRAM+ is a research software in active development and thus the models and data may change. This report will be updated at appropriate developmental intervals. This document provides a description of the methodology and models contained in HyRAM+ version 4.0. The most significant change for HyRAM+ version 4.0 from HyRAM version 3.1 is the incorporation of other alternative fuels, namely methane (as a proxy for natural gas) and propane into the toolkit. This change necessitated significant changes to the installable graphical user interface as well as changes to the back-end Python models. A second major change is the inclusion of physics models for the overpressure associated with the delayed ignition of an unconfined jet/plume of flammable gas.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM) (V.3.1) (Technical Reference Manual)

The HyRAM software toolkit provides a basis for conducting quantitative risk assessment and consequence modeling for hydrogen infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM is designed to facilitate the use of state-of-the-art science and engineering models to conduct robust, repeatable assessments of hydrogen safety, hazards, and risk. HyRAM includes generic probabilities for hydrogen equipment failures, probabilistic models for the impact of heat flux on humans and structures, and experimentally validated first-order models of hydrogen release and flame physics. HyRAM integrates deterministic and probabilistic models for quantifying accident scenarios, predicting physical effects, and characterizing hydrogen hazards (thermal effects from jet res, overpressure effects from deflagrations), and assessing impact on people and structures. HyRAM is developed at Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Department of Energy to increase access to technical data about hydrogen safety and to enable the use of that data to support development and revision of national and international codes and standards. HyRAM is a research software in active development and thus the models and data may change. This report will be updated at appropriate developmental intervals. This document provides a description of the methodology and models contained in HyRAM version 3.1. There have been several impactful updates since version 3.0. HyRAM 3.1 contains a correction to use the volume fraction for two-phase speed of sound calculations; this only affects cryogenic releases in which two-phase ow (vapor and liquid) is predicted in the orifice. Other changes include clarifications that inputs for tank pressure should be given in absolute pressure, not gauge pressure. Additionally, the interface now rejects invalid inputs to probability distributions, and the less accurate single-point radiative source model selection was removed from the interface.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM) (Version 3.0 Technical Reference Manual)

The HyRAM software toolkit provides a basis for conducting quantitative risk assessment and consequence modeling for hydrogen infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM is designed to facilitate the use of state-of-the-art science and engineering models to conduct robust, repeatable assessments of hydrogen safety, hazards, and risk. HyRAM includes generic probabilities for hydrogen equipment failures, probabilistic models for the impact of heat flux on humans and structures, and computationally and experimentally validated first-order models of hydrogen release and flame physics. HyRAM integrates deterministic and probabilistic models for quantifying accident scenarios, predicting physical effects, and characterizing hydrogen hazards (thermal effects from jet fires, overpressure effects from deflagrations), and assessing impact on people and structures. HyRAM is developed at Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Department of Energy to increase access to technical data about hydrogen safety and to enable the use of that data to support development and revision of national and international codes and standards. HyRAM is a research software in active development and thus the models and data may change. This report will be updated at appropriate developmental intervals. This document provides a description of the methodology and models contained in the HyRAM version 3.0. HyRAM 3.0 includes the new ability to model cryogenic hydrogen releases from liquid hydrogen systems, using a different property calculation method and different equations of state. Other changes include modifications to the ignition probability calculations, component leak frequency calculations, and addition of default impulse data.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Lessons Learned for Responsible Use of Cloud in the Cirrus Project, Following the CrowdStrike Outage Event

A disruption in CrowdStrike’s Falcon cybersecurity platform on July 19th, 2024, caused worldwide chaos. This event highlights the imperative need for cloud security measures for networks that are critically reliant on cloud technology. This incident negatively impacted air travel, government networks, and critical infrastructure sectors such as hospitals and financial institutions. While no electric utilities had a physical impact, and few had an IT impact, there were issues created by loss of cloud services, and other interrelated industries. For utilities and energy distribution organizations, understanding and mitigating these risks is essential. The Cirrus tool offers a strategic solution engineered to weave cloud integration seamlessly into the fabric of operational management, thereby enhancing resilience and streamlining efficiency in the face of digital challenges.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Review of analytical studies on seismic fluid-structure interaction of base-supported cylindrical tanks

Analytical solutions for seismic fluid-structure interaction (FSI) of tanks are used by analysts and engineers for a number of purposes, including preliminary sizing, risk assessment, and verification of numerical models. Analytical solutions for seismic FSI of tanks were first developed in the 1930s and have been extended and/or modified in the following nine decades to accommodate different seismic inputs and boundary conditions. This report reviews published analytical solutions for rigid and flexible, base-supported, cylindrical tanks subjected to unidirectional horizontal motion of a small amplitude. The studies parsed the fluid-structure (FSI) response into an impulsive and a convective component, and addressed frequencies of lateral motions of the tank (i.e., impulsive frequencies), hydrodynamic pressures, frequencies of waves (i.e., convective frequencies), wave heights, and reactions at the base. The solutions were categorized into exact and approximate solutions based on the methodologies used. Herein, FSI responses are calculated and compared for a range of tank dimensions using the analytical solutions from the different studies. The responses presented here are normalized to be unitless, and can be used for tanks with different dimensions and mechanical properties, and subjected to different input motions. A sample steel water tank is analyzed using the normalized solutions for two earthquake ground motions with different frequency contents. Ignoring tank flexibility may significantly underestimate seismic responses of the tank and its contained fluid. The approximate solutions, which have been widely used for decades, may not be sufficiently accurate in the modern era. Calculation errors in the reviewed studies are identified and corrected, and differences are quantified for the sample tank.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Diagnostics: Chapter 8 of the special issue: on the path to tokamak burning plasma operation

This chapter presents the activity conducted by the ITPA topical group (TG) on Diagnostics over about the last 15 years. Following a general introduction of the ITER Diagnostics led by their measurement roles, the document is organized in several subchapters detailing the design support, research and development activity conducted by each of the specialist working groups (WGs) of the TG. Please note that the magnetic diagnostics were supported at the TG without a specific WG. Their status is included in the general introduction. In the following some highlights of the subchapter’s contents are provided. Recent advances in ITER first wall (FW) diagnostics for the measurements of plasma-metallic wall interaction in support of the ITER research plan are reported. An InfraRed imaging Video Bolometer for ITER has been developed and tested on several tokamaks to measure the radiated power loss. A laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) technique which utilizes a pulsed laser beam to ablate locally by forming a crater, will measure local tritium inventory in the FW material. Real-time Residual Gas Analyzers will measure the neutral gas composition in a divertor port and an equatorial port during plasma operation. Due to the full metallic FW environment, the plasma-wall interaction in ITER will face several challenges such as the compromised radiated power and divertor heat flux measurements by reflection. Ray tracing and analysis codes have been developed to eliminate and correct the effects of reflection in the measurements. The characteristics of the reflecting surfaces depending on the roughness and angle of the incidence have been measured by dedicated experiments, and the results were applied to the reflection elimination. For the measurement of the metallic impurity radiation induced by eroded metallic atoms, a vacuum ultraviolet spectrometer has been developed and tested. An extensive thermonuclear diagnostic suite will be required to support the operation of ITER and the planned experimental program for future burning plasma experiments. Due to the harsh environmental conditions, the implementation of diagnostic systems in ITER is a major challenge. These conditions include high levels of neutron and gamma fluxes, neutron heating, particle bombardment. Therefore, the selection and design of diagnostic systems must take into account a number of phenomena previously unseen in diagnostic design. For this reason, the measurement of neutrons and confined or lost fast ions, with particular emphasis on alpha particles, is critical to ITER. The diagnostics associated with these measurements will be important for future plasma-burning experiments at ITER. The high neutron emission and very large plasma size in ITER make neutron diagnostics the main diagnostic method used to measure plasma parameters such as fusion power, fusion power density, ion temperature, energy of fast ions and their spatial distributions in the plasma core. Active spectroscopy techniques are methods where a neutral particle beam is injected into the plasma and information on plasma parameters is extracted from the measurement of line emission resulting from the beam-plasma interaction, either by plasma ions or by beam atoms. Spatial localization is achieved by crossing the beamline and multiple observation lines. The ITER plasma will be a high temperature, moderately dense, fully ionized collisional plasma. The plasma facing surfaces are principally metallic being fashioned from beryllium or tungsten but many other elements, arising from either structural or from operational needs, may enter this plasma. The energy range of the emitted photons range from meV (infra-red) to multi keV (x-rays) and originate from all areas of the plasma volume. The primary role of passive emission diagnostics is to identify what is in the plasma from spectral signatures. Extracting quantitative information from these measurements such as impurity content, ion temperature, rotation, degree of detachment and radiated power depends on calibrated instruments, a physics model of the atomic and molecular processes and plasma transport and an analysis workflow that takes into account environmental effects such as reflections. The particular needs for ITER have prompted a multi-machine, many-year effort to address all these aspects and this chapter reviews the work on diagnostic design, experiments and new analysis techniques. An overview of the laser diagnostics to be implemented on ITER is also provided in this paper. This includes descriptions of the Thomson scattering in the core, edge and divertor regions, polarimetry and interferometry diagnostics used for measuring plasma density and also measurements of helium density in the divertor using Laser Induced Flourescence. Techniques which can allow improvements on current measurements are also addressed in particular expanding poloidal polarimetry measurements to measure field fluctuations and proposed use of dispersion interferometery which has a number of advantages over existing methods. This paper identifies particular areas where further research and testing on existing tokamaks is useful even at this advanced stage to inform the design of diagnostics for ITER. Outstanding areas of concern for the implementation of laser diagnostics, in particular with a view to reliable operation are identified. An overview of the latest developments of microwave diagnostic systems and techniques is given. The primary focus is the contributions for ITER—the next step burning plasma experiment—which is supplemented by describing recent progress of techniques applicable for fusion experiments beyond ITER. The contributions are intentionally kept concise, and are being supplemented by a rich list of references for further studies. Radiation induced effects are receiving continuous and well-deserved attention of the ITER diagnostic community and they are in many cases one of the primary design drivers of the ITER diagnostic systems. The paper summarizes recent progress in this area focusing primarily on the ITER diagnostics but in some cases provides also outlook for the possible solutions for even more demanding radiation environment of fusion reactors beyond ITER. Despite advancements in the area of modeling and simulation of various radiation induced effects, experimental testing in a nuclear environment as close as possible to the target one is still seen as unavoidable for proper qualification of particular diagnostic functional elements. Recent advancement within three diagnostic areas: optical diagnostics, magnetics and bolometers is covered. Encouraging results on qualification of silica glass vacuum window assemblies are presented. In the area of magnetic sensors, progress of irradiation tests performed on ITER in-vessel LTCC inductive sensors is presented with outlook for novel technological approaches to inductive sensors utilizing thick printing and photolithography technologies being highlighted. Summary of advancements in the area of steady state magnetic field sensors based on Hall effect is given. New results of neutron irradiation test of the ITER borosilicate glass inserts for vacuum electrical feedthroughs are summarized finding negligible swelling at target level of neutron fluence. Off-line irradiation tests of fiber optic current sensors for plasma current measurement demonstrated that both for gamma doses up to 5 MGy and a total neutron fluence up to 10 15 cm −2 , radiation induced changes are still compatible with required measurement accuracy on ITER. The ITER bolometers are given as an example how considering radiation effects may influence the diagnostic design. Finally, outlook for future main R&D directions is outlined. All optical and laser-based diagnostics in ITER will be using mirrors to guide plasma radiation toward detectors, cameras and sensors. In the hostile plasma, radiation and particle environment the optical characteristics of diagnostic mirrors will degrade directly affecting the entire performance of involved diagnostic systems. An assessment of factors affecting mirror performance is provided. Among the prime adverse factors are deposition of plasma impurities, sputtering of mirror surface and steam ingress in the vicinity of mirrors. Within the International Tokamak Physics Activity with active support by ITER central team and domestic agencies, the structured research and development (R&D) program on mitigation of risks for diagnostic mirrors is underway. Within this program the mirror material development, the passive mitigation of mirror degradation by using diagnostic ducts and shutters along with an active mirror recovery program comprising the in-situ mirror cleaning and calibration is underway. Recent developments in diagnostic mirror R&D are described in this Chapter along with an example of their implementation of R&D solutions in ITER Infrared Thermography diagnostic. An assessment of still open engineering and physics questions, considerations on mirror risks during an early phase of ITER operation are given along with an overview of diagnostic mirror evolution in the late ITER operation stage toward the demonstration fusion power plant. Several crucial areas of diagnostic R&D outlined in ITER Research Plan are addressed. The basic control groups in a fusion reactor can be broken-down in five categories: (1) plasma position, magnetic configuration, and plasma current control, (2) profile control and confinement optimization, (3) MHD control and suppression, (4) edge dissipation control, radiation and plasma exhaust control and (5) break-down optimization. These categories are coupled via the physics (a control action in one domain will affect the other domains) and via shared actuators (e.g. ECRH for impurity accumulation avoidance, current density distribution control and MHD suppression). Consequently, a supervisory control system should determine the priority of the various control tasks, their couplings, and the interfaces with the safety and interlock system. For the systematic development of the various controllers taking the complexity of the plasma and the control system into account, a model-based approach is required. A short historical overview is given of the developments in systems and control theory and control engineering with special emphasis on those developments that are most relevant for Nuclear Fusion research and operation. An overview is given of the state of the field of fusion plasma control for the control categories. It will be shown how synthetic diagnostics are being developed in ITER and how they are used in diagnostic design and design validation and how they can be in model-based controller synthesis using relatively simple models. In modern control methods, multiple diagnostics are used to constrain relatively simple models. The constrained models provide an estimate for the state. This opens the route to state controllers, such as model predictive control. A major challenge in nuclear fusion research is the coherent combination of data from heterogeneous diagnostics and modeling codes for machine control and safety as well as physics studies. Measured data from different diagnostics often provide information about the same subset of physical parameters. Additionally, information provided by some diagnostics might be needed for the analysis of other diagnostics. A joint analysis of complementary and redundant data allows, e.g. to improve the reliability of parameter estimation, to increase the spatial and temporal resolution of profiles, to obtain synergistic effects, to consider diagnostics interdependencies and to find and resolve data inconsistencies. Physics-based modeling and parameter relationships provide additional information improving the treatment of ill-posed inversion problems. A coherent combination of all kind of available information within a probabilistic framework allows for improved data analysis results. The concept of integrated data analysis (IDA) in the framework of Bayesian probability theory is outlined and contrasted with conventional data analysis. Components of the probabilistic approach are summarized and specific ingredients beneficial for data analysis at fusion devices are discussed.

ITER↗

PV System Owner's Guide to Identifying, Assessing, and Addressing Weather Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Impacts

The report is designed to help federal facility managers, engineers, contractors, and consultants identify the most common PV system vulnerabilities that could lead from mild to catastrophic loss of PV systems during severe weather events. The guide helps users understand the type and severity of severe weather that can occur at any given location, and provides pre- and post-storm operations and maintenance (O&M) measures that can reduce the potential for damage to a PV system during a severe weather event and help speed the recovery of a PV system damaged during a storm. The guide emphasizes safety in responding to damage from severe weather events.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment Studies for Advanced Reactor Using RAVEN

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is used extensively to evaluate the risks associated with complex engineering systems like Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Current PSA models are based on the Event-Tree/Fault-Tree (ET/FT) methodology. ET and FT models are static and are based on Boolean logic approaches. In the past, concerns have been raised in the literature regarding the capability of the traditional static modelling approaches to adequately account for the impact of process, hardware, software, firmware and human interactions on the stochastic system behaviour. To overcome the limitations of the traditional approach to PSA, several dynamic PSA methodologies have been proposed. One of the dynamic PSA methodologies used for dynamic evaluations is Dynamic Event Tree (DET) framework which can be used to assess the impact of the parameter variability and scenario dynamics on the PSA model for the initiating event. The DET framework couples the stochastic model (number of component/trains that start on demand, operator action timing, etc.) with a Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) model of the plant. This paper explores the use of DET along with a case study on advanced reactor. The initiating event selected for the study was Class IV power supply failure event. The TH analysis considering uncertainty in various parameters was performed using RELAP5 and Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENvironment (RAVEN) tool. Based on the uncertainty analysis, it is concluded that the peak clad temperatures (PCT) are within the limits in all the code runs implying a high-degree of safety margin. However, variation in time to reach the PCT was observed among the code runs and the mean time to reach the PCT was found to be around 8590sec (approximately 2.4 hours). Hence, sufficient time margin is available for human intervention and the operator might have a relatively stress-free state during such an accident scenario. Due to the static nature of the traditional PSA models, the safety margin available was lesser, whereas, with the help of dynamic PSA models, one can demonstrate that the actual available safety margin is more in the present case study and is valuable input from the design point of view.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF EVENT TREES AND FAULT TREES: A MODEL-BASED APPROACH

In the past few decades, increasing complexity in modern engineering systems has been driven by the integration of a large number of components and by the fact that the system operations involve many disciplines (e.g., thermal-hydraulics, plant operations, cyber-security). Current safety/reliability modeling approaches to such systems are labor intensive, difficult to learn, and rely heavily on simplistic Boolean logic to depict failure propagation and accident progression. While these methods serve well for simple systems (i.e., linear causal systems with limited small inter- and intra-system interactions), their results are difficult to verify when modeling complex systems (typically performed through the extensive use of modeling assumptions). The development of new methods is addressed to meet these challenges through a model-based system engineering (MBSE) lens. Under MBSE philosophy, every aspect of the system (form or function) is represented by a model that completely characterizes its architecture or behavior. MBSE approach greatly improves the management of design, analysis and verification of complex systems. An integration of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) methods with MBSE models is proposed to perform safety/reliability analyses of engineering systems. In particular, MBSE representation of the system (performed using Systems Modeling Language [SysML]) is coupled with DPRA methods to automatically generate event trees and fault trees.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Populating the Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HYCRED) with Incident Data from Hydrogen Dispensing

Safety, risk, and reliability issues are vital to ensure the continuous and profitable operation of hydrogen technologies. Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) has been used to enable the safe deployment of engineering systems, especially hydrogen fueling stations. However, QRA studies require reliability data which are essential to collect to make the studies as realistic and relevant as possible. These data are currently lacking and data from other industries, such as oil and gas, are used in hydrogen system QRAs. This may lead to inaccurate results since hydrogen fueling stations have differences in physical properties, system design, and operational parameters when compared to other fueling stations, thus necessitating new data sources are necessary to capture the effects of these differences. To address this gap, we developed a structure for a hydrogen component reliability database, (HyCReD) [1], which could be used to generate reliability data to be used in QRA studies. In this paper, we demonstrate populating the HyCReD database with information extracted from new narrative reports on hydrogen fueling station incidents, specifically focused on the dispensing processes. We analyze five new events and demonstrate the feasibility of populating the database and types of meaningful insights that can be obtained at this stage.

component reliability↗

NRAP-open-IAM: A flexible open-source integrated-assessment-model for geologic carbon storage risk assessment and management

Large-scale implementation of geologic carbon storage (GCS) to help reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions requires stakeholder confidence that injected CO2 will remain contained and that potential subsurface environmental risks are acceptably small and manageable. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) has developed an open-source integrated assessment model (NRAP-Open-IAM) to help address questions about a potential GCS site’s ability to effectively contain injected CO 2 and protect groundwater and other overlying environmentally sensitive receptors. NRAP-Open-IAM allows a user to: (1) incorporate relevant site geologic and injection scenario data; (2) characterize important site features and events;(3) couple fast prediction models of various system components of the engineered geologic system; and (4) execute stochastic, dynamic simulation of whole GCS system performance, leakage risk assessment, and uncertainty quantification. NRAP-Open-IAM is available on GitLab (https://gitlab.com/NRAP/OpenIAM), and is accompanied by multiple application examples and detailed user and developer guides.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Enhancement of Industry Legacy Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods and Tools

Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) are integral to nuclear power plant (NPP) operations, having tremendously benefitted the safety of the U.S. reactor fleet for decades. Insights obtained from the models have provided perspectives on a variety of applications, both at the plant and for the regulator. While these models are very useful, they are now being asked to represent and analyze aspects of the plant that were never envisioned by the initial PRA practitioners. Furthermore, heightened demands on the PRA models have led to increased computing power requirements. Additionally, as the complexity of the PRA models increased, the difficulty experienced by non-PRA experts in trying to understand these models, grasp the insights they provide, and effectively use that information has become problematic. The need for research to address key issues regarding PRA tools and methods has never been greater. Although the nuclear power industry has largely been well-served by these tools and methods, the underlying science is dated, remaining mostly unchanged for over two decades. Three areas were identified as most beneficial to address to maintain and improve the usefulness of the current practice legacy PRA tools: improvement in quantification speed, increased ability to efficiently model multi-hazard models, and improvement in modeling human action dependency in PRA. This report provides the outcomes from the FY2021 research into these three areas, identifying potential technical gaps and solutions, and charting the next steps forward to address current PRA challenges.

42 ENGINEERING↗