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SU-G-TeP4-05: An Evaluation of a Low Dose Rate (LDR) Prostate Brachytherapy Procedure Using a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Purpose: The aim of the study is the application of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to access the risks for patients undergoing a Low Dose Rate (LDR) Prostate Brachytherapy Treatment. Methods: FMEA was applied to identify all the sub processes involved in the stages of identifying patient, source handling, treatment preparation, treatment delivery, and post treatment. These processes characterize the radiation treatment associated with LDR Prostate Brachytherapy. The potential failure modes together with their causes and effects were identified and ranked in order of their importance. Three indexes were assigned for each failure mode: the occurrence rating (O), the severity rating (S), and the detection rating (D). A ten-point scale was used to score each category, ten being the number indicating most severe, most frequent, and least detectable failure mode, respectively. The risk probability number (RPN) was calculated as a product of the three attributes: RPN = O X S x D. The analysis was carried out by a working group (WG) at UPMC. Results: The total of 56 failure modes were identified including 32 modes before the treatment, 13 modes during the treatment, and 11 modes after the treatment. In addition to the protocols already adopted in the clinical practice, the prioritized risk management will be implanted to the high risk procedures on the basis of RPN score. Conclusion: The effectiveness of the FMEA method was established. The FMEA methodology provides a structured and detailed assessment method for the risk analysis of the LDR Prostate Brachytherapy Procedure and can be applied to other radiation treatment modes.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

StingRAY Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis: WEC Risk Registers

Analysis method to systematically identify all potential failure modes and their effects on the Stingray WEC system. This analysis is incorporated early in the development cycle such that the mitigation of the identified failure modes can be achieved cost effectively and efficiently. The FMECA can begin once there is enough detail to functions and failure modes of a given system, and its interfaces with other systems. The FMECA occurs coincidently with the design process and is an iterative process which allows for design changes to overcome deficiencies in the analysis.Risk Registers for major subsystems completed according to the methodology described in "Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis Risk Reduction Program Plan.pdf" document below, in compliance with the DOE Risk Management Framework developed by NREL.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

Failure mode and effects analysis based risk profile assessment for stereotactic radiosurgery programs at three cancer centers in Brazil

Purpose: The goal of this study was to evaluate the safety and quality management program for stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) treatment processes at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil by using three industrial engineering tools (1) process mapping, (2) failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and (3) fault tree analysis. Methods: The recommendations of Task Group 100 of American Association of Physicists in Medicine were followed to apply the three tools described above to create a process tree for SRS procedure for each radiotherapy center and then FMEA was performed. Failure modes were identified for all process steps and values of risk priority number (RPN) were calculated from O, S, and D (RPN = O × S × D) values assigned by a professional team responsible for patient care. Results: The subprocess treatment planning was presented with the highest number of failure modes for all centers. The total number of failure modes were 135, 104, and 131 for centers I, II, and III, respectively. The highest RPN value for each center is as follows: center I (204), center II (372), and center III (370). Failure modes with RPN ≥ 100: center I (22), center II (115), and center III (110). Failure modes characterized by S ≥ 7, represented 68% of the failure modes for center III, 62% for center II, and 45% for center I. Failure modes with RPNs values ≥100 and S ≥ 7, D ≥ 5, and O ≥ 5 were considered as high priority in this study. Conclusions: The results of the present study show that the safety risk profiles for the same stereotactic radiotherapy process are different at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil. Although this is the same treatment process, this present study showed that the risk priority is different and it will lead to implementation of different safety interventions among the centers. Therefore, the current practice of applying universal device-centric QA is not adequate to address all possible failures in clinical processes at different radiotherapy centers. Integrated approaches to device-centric and process specific quality management program specific to each radiotherapy center are the key to a safe quality management program.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Continued Discussion of Failure Mode Modeling and Overall Component Reliability: Is the Data Missing or Censored?

This paper is a continuation of a paper presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, in which a discussion of modeling failure modes of complex components was presented; see Paulos and Smith (2016). The paper demonstrated how the typical method of treating failure modes as being exponential in nature may yield optimistic predictions when estimating how improvements to components will perform in the real world. Instead of relying on textbook methods, it is more accurate to model the failure modes as a race in time; unfortunately, this does not give a closed-form solution. This work uses a simulation to solve for the model of the world, and is compared to the standard methodology of treating the failure modes as exponential random failures. The standard method is shown to have optimistic predictions, which will lead to prediction errors when failure modes were removed or “fixed.” The failure mode methodology presented in the first paper treated the data as being censored when the test stopped. In this paper, we will compare the results from treating the data as both censored and missing, and comparisons will be shown showing which method is more accurate and under what conditions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Application of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis to Intraoperative Radiation Therapy Using Mobile Electron Linear Accelerators

Purpose: Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) represents a prospective approach for risk assessment. A multidisciplinary working group of the Italian Association for Medical Physics applied FMEA to electron beam intraoperative radiation therapy (IORT) delivered using mobile linear accelerators, aiming at preventing accidental exposures to the patient. Methods and Materials: FMEA was applied to the IORT process, for the stages of the treatment delivery and verification, and consisted of three steps: 1) identification of the involved subprocesses; 2) identification and ranking of the potential failure modes, together with their causes and effects, using the risk probability number (RPN) scoring system, based on the product of three parameters (severity, frequency of occurrence and detectability, each ranging from 1 to 10); 3) identification of additional safety measures to be proposed for process quality and safety improvement. RPN upper threshold for little concern of risk was set at 125. Results: Twenty-four subprocesses were identified. Ten potential failure modes were found and scored, in terms of RPN, in the range of 42-216. The most critical failure modes consisted of internal shield misalignment, wrong Monitor Unit calculation and incorrect data entry at treatment console. Potential causes of failure included shield displacement, human errors, such as underestimation of CTV extension, mainly because of lack of adequate training and time pressures, failure in the communication between operators, and machine malfunctioning. The main effects of failure were represented by CTV underdose, wrong dose distribution and/or delivery, unintended normal tissue irradiation. As additional safety measures, the utilization of a dedicated staff for IORT, double-checking of MU calculation and data entry and finally implementation of in vivo dosimetry were suggested. Conclusions: FMEA appeared as a useful tool for prospective evaluation of patient safety in radiotherapy. The application of this method to IORT lead to identify three safety measures for risk mitigation.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Predicting Failure Modes and Ductility of Dual Phase Steels Using Plastic Strain Localization

Ductile failure of metals is often treated as the result of void nucleation, growth and coalescence. Various criteria have been proposed to capture this failure mechanism for various materials. In this study, ductile failure of dual phase steels is predicted in the form of plastic strain localization resulting from the incompatible deformation between the harder marternsite phase and the softer ferrite matrix. Microstructure-level inhomogeneity serves as the initial imperfection triggering the instability in the form of plastic strain localization during the deformation process. Failure modes and ultimate ductility of two dual phase steels are analyzed using finite element analyses based on the actual steel microstructures. The plastic work hardening properties for the constituent phases are determined by the in-situ synchrotron-based high-energy X-ray diffraction technique. Under different loading conditions, different failure modes and ultimate ductility are predicted in the form of plastic strain localization. It is found that the local failure mode and ultimate ductility of dual phase steels are closely related to the stress state in the material. Under plane stress condition with free lateral boundary, one dominant shear band develops and leads to final failure of the material. However, if the lateral boundary is constrained, splitting failure perpendicular to the loading direction is predicted with much reduced ductility. On the other hand, under plane strain loading condition, commonly observed necking phenomenon is predicted which leads to the final failure of the material. These predictions are in reasonably good agreement with experimental observations.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

WE-H-BRC-02: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis of Liver Stereotactic Body Radiotherapy

Purpose: To identify areas of improvement in our liver stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) program, using failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). Methods: A multidisciplinary group consisting of one physician, three physicists, one dosimetrist and two therapists was formed. A process map covering 10 major stages of the liver SBRT program from the initial diagnosis to post treatment follow-up was generated. A total of 102 failure modes, together with their causes and effects, were identified. The occurrence (O), severity (S) and lack of detectability (D) were independently scored. The ranking was done using the risk probability number (RPN) defined as the product of average O, S and D numbers for each mode. The scores were normalized to remove inter-observer variability, while preserving individual ranking order. Further, a correlation analysis on the overall agreement on rank order of all failure modes resulted in positive values for successive pairs of evaluators. The failure modes with the highest RPN value were considered for further investigation. Results: The average normalized RPN values for all modes were 39 with a range of 9 to 103. The FMEA analysis resulted in the identification of the top 10 critical failures modes as: Incorrect CT-MR registration, MR scan not performed in treatment position, patient movement between CBCT acquisition and treatment, daily IGRT QA not verified, incorrect or incomplete ITV delineation, OAR contours not verified, inaccurate normal liver effective dose (Veff) calculation, failure of bolus tracking for 4D CT scan, setup instructions not followed for treatment and plan evaluation metrics missed. Conclusion: The application of FMEA to our liver SBRT program led to the identification and possible improvement of areas affecting patient safety.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

WE-G-BRA-09: Microsphere Brachytherapy Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in a Dual-Vendor Environment

Purpose: To improve the safety and quality of a dual-vendor microsphere brachytherapy program with failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). Methods: A multidisciplinary team including physicists, dosimetrists, a radiation oncologist, an interventional radiologist, and radiation safety personnel performed an FMEA for our dual-vendor microsphere brachytherapy program employing SIR-Spheres (Sirtex Medical Limited, Australia) and Theraspheres (BTG, England). We developed a program process tree and step-by-step instructions which were used to generate a comprehensive list of failure modes. These modes were then ranked according to severity, occurrence rate, and detectability. Risk priority numbers (RPNs) were calculated by multiplying these three scores together. Three different severity scales were created: one each for harmful effects to the patient, staff, or the institution. Each failure mode was ranked on one or more of these scales. Results: The group identified 164 failure modes for the microsphere program. 113 of these were ranked using the patient severity scale, 52 using the staff severity scale, and 50 using the institution severity scale. The highest ranked items on the patient severity scale were an error in the automated dosimetry worksheet (RPN = 297.5), and the incorrect target specified on the planning study (RPN = 135). Some failure modes ranked differently between vendors, especially those corresponding to dose vial preparation because of the different methods used. Based on our findings, we made several improvements to our QA program, including documentation to easily identify which product is being used, an additional hand calculation during planning, and reorganization of QA steps before treatment delivery. We will continue to periodically review and revise the FMEA. Conclusion: We have applied FMEA to our dual-vendor microsphere brachytherapy program to identify potential key weaknesses in the treatment chain. Our FMEA results were used to improve the effectiveness of our overall microsphere program.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

A Summary of Taxonomies of Digital System Failure Modes Provided by the DigRel Task Group

Recently, the CSNI directed WGRisk to set up a task group called DIGREL to initiate a new task on developing a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of PSA. It is an important step towards standardized digital I&C reliability assessment techniques for PSA. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison of the failure mode taxonomies provided by the participants. The failure modes are classified in terms of their levels of detail. Software and hardware failure modes are discussed separately.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

WE-H-BRC-01: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of Skin Electronic Brachytherapy Using Esteya Unit

Purpose: A failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) of skin lesions treatment process using Esteya™ device (Elekta Brachyterapy, Veenendaal, The Netherlands) was performed, with the aim of increasing the quality of the treatment and reducing the likelihood of unwanted events. Methods: A multidisciplinary team with experience in the treatment process met to establish the process map, which outlines the flow of various stages for such patients undergoing skin treatment. Potential failure modes (FM) were identified and the value of severity (S), frequency of occurrence (O), and lack of detectability (D) of the proposed FM were scored individually, each on a scale of 1 to 10 following TG-100 guidelines of the AAPM. These failure modes were ranked according to our risk priority number (RPN) and S scores. The efficiency of existing quality management tools was analyzed through a reassessment of the O and D made by consensus. Results: 149 FM were identified, 43 of which had RPN ≥ 100 and 30 had S ≥ 7. After introduction of the tools of quality management, only 3 FM had RPN ≥ 100 and 22 FM had RPN ≥ 50. These 22 FM were thoroughly analyzed and new tools for quality management were proposed. The most common cause of highest RPN FM was associated with the heavy patient workload and the continuous and accurate applicator-patient skin contact during the treatment. To overcome this second item, a regular quality control and setup review by a second individual before each treatment session was proposed. Conclusion: FMEA revealed some of the FM potentials that were not predicted during the initial implementation of the quality management tools. This exercise was useful in identifying the need of periodic update of the FMEA process as new potential failures can be identified.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-F-T-245: The Investigation of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and PDCA for the Radiotherapy Risk Reduction

Purpose: To optimize the clinical processes of radiotherapy and to reduce the radiotherapy risks by implementing the powerful risk management tools of failure mode and effects analysis(FMEA) and PDCA(plan-do-check-act). Methods: A multidiciplinary QA(Quality Assurance) team from our department consisting of oncologists, physicists, dosimetrists, therapists and administrator was established and an entire workflow QA process management using FMEA and PDCA tools was implemented for the whole treatment process. After the primary process tree was created, the failure modes and Risk priority numbers(RPNs) were determined by each member, and then the RPNs were averaged after team discussion. Results: 3 of 9 failure modes with RPN above 100 in the practice were identified in the first PDCA cycle, which were further analyzed to investigate the RPNs: including of patient registration error, prescription error and treating wrong patient. New process controls reduced the occurrence, or detectability scores from the top 3 failure modes. Two important corrective actions reduced the highest RPNs from 300 to 50, and the error rate of radiotherapy decreased remarkably. Conclusion: FMEA and PDCA are helpful in identifying potential problems in the radiotherapy process, which was proven to improve the safety, quality and efficiency of radiation therapy in our department. The implementation of the FMEA approach may improve the understanding of the overall process of radiotherapy while may identify potential flaws in the whole process. Further more, repeating the PDCA cycle can bring us closer to the goal: higher safety and accuracy radiotherapy.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Probability of Loss of Assured Safety in Systems with Multiple Time-Dependent Failure Modes: Incorporation of Delayed Link Failure in the Presence of Aleatory Uncertainty

Probability of loss of assured safety (PLOAS) is modeled for weak link (WL)/strong link (SL) systems in which one or more WLs or SLs could potentially degrade into a precursor condition to link failure that will be followed by an actual link failure after some amount of elapsed time. The descriptor loss of assured safety (LOAS) is used because failure of the WL system places the entire system in an inoperable configuration while failure of the SL system before failure of the WL system, although undesirable, does not necessarily result in an unintended operation of the entire system. Thus, safety is “assured” by failure of the WL system before failure of the SL system. Here, the following topics are considered: (i) Definition of precursor occurrence time cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for individual WLs and SLs, (ii) Formal representation, approximation and illustration of PLOAS with (a) constant delay times, (b) aleatory uncertainty in delay times, and (c) delay times defined by functions of link properties at occurrence times for link failure precursors, and (iii) Procedures for the verification of PLOAS calculations for the three indicated definitions of delayed link failure.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Probability of Loss of Assured Safety in Systems with Multiple Time-Dependent Failure Modes: Incorporation of Delayed Link Failure in the Presence of Aleatory Uncertainty.

Probability of loss of assured safety (PLOAS) is modeled for weak link (WL)/strong link (SL) systems in which one or more WLs or SLs could potentially degrade into a precursor condition to link failure that will be followed by an actual failure after some amount of elapsed time. The following topics are considered: (i) Definition of precursor occurrence time cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for individual WLs and SLs, (ii) Formal representation of PLOAS with constant delay times, (iii) Approximation and illustration of PLOAS with constant delay times, (iv) Formal representation of PLOAS with aleatory uncertainty in delay times, (v) Approximation and illustration of PLOAS with aleatory uncertainty in delay times, (vi) Formal representation of PLOAS with delay times defined by functions of link properties at occurrence times for failure precursors, (vii) Approximation and illustration of PLOAS with delay times defined by functions of link properties at occurrence times for failure precursors, and (viii) Procedures for the verification of PLOAS calculations for the three indicated definitions of delayed link failure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for a Photovoltaic Inverter

While PV panel reliability continues to increase, PV inverters become the limiting factor for PV system reliability. Consequently, it is critical to have a generic tool from a third party for PV inverter reliability assessment to help 1) utilities/PV farm operators schedule maintenance in advance, and 2) inverter developers improve the next-generation design. However, these two things cannot be accomplished without first understanding the reasons behind inverter failure. Following this idea, as the first step, it is essential to identify and investigate the most failure-prone components within a PV inverter system. After all, any system is only as reliable as the components that are contained within it. This motivates the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) work presented for this workshop. The FMEA is conducted as follows: first, the overview of the methodology on the development of the FMEA is presented; then, based on a top-down approach starting from the PV inverter system, critical inverter components with high failure rates are identified and summarized; afterward, a thorough FMEA study at a component-level is performed and its results, including failure modes, failure mechanisms, and critical stressors, are tabulated; finally, according to three rankings (chance of occurrence, severity of occurrence, and ease of detection prior to failure) for each failure mechanism provided by the FMEA, risk priority numbers are calculated and the failure mechanisms along with the critical stressors are ranked in terms of their potentially detrimental effect on the PV inverter.

Brown, Buck↗

The use of failure mode and effects analysis to construct an effective disposal and prevention mechanism for infectious hospital waste

Highlights: > This study is based on a real case in a regional teaching hospital in Taiwan. > We use Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) as the evaluation method. > We successfully identify the risk factors of infectious waste disposal. > We propose plans for the detection of exceptional cases of infectious waste. - Abstract: In recent times, the quality of medical care has been continuously improving in medical institutions wherein patient-centred care has been emphasized. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has also been promoted as a method of basic risk management and as part of total quality management (TQM) for improving the quality of medical care and preventing mistakes. Therefore, a study was conducted using FMEA to evaluate the potential risk causes in the process of infectious medical waste disposal, devise standard procedures concerning the waste, and propose feasible plans for facilitating the detection of exceptional cases of infectious waste. The analysis revealed the following results regarding medical institutions: (a) FMEA can be used to identify the risk factors of infectious waste disposal. (b) During the infectious waste disposal process, six items were scored over 100 in the assessment of uncontrolled risks: erroneous discarding of infectious waste by patients and their families, erroneous discarding by nursing staff, erroneous discarding by medical staff, cleaning drivers pierced by sharp articles, cleaning staff pierced by sharp articles, and unmarked output units. Therefore, the study concluded that it was necessary to (1) provide education and training about waste classification to the medical staff, patients and their families, nursing staff, and cleaning staff; (2) clarify the signs of caution; and (3) evaluate the failure mode and strengthen the effects.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MO-D-213-02: Quality Improvement Through a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of Pediatric External Beam Radiotherapy

Purpose: To conduct a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) as per AAPM Task Group 100 on clinical processes associated with teletherapy, and the development of mitigations for processes with identified high risk. Methods: A FMEA was conducted on clinical processes relating to teletherapy treatment plan development and delivery. Nine major processes were identified for analysis. These steps included CT simulation, data transfer, image registration and segmentation, treatment planning, plan approval and preparation, and initial and subsequent treatments. Process tree mapping was utilized to identify the steps contained within each process. Failure modes (FM) were identified and evaluated with a scale of 1–10 based upon three metrics: the severity of the effect, the probability of occurrence, and the detectability of the cause. The analyzed metrics were scored as follows: severity – no harm = 1, lethal = 10; probability – not likely = 1, certainty = 10; detectability – always detected = 1, undetectable = 10. The three metrics were combined multiplicatively to determine the risk priority number (RPN) which defined the overall score for each FM and the order in which process modifications should be deployed. Results: Eighty-nine procedural steps were identified with 186 FM accompanied by 193 failure effects with 213 potential causes. Eighty-one of the FM were scored with a RPN > 10, and mitigations were developed for FM with RPN values exceeding ten. The initial treatment had the most FM (16) requiring mitigation development followed closely by treatment planning, segmentation, and plan preparation with fourteen each. The maximum RPN was 400 and involved target delineation. Conclusion: The FMEA process proved extremely useful in identifying previously unforeseen risks. New methods were developed and implemented for risk mitigation and error prevention. Similar to findings reported for adult patients, the process leading to the initial treatment has an associated high risk.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Transition among failure modes of the bending system with a stiff film on a soft substrate

Growing interest is being attracted by stretchable and flexible electronics recently due to their attractive characteristics, commercial potentials, and engineering challenges. In comparison with the system on a macroscopic scale, different failure modes are observed in a system with a thin film bonded on an elastomeric substrate. Furthermore, the experimental observations reveal that failure modes occur in turn with the increasing of thickness ratio of the film to substrate. In this paper, theoretical analysis is performed on the failure mechanism in this system with the focus on transitions among these failure modes based on the theory of fracture mechanics. The present theoretical predictions are coincident with related experiment results and can be used to guide the related structural design.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

SU-F-P-07: Applying Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to Treatment Planning System QA

Purpose: A small-scale implementation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for treatment planning system QA by utilizing methodology of AAPM TG-100 report. Methods: FMEA requires numerical values for severity (S), occurrence (O) and detectability (D) of each mode of failure. The product of these three values gives a risk priority number (RPN). We have implemented FMEA for the treatment planning system (TPS) QA for two clinics which use Pinnacle and Eclipse TPS. Quantitative monthly QA data dating back to 4 years for Pinnacle and 1 year for Eclipse have been used to determine values for severity (deviations from predetermined doses at points or volumes), and occurrence of such deviations. The TPS QA protocol includes a phantom containing solid water and lung- and bone-equivalent heterogeneities. Photon and electron plans have been evaluated in both systems. The dose values at multiple distinct points of interest (POI) within the solid water, lung, and bone-equivalent slabs, as well as mean doses to several volumes of interest (VOI), have been re-calculated monthly using the available algorithms. Results: The computed doses vary slightly month-over-month. There have been more significant deviations following software upgrades, especially if the upgrade involved re-modeling of the beams. TG-100 guidance and the data presented here suggest an occurrence (O) of 2 depending on the frequency of re-commissioning the beams, severity (S) of 3, and detectability (D) of 2, giving an RPN of 12. Conclusion: Computerized treatment planning systems could pose a risk due to dosimetric errors and suboptimal treatment plans. The FMEA analysis presented here suggests that TPS QA should immediately follow software upgrades, but does not need to be performed every month.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗