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An analysis of in-flight spacecraft part hours and failure data from the Mariner Mars 1969 Project is given. It contains failure rates computed from this data for all electronic and electromagnetic parts on the Mariners 6 and 7 spacecraft. Also included are failure rates based on combining flight data from Mariners 4,5,6, and 7.
It is shown that the initial assumption of the ratio of unpowered to powered failure rates can have a strong influence on the design of a modular system intended for space missions. The analysis is performed for parallel systems and for triple modular redundant systems. Parallel systems are shown to be much more sensitive to the unpowered to powered failure rate ratio than the TMR/Spares systems, however, regardless of which standby redundancy technique is considered, the dependence of the system reliability on this ratio increases as the number of standby spares increases.
Field failure rates and confidence factors are presented for 88 identifiable components of the ground support equipment at the John F. Kennedy Space Center. For most of these, supplementary information regarding failure mode and cause is tabulated. Complete reliability assessments are included for three systems, eight subsystems, and nine generic piece-part classifications. Procedures for updating or augmenting the reliability results are also included.
Space life performance data on 57 Goddard Space Flight Center spacecraft are analyzed from the standpoint of determining an appropriate reliability model and the associated reliability parameters. Data from published NASA reports, which cover the space performance of GSFC spacecraft launched in the 1960-1970 decade, form the basis of the analyses. The results of the analyses show that the time distribution of 449 malfunctions, of which 248 were classified as failures (not necessarily catastrophic), follow a reliability growth pattern that can be described with either the Duane model or a Weibull distribution. The advantages of both mathematical models are used in order to: identify space failure rates, observe chronological trends, and compare failure rates with those experienced during the prelaunch environmental tests of the flight model spacecraft.
The reported study presents the results of analyses conducted with the aid of both Duane and Weibull growth models. The failure rate values provided may be useful for estimating future space performance, and comparing past, present, and future space performance. Failure rate data from thermal-vacuum system tests are examined and related to the space values. Attention is given to the data base, the time distribution of space malfunctions, limitations on data, and average component reliability for three years in space.
Tolerance and confidence limits for classes of distributions based on failure rates
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) integrated circuits (IC) are one of the key electronic components in today's sophisticated launch and space vehicle complex avionic systems, largely due to their superb reprogrammable and reconfigurable capabilities combined with relatively low non-recurring engineering costs (NRE) and short design cycle. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols and control signal commands. This paper will demonstrate guidelines to estimate FPGA failure rates for ascent and in space operations. The guidelines will account for hardware and radiation-induced failures, as well as Bayesian updates to failure rates. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the FPGA IC. The radiation portion will expand on FPGA susceptibility to different space radiation environments.
Mariner Mars 1964 failure rates computed for use in reliability predictions and cost allocations
Systematic detection policies and Monte Carlo experiments on increased failure rate
Field failure rates and confidence factors are presented for 88 identifiable components of the ground support equipment at the John F. Kennedy Space Center. For most of these, supplementary information regarding failure mode and cause is tabulated. Complete reliability assessments are included for three systems, eight subsystems, and nine generic piece-part classifications. Procedures for updating or augmenting the reliability results presented in this handbook are also included.
Spacecraft parachute recovery systems, especially those with a parachute cluster, require testing to identify and reduce failures. This is especially important when the spacecraft in question is human-rated. Due to the recent effort to make spaceflight affordable, the importance of determining a minimum requirement for testing has increased. The number of tests required to achieve a mature design, with a relatively constant failure rate, can be estimated from a review of previous complex spacecraft recovery systems. Examination of the Apollo parachute testing and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster recovery chute system operation will clarify at which point in those programs the system reached maturity. This examination will also clarify the risks inherent in not performing a sufficient number of tests prior to operation with humans on-board. When looking at complex parachute systems used in spaceflight landing systems, a pattern begins to emerge regarding the need for a minimum amount of testing required to wring out the failure modes and reduce the failure rate of the parachute system to an acceptable level for human spaceflight. Not only a sufficient number of system level testing, but also the ability to update the design as failure modes are found is required to drive the failure rate of the system down to an acceptable level. In addition, sufficient data and images are necessary to identify incipient failure modes or to identify failure causes when a system failure occurs. In order to demonstrate the need for sufficient system level testing prior to an acceptable failure rate, the Apollo Earth Landing System (ELS) test program and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Recovery System failure history will be examined, as well as some experiences in the Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System will be noted.
This is a case study on revised estimates of induced failure for International Space Station (ISS) on-orbit replacement units (ORUs). We devise a heuristic to leverage operational experience data by aggregating ORU, associated function (vehicle sub -system), and vehicle effective' k-factors using actual failure experience. With this input, we determine a significant failure threshold and minimize the difference between the actual and predicted failure rates. We conclude with a discussion on both qualitative and quantitative improvements the heuristic methods and potential benefits to ISS supportability engineering analysis.
Survey and questionnaire techniques were used to gather data from users and manufacturers on the failure rates in the field of plastic encapsulated semiconductors. It was found that such solid state devices are being successfully used by commercial companies which impose certain screening and qualification procedures. The reliability of these semiconductors is now adequate to support their consideration in NASA systems, particularly in low cost systems. The cost of performing necessary screening for NASA applications was assessed.
Today's launch vehicles complex electronic and avionic systems heavily utilize the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuit (IC). FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MIL-STD-1553B, and in control signal commands such as in solenoid/servo valves actuations. This paper will demonstrate guidelines to estimate FPGA failure rates for a launch vehicle, the guidelines will account for hardware, firmware, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC, FPGA memory and clock. The firmware portion will provide guidelines on the high level FPGA programming language and ways to account for software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will provide guidelines on environment susceptibility as well as guidelines on tailoring other launch vehicle programs historical data to a specific launch vehicle.
An m-out-of-n:G system is composed of statistically independent and identically distributed components with exponential lifetimes. The reliability of such a system is obtained under the assumption that the failure of a component changes the failure rate of the surviving components.
Today's launch vehicles complex electronic and avionics systems heavily utilize Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuits (IC) for their superb speed and reconfiguration capabilities. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MILSTD- 1553B and in control signal commands such as in solenoid valve actuations. This paper will identify reliability concerns and high level guidelines to estimate FPGA total failure rates in a launch vehicle application. The paper will discuss hardware, hardware description language, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC. The hardware description language portion will discuss the high level FPGA programming languages and software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will discuss FPGA susceptibility to space environment radiation.
The critical point of any Bayesian analysis concerns the choice and quantification of the prior information. The effects of prior data on a Bayesian analysis are studied. Comparisons of the maximum likelihood estimator, the Bayesian estimator, and the known failure rate are presented. The results of the many simulated trails are then analyzed to show the region of criticality for prior information being supplied to the Bayesian estimator. In particular, effects of prior mean and variance are determined as a function of the amount of test data available.
Equations which define the reliability of n-fold parallel systems with stand-by spares, and triply redundant, majority-voting systems with stand-by spares have been derived. The stand-by spares have been assumed to have a non-zero failure rate while in the stand-by mode. A Monte Carlo system simulation has been generated and the results compared to the theoretical reliability predictions. A comparison of these two stand-by configurations is also presented for three through six total units.