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SU-E-T-627: Failure Modes and Effect Analysis for Monthly Quality Assurance of Linear Accelerator

Purpose: To develop and implement a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) on routine monthly Quality Assurance (QA) tests (physical tests part) of linear accelerator. Methods: A systematic failure mode and effect analysis method was performed for monthly QA procedures. A detailed process tree of monthly QA was created and potential failure modes were defined. Each failure mode may have many influencing factors. For each factor, a risk probability number (RPN) was calculated from the product of probability of occurrence (O), the severity of effect (S), and detectability of the failure (D). The RPN scores are in a range of 1 to 1000, with higher scores indicating stronger correlation to a given influencing factor of a failure mode. Five medical physicists in our institution were responsible to discuss and to define the O, S, D values. Results: 15 possible failure modes were identified and all RPN scores of all influencing factors of these 15 failue modes were from 8 to 150, and the checklist of FMEA in monthly QA was drawn. The system showed consistent and accurate response to erroneous conditions. Conclusion: The influencing factors of RPN greater than 50 were considered as highly-correlated factors of a certain out-oftolerance monthly QA test. FMEA is a fast and flexible tool to develop an implement a quality management (QM) frame work of monthly QA, which improved the QA efficiency of our QA team. The FMEA work may incorporate more quantification and monitoring fuctions in future.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

WE-G-BRA-08: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for Gamma Knife Radiosurgery

Purpose: To perform a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) study for Gamma Knife (GK) radiosurgery processes at our institution based on our experience with the treatment of more than 13,000 patients. Methods: A team consisting of medical physicists, nurses, radiation oncologists, neurosurgeons at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and an external physicist expert was formed for the FMEA study. A process tree and a failure mode table were created for the GK procedures using the Leksell GK Perfexion and 4C units. Three scores for the probability of occurrence (O), the severity (S), and the probability of no detection (D) for failure modes were assigned to each failure mode by each professional on a scale from 1 to 10. The risk priority number (RPN) for each failure mode was then calculated (RPN = OxSxD) as the average scores from all data sets collected. Results: The established process tree for GK radiosurgery consists of 10 sub-processes and 53 steps, including a sub-process for frame placement and 11 steps that are directly related to the frame-based nature of the GK radiosurgery. Out of the 86 failure modes identified, 40 failure modes are GK specific, caused by the potential for inappropriate use of the radiosurgery head frame, the imaging fiducial boxes, the GK helmets and plugs, and the GammaPlan treatment planning system. The other 46 failure modes are associated with the registration, imaging, image transfer, contouring processes that are common for all radiation therapy techniques. The failure modes with the highest hazard scores are related to imperfect frame adaptor attachment, bad fiducial box assembly, overlooked target areas, inaccurate previous treatment information and excessive patient movement during MRI scan. Conclusion: The implementation of the FMEA approach for Gamma Knife radiosurgery enabled deeper understanding of the overall process among all professionals involved in the care of the patient and helped identify potential weaknesses in the overall process.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

WE-H-BRC-01: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of Skin Electronic Brachytherapy Using Esteya Unit

Purpose: A failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) of skin lesions treatment process using Esteya™ device (Elekta Brachyterapy, Veenendaal, The Netherlands) was performed, with the aim of increasing the quality of the treatment and reducing the likelihood of unwanted events. Methods: A multidisciplinary team with experience in the treatment process met to establish the process map, which outlines the flow of various stages for such patients undergoing skin treatment. Potential failure modes (FM) were identified and the value of severity (S), frequency of occurrence (O), and lack of detectability (D) of the proposed FM were scored individually, each on a scale of 1 to 10 following TG-100 guidelines of the AAPM. These failure modes were ranked according to our risk priority number (RPN) and S scores. The efficiency of existing quality management tools was analyzed through a reassessment of the O and D made by consensus. Results: 149 FM were identified, 43 of which had RPN ≥ 100 and 30 had S ≥ 7. After introduction of the tools of quality management, only 3 FM had RPN ≥ 100 and 22 FM had RPN ≥ 50. These 22 FM were thoroughly analyzed and new tools for quality management were proposed. The most common cause of highest RPN FM was associated with the heavy patient workload and the continuous and accurate applicator-patient skin contact during the treatment. To overcome this second item, a regular quality control and setup review by a second individual before each treatment session was proposed. Conclusion: FMEA revealed some of the FM potentials that were not predicted during the initial implementation of the quality management tools. This exercise was useful in identifying the need of periodic update of the FMEA process as new potential failures can be identified.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

A streamlined failure mode and effects analysis

Purpose: Explore the feasibility and impact of a streamlined failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) using a structured process that is designed to minimize staff effort. Methods: FMEA for the external beam process was conducted at an affiliate radiation oncology center that treats approximately 60 patients per day. A structured FMEA process was developed which included clearly defined roles and goals for each phase. A core group of seven people was identified and a facilitator was chosen to lead the effort. Failure modes were identified and scored according to the FMEA formalism. A risk priority number,RPN, was calculated and used to rank failure modes. Failure modes with RPN > 150 received safety improvement interventions. Staff effort was carefully tracked throughout the project. Results: Fifty-two failure modes were identified, 22 collected during meetings, and 30 from take-home worksheets. The four top-ranked failure modes were: delay in film check, missing pacemaker protocol/consent, critical structures not contoured, and pregnant patient simulated without the team's knowledge of the pregnancy. These four failure modes hadRPN > 150 and received safety interventions. The FMEA was completed in one month in four 1-h meetings. A total of 55 staff hours were required and, additionally, 20 h by the facilitator. Conclusions: Streamlined FMEA provides a means of accomplishing a relatively large-scale analysis with modest effort. One potential value of FMEA is that it potentially provides a means of measuring the impact of quality improvement efforts through a reduction in risk scores. Future study of this possibility is needed.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of Biorefinery Pathways

This talk provides an overview of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) development and implementation as a systematic criticality and risk assessment tool for biorefinery pathways within the FCIC. This supports a quality by design (QbD) approach, and this talk provides a high-level overview of the results for the FMEA evaluation focused on the generation of pine residue materials for high-temperature pyrolysis conversion. the FMEA interviews included two approaches. The first approach was based around the entire system of unit operations giving a wholistic system level view. The second approach used detailed interviews from individual unit operation within the system allowing for specific failures for individual system components. These two approaches provide different resolutions of information about the reliability and risk. The FMEA results focused on failures associated with meeting critical quality attributes (CQAs) identified for the high temperature conversion of loblolly pine residues and were supplemented with experimental data supporting process upsets and reliability also collected within the consortium. Estimations of risk scores for meeting each given CQA specification, identification of the impacts for not meeting a CQA specification, capturing causes associated with material attributes and process parameters for each failure, identification of current detection methods, and speculation of potential mitigation strategies for decreasing a failure’s risk score were gathered through the FMEA interviews, and were combined to understand the overall process risk metrics and where technology, process, and knowledge improvements are needed in order to de-risk emerging biorefineries.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Matrix Failure Modes and Effects Analysis as a Knowledge Base for a Real Time Automated Diagnosis Expert System

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis contain a wealth of information that can be used to create the knowledge base required for building automated diagnostic Expert systems. A real time monitoring and diagnosis expert system based on an actual NASA project's matrix failure modes and effects analysis was developed. This Expert system Was developed at NASA Ames Research Center. This system was first used as a case study to monitor the Research Animal Holding Facility (RAHF), a Space Shuttle payload that is used to house and monitor animals in orbit so the effects of space flight and microgravity can be studied. The techniques developed for the RAHF monitoring and diagnosis Expert system are general enough to be used for monitoring and diagnosis of a variety of other systems that undergo a Matrix FMEA. This automated diagnosis system was successfully used on-line and validated on the Space Shuttle flight STS-58, mission SLS-2 in October 1993.

Herrin, Stephanie↗

Application of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis to Intraoperative Radiation Therapy Using Mobile Electron Linear Accelerators

Purpose: Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) represents a prospective approach for risk assessment. A multidisciplinary working group of the Italian Association for Medical Physics applied FMEA to electron beam intraoperative radiation therapy (IORT) delivered using mobile linear accelerators, aiming at preventing accidental exposures to the patient. Methods and Materials: FMEA was applied to the IORT process, for the stages of the treatment delivery and verification, and consisted of three steps: 1) identification of the involved subprocesses; 2) identification and ranking of the potential failure modes, together with their causes and effects, using the risk probability number (RPN) scoring system, based on the product of three parameters (severity, frequency of occurrence and detectability, each ranging from 1 to 10); 3) identification of additional safety measures to be proposed for process quality and safety improvement. RPN upper threshold for little concern of risk was set at 125. Results: Twenty-four subprocesses were identified. Ten potential failure modes were found and scored, in terms of RPN, in the range of 42-216. The most critical failure modes consisted of internal shield misalignment, wrong Monitor Unit calculation and incorrect data entry at treatment console. Potential causes of failure included shield displacement, human errors, such as underestimation of CTV extension, mainly because of lack of adequate training and time pressures, failure in the communication between operators, and machine malfunctioning. The main effects of failure were represented by CTV underdose, wrong dose distribution and/or delivery, unintended normal tissue irradiation. As additional safety measures, the utilization of a dedicated staff for IORT, double-checking of MU calculation and data entry and finally implementation of in vivo dosimetry were suggested. Conclusions: FMEA appeared as a useful tool for prospective evaluation of patient safety in radiotherapy. The application of this method to IORT lead to identify three safety measures for risk mitigation.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

SU-G-TeP4-05: An Evaluation of a Low Dose Rate (LDR) Prostate Brachytherapy Procedure Using a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Purpose: The aim of the study is the application of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to access the risks for patients undergoing a Low Dose Rate (LDR) Prostate Brachytherapy Treatment. Methods: FMEA was applied to identify all the sub processes involved in the stages of identifying patient, source handling, treatment preparation, treatment delivery, and post treatment. These processes characterize the radiation treatment associated with LDR Prostate Brachytherapy. The potential failure modes together with their causes and effects were identified and ranked in order of their importance. Three indexes were assigned for each failure mode: the occurrence rating (O), the severity rating (S), and the detection rating (D). A ten-point scale was used to score each category, ten being the number indicating most severe, most frequent, and least detectable failure mode, respectively. The risk probability number (RPN) was calculated as a product of the three attributes: RPN = O X S x D. The analysis was carried out by a working group (WG) at UPMC. Results: The total of 56 failure modes were identified including 32 modes before the treatment, 13 modes during the treatment, and 11 modes after the treatment. In addition to the protocols already adopted in the clinical practice, the prioritized risk management will be implanted to the high risk procedures on the basis of RPN score. Conclusion: The effectiveness of the FMEA method was established. The FMEA methodology provides a structured and detailed assessment method for the risk analysis of the LDR Prostate Brachytherapy Procedure and can be applied to other radiation treatment modes.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

ECAR-7517 Rev 1 MARVEL I&C Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

The purpose of this document is to perform a single-failure analysis through the use of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Safety Related components of the MARVEL Instrumentation and Control (I&C) System. The intent is that this document will meet the requirements for a single-failure analysis described in IEEE-379, “IEEE Standard for Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems”, to verify that this design does indeed meet the single failure criterion. Principles of IEEE-352, “IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems” are followed to ensure the analysis is consistent with industry standards.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

SU-F-P-07: Applying Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to Treatment Planning System QA

Purpose: A small-scale implementation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for treatment planning system QA by utilizing methodology of AAPM TG-100 report. Methods: FMEA requires numerical values for severity (S), occurrence (O) and detectability (D) of each mode of failure. The product of these three values gives a risk priority number (RPN). We have implemented FMEA for the treatment planning system (TPS) QA for two clinics which use Pinnacle and Eclipse TPS. Quantitative monthly QA data dating back to 4 years for Pinnacle and 1 year for Eclipse have been used to determine values for severity (deviations from predetermined doses at points or volumes), and occurrence of such deviations. The TPS QA protocol includes a phantom containing solid water and lung- and bone-equivalent heterogeneities. Photon and electron plans have been evaluated in both systems. The dose values at multiple distinct points of interest (POI) within the solid water, lung, and bone-equivalent slabs, as well as mean doses to several volumes of interest (VOI), have been re-calculated monthly using the available algorithms. Results: The computed doses vary slightly month-over-month. There have been more significant deviations following software upgrades, especially if the upgrade involved re-modeling of the beams. TG-100 guidance and the data presented here suggest an occurrence (O) of 2 depending on the frequency of re-commissioning the beams, severity (S) of 3, and detectability (D) of 2, giving an RPN of 12. Conclusion: Computerized treatment planning systems could pose a risk due to dosimetric errors and suboptimal treatment plans. The FMEA analysis presented here suggests that TPS QA should immediately follow software upgrades, but does not need to be performed every month.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Risk management for outsourcing biomedical waste disposal – Using the failure mode and effects analysis

Highlights: • This study is based on a real case in hospital in Taiwan. • We use Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as the evaluation method. • We successfully identify the evaluation factors of bio-medical waste disposal risk. - Abstract: Using the failure mode and effects analysis, this study examined biomedical waste companies through risk assessment. Moreover, it evaluated the supervisors of biomedical waste units in hospitals, and factors relating to the outsourcing risk assessment of biomedical waste in hospitals by referring to waste disposal acts. An expert questionnaire survey was conducted on the personnel involved in waste disposal units in hospitals, in order to identify important factors relating to the outsourcing risk of biomedical waste in hospitals. This study calculated the risk priority number (RPN) and selected items with an RPN value higher than 80 for improvement. These items included “availability of freezing devices”, “availability of containers for sharp items”, “disposal frequency”, “disposal volume”, “disposal method”, “vehicles meeting the regulations”, and “declaration of three lists”. This study also aimed to identify important selection factors of biomedical waste disposal companies by hospitals in terms of risk. These findings can serve as references for hospitals in the selection of outsourcing companies for biomedical waste disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Summary Report

This report provides an overview of the development of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and its implementation as a systematic criticality and risk assessment tool supporting a quality by design (QbD) approach for FCIC research. This report also provides a high-level overview of the results for the FMEA evaluation of two feedstock preprocessing system configurations: (1) generation of pine residue materials for high-temperature pyrolysis conversion and (2) generation of corn stover materials for low-temperature conversion using deacetylation and disc mechanical refining pretreatment for fermentation to hydrocarbons. For the results presented in this report, our FMEA interviews included two approaches. The first approach was to perform FMEA interviews for the entire system of unit operations giving a wholistic system level view. The second approach consisted of detailed interviews for each individual unit operation within the system allowing for a “deep dive” into the specific failures for the individual components within the configuration. These two approaches provide different resolutions of information. The FMEA results of this report were focused on failures associated with meeting critical quality attributes (CQAs) identified for the target conversion processes for each processed feedstock type. The information gathered through the FMEA interviews include estimations of risk scores for meeting each given CQA specification, identification of the impacts for not meeting a CQA specification, capturing causes associated with material attributes and process parameters for each failure, identification of current detection methods, and speculation of potential mitigation strategies for decreasing a failure’s risk score. The complete results of all FMEA interviews are provided in the Appendices of this report.

conversion↗

SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment

Purpose: To evaluate the differences between the Veteran Affairs Healthcare Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and the AAPM Task Group 100 Failure and Effect Analysis (FMEA) risk assessment techniques in the setting of a stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) procedure were compared respectively. Understanding the differences in the techniques methodologies and outcomes will provide further insight into the applicability and utility of risk assessments exercises in radiation therapy. Methods: HFMEA risk assessment analysis was performed on a stereotactic radiosurgery procedure. A previous study from our institution completed a FMEA of our SRS procedure and the process map generated from this work was used for the HFMEA. The process of performing the HFMEA scoring was analyzed, and the results from both analyses were compared. Results: The key differences between the two risk assessments are the scoring criteria for failure modes and identifying critical failure modes for potential hazards. The general consensus among the team performing the analyses was that scoring for the HFMEA was simpler and more intuitive then the FMEA. The FMEA identified 25 critical failure modes while the HFMEA identified 39. Seven of the FMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the HFMEA and 21 of the HFMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the FMEA. HFMEA as described by the Veteran Affairs provides guidelines on which failure modes to address first. Conclusion: HFMEA is a more efficient model for identifying gross risks in a process than FMEA. Clinics with minimal staff, time and resources can benefit from this type of risk assessment to eliminate or mitigate high risk hazards with nominal effort. FMEA can provide more in depth details but at the cost of elevated effort.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Feedstock-Conversion Interface Consortium: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Summary Report (FY2022)

This report provides an overview of the development of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and its implementation as a systematic criticality and risk assessment tool supporting a quality by design (QbD) approach for FCIC research. This report also provides a high-level overview of the results for the FMEA evaluation of two feedstock preprocessing system configurations: (1) generation of pine residue materials for high-temperature pyrolysis conversion and (2) generation of corn stover materials for low-temperature conversion using deacetylation and disc mechanical refining pretreatment for fermentation to hydrocarbons. For the results presented in this report, our FMEA interviews included two approaches. The first approach was to perform FMEA interviews for the entire system of unit operations giving a wholistic system level view. The second approach consisted of detailed interviews for each individual unit operation within the system allowing for a “deep dive” into the specific failures for the individual components within the configuration. These two approaches provide different resolutions of information. The FMEA results of this report were focused on failures associated with meeting critical quality attributes (CQAs) identified for the target conversion processes for each processed feedstock type. The information gathered through the FMEA interviews include estimations of risk scores for meeting each given CQA specification, identification of the impacts for not meeting a CQA specification, capturing causes associated with material attributes and process parameters for each failure, identification of current detection methods, and speculation of potential mitigation strategies for decreasing a failure’s risk score. The complete results of all FMEA interviews are provided in the Appendices of this report.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the US DCLL Test Blanket Module

This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of a small tritium-breeding test blanket module design for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. The FMEA was quantified with “generic” component failure rate data, and the failure events are binned into postulated initiating event families and frequency categories for safety assessment. An appendix to this report contains repair time data to support an occupational radiation exposure assessment for test blanket module maintenance.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Assistant Tool Feasibility Study

An effort to determine the feasibility of a software tool to assist in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been completed. This new and unique approach to FMEA uses model based systems engineering concepts to recommend failure modes, causes, and effects to the user after they have made several selections from pick lists about a component s functions and inputs/outputs. Recommendations are made based on a library using common failure modes identified over the course of several major human spaceflight programs. However, the tool could be adapted for use in a wide range of applications from NASA to the energy industry.

Flores, Melissa↗

SU-E-T-421: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of Xoft Electronic Brachytherapy for the Treatment of Superficial Skin Cancers

Purpose: To perform a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) of the process for treating superficial skin cancers with the Xoft Axxent electronic brachytherapy (eBx) system, given the recent introduction of expanded quality control (QC) initiatives at our institution. Methods: A process map was developed listing all steps in superficial treatments with Xoft eBx, from the initial patient consult to the completion of the treatment course. The process map guided the FMEA to identify the failure modes for each step in the treatment workflow and assign Risk Priority Numbers (RPN), calculated as the product of the failure mode’s probability of occurrence (O), severity (S) and lack of detectability (D). FMEA was done with and without the inclusion of recent QC initiatives such as increased staffing, physics oversight, standardized source calibration, treatment planning and documentation. The failure modes with the highest RPNs were identified and contrasted before and after introduction of the QC initiatives. Results: Based on the FMEA, the failure modes with the highest RPN were related to source calibration, treatment planning, and patient setup/treatment delivery (Fig. 1). The introduction of additional physics oversight, standardized planning and safety initiatives such as checklists and time-outs reduced the RPNs of these failure modes. High-risk failure modes that could be mitigated with improved hardware and software interlocks were identified. Conclusion: The FMEA analysis identified the steps in the treatment process presenting the highest risk. The introduction of enhanced QC initiatives mitigated the risk of some of these failure modes by decreasing their probability of occurrence and increasing their detectability. This analysis demonstrates the importance of well-designed QC policies, procedures and oversight in a Xoft eBx programme for treatment of superficial skin cancers. Unresolved high risk failure modes highlight the need for non-procedural quality initiatives such as improved planning software and more robust hardware interlock systems.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

The use of failure mode and effects analysis to construct an effective disposal and prevention mechanism for infectious hospital waste

Highlights: > This study is based on a real case in a regional teaching hospital in Taiwan. > We use Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) as the evaluation method. > We successfully identify the risk factors of infectious waste disposal. > We propose plans for the detection of exceptional cases of infectious waste. - Abstract: In recent times, the quality of medical care has been continuously improving in medical institutions wherein patient-centred care has been emphasized. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has also been promoted as a method of basic risk management and as part of total quality management (TQM) for improving the quality of medical care and preventing mistakes. Therefore, a study was conducted using FMEA to evaluate the potential risk causes in the process of infectious medical waste disposal, devise standard procedures concerning the waste, and propose feasible plans for facilitating the detection of exceptional cases of infectious waste. The analysis revealed the following results regarding medical institutions: (a) FMEA can be used to identify the risk factors of infectious waste disposal. (b) During the infectious waste disposal process, six items were scored over 100 in the assessment of uncontrolled risks: erroneous discarding of infectious waste by patients and their families, erroneous discarding by nursing staff, erroneous discarding by medical staff, cleaning drivers pierced by sharp articles, cleaning staff pierced by sharp articles, and unmarked output units. Therefore, the study concluded that it was necessary to (1) provide education and training about waste classification to the medical staff, patients and their families, nursing staff, and cleaning staff; (2) clarify the signs of caution; and (3) evaluate the failure mode and strengthen the effects.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗