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Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗

Exploring the Moon: Training Astronauts for Artemis Missions

For the first time in over 50 years, NASA scientists are training astronauts assigned to lunar missions. The successful Artemis 1 test flight in 2022 set the stage for future human missions to the Moon. The Artemis II mission will send astronauts to fly by the Moon, providing the first opportunity since Apollo for humans to directly observe and document the lunar surface from a few thousand kilometers, including the lunar far side. Artemis III will be the first human mission to land and explore the Moon’s surface near the lunar South Pole. To prepare for Artemis exploration, geology training for the Artemis II crew and detailed training plans for Artemis III and beyond are in full swing. NASA scientists have been working for several years with the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center on a progressive geology training program that starts with incoming astronaut classes, offers opportunities to maintain the geology proficiency between flight assignments, and trains the broader engineering-operations-management community in geology and field operations. In the spring of 2023, our team developed an introductory week-long class called Lunar Fundamentals and delivered this content to the Artemis II crew, as well as key NASA Flight Control Team members. The Lunar Fundamentals curriculum combines basic geographic and geologic information about the Moon; includes detailed content on major geologic processes, the lunar environment, lunar volatiles, and sample science; provides historical context of our growing knowledge about the Moon; and introduces new lunar data sets and tools for exploring the lunar surface. With the Lunar Fundamentals foundation, we continue development of the advanced planetary science classroom content for the Artemis III crew, together with field training science objectives and plans. Partnering with our FOD colleagues, we are building an integrated training plan for lunar science, exploration field methods, and operational skills to ensure that the Artemis astronauts exploring the Moon will have the necessary foundation in geology and lunar science to achieve mission success.

Astronauts training↗

Artemis Internal Science Team Update: Artemis Science Flight Operations

The Artemis Internal Science Team (AIST) is positioned across NASA to provide crossmission Science leadership across the Agency and Artemis. To prepare for the next generation of planetary surface exploration-based extravehicular activities (EVAs), we draw heavily from experience with Apollo, SkyLab, Space Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and analog tests to design the structure by which science will be integrated in the Plan, Train, and Fly phases of Artemis missions. AIST members have been working for years to integrate science into the Artemis flight operations structure, most notably through a tight collaboration with the NASA JSC Flight Operations Directorate (FOD). This abstract describes several examples of this integration, including Structure of RealTime Science Integration, the development of the EVA Science Officer Flight Controller Position, the development and testing of the Science Evaluation Room, and the development of Training for Artemis Science Teams.

K E Young↗

EPS analysis of nominal STS-1 flight

The results of electrical power system (EPS) analysis of the planned Shuttle Transportation System Flight 1 mission are presented. The capability of the orbiter EPS to support the planned flight and to provide program tape information and supplementary data specifically requested by the flight operations directorate was assessed. The analysis was accomplished using the orbiter version of the spacecraft electrical power simulator program, operating from a modified version of orbiter electrical equipment utilization baseline revision four. The results indicate that the nominal flight, as analyzed, is within the capabilities of the orbiter power generation system, but that a brief, and minimal, current overload may exist between main distributor 1 and mid power controlled 1, and that inverter 9 may the overloaded for extended periods of time. A comparison of results with launch commit criteria also indicated that some of the presently existing launch redlines may be violated during the terminal countdown.

Wolfgram, D. F.↗

Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) Activities in Support of Artemis I and Plans for Artemis II

The Artemis I mission in 2022 accomplished humanity’s first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) with a human-rated spacecraft in over fifty years. Artemis comprises several key Program elements – Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion Crew Module, Service Module, Launch Abort System; the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Exploration Ground System (EGS). Much of our human spaceflight experience with crewed lunar missions is captured in historical program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous and reliable spacecraft. The assessment of compliance with applicable safety requirements and adequacy of hazard controls and verifications is the responsibility of the MPCV Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), along with a Joint [NASA/ESA] Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP) for the review of the European Service Module (ESM). The MSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering was added as a Panel co-chair, which enhanced the Engineering organization’s engagement and level of understanding of hazard analysis methodology and results. The MSERP has representation from each office, including Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) and Health and Medical Technical Authority, supporting the Orion Program in addition to the Engineering and Safety Technical Authority co-chairs. Second, the JSERP has a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety organizations, which recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership. This paper will focus on SMA processes, activities, and plans for the Orion element and explore unique challenges associated with Artemis II as we approach the flight of the first crewed Orion vehicle.

Paul J. Collier↗

Work Term Assignment Spring 2017

My tour in the Engineering Robotics directorate exceeded my expectations. I learned lessons about Creo, manufacturing and assembly, collaboration, and troubleshooting. During my first tour, last spring, I used Creo on a smaller project, but had limited experience with it before starting in the Dynamic Systems Test branch this spring. I gained valuable experience learning assembly design, sheet metal design and designing with intent for manufacturing and assembly. These skills came from working both on the hatch and the floor. I also learned to understand the intent of other designers on models I worked with. While redesigning the floor, I was modifying an existing part and worked to understand what the previous designer had done to make it fit with the new model. Through working with the machine shop and in the mock-up, I learned much more about manufacturing and assembly. I used a Dremel, rivet gun, belt sander, and countersink for the first time. Through taking multiple safety training for different machine shops, I learned new machine shop safety skills specific to each one. This semester also gave me new collaborative opportunities. I collaborated with engineers within my branch as well as with Human Factors and the building 10 machine shop. This experience helped me learn how to design for functionality and assembly, not only for what would be easiest in my designs. In addition to these experiences, I learned many lessons in troubleshooting. I was the first person in my office to use a Windows 10 computer. This caused unexpected issues with NASA services and programs, such as the Digital Data Management Server (DDMS). Because of this, I gained experience finding solutions to lockout and freeze issues as well as Creo specific settings. These will be useful skills to have in the future and will be implemented in future rotations. This co-op tour has motivated me more to finish my degree and pursue my academic goals. I intend to take a machining Career Gateway Elective in the Fall to improve my skills in building as well as designing with manufacturing intent. I am also inspired to take more mechatronics CGE courses before I graduate to learn more about the crossover between mechanical and electrical engineering. This semester, I worked on multiple projects and had the opportunity to learn from engineers of different disciplines. I became proficient in Creo 2.0, a program I had not used significantly before. I finished modifying the hatch for 3D print and made sizeable modifications to the nose floor support design. I also gained hands-on experience that will be useful in my engineering career in the future. I would consider all of these major achievements from this spring semester. Lastly, I learned to ask more questions and to search for the right people to find answers which I know will be a valuable skill in the future. This summer, I will be completing my last rotation in the Flight Operations Directorate at Ellington Air Field. After this last tour, I will be returning to school for the Fall, Spring and Summer. I will graduate in August of 2018. I am looking forward to learning more about the different jobs available to engineers. This division works directly with many different types of aircrafts and I am excited to learn more about this focus of engineering. The Aircraft Operations Division values team work greatly and I intend to improve my interpersonal skills by working with them this summer.

Sico, Mallory↗

Human-in-the-Loop Operations over Time Delay: NASA Analog Missions Lessons Learned

Teams at NASA have conducted studies of time-delayed communications as it effects human exploration. In October 2012, the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Analog Missions project conducted a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) with the primary stakeholders to share information and experiences of studying time delay, to build a coherent picture of how studies are covering the problem domain, and to determine possible forward plans (including how to best communicate study results and lessons learned, how to inform future studies and mission plans, and how to drive potential development efforts). This initial meeting s participants included personnel from multiple NASA centers (HQ, JSC, KSC, ARC, and JPL), academia, and ESA. It included all of the known studies, analog missions, and tests of time delayed communications dating back to the Apollo missions including NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO), Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS/RATS), International Space Station Test-bed for Analog Research (ISTAR), Pavilion Lake Research Project (PLRP), Mars 520, JPL Mars Orbiters/Rovers, Advanced Mission Operations (AMO), Devon Island analog missions, and Apollo experiences. Additionally, the meeting attempted to capture all of the various functional perspectives via presentations by disciplines including mission operations (flight director and mission planning), communications, crew, Capcom, Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), Behavioral Health and Performance (BHP), Medical/Surgeon, Science, Education and Public Outreach (EPO), and data management. The paper summarizes the descriptions and results from each of the activities discussed at the TIM and includes several recommendations captured in the meeting for dealing with time delay in human exploration along with recommendations for future development and studies to address this issue.

Rader, Steven N.↗

Utilization of the International Space Station for Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test (CAST)

The United States space policy is evolving toward missions beyond low Earth orbit. In an effort to meet that policy, NASA has recognized Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) as a valuable capability. Identified within AMO capabilities is the potential for autonomous planning and replanning during human spaceflight operations. That is allowing crew members to collectively or individually participate in the development of their own schedules. Currently, dedicated mission operations planners collaborate with international partners to create daily plans for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), taking into account mission requirements, ground rules, and various vehicle and payload constraints. In future deep space operations the crew will require more independence from ground support due to communication transmission delays. Furthermore, crew members who are provided with the capability to schedule their own activities are able to leverage direct experience operating in the space environment, and possibly maximize their efficiency. CAST (Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test) is an ISS investigation designed to analyze three important hypotheses about crew autonomous scheduling. First, given appropriate inputs, the crew is able to create and execute a plan in a reasonable period of time without impacts to mission success. Second, the proximity of the planner, in this case the crew, to the planned operations increases their operational efficiency. Third, crew members are more satisfied when given a role in plan development. This paper presents the results from a single astronaut test subject who participated in five CAST sessions. The details on the operational philosophy of CAST are discussed, including the approach to crew training, selection criteria for test days, and data collection methods. CAST is a technology demonstration payload sponsored by the ISS Research Science and Technology Office, and performed by experts in Mission Operations Planning from the Flight Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center, and researchers across multiple NASA centers. It is hoped the results of this investigation will guide NASA's implementation of autonomous mission operations for long duration human space missions to Mars and beyond.

Healy, Matthew↗

Progress of Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test (CAST) On the ISS

The United States space policy is evolving toward missions beyond low Earth orbit. In an effort to meet that policy, NASA has recognized Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) as a valuable capability. Identified within AMO capabilities is the potential for autonomous planning and replanning during human spaceflight operations. That is allowing crew members to collectively or individually participate in the development of their own schedules. Currently, dedicated mission operations planners collaborate with international partners to create daily plans for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), taking into account mission requirements, ground rules, and various vehicle and payload constraints. In future deep space operations the crew will require more independence from ground support due to communication transmission delays. Furthermore, crew members who are provided with the capability to schedule their own activities are able to leverage direct experience operating in the space environment, and possibly maximize their efficiency. CAST (Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test) is an ISS investigation designed to analyze three important hypotheses about crew autonomous scheduling. First, given appropriate inputs, the crew is able to create and execute a plan in a reasonable period of time without impacts to mission success. Second, the proximity of the planner, in this case the crew, to the planned operations increases their operational efficiency. Third, crew members are more satisfied when given a role in plan development. This presentation shows the progress done in this study with a single astronaut test subject participating in five CAST sessions. CAST is a technology demonstration payload sponsored by the ISS Research Science and Technology Office, and performed by experts in Mission Operations Planning from the Flight Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center, and researchers across multiple NASA centers.

Healy, Matthew↗

NASA's Geoscience Training Program for Astronauts

Geoscientists have been training and preparing astronauts to observe the Earth from space and explore other planetary surfaces with a legacy that reaches back to the early days of the space program. Continuing this legacy and critical function, a core NASA team has been closely coordinating with the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) as well as academic, institute, and other governmental partners to conduct a comprehensive geoscience training program that ranges from initial astronaut candidate training to preparing crew for Artemis missions. Described below are the three program training phases, along with recent program highlights and forward planning.

Graff, T. G.↗

LUNAR SURFACE GEOSCIENCE TRAINING FOR ASTRONAUTS

Geoscientists have been training and preparing astronauts to observe the Earth from space and explore other planetary surfaces with a legacy that reaches back to the early days of the space program. Continuing this legacy and critical function, a core NASA team has been closely coordinating with the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) as well as academic, research institutions, and other governmental partners to conduct a comprehensive geoscience training program that ranges from initial astronaut candidate training to preparing assigned crew for future lunar surface missions. Described below are the three program training phases (summarized in Figure 1), along with recent program highlights and forward planning. Given NASA’s increased planning and development efforts regarding near-term lunar surface science activities, we welcome ideas, concepts, capabilities, collaborations, and innovations to this astronaut training program.

T. G. Graff↗

Training Artemis Astronauts to Explore the Moon

To prepare for human exploration of the Moon in the mid-2020s, NASA is developing a program to provide geoscience and planetary science classroom training and geologic eld training to astronauts and other mission personnel. The Artemis geoscience training plan builds on a long legacy: NASA has trained astronauts in geology, planetary science, and geological eld work for more than 50 years. From ~1965-1972, the geology focus for astronauts included orbital Earth observations during the early NASA missions, but the endgame was preparation for the Apollo missions to the Lunar surface [see Phinney (2015), NASA-SP-2015-626; Lofgren et al.(2011);Schmitt, et al. (2011); and El Baz (2011), all from GSA SP483]. From the mid 1970s through2017, the primary purpose for geoscience training was to prepare astronauts to observe theEarth and document a wide variety of Earth processes from orbital platforms (Skylab, SpaceShuttle and International Space Station). Astronaut observations of Earth from the InternationalSpace Station remain an important activity today, but the prospect of exploration of the lunar surface through the Artemis Program lends additional purpose to the geoscience content and eld experiences that we provide the astronauts. We recently completed the geology and eld training with Astronaut Class 22 and are now planning both focused eld exercises and simulations for future Artemis crews, as well as the accompanying classroom lessons on lunar and planetary sciences. The training we offer extends beyond the astronaut office – we partner across operational and engineering organizations at NASA and provide eld work exercises and opportunities to personnel in the Flight Operations Directorate (responsible for the overall training and certification), as well as the exploration Extravehicular Activity Oce (developing spacewalk suits and tools). These partnerships contribute to building a common language and sense of purpose, and also help to ensure that NASA’s geoscience training and science operations are fully integrated with the teams and systems responsible for getting the next generation of astronauts to the surface of the Moon.

Artemis↗

Crew Autonomy through Self-Scheduling: Guidelines for Crew Scheduling Performance Envelope and Mitigation Strategies

As NASA considers long-duration exploration missions, it is envisioned that crews will behave more autonomously as compared to low-Earth orbit missions. When considering long duration exploration missions, Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) identified the following benefits and challenges presented on this slide. As missions operate further from Earth, the communication latency between the spacecraft and Mission Control Center will increase requiring the crew to take a more active role in reacting to daily planning. However, one of the key challenges for crew self-scheduling is that we do not want to overwhelm astronauts who are not expert mission planners. This leads to our primary research objective: to first, characterize the human performance envelope for the task of planning and scheduling in the context of human spaceflight operations, then, develop countermeasure aids to mitigate adverse performance effects due to plan complexity, and finally, inform performance standards and guidelines based on research results. Our next steps are to finish summarizing our findings from the experiment in conference papers and our upcoming yearly report. In the upcoming year, we will continue to collect data in analog missions and begin summarizing our recommended standards and guidelines.

user experience↗

How To Train Your Dragon (and Vice Versa) – Human Spaceflight Research and The First Commercial Crews

The International Space Station has been an orbiting laboratory for human spaceflight research for over 20 years. NASA’s human research implementation teams have worked to develop, refine, and execute pre-, in-, and post-flight sessions to collect critical research data that will enable future spaceflight missions. The teams have worked closely with the spaceflight vehicle teams, including those for Soyuz and the now retired Space Shuttle vehicles, to successfully conduct this research. As NASA has transitioned to commercial vehicles for transport of crews to the ISS, the implementation teams have expanded their scope to include the SpaceX and upcoming Boeing vehicles. This session will focus on the unique implementation needs for the first available commercial platform, SpaceX. We will identify implementation adjustments made to accommodate the SpaceX Dragon system, including crew training and preflight baseline data collection, inflight operations tied to landing, and postflight planning and crew testing, as well as offer lessons learned from the past three SpaceX long-duration crew missions. Representatives from the Flight Operations Directorate, including the Astronaut Office and the vehicle recovery team, will also provide their perspectives on this new system, and how it affects their work with the human research community. A panel discussion with dedicated time for Q&A will follow.

Pasha Morshedi↗

Developing a Motion-Based System for Lunar Vehicle Handling Qualities Testing

— Motion and visual cue influences are critical in any simulator system, as they impact multiple aspects of the human’s neurovestibular and visual systems. Cues of real motion proceeds to the brain before cues of visual change. It is important therefore for simulator motion cues to exist and to match those realistically with those of the real vehicle to provide transferable training of the activity for operations. The United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine (1989)[1] stated that motion platforms are the only simulation devices capable of fully stimulating the body motion sensors. They confirmed that motion platforms can impart accelerations to the whole body and therefore exercise the automatic motion feedback-loop that operators are used to. With both visual and motion cues handling the vehicle becomes more realistic. Strachan (2019)[1] confirms motion cueing from a well set-up motion platform has been found to be important especially in conditions such as night or reduced visibility where motion cues may be more relied upon. As of this writing, the only lunar rover motion simulator is housed at the General Motors (GM) Milford Proving Ground, which only simulates the motions of a traditional car. A NASA Test Team proposed to complete a motion-based simulation system for NASA’s Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) which resides at Johnson Space Center’s Systems Engineering Simulator facility. This activity integrated existing fixed base simulation capabilities with a newly procured six-degree of freedom motion base platform for the design, development, evaluation, and training associated with the LTV project. This would incorporate a South Pole Lunar virtual reality simulation using Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 5m/pixel high-resolution imagery and Unreal 5.2 Virtual Shadow Maps, combined with a virtual reality (VR) headset, integrated within a rover cockpit on a Mikrolar Motion Platform for evaluating human performance and vehicle handling qualities for concept roving vehicle designs. The motion-based system received its Human Rating Certification on March 2023. To begin testing the new facility, a preliminary handling qualities study was conducted. The objectives were to determine if there is a correlation amongst three handling quality methods of performance for a lunar vehicle and to understand the effects of a simulated 1/6-g loads and visuals with a motion platform on the operator while in a 1-g physical environment. The capability this system provides directly benefits the NASA’s Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility Program and NASA’s Flight Operations Directorate in evaluating the driving qualities of vehicle concepts, human performance related to the operating of a lunar surface vehicle, and assessment of suit related driving impacts. It would also provide direct operational benefit by providing a first-in class and unique simulation platform for the lunar astronaut training curriculum. The empirical knowledge of rover and human performance on this scale is paramount as there is currently no other lunar surface simulator with these capabilities. The result of this study ensures a broadly applicable method of testing for shirtsleeve, unpressurized and pressurized suited rover handling qualities.

Test Track↗

NASA FOD – KARI Operations

Presentation outlining the cooperation between NASA FOD (Flight Operations Directorate) and KARI (Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter) for spaceflight operations of KARI's KPLO spacecraft.

Shane Fuller↗

NASA/MOD Operations Impacts from Shuttle Program

Operations plays a pivotal role in the success of any human spaceflight program. This paper will highlight some of the core tenets of spaceflight operations from a systems perspective and use several examples from the Space Shuttle Program to highlight where the success and safety of a mission can hinge upon the preparedness and competency of the operations team. Further, awareness of the types of operations scenarios and impacts that can arise during human crewed space missions can help inform design and mission planning decisions long before a vehicle gets into orbit. A strong operations team is crucial to the development of future programs; capturing the lessons learned from the successes and failures of a past program will allow for safer, more efficient, and better designed programs in the future. No matter how well a vehicle is designed and constructed, there are always unexpected events or failures that occur during space flight missions. Preparation, training, real-time execution, and troubleshooting are skills and values of the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) flight controller; these operational standards have proven invaluable to the Space Shuttle Program. Understanding and mastery of these same skills will be required of any operations team as technology advances and new vehicles are developed. This paper will focus on individual Space Shuttle mission case studies where specific operational skills, techniques, and preparedness allowed for mission safety and success. It will detail the events leading up to the scenario or failure, how the operations team identified and dealt with the failure and its downstream impacts. The various options for real-time troubleshooting will be discussed along with the operations team final recommendation, execution, and outcome. Finally, the lessons learned will be summarized along with an explanation of how these lessons were used to improve the operational preparedness of future flight control teams.

Fitzpatrick, Michael↗