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At least 37 records · Page 2

Applying Robotics to HAZMAT

The use of robotics in situations involving hazardous materials can significantly reduce the risk of human injuries. The Emergency Response Robotics Project, which began in October 1990 at JPL, is developing a teleoperated mobile robot allowing HAZMAT (hazardous materials) teams to remotely respond to incidents involving hazardous materials. The current robot, called HAZBOT III, can assist in locating, characterizing, identifying, and mitigating hazardous material incidences without risking entry team personnel. The active involvement of the JPL Fire Department HAZMAT team has been vital in developing a robotic system which enables them to perform remote reconnaissance of a HAZMAT incident site. This paper provides a brief review of the history of the project, discusses the current system in detail, and presents other areas in which robotics can be applied, thereby removing people from hazardous environments/operations.

robot↗

Applying robotics to HAZMAT

The use of robotics in situations involving hazardous materials can significantly reduce the risk of human injuries. The Emergency Response Robotics Project, which began in October 1990 at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, is developing a teleoperated mobile robot allowing HAZMAT (hazardous materials) teams to remotely respond to incidents involving hazardous materials. The current robot, called HAZBOT III, can assist in locating characterizing, identifying, and mitigating hazardous material incidents without risking entry team personnel. The active involvement of the JPL Fire Department HAZMAT team has been vital in developing a robotic system which enables them to perform remote reconnaissance of a HAZMAT incident site. This paper provides a brief review of the history of the project, discusses the current system in detail, and presents other areas in which robotics can be applied removing people from hazardous environments/operations.

Welch, Richard V.↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Machine Learning Emulation of Spatial Deposition from a Multi-Physics Ensemble of Weather and Atmospheric Transport Models

In the event of an accidental or intentional hazardous material release in the atmosphere, researchers often run physics-based atmospheric transport and dispersion models to predict the extent and variation of the contaminant spread. These predictions are imperfect due to propagated uncertainty from atmospheric model physics (or parameterizations) and weather data initial conditions. Ensembles of simulations can be used to estimate uncertainty, but running large ensembles is often very time consuming and resource intensive, even using large supercomputers. In this paper, we present a machine-learning-based method which can be used to quickly emulate spatial deposition patterns from a multi-physics ensemble of dispersion simulations. We use a hybrid linear and logistic regression method that can predict deposition in more than 100,000 grid cells with as few as fifty training examples. Logistic regression provides probabilistic predictions of the presence or absence of hazardous materials, while linear regression predicts the quantity of hazardous materials. The coefficients of the linear regressions also open avenues of exploration regarding interpretability—the presented model can be used to find which physics schemes are most important over different spatial areas. A single regression prediction is on the order of 10,000 times faster than running a weather and dispersion simulation. However, considering the number of weather and dispersion simulations needed to train the regressions, the speed-up achieved when considering the whole ensemble is about 24 times. Ultimately, this work will allow atmospheric researchers to produce potential contamination scenarios with uncertainty estimates faster than previously possible, aiding public servants and first responders.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Environmentally Sound Processing Technology: JANNAF Safety and Environmental Protection Subcommittee and Propellant Development and Characterization Subcommittee Joint Workshop

Topics covered include: Risk assessment of hazardous materials, Automated systems for pollution prevention and hazardous materials elimination, Study design for the toxicity evaluation of ammonium perchlorate, Plasma sprayed bondable stainless surface coatings, Development of CFC-free cleaning processes, New fluorinated solvent alternatives to ozone depleting solvents, Cleaning with highly fluorinated liquids, Biotreatment of propyleneglycol nitrate by anoxic denitrification, Treatment of hazardous waste with white rot fungus, Hydrothermal oxidation as an environmentally benign treatment technology, Treatment of solid propellant manufacturing wastes by base hydrolysis, Design considerations for cleaning using supercritical fluid technology, and Centrifugal shear carbon dioxide cleaning.

Pickett, Lorri A.↗

Control of Materials Flammability Hazards

This viewgraph presentation provides information on selecting, using, and configuring spacecraft materials in such a way as to minimize the ability of fire to spread onboard a spacecraft. The presentation gives an overview of the flammability requirements of NASA-STD-6001, listing specific tests and evaluation criteria it requires. The presentation then gives flammability reduction methods for specific spacecraft items and materials.

Griffin, Dennis E.↗

Emergency Operations Center at Johnson Space Center

In June 1966, at the start of the Gulf Coast hurricane season, the Johnson Space Center (JSC) celebrated the opening of its new 4,000-square foot, state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The new EOC has been upgraded and enhanced to support a wide spectrum of emergencies affecting JSC and neighboring communities. One of the main features of the EOC is its premier computerized dispatch center. The new system unites many of JSC's critical emergency functions into one integrated network. It automatically monitors fire alarms, security entrances, and external cameras. It contains the JSC inventory of hazardous materials, by building and room, and can call up Material Safety Data Sheets for most of the generic hazardous materials used on-site. The EOC is available for community use during area emergencies such as hurricanes and is a welcome addition to the Clear Lake/Galveston Bay Area communities' emergency response resources.

Caylor, Gary C.↗

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Joint Test Protocol for Validation of Alternative Low-Emission Surface Preparation/Depainting Technologies for Structural Steel

Headquarters National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) chartered the Acquisition Pollution Prevention (AP2) Office to coordinate agency activities affecting pollution prevention issues identified during system and component acquisition and sustainment processes. The primary objectives of the AP2 Office are to: (1) Reduce or eliminate the use of hazardous materials (HazMats) or hazardous processes at manufacturing, remanufacturing, and sustainment locations. (2) A void duplication of effort in actions required to reduce or eliminate HazMats through joint center cooperation and technology sharing. This project will identify, evaluate and approve alternative surface preparation technologies for use at NASA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) installations. Materials and processes will be evaluated with the goal of selecting those processes that will improve corrosion protection at critical systems, facilitate easier maintenance activity, extend maintenance cycles, eliminate flight hardware contamination and reduce the amount of hazardous waste generated. This Joint Test Protocol (JTP) contains the critical requirements and tests necessary to qualify alternative Low-Emission Surface Preparation/Depainting Technologies for Structural Steel Applications. These tests were derived from engineering, performance, and operational impact (supportability) requirements defined by a consensus of NASA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) participants. The Field Test Plan (FTP), entitled Joint Test Protocol for Validation of Alternative Low Emission Surface Preparation/Depainting Technologies for Structural Steel, prepared by ITB, defines the field evaluation and testing requirements for validating alternative surface preparation/depainting technologies and supplements the JTP.

Lewis, Pattie↗

Field Evaluations Test Plan for Validation of Alternative Low-Emission Surface Preparation/Depainting Technologies for Structural Steel

Headquarters National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) chartered the Acquisition Pollution Prevention (AP2) Office to coordinate agency activities affecting pollution prevention issues identified during system and component acquisition and sustainment processes. The primary objectives of the AP2 Office are to: (1) Reduce or eliminate the use of hazardous materials (HazMats) or hazardous processes at manufacturing, remanufacturing, and sustainment locations. (2) Avoid duplication of effort in actions required to reduce or eliminate HazMats through joint center cooperation and technology sharing. To achieve a substrate condition suitable for the application of a coating system, both new and old (in-situ) substrates must undergo some type of surface preparation and/or depainting operation to ensure adhesion of the new coating system. The level of cleanliness or anchor profile desired is typically a function of the type of coating to be applied and the specification being adhered to. In high performance environments, cleanliness and surface profile requirements for carbon steel (the dominant substrate for facilities, structures and equipment) dictates the use of abrasive media. Many of the abrasive media currently used across NASA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) installations generate large quantities of fugitive particulate emissions and waste. The high quantities of airborne dust and waste generated from these operations pose significant environmental concern. Efforts to contain emissions and the reduce quantity of waste generated have significant implications on project cost; this is often a deterrent to engaging in maintenance activities. In response to recent technological developments and NASA's and AFSPC's need to undertake environmentally conscious corrosion prevention projects, a review of the industry needs to be undertaken to evaluate surface preparation technologies (materials and processes) for embrace. This project will identify, evaluate and approve alternative surface preparation technologies for use at NASA and AFSPC installations. Materials and processes will be evaluated with the goal of selecting those processes that will improve corrosion protection at critical systems, facilitate easier maintenance activity, extend maintenance cycles, eliminate flight hardware contamination and reduce the amount of hazardous waste generated. This Field Evaluations Test Plan defines the field evaluation and testing requirements for validating alternative surface preparation/depainting technologies and supplements the JTP. The field evaluations will be performed at Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, under the oversight of the Project Engineer. Additional field evaluations may be performed at other NASA centers or AFSPC facilities.

Lewis, Pattie↗

Ghostbusters for Batteries

End-of-life lithium-ion batteries are Class 9 hazardous materials due to flammability of electrolyte and lithium. It is why the transportation cost ranges from $2.49/kg - $7.20/kg for civilian and defense disposition, that is over 50% of the cost of recycling. Damaged batteries have many times greater transportation cost. Dead batteries require costly bunker-storage that occupies real estate and personnel that could be used for productive purposes. Insurance is expensive and accidents are almost assured even with relatively low volumes of waste. Tipping fees on top of this adds an unpredictable, inflated cost for the EV industry, which is very cost sensitive for survival. Transforming lithium-ion into a class of non-hazardous material reduces transportation cost to $0.10/kg, providing a value opportunity of ~$2/kg to ~$6/kg for civilian and defense disposition respectively. OnTo can eliminate the risk of thermal runaway with a brief, non-toxic treatment to eliminate flammability and toxic risks in most any battery, except Pb, which is inherently toxic. With the service, OnTo also can provide rigorous certainty that cells are rendered inert. OnTo’s patented and patent pending deactivation technology improves the cost and safety for disposition of end-of-life lithium-ion battery packs and cells. Deactivation uses non-toxic chemical processing to remove inherent risks in lithium-ion and other primary and secondary chemistries. The technology has been demonstrated and developed through DOE contract with OnTo Technology LLC (EE0008475).

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Emergency preparedness and planning

Monsanto's emergency response plan in dealing with hazardous materials at their facilities is presented. Topics discussed include the following: CPR training; emergency medial training; incident reports; contractor injuries; hazardous materials transport; evacuation; and other industrial safety concerns.

Bouvier, Kenneth↗

Basics of Biosafety

This slide presentation reviews the basics of biosafety and the importance of assuring proper biosafety practices. The objectives of the presentation are to review regulations about biosafety, and the different biosafety levels; the biosafety facilities at Johnson Space Center; the usage and maintenance of the biosafety cabinet, the proper methods to handle biologically hazardous materials upon exposure, and the methods of cleanup in the event of a spill, and the training requirements that are mandated for personnel handling biologically hazardous materials.

Wong, Willy↗

A Thermal Physiological Comparison of Two HazMat Protective Ensembles With and Without Active Convective Cooling

Wearing impermeable garments for hazardous materials clean up can often present a health and safety problem for the wearer. Even short duration clean up activities can produce heat stress injuries in hazardous materials workers. It was hypothesized that an internal cooling system might increase worker productivity and decrease likelihood of heat stress injuries in typical HazMat operations. Two HazMat protective ensembles were compared during treadmill exercise. The different ensembles were created using two different suits: a Trelleborg VPS suit representative of current HazMat suits and a prototype suit developed by NASA engineers. The two life support systems used were a current technology Interspiro Spirolite breathing apparatus and a liquid air breathing system that also provided convective cooling. Twelve local members of a HazMat team served as test subjects. They were fully instrumented to allow a complete physiological comparison of their thermal responses to the different ensembles. Results showed that cooling from the liquid air system significantly decreased thermal stress. The results of the subjective evaluations of new design features in the prototype suit were also highly favorable. Incorporation of these new design features could lead to significant operational advantages in the future.

Williamson, Rebecca↗

Toxic substances registry system: Index of material safety data sheets

The Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS's) listed in this index reflect product inventories and associated MSDS's which were submitted to the Toxic Substances Registry database maintained by the Base Operations Contractor at the Kennedy Space Center. The purpose of this index is to provide KSC government, contractor, and tenant organizations a means to access information on the hazards associated with these chemicals. The Toxic Substance Registry Service (TSRS) was established to manage information dealing with the storage and use of toxic and otherwise hazardous materials at KSC. As a part of this service, the BOC Environmental Health Services maintains a central repository of MSDS's which were provided to TSRS. The data on the TSRS are obtained from NASA, contractor, and tenant organizations who use or store hazardous materials at KSC. It is the responsibility of these organizations to conduct inventories, obtain MSDS's, distribute Hazard Communication information to their employees, and otherwise implement compliance with appropriate Federal, State, and NASA Hazard Communication and Worker Right-to-Know regulations and policies.

Source record↗

Isotope-Specific Analysis of Neutron-Irradiated Lithium Aluminate Ceramics by Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy

The effects of neutron irradiation on lithium aluminate targets and the permeation of tritium into surrounding components are primary concerns in the development of materials for use in tritium production. The high specific activity and volatility of the tritium in activated samples greatly increase the challenges of experimental analysis. This paper reports the determination of the chemical forms and quantities of H-3 and Li-6 in irradiated and non-irradiated LiAlO2 by nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy, and demonstrates that measurements can be performed in a non-destructive, safe manner to obtain isotope-selective, quantitative information on highly hazardous materials.

Tritium, solid state nuclear magnetic resonance sp↗

Explosion Welding for Hermetic Containerization

A container designed for storing samples of hazardous material features a double wall, part of which is sacrificed during an explosion-welding process in which the container is sealed and transferred to a clean environment. The major advantage of this container sealing process is that once the samples have been sealed inside, the outer wall of what remains of the container is a clean surface that has not come into contact with the environment from which the samples were taken. Thus, there is no need to devise a decontamination process capable of mitigating all hazards that might be posed by unanticipated radioactive, chemical, and/or biological contamination of the outside of the container. The container sealing method was originally intended to be used to return samples from Mars to Earth, but it could also be used to store samples of hazardous materials, without the need to decontaminate its outer surface. The process stages are shown. In its initial double-wall form, the volume between the walls is isolated from the environment; in other words, the outer wall (which is later sacrificed) initially serves to protect the inner container from contamination. The sample is placed inside the container through an opening at one end, then the container is placed into a transfer dock/lid. The surfaces that will be welded together under the explosive have been coated with a soft metallic sacrificial layer. During the explosion, the sacrificial layer is ejected, and the container walls are welded together, creating a strong metallic seal. The inner container is released during the same event and enters the clean environment.

Dolgin, Benjamin↗