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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

Analyzing Distributed Functions in an Integrated Hazard Analysis

Large scale integration of today's aerospace systems is achievable through the use of distributed systems. Validating the safety of distributed systems is significantly more difficult as compared to centralized systems because of the complexity of the interactions between simultaneously active components. Integrated hazard analysis (IHA), a process used to identify unacceptable risks and to provide a means of controlling them, can be applied to either centralized or distributed systems. IHA, though, must be tailored to fit the particular system being analyzed. Distributed systems, for instance, must be analyzed for hazards in terms of the functions that rely on them. This paper will describe systems-oriented IHA techniques (as opposed to traditional failure-event or reliability techniques) that should be employed for distributed systems in aerospace environments. Special considerations will be addressed when dealing with specific distributed systems such as active thermal control, electrical power, command and data handling, and software systems (including the interaction with fault management systems). Because of the significance of second-order effects in large scale distributed systems, the paper will also describe how to analyze secondary functions to secondary functions through the use of channelization.

Morris, A. Terry↗
NASA NTRS1974

Hazard analysis of Clostridium perfringens in the Skylab Food System

The Skylab Food System presented unique microbiological problems because food was warmed in null-gravity and because the heat source was limited to 69.4 C (to prevent boiling in null-gravity). For these reasons, the foods were manufactured using critical control point techniques of quality control coupled with appropriate hazard analyses. One of these hazard analyses evaluated the threat from Clostridium perfringens. Samples of food were inoculated with C. perfringens and incubated for 2 h at temperatures ranging from 25 to 55 C. Generation times were determined for the foods at various temperatures. Results of these tests were evaluated taking into consideration: food-borne disease epidemiology, the Skylab food manufacturing procedures, and the performance requirements of the Skylab Food System. Based on this hazard analysis, a limit for C. perfringens of 100/g was established for Skylab foods.

Bourland, C. T.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Resources Available for Hazards Analysis of Aerospace Fluids

In recent years, the legislative and executive branches of the federal government have pushed to make government more efficient and responsive to the needs of the marketplace. One of these initiatives, Public Law 104-113, also known as the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), is designed to accelerate technology transfer to industry and promote government-industry partnership. Summarized, NTTAA states that '... all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments. Government agencies must now determine if their in-house requirement-setting activities are sufficiently unique that no public interest is served by having them adopted by a voluntary consensus organization (VCO), or if not, to use or develop voluntary consensus standards. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is chartered by the law to monitor federal agency progress and report the results to Congress. In response to NTTAA, agency-wide oxygen and hydrogen safety standards sponsored by the NASA Headquarters (HQ) Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) were obvious choices for early adoption by VCOs. In 1996, HQ sought assistance from the Johnson Space Center (JSC) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), the technical lead for development of these safety standards, to evaluate their adoption by VCOs. At that time, WSTF-developed propellant hazards manuals were likewise identified for possible VCO adoption. Subsequently, WSTF was asked to represent NASA for development of an international ISO safety standard for hydrogen use. Concurrent with these WSTF standards activities are related efforts to develop and publish propellant hazards analysis protocols and safety courses for the industrial, propellant use of oxygen, hydrogen, and hypergols. This paper reports on these efforts and describes WSTF's overall voluntary consensus standards program to coordinate the interchange of NASA's propellant hazards and safety information with industry.

Woods, S. S.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Enclosure fire hazard analysis using relative energy release criteria

A method for predicting the probable course of fire development in an enclosure is presented. This fire modeling approach uses a graphic plot of five fire development constraints, the relative energy release criteria (RERC), to bound the heat release rates in an enclosure as a function of time. The five RERC are flame spread rate, fuel surface area, ventilation, enclosure volume, and total fuel load. They may be calculated versus time based on the specified or empirical conditions describing the specific enclosure, the fuel type and load, and the ventilation. The calculation of these five criteria, using the common basis of energy release rates versus time, provides a unifying framework for the utilization of available experimental data from all phases of fire development. The plot of these criteria reveals the probable fire development envelope and indicates which fire constraint will be controlling during a criteria time period. Examples of RERC application to fire characterization and control and to hazard analysis are presented along with recommendations for the further development of the concept.

Coulbert, C. D.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Hazards Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of Four Concept Vehicle Propulsion Systems

The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each. Boeing also created a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for each of the concept vehicles, as the FTA contains the connectivity between systems and is an accepted, top-down method to analyze the safety of an air-vehicle. Conceptual design of notional powertrain configuration for each of four (4) NASA RVLT (Revolutionary Vertical Lift Technology) Concept Vehicles were developed in as much detail as was necessary to support the reliability and safety analysis for this project. Functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations were created and used to order the FHA, FMECA, and FTA. Hazards were identified and the severity of each were categorized in the FHA for use in a follow-up FMECA. The FTA took inputs from the FMECA and the functional block diagrams to develop the connectivity and develop a quantitative architecture that could be used to perform sensitivity studies, as related to vehicle safety.Guidelines for reliability targets for both the air vehicle and the operation in the UAM (Urban Air Mobility) mission are discussed. An industry literature search was performed in order to assess gaps in existing government regulations and industry specifications. The industry literature search led to air-vehicle and operational reliability discussions, as related to Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion (DE/HEP) system operating in the UAM role. A discussion of results and recommendations for future work is also provided.

Hazards Analysis↗
NASA NTRS2001

Introduction to Mars Sample Handling Workshop Series: Overview of Mars Sample Hazard Analysis

Samples returned from Mars should be contained and treated as though potentially hazardous until proven otherwise If sample containment cannot be verified en route to Earth, the sample and spacecraft should either be sterilized in space or not returned to Earth. Integrity of sample containment should be maintained through reentry and transfer to a receiving facility. Controlled distribution of unsterilized materials should only occur if analyses determine the sample not to contain a biological hazard. Planetary protection measures adopted for the first sample return should not be relaxed for subsequent missions without thorough scientific review and concurrence by an appropriate independent body

Rummel, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Overview of Mars Sample Hazard Analysis (Requirements Workshop Series)

Samples returned from Mars should be contained and treated as though potentially hazardous until proven otherwise. If sample containment cannot be verified en route to Earth, the sample and spacecraft should either be sterilized in space or not returned to Earth. Integrity of sample containment should be maintained through reentry and transfer to a receiving facility. Controlled distribution of unsterilized materials should only occur if analyses determine the sample not to contain a biological hazard. Planetary protection measures adopted for the first sample return should not be relaxed for subsequent missions without thorough scientific review and concurrence by an appropriate independent body.

Rummel, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Subsystem Hazard Analysis Methodology for the Ares I Upper Stage Source Controlled Items

This article describes processes involved in developing subsystem hazard analyses for Source Controlled Items (SCI), specific components, sub-assemblies, and/or piece parts, of the NASA ARES I Upper Stage (US) project. SCIs will be designed, developed and /or procured by Boeing as an end item or an off-the-shelf item. Objectives include explaining the methodology, tools, stakeholders and products involved in development of these hazard analyses. Progress made and further challenges in identifying potential subsystem hazards are also provided in an effort to assist the System Safety community in understanding one part of the ARES I Upper Stage project.

Mitchell, Michael S.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Three-dimensional displays for natural hazards analysis, using classified Landsat Thematic Mapper digital data and large-scale digital elevation models

Methods are described for using Landsat Thematic Mapper digital data and digital elevation models for the display of natural hazard sites in a mountainous region of northwestern Montana, USA. Hazard zones can be easily identified on the three-dimensional images. Proximity of facilities such as highways and building locations to hazard sites can also be easily displayed. A temporal sequence of Landsat TM (or similar) satellite data sets could also be used to display landscape changes associated with dynamic natural hazard processes.

Butler, David R.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Space Station Freedom/lunar transfer vehicle propellant operation hazard analysis

Space Station Freedom (SSF), as a transportation node for Space Exploration Initiative missions, would involve the assembly and refurbishing of lunar and Mars transfer vehicles. This includes operations involving cryogenic propellants (LH2 7 LO2) such as storing and handling of loaded propellant tanks, assembly onto the vehicle, and propellant transfer. Cryogenic propellants dictate rigorous safety precautions and impose unique requirements to ensure flight safety to both personnel and SSF elements. The objective of this study is to identify potential hazards and risks associated with cryogenic propellants. This involves identification of pertinent system design features and operational procedures. Criticality of identified risks/hazards shall be assessed and those that fall in the catastrophic and critical categories shall include mitigating solutions.

Dominick, Sam↗
NASA NTRS2006

Landing and Population Hazard Analysis for Stardust Entry in Operations and Entry Planning

Stardust is a comet sample return mission that successfully returned to Earth on January 15, 2006. Stardust's targeted landing area was the Utah Test and Training Range in the Northwest corner of Utah. Requirements for the risks associated with landing were levied on Stardust by the Utah Test and Training Range and NASA. This paper describes the analysis to verify that these requirements were met and and includes calculation of debris survivability, generation of landing site selection plots, and identification of keep-out zones, as well as appropriate selection of the landing site. Operationally the risk requirements were all met for both of the GOMO-GO polls, so entry was authorized.

simulation↗
NASA NTRS2005

A Review of Diagnostic Techniques for ISHM Applications

System diagnosis is an integral part of any Integrated System Health Management application. Diagnostic applications make use of system information from the design phase, such as safety and mission assurance analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, hazards analysis, functional models, fault propagation models, and testability analysis. In modern process control and equipment monitoring systems, topological and analytic , models of the nominal system, derived from design documents, are also employed for fault isolation and identification. Depending on the complexity of the monitored signals from the physical system, diagnostic applications may involve straightforward trending and feature extraction techniques to retrieve the parameters of importance from the sensor streams. They also may involve very complex analysis routines, such as signal processing, learning or classification methods to derive the parameters of importance to diagnosis. The process that is used to diagnose anomalous conditions from monitored system signals varies widely across the different approaches to system diagnosis. Rule-based expert systems, case-based reasoning systems, model-based reasoning systems, learning systems, and probabilistic reasoning systems are examples of the many diverse approaches ta diagnostic reasoning. Many engineering disciplines have specific approaches to modeling, monitoring and diagnosing anomalous conditions. Therefore, there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach to building diagnostic and health monitoring capabilities for a system. For instance, the conventional approaches to diagnosing failures in rotorcraft applications are very different from those used in communications systems. Further, online and offline automated diagnostic applications are integrated into an operations framework with flight crews, flight controllers and maintenance teams. While the emphasis of this paper is automation of health management functions, striking the correct balance between automated and human-performed tasks is a vital concern.

Patterson-Hine, Ann↗
NASA NTRS2002

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray↗
NASA NTRS2011

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗