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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Reliability Analysis and Standardization of Spacecraft Command Generation Processes

center dot In order to reduce commanding errors that are caused by humans, we create an approach and corresponding artifacts for standardizing the command generation process and conducting risk management during the design and assurance of such processes. center dot The literature review conducted during the standardization process revealed that very few atomic level human activities are associated with even a broad set of missions. center dot Applicable human reliability metrics for performing these atomic level tasks are available. center dot The process for building a "Periodic Table" of Command and Control Functions as well as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models is demonstrated. center dot The PRA models are executed using data from human reliability data banks. center dot The Periodic Table is related to the PRA models via Fault Links.

human errors.↗
NASA NTRS1994

A rose by any other name: Certification seen as process rather than content

Green (1990) believes that the two main factors safeguarding flying from human error are both related to certification and regulation. First is the increasingly proceduralized nature of flying whereby as much as possible is reduced to a rule-based activity. Second is the emphasis placed upon training and competency checking of aircrew in simulators and in the air, both generally and for all particular types of aircraft flown. This leaves, believes Green, other human factors that are relatively unaddressed as yet and which can give rise to human reliability problems. These include: hardware factors and especially pilot/co-pilot relationships; and system factors including fatigue and cost/safety trade-offs. He also, importantly, identifies problems with the integration of the 'electronic crew member' following increased automation. Human reliability failures with artificial intelligence and automation, due to over-reliance on the system fail-safe mechanisms, or to operator under- confidence in the integrity or self-regulating capacity of the system, or to out-of-loop effects, are widely accepted as being due to deficiencies in plant design, planning, management and maintenance more than to 'operator error' - Reason's (1990) latent error or organization pathogens argument. Reliability failures in complex systems are well enough documented to give cause for concern and at least promote a debate on the merits of a full certification program. The purpose of this short paper is to seek out and explore what is valuable in certification, at the least to show that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages and at best to identify positive outcomes perhaps not obtainable in other ways. On both sides of the debate on certification there is general agreement on the need for a better human factors perspective and effort in complex aviation systems design. What is at issue is how this is to be promoted. It is incumbent upon opponents of certification to say how else such promotion be enabled. This is an exploratory and philosophical review, not a focused and specific one, and it will draw upon much that is not firmly in the domain of complex aviation systems.

Wilson, John R.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Lost in Translation: the Case for Integrated Testing

The building of a spacecraft is complex and often involves multiple suppliers and companies that have their own designs and processes. Standards have been developed across the industries to reduce the chances for critical flight errors at the system level, but the spacecraft is still vulnerable to the introduction of critical errors during integration of these systems. Critical errors can occur at any time during the process and in many cases, human reliability analysis (HRA) identifies human error as a risk driver. Most programs have a test plan in place that is intended to catch these errors, but it is not uncommon for schedule and cost stress to result in less testing than initially planned. Therefore, integrated testing, or "testing as you fly," is essential as a final check on the design and assembly to catch any errors prior to the mission. This presentation will outline the unique benefits of integrated testing by catching critical flight errors that can otherwise go undetected, discuss HRA methods that are used to identify opportunities for human error, lessons learned and challenges over ownership of testing will be discussed.

Young, Aaron↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategies for Quantifying Human Space Flight Performance in the Crew Health and Performance System

The Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team at NASA Glenn Research Center is planning a customized approach to quantify human spaceflight performance changes with respect to changes to the CHP system functions and capabilities. Using the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) initiated by NASA’s Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) [1], the team is surveying potential candidate models and novel strategies that generate metrics suitable for supporting decision making related to how the CHP system may influence human system performance risk. One such investigation includes classic Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) models. Traditionally, HRA methods estimate the occurrence of human errors and their impact on the success of an activity when designing and operating a system. While humans perceive, interpret, decide on, and carry out a course of action, the factors affecting performance and error likelihood are commonly referred to as performance shaping factors (PSFs). Originally developed to alleviate safety concerns related to nuclear power plant operations, HRA methods such as THERP [2] and CREAM [3] dismantle an activity into tasks, requiring elemental steps to be executed, and assess their failure due to predefined PSFs. In this study, we compare generic HRA methods and those that incorporate some human spaceflight aspects, such as sleep conditions (SCREAM [4]), with respect to how they may be adopted to capture performance with an intention to mitigate detrimental outcomes elucidated by the HSRB DAGs. We suggest strategies to quantify astronaut performance specific to spaceflight activities and illustrate how such concepts may help in optimizing the CHP system capabilities with respect to Artemis missions.

dag↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.

Hamlin, Teri↗
NASA NTRS1997

Reduction of Maintenance Error Through Focused Interventions

It is well known that a significant proportion of aviation accidents and incidents are tied to human error. In flight operations, research of operational errors has shown that so-called "pilot error" often involves a variety of human factors issues and not a simple lack of individual technical skills. In aircraft maintenance operations, there is similar concern that maintenance errors which may lead to incidents and accidents are related to a large variety of human factors issues. Although maintenance error data and research are limited, industry initiatives involving human factors training in maintenance have become increasingly accepted as one type of maintenance error intervention. Conscientious efforts have been made in re-inventing the "team" concept for maintenance operations and in tailoring programs to fit the needs of technical operations. Nevertheless, there remains a dual challenge: to develop human factors interventions which are directly supported by reliable human error data, and to integrate human factors concepts into the procedures and practices of everyday technical tasks. In this paper, we describe several varieties of human factors interventions and focus on two specific alternatives which target problems related to procedures and practices; namely, 1) structured on-the-job training and 2) procedure re-design. We hope to demonstrate that the key to leveraging the impact of these solutions comes from focused interventions; that is, interventions which are derived from a clear understanding of specific maintenance errors, their operational context and human factors components.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Operational Interventions to Maintenance Error

A significant proportion of aviation accidents and incidents are known to be tied to human error. However, research of flight operational errors has shown that so-called pilot error often involves a variety of human factors issues and not a simple lack of individual technical skills. In aircraft maintenance operations, there is similar concern that maintenance errors which may lead to incidents and accidents are related to a large variety of human factors issues. Although maintenance error data and research are limited, industry initiatives involving human factors training in maintenance have become increasingly accepted as one type of maintenance error intervention. Conscientious efforts have been made in re-inventing the team7 concept for maintenance operations and in tailoring programs to fit the needs of technical opeRAtions. Nevertheless, there remains a dual challenge: 1) to develop human factors interventions which are directly supported by reliable human error data, and 2) to integrate human factors concepts into the procedures and practices of everyday technical tasks. In this paper, we describe several varieties of human factors interventions and focus on two specific alternatives which target problems related to procedures and practices; namely, 1) structured on-the-job training and 2) procedure re-design. We hope to demonstrate that the key to leveraging the impact of these solutions comes from focused interventions; that is, interventions which are derived from a clear understanding of specific maintenance errors, their operational context and human factors components.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗
NASA NTRS2019

SCREAM: Space-based Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method

Given both ground-based performance shaping factors (PSFs) collected by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and potential space-based PSFs collected by JSC's HH&P, this year's task is to determine how to combine them for future human reliability analysis (HRA) of space missions. All HRA to date for space missions have been based on ground data (i.e. 1-G environment). There is no space-based HRA approach. The target of this project to produce a "first of its kind" HRA approach for space missions. As humans go beyond Earth orbit and missions become longer, human performance and reliability is expected to degrade. The questions become by how much, when, and what, leading to defining the overall effect on crew risk. Knowing this information earlier rather than later will help us mitigate this risk by vehicle design, crew training, and operational workarounds.

Boyer, Roger L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

And the Human Saves the Day or Maybe They Ruin It, The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth as safely as we have. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflight, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The paper discusses the concepts of human involvement in technological programs, how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and the tradeoffs between having a human in the loop or not. Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lowers the risk.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Managing Maintenance Error: Six Lessons From Aviation Maintenance

There are clear parallels between the ground processing of spacecraft and the maintenance of airline aircraft. In both cases, reliable human performance is critical to safe outcomes. Examples of human factors in airline maintenance and spacecraft ground processing illustrate the similarities between these two domains. The worldwide aviation industry began to pay close attention to human factors in maintenance after several maintenance-related disasters in the 1970s and 80s. Rather than simply applying solutions that had been developed for flight crew and air traffic controllers, the aviation industry developed human factors interventions specifically tailored for maintenance personnel. These interventions have led to safety improvements, greater reliability, and significant cost savings. Six human factors approaches from airline maintenance that can be usefully applied to enhance the quality and safety of ground processing are outlined. These are 1) Design for assembly, test, and maintenance, 2) Non technical skills training, 3) Improved design of documentation, 4) Reduction of iatrogenic quality lapses, 5) Barrier and control analysis, and 6) Continuous improvement based on learning from quality lapses.

maintenance human factors↗
NASA NTRS2003

Development of an Integrated Human Factors Toolkit

An effective integration of human abilities and limitations is crucial to the success of all NASA missions. The Integrated Human Factors Toolkit facilitates this integration by assisting system designers and analysts to select the human factors tools that are most appropriate for the needs of each project. The HF Toolkit contains information about a broad variety of human factors tools addressing human requirements in the physical, information processing and human reliability domains. Analysis of each tool includes consideration of the most appropriate design stage, the amount of expertise in human factors that is required, the amount of experience with the tool and the target job tasks that are needed, and other factors that are critical for successful use of the tool. The benefits of the Toolkit include improved safety, reliability and effectiveness of NASA systems throughout the agency. This report outlines the initial stages of development for the Integrated Human Factors Toolkit.

Resnick, Marc L.↗
NASA NTRS2012

A Systems Modeling Approach for Risk Management of Command File Errors

The main cause of commanding errors is often (but not always) due to procedures. Either lack of maturity in the processes, incompleteness of requirements or lack of compliance to these procedures. Other causes of commanding errors include lack of understanding of system states, inadequate communication, and making hasty changes in standard procedures in response to an unexpected event. In general, it's important to look at the big picture prior to making corrective actions. In the case of errors traced back to procedures, considering the reliability of the process as a metric during its' design may help to reduce risk. This metric is obtained by using data from Nuclear Industry regarding human reliability. A structured method for the collection of anomaly data will help the operator think systematically about the anomaly and facilitate risk management. Formal models can be used for risk based design and risk management. A generic set of models can be customized for a broad range of missions.

probabilistic risk↗
NASA NTRS2004

EVA Performance Prediction

Astronaut physical performance capabilities in micro gravity EV A or on planetary surfaces when encumbered by a life support suit and debilitated by a long exposure to micro gravity will be less than unencumbered pre flight capabilities. The big question addressed by human factors engineers is: what can the astronaut be expected to do on EVA or when we arrive at a planetary surface? A second question is: what aids to performance will be needed to enhance the human physical capability? These questions are important for a number of reasons. First it is necessary to carry out accurate planning of human physical demands to ensure that time and energy critical tasks can be carried out with confidence. Second it is important that the crew members (and their ground or planetary base monitors) have a realistic picture of their own capabilities, as excessive fatigue can lead to catastrophic failure. Third it is important to design appropriate equipment to enhance human sensory capabilities, locomotion, materials handling and manipulation. The evidence from physiological research points to musculoskeletal, cardiovascular and neurovestibular degradation during long duration exposure to micro gravity . The evidence from the biomechanics laboratory (and the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory) points to a reduction in range of motion, strength and stamina when encumbered by a pressurized suit. The evidence from a long history of EVAs is that crewmembers are indeed restricted in their physical capabilities. There is a wealth of evidence in the literature on the causes and effects of degraded human performance in the laboratory, in sports and athletics, in industry and in other physically demanding jobs. One approach to this challenge is through biomechanical and performance modeling. Such models must be based on thorough task analysis, reliable human performance data from controlled studies, and functional extrapolations validated in analog contexts. The task analyses currently carried out for EVA activities are based more on extensive domain experience than any formal analytic structure. Conversely, physical task analysis for industrial and structured evidence from training and EV A contexts. Again on earth there is considerable evidence of human performance degradation due to encumbrance and fatigue. These industrial models generally take the form of a discounting equation. The development of performance estimates for space operations, such as timeline predictions for EVA is generally based on specific input from training activity, for example in the NBL or KC135. uniformed services tasks on earth are much more formalized. Human performance data in the space context has two sources: first there is the micro analysis of performance in structured tasks by the space physiology community and second there is the less structured evidence from training and EV A contexts.

Peacock, Brian↗
NASA NTRS2018

Modeling the Risk of U.S. Offshore Oil & Gas Exploration-Well Drilling, Commercial Nuclear Plants, and Human Spaceflight

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been applied in different industries for many years. Each industry and technology area presents varying challenges and priorities, and the risk models therefore need to be somewhat different. This paper compares aspects of risk modeling of offshore drilling, nuclear plant operation, and human spaceflight. Risk models in all three technology areas have certain high-level similarities: (1) they employ redundancy and diversity in their means to prevent or mitigate risk, including a mix of active and passive systems designed to respond to off-normal evolutions; (2) they are affected by human reliability; (3) their models require consideration of coupling between scenario structure and scenario phenomenology. But in examining the models in more detail, one sees important differences in methodology and emphasis. For purposes of comparison, this paper discusses aspects of a risk model of an offshore drilling operation in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, focusing on where such a development differs in important ways from models of commercial U.S. nuclear plants and models developed for human spaceflight.

Boyer, Roger L.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Probabilistic Simulation of the Human Factor in Structural Reliability

The formal approach described herein computationally simulates the probable ranges of uncertainties for the human factor in probabilistic assessments of structural reliability. Human factors such as marital status, professional status, home life, job satisfaction, work load, and health are studied by using a multifactor interaction equation (MFIE) model to demonstrate the approach. Parametric studies in conjunction with judgment are used to select reasonable values for the participating factors (primitive variables). Subsequently performed probabilistic sensitivity studies assess the suitability of the MFIE as well as the validity of the whole approach. Results show that uncertainties range from 5 to 30 percent for the most optimistic case, assuming 100 percent for no error (perfect performance).

Chamis, Christos C.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Assessing the Relative Risk of Aerocapture Using Probabalistic Risk Assessment

A recent study performed for the Aerocapture Technology Area in the In-Space Propulsion Technology Projects Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center investigated the relative risk of various capture techniques for Mars missions. Aerocapture has been proposed as a possible capture technique for future Mars missions but has been perceived by many in the community as a higher risk option as compared to aerobraking and propulsive capture. By performing a probabilistic risk assessment on aerocapture, aerobraking and propulsive capture, a comparison was made to uncover the projected relative risks of these three maneuvers. For mission planners, this knowledge will allow them to decide if the mass savings provided by aerocapture warrant any incremental risk exposure. The study focuses on a Mars Sample Return mission currently under investigation at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). In each case (propulsive, aerobraking and aerocapture), the Earth return vehicle is inserted into Martian orbit by one of the three techniques being investigated. A baseline spacecraft was established through initial sizing exercises performed by JPL's Team X. While Team X design results provided the baseline and common thread between the spacecraft, in each case the Team X results were supplemented by historical data as needed. Propulsion, thermal protection, guidance, navigation and control, software, solar arrays, navigation and targeting and atmospheric prediction were investigated. A qualitative assessment of human reliability was also included. Results show that different risk drivers contribute significantly to each capture technique. For aerocapture, the significant drivers include propulsion system failures and atmospheric prediction errors. Software and guidance hardware contribute the most to aerobraking risk. Propulsive capture risk is mainly driven by anomalous solar array degradation and propulsion system failures. While each subsystem contributes differently to the risk of each technique, results show that there exists little relative difference in the reliability of these capture techniques although uncertainty for the aerocapture estimates remains high given the lack of in-space demonstration.

Percy, Thomas K.↗
NASA NTRS2014

High-Power Hall Propulsion Development at NASA Glenn Research Center

The NASA Office of the Chief Technologist Game Changing Division is sponsoring the development and testing of enabling technologies to achieve efficient and reliable human space exploration. High-power solar electric propulsion has been proposed by NASA's Human Exploration Framework Team as an option to achieve these ambitious missions to near Earth objects. NASA Glenn Research Center (NASA Glenn) is leading the development of mission concepts for a solar electric propulsion Technical Demonstration Mission. The mission concepts are highlighted in this paper but are detailed in a companion paper. There are also multiple projects that are developing technologies to support a demonstration mission and are also extensible to NASA's goals of human space exploration. Specifically, the In-Space Propulsion technology development project at NASA Glenn has a number of tasks related to high-power Hall thrusters including performance evaluation of existing Hall thrusters; performing detailed internal discharge chamber, near-field, and far-field plasma measurements; performing detailed physics-based modeling with the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Hall2De code; performing thermal and structural modeling; and developing high-power efficient discharge modules for power processing. This paper summarizes the various technology development tasks and progress made to date

Kamhawi, Hani↗