Critical Cost-Effective Wind Blade Inspections Using Autonomous Inspection Systems.
Abstract not provided.
Ely, George Ray↗
SEARCH · Search NASA
Results for “Inspection”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Double-Shell Tank Primary Bottom Visual Inspection Results - 20025
A pressing need for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program at Hanford is of the ability to inspect the bottom of the tanks. Though the DSTs' annulus spaces (the space between the internal and external tank walls) have been inspected visually since 1992 and with Ultrasonic Testing (UT) since 1996, inspections of the tank bottoms have been able to be conducted due to limitations of available technology, omitting about 40 percent of the tank surface below the maximum fill level from routine inspection. Visual inspections of the tank annulus have been conducted up to five times in some DSTs and portions of the annulus space for all of the DSTs has been inspected twice with UT. This region includes the walls of the primary tank and secondary liner along with accessible portions of the secondary liner bottom. Due to this lack of technology, the degradation of the primary tank bottom in Tank AY-102 was undetected until the tank leaked into its annulus space, confirmed in 2012. Since that time, WRPS has been working with the nondestructive examination community and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, to evaluate potential technologies to conduct these challenging remote inspections. Recent work has included the development, testing, and deployment of several remote visual inspection technologies to observe the condition of the primary tank bottom of the DSTs by leveraging air distribution slots in the refractory pad on which it rests. Robotic solutions to conduct this inspection were developed with a detailed understanding of the physical configuration and operational logistics. Understanding and subsequent communication of these details to vendors within the robotics and nondestructive examination community was a critical component to the successful production of these new tools. Throughout the FY16-FY18 years, vendors from nondestructive examination community were solicited for ideas to meet the tank bottom inspection challenge. Two tank bottom visual inspection solutions were then pursued to meet that challenge. Both tools were successfully deployed at Tank AP-107, and provided valuable visuals, never before obtained from the under tank environment of a double-shell tank. While there are minor opportunities for improvement identified with each system, general outcomes were overwhelmingly positive. Both systems were successfully able to navigate the refractory air slot pattern from the outer edge to the tank center and record video footage. The micro-crawler provided high quality and very stable footage through the air slot pattern, but took longer to deploy into the slots and traverse through them than the alternative system. The push-pull tethered camera was able to navigate all seven of its target air slots in a matter of a few hours, which included deployment, movement between slot entrances, and complete removal of the system from the annulus environment. Through these air slots, new information was gained about the tank bottom and refractory pad condition of tank AP-107, AP-106, AP-108, and AN-102. While some debris was noted in the air slots, including sand, chipped refractory, and construction materials, the refractory was found to be structurally stable and adequately supporting the primary tank bottom through the full diameter of the tank. Primary tank bottom steel exterior was found to be in good condition, free of ongoing or aggressive corrosion conditions. Looking toward the future, robotic access to and visual inspection of refractory air slots and the primary tank bottom steel has now proven viable. Incorporating periodic air slot inspections as a regular practice within the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program is the next step, allowing trending of any changes in condition. As ultrasonic testing infrastructure was leveraged to complete the initial system deployments described in this report, it makes sense to adopt that same strategy for ongoing periodic examinations and deploy these primary tank bottom inspection tools alongside ultrasonic testing operations. Development of visual inspection tools to evaluate the primary tank bottom region of the double-shell tanks was planned as the first stage of inspection. Continued development of volumetric sensors and incorporation of these inspection tools into Hanford's ongoing Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program are the next steps, seeking to continuously expand understanding of asset integrity and remaining useful life. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Double-Shell Tank Primary Bottom Inspection Development - 19067
Double-Shell Tank (DST) integrity at Hanford is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods [1]. A pressing need for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program is the ability to inspect the bottom of the tanks. Though the DSTs' annulus spaces (the space between the internal and external tank walls) have been inspected visually since 1992 and with Ultrasonic Testing (UT) since 1996, WRPS has been unable to conduct inspections of the tank bottoms due to limitations of available technology, omitting about 40 percent of the tank surface below the maximum fill level from routine inspection. Visual inspections of the tank annulus have been conducted up to five times in some DSTs and the annulus space for all of the DSTs has been inspected twice with UT. The annulus region includes the walls of the primary tank and secondary liner along with accessible portions of the secondary liner bottom. Due to the lack of under-tank inspection technology, degradation of the primary tank bottom in Tank AY-102 was undetected until the tank leaked into its annulus space, confirmed in 2012 [2]. Since that time, WRPS has been working with the nondestructive examination community and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to evaluate potential technologies to conduct these challenging remote inspections. Recent work has included the development, testing, and deployment of several remote visual inspection technologies to observe the condition of the primary tank bottom of the DSTs by leveraging air distribution slots in the refractory pad on which it rests. Robotic solutions to conduct this inspection were developed with a detailed understanding of the physical configuration and operational logistics. Understanding and subsequent communication of these details to vendors within the robotics and nondestructive examination community was a critical component to the successful production of these new tools. In total, two remote visual inspection tools were produced by two vendors. The first tool was designed to leverage existing ultrasonic testing magnetic wall crawler technology in use within the double-shell tank annuli at Hanford. This resulted in a cost savings, immediate familiarization with the equipment, and a more streamlined shop to field experience. The second tool was developed from the ground up, and represents a more tailored and purpose-built solution to the problem. While costlier and more complex, it is also more versatile and capable of future growth or adaptation. Initial design of both tools began in early FY17 with fabrication and testing completed in early FY18. The tools were designed to be deployed alongside existing inspection operations and expand coverage. Development of visual inspection tools to evaluate the primary tank bottom region of the double-shell tanks was planned as the first stage of inspection. Continued development of volumetric sensors and incorporation of these inspection tools into Hanford's ongoing Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program are the next steps, continuously seeking to expand understanding of asset integrity and remaining useful life. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Autonomous Aerial Power Plant Inspection in GPS-denied Environments
Inspection of coal-fired power plants is frequently dangerous, includes difficult places to reach, and can turn expensive due to the downtimes and cost of inspection crew. Robotic systems have shown capabilities to address some of these issues, but most of the current robotic inspection technology in power plants is designed for specific components. Conversely, recent advances in machine vision have empowered aerial platforms for long-range, remotely-controlled, GPS-based inspections of industrial plants. This capability has led to wide spread utilization of aerial robots (commonly termed Drones, UVS or UAS) platforms for inspection in less challenging environments where both collision avoidance, and GPS reception are not significant issues. The challenge in adapting airborne technology for power plant inspection lies in internal structures and the complex network of piping, and distribution systems, which impose significant risks for collision and can hinder the reception and transmission of GPS signals. The current state of the art in aerial inspection technology within the energy sector is controlled via radio control, and utilizes GPS-based navigation, for inspection of large-scale plants such as offshore platforms and wind turbine parks. Nevertheless, close-range and autonomous inspection in the GPS-denied environments of power plants has not yet been achieved, as it requires precise guidance and navigation with real-time situational awareness and obstacle avoidance capabilities. This endeavor introduced the use of rotary wing flying robots, due to their station keeping and vertical take-off capabilities for power plant components inspection. To enable close quarter inspection two methods were used. One method uses the 3D CAD (Three-dimensional Computer-Aided Design) model of the asset to inspect to generate the UAV’s inspection path. To acquire, analyze and process the 3D model, first, the STL file is produced to obtain surface points and vectors normal to the surface. Later, by introducing other variables such as wall offset and a controlled trajectory between each outline and each subsequent layer, the flight path is generated. The proposed framework will generate a path that will pass as close as desired from the surface and navigate in intricate environments. A second method, use advanced manufacturing techniques such as CNC (Computer Numerical Control) and additive manufacturing. Once the inspection flight path is obtained, vision-based navigation systems are employed to have the UAV autonomously tracking the provided trajectory. Finally, Artificial Intelligence-enabled developments are in charge of detecting cracks and corrosion in structural components of power plants. The proposed methods are validated in simulations, laboratory and industrial setups, where it is shown that the developed systems acting together enable close-quarter autonomous aerial inspection and mapping in power plant assets. The system can be further improved by adding more sensors to navigate in different GPS-denied environments, with non-homogeneous lighting conditions, dust and in general situations where vision-based systems may fail.
01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
Advancements in the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System Inspections at the Savannah River Site - 16030
A facility safety envelope requires management of activities to ensure no unacceptable radiological or chemical hazards to the public, site worker and environment occur. While appropriate design and construction methods ensure an initial physical plant configuration, what actions must an operating Facility take to ensure the physical plant continues to meet a safety configuration throughout Facility life? While a physical walk down of the plant is a tried and true method to confirm conditions, what other methods must be used when a walk down is not possible? What inspection methods are used when balancing budget pressures against obtaining inspection data? The periodic inspections of the H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel are performed remotely. The 2015 remote Tunnel inspection has been the most successful inspection to date. This presentation highlights the continued lessons learned with the most recent 2015 remote Tunnel inspection. These lessons learned are applicable to Facilities considering or performing remote inspections. The Recovery Crawler Project was tasked with determining if the 2014 Inspection Crawler could be retrieved, perform the retrieval if feasible and complete the inspection of the remaining sections of the exhaust tunnel that were not previously performed. The objectives for the project were met, the Inspection Crawler was deemed unusable and left in place and the Recovery Crawler performed the complete 143 meters (470 feet) of tunnel inspection and an additional 55 meters (180 feet) of exhaust tunnel inspection not previously completed. The remote inspection of a 60+ year operating Canyon Exhaust tunnel is a complex endeavor requiring close coordination of multiple organizations, adherence to Conduct of Operations, Radiological Safety, Worker Safety, etc. principles as well as alignment with Facility Safety Basis requirements. This paper discusses the challenges, actions required getting ready for the 2015 recovery and continued inspection and the hazards encountered performing the actual recovery/inspection. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Identifying, Assessing, and Mitigating Risk of Single-Point Inspections on the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
In the production of each Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), over 100,000 inspections are performed. ATK Thiokol Inc. reviewed these inspections to ensure a robust inspection system is maintained. The principal effort within this endeavor was the systematic identification and evaluation of inspections considered to be single-point. Single-point inspections are those accomplished on components, materials, and tooling by only one person, involving no other check. The purpose was to more accurately characterize risk and ultimately address and/or mitigate risk associated with single-point inspections. After the initial review of all inspections and identification/assessment of single-point inspections, review teams applied risk prioritization methodology similar to that used in a Process Failure Modes Effects Analysis to derive a Risk Prioritization Number for each single-point inspection. After the prioritization of risk, all single-point inspection points determined to have significant risk were provided either with risk-mitigating actions or rationale for acceptance. This effort gave confidence to the RSRM program that the correct inspections are being accomplished, that there is appropriate justification for those that remain as single-point inspections, and that risk mitigation was applied to further reduce risk of higher risk single-point inspections. This paper examines the process, results, and lessons learned in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk associated with single-point inspections accomplished in the production of the Space Shuttle RSRM.
Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗
Evaluating Heuristics for Planning Effective and Efficient Inspections
A significant body of knowledge concerning software inspection practice indicates that the value of inspections varies widely both within and across organizations. Inspection effectiveness and efficiency can be measured in numerous ways, and may be affected by a variety of factors such as Inspection planning, the type of software, the developing organization, and many others. In the early 1990's, NASA formulated heuristics for inspection planning based on best practices and early NASA inspection data. Over the intervening years, the body of data from NASA inspections has grown. This paper describes a multi-faceted exploratory analysis performed on this · data to elicit lessons learned in general about conducting inspections and to recommend improvements to the existing heuristics. The contributions of our results include support for modifying some of the original inspection heuristics (e.g. Increasing the recommended page rate), evidence that Inspection planners must choose between efficiency and effectiveness, as a good tradeoff between them may not exist, and Identification of small subsets of inspections for which new inspection heuristics are needed. Most Importantly, this work illustrates the value of collecting rich data on software Inspections, and using it to gain insight into, and Improve, inspection practice.
Shull, Forrest J.↗
Thermographic inspection of pipes, tanks, and containment liners
Nuclear power plants are required to operate at a high level of safety. Recent industry and license renewal commitments aim to further increase safety by requiring the inspection of components that have not traditionally undergone detailed inspected in the past, such as tanks and liners. NEI 09-14 requires the inspection of buried pipes and tanks while containment liner inspections are required as a part of license renewal commitments. Containment liner inspections must inspect the carbon steel liner for defects - such as corrosion - that could threaten the pressure boundary and ideally, should be able to inspect the surrounding concrete for foreign material that could be in contact with the steel liner and potentially initiate corrosion. Such an inspection requires a simultaneous evaluation of two materials with very different material properties. Rapid, yet detailed, inspection results are required due to the massive size of the tanks and containment liners to be inspected. For this reason, thermal NDE methods were evaluated to inspect tank and containment liner mockups with simulated defects. Thermographic Signal Reconstruction (TSR) was utilized to enhance the images and provide detailed information on the sizes and shapes of the observed defects. The results show that thermographic inspection is highly sensitive to the defects of interest and is capable of rapidly inspecting large areas.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 0)
This report provides the results of the annual post-closure use restriction (UR) inspections at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This report covers post-closure UR inspections for calendar year 2020, and includes visual inspections and repair activities completed at the following corrective action units (CAUs): • CAU 407, Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424, Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453, Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487, Thunderwell Site (TTR). Note: CAU 400, Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) (CASs TA-19-001-05PT, Ordnance Disposal Pit; and TA-55-00-TAB2, Ordnance Disposal Pit) no longer requires inspection and reporting, as described in the Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada for Calendar Year 2019. Site figures are included in Appendix A. The Post-Closure Inspection Plans and Record of Technical Change modifying the requirements for each UR are included in Appendix B. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are included in Appendix C. Field Notes are included in Appendix D. Appendix E, Inspection Photographs, does not include photographs because none were taken during the 2020 post-closure inspections. Appendix F, Post-Closure Vegetation Monitoring Report, does not include any data because vegetation monitoring was not conducted or required at any CAU in 2020. Visual inspections were conducted according to the post-closure requirements outlined in specific CAU and CAS URs, and approved by NDEP. The annual post-closure inspections for CASs associated with CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 were conducted on May 20, 2020. No maintenance or repair issues were noted at CAUs 487, or at CASs associated with CAU 424 (except CASs 03-08-002-A304 and 03-08-002-A308). Maintenance items and subsequent repairs include the following: • CAU 407, CAS TA-23-001-TARC (Roller Coaster RadSafe Area): A UR sign was loose and was rehung during the inspection. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A304 (Landfill Cell A3-4): The northeast monument needed a UR sign. The UR sign was attached to the monument on August 11, 2020. • CAU 424, CAS 03-08-002-A308 (Landfill Cell A3-8): The southeast monument needed additional lava rock. The lava rock was added during the inspection. • CAU 453, CAS 09-55-001-0952 (Area 9 Landfill): Two animal burrows were noted in the western portion of the northern and southern trenches (one burrow per trench). The animal burrows were repaired on August 11, 2020.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Evaluation of H-Canyon Ventilation Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 20052
The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program [1] provides a process to inspect, evaluate, and document the conditions of passive safety related structural systems and components, their degradation mechanisms and their impact on the safety envelope. The Structural Integrity Program performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the systems and components can perform their safety function and recommend corrective actions before the function is compromised. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The underground reinforced concrete Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel to perform the inspection. Unlike active systems that can be subjected to physical testing to confirm capability, qualification calculations, including modeling, is performed to assess passive design feature capabilities relative to operational, accident and natural phenomena hazards events. Input for these calculations come from knowledge of field conditions, design drawings and conservative assumptions. The knowledge of field conditions comes from concrete and soil testing activities as well as inspection data. The use of cameras on crawlers to obtain inspection data and how that data is used in qualification calculations is the focus of this discussion. Remote Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras, prior to Calendar Year 2003 (CY2003). Since CY2003, six camera equipped crawlers have been used. Crawlers have evolved and improved by incorporating lessons learned from the previous inspections. The latest 2019 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System and captured images that were previously unseen, thus providing key visual data for the Structural Integrity Program report [2]. The inspection data serves as 1) input to qualification calculations, 2) validates current conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations, and 3) documents a record of change over time. This data is vital for the effective evaluation of the tunnel structure and aids with predicting the life cycle service life safety envelope to protect the public, environment, and facility worker. The goal of the 2019 deployment was to use a more robust vehicle to ensure travel over obstacles, perform the inspection with higher resolution cameras, and have the ability to elevate the cameras to view surfaces previously obscured by abandon-in-place ducts in the tunnel. The inspection information will serve to strengthen the input basis for qualification calculations, versus using excessive conservative calculation assumptions. This 2019 inspection was compared with previous crawler visual evidence to identify change over time to project remaining service life and confirm field conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations. The results of the 2019 Exhaust Tunnel inspection continue to improve and provide a firm basis to make sound engineering judgements regarding tunnel capability and approaches in projecting remaining service life with an aging system and component. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
H-Canyon Ventilation System Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 18052
The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program (SIP) performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the component is capable of performing its safety function. This Program provides the process to document the conditions of safety related structural systems and components, their damage mechanisms, and recommend repairs if required before there is impact on the safety envelope. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel. Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras prior to CY2003. Since CY2003, five camera equipped crawlers have been used with varying levels of inspection success. With each successive crawler inspection, expectations have increased to perform tasks beyond visual examinations. The 2017 crawler performed the visual inspection but also included improvements on crawler performance, such as testing the use of wireless capability and remediation of crawler travel route, to the addition of stationary cameras and lighting at key locations. The latest 2017 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System for the second time since development, thus providing key visual data for the integrity program [2]. In addition, several access ports were installed in 2017 following the removal of concrete core samples that allow for new visual inspection of the Canyon Crossover tunnel, thus providing information for an area that was generally inaccessible for monitoring. Planning for the 2019 crawler inspection is underway with the expectations to improve upon inspection cameras and also introduce mapping technologies such as LIDAR. The challenge to obtain meaningful data from the remote inspections of a 60+ year operating Canyon Exhaust tunnel continues to be a complex endeavor requiring close coordination of multiple organizations, adherence to Conduct of Operations, Radiological Safety, Worker Safety, etc. principles as well as alignment with Facility Safety Basis requirements. This paper discusses the continuing improvements in inspection techniques and the challenges associated these inspections. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Software Formal Inspections Guidebook
The Software Formal Inspections Guidebook is designed to support the inspection process of software developed by and for NASA. This document provides information on how to implement a recommended and proven method for conducting formal inspections of NASA software. This Guidebook is a companion document to NASA Standard 2202-93, Software Formal Inspections Standard, approved April 1993, which provides the rules, procedures, and specific requirements for conducting software formal inspections. Application of the Formal Inspections Standard is optional to NASA program or project management. In cases where program or project management decide to use the formal inspections method, this Guidebook provides additional information on how to establish and implement the process. The goal of the formal inspections process as documented in the above-mentioned Standard and this Guidebook is to provide a framework and model for an inspection process that will enable the detection and elimination of defects as early as possible in the software life cycle. An ancillary aspect of the formal inspection process incorporates the collection and analysis of inspection data to effect continual improvement in the inspection process and the quality of the software subjected to the process.
Source record↗
Integrating extended reality with inspection systems
An extended reality (“XR”) inspection system for inspecting a target is provided. The XR inspection system includes an inspection system and an XR device. The inspection system includes an inspection main unit and an inspection probe. The inspection main unit collects inspection data from the inspection probe, receives commands input by an inspector using the XR device, performs functions associated with the commands, and sends display data to the XR device. The XR device provides an augmented reality display and sensors. The XR device displays display data received from the inspection main unit, receives commands via the sensors from the inspector, and sends the commands to the inspection main unit.
Keene, Lionel↗
Container inspection in the port container terminal by using 14 MeV neutrons
A proposal for an autonomous and flexible ship container inspection system is presented. This could be accomplished by the incorporation of inspection system on the container transportation devices (straddle carriers, yard gentry cranes automated guided vehicles, trailers). This configuration is terminal specific and it will be decided by container terminal operator. In such a way no part of port operational area will be used for inspection. The inspection scenario will include container transfer from ship to transportation device with inspection unit mounted on it, inspection during container movement to the container location. A neutron generator without associated alpha particle detection will be used. This will allow the use of higher neutron intensity (5x10{sup 9} - 10{sup 10} n/s in 4π). The inspected container will be stationary in the 'inspection position' on the transportation device while the 'inspection unit' will move along its side. Following analytical methods will be used simultaneously: neutron radiography, X-ray radiography, neutron activation analysis, (n,γ) and (n,n'γ) reactions, neutron absorption, and scattering, X-ray backscattering, Neutron techniques will take the advantage of using 'smart collimators' for neutrons and gammas, both emitted and detected. The inspected voxel will be defined by intersections/union of neutron generator and detectors solid angles. The container inspection protocol will be based on identification of discrepancies between its cargo manifest and its elemental 'fingerprint' and radiography profiles. In addition, the information on container weight will be obtained during the container transport and foreseen screening from the measurement of density of material in the container. (authors)
42 ENGINEERING↗
An experiment to assess the cost-benefits of code inspections in large scale software development
This experiment (currently in progress) is designed to measure costs and benefits of different code inspection methods. It is being performed with a real development team writing software for a commercial product. The dependent variables for each code unit's inspection are the elapsed time and the number of defects detected. We manipulate the method of inspection by randomly assigning reviewers, varying the number of reviewers and the number of teams, and, when using more than one team, randomly assigning author repair and non-repair of detected defects between code inspections. After collecting and analyzing the first 17 percent of the data, we have discovered several interesting facts about reviewers, about the defects recorded during reviewer preparation and during the inspection collection meeting, and about the repairs that are eventually made. (1) Only 17 percent of the defects that reviewers record in their preparations are true defects that are later repaired. (2) Defects recorded at the inspection meetings fall into three categories: 18 percent false positives requiring no author repair, 57 percent soft maintenance where the author makes changes only for readability or code standard enforcement, and 25 percent true defects requiring repair. (3) The median elapsed calendar time for code inspections is 10 working days - 8 working days before the collection meeting and 2 after. (4) In the collection meetings, 31 percent of the defects discovered by reviewers during preparation are suppressed. (5) Finally, 33 percent of the true defects recorded are discovered at the collection meetings and not during any reviewer's preparation. The results to date suggest that inspections with two sessions (two different teams) of two reviewers per session (2sX2p) are the most effective. These two-session inspections may be performed with author repair or with no author repair between the two sessions. We are finding that the two-session, two-person with repair (2sX2pR) inspections are the most expensive, taking 15 working days of calendar time from the time the code is ready for review until author repair is complete, whereas two-session, two-person with no repair (2sX2pN) inspections take only 10 working days, but find about 10 percent fewer defects.
Porter, A.↗
Infrared On-Orbit Inspection of Shuttle Orbiter Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Using Solar Heating
Thermographic nondestructive inspection techniques have been shown to provide quantitative, large area damage detection capabilities for the ground inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) used for the wing leading edge of the Shuttle orbiter. The method is non-contacting and able to inspect large areas in a relatively short inspection time. Thermal nondestructive evaluation (NDE) inspections have been shown to be applicable for several applications to the Shuttle in preparation for return to flight, including for inspection of RCC panels during impact testing, and for between-flight orbiter inspections. The focus of this work is to expand the capabilities of the thermal NDE methodology to enable inspection by an astronaut during orbital conditions. The significant limitations of available resources, such as weight and power, and the impact of these limitations on the inspection technique are discussed, as well as the resultant impact on data analysis and processing algorithms. Of particular interest is the impact to the inspection technique resulting from the use of solar energy as a heat source, the effect on the measurements due to working in the vacuum of space, and the effect of changes in boundary conditions, such as radiation losses seen by the material, on the response of the RCC. The resultant effects on detectability limits are discussed. Keywords: Nondestructive Evaluation, Shuttle, on-orbit inspection, thermography, infrared
Howell, P. A.↗
(abstract) Formal Inspection Technology Transfer Program
A Formal Inspection Technology Transfer Program, based on the inspection process developed by Michael Fagan at IBM, has been developed at JPL. The goal of this program is to support organizations wishing to use Formal Inspections to improve the quality of software and system level engineering products. The Technology Transfer Program provides start-up materials and assistance to help organizations establish their own Formal Inspection program. The course materials and certified instructors associated with the Technology Transfer Program have proven to be effective in classes taught at other NASA centers as well as at JPL. Formal Inspections (NASA tailored Fagan Inspections) are a set of technical reviews whose objective is to increase quality and reduce the cost of software development by detecting and correcting errors early. A primary feature of inspections is the removal of engineering errors before they amplify into larger and more costly problems downstream in the development process. Note that the word 'inspection' is used differently in software than in a manufacturing context. A Formal Inspection is a front-end quality enhancement technique, rather than a task conducted just prior to product shipment for the purpose of sorting defective systems (manufacturing usage). Formal Inspections are supporting and in agreement with the 'total quality' approach being adopted by many NASA centers.
certified instructors Formal Inspections↗
In-service Inspection of Radioactive Waste Tanks at the Savannah River Site – 15410
Liquid radioactive wastes from the Savannah River Site (SRS) separation process are stored in large underground carbon steel tanks. The high level wastes are processed in several of the tanks and then transferred by piping to other site facilities for further processing before they are stabilized in a vitrified or grout waste form. Based on waste removal and processing schedules, many of the tanks will be required to be in service for times exceeding the initial intended life. Until the waste is removed from storage, transferred, and processed, the materials and structures of the tanks must maintain a confinement function by providing a barrier to the environment and by maintaining acceptable structural stability during design basis events, which include loadings from both normal service and abnormal (e.g., earthquake) conditions. A structural integrity program is in place to maintain the structural and leak integrity functions of these waste tanks throughout their intended service life. In-service inspection (ISI) is an essential element of a comprehensive structural integrity program for the waste tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The ISI program was developed to determine the degree of degradation the waste tanks have experienced due to service conditions. As a result of the inspections, an assessment can be made of the effectiveness of corrosion controls for the waste chemistry, which precludes accelerated localized and general corrosion of the waste tanks. Ultrasonic inspections (UT) are performed to detect and quantify the degree of general wall thinning, pitting and cracking as a measure of tank degradation. The results from these inspections through 2013, for the 27 Type III/IIIA tanks, indicate no reportable in-service corrosion degradation in the primary tank (i.e., general, pitting, or cracking). The average wall thickness for all tanks remains above the manufactured nominal thickness minus 0.25 millimeter and the largest pit identified is approximately 1.70 millimeter deep (i.e., less than 10% through-wall). Improvements to the inspection program were recently instituted to provide additional confidence in the degradation rates. Thickness measurements from a single vertical strip along the accessible height of the primary tank have been used as a baseline to compare historical measurements. Changes in wall thickness and pit depths along this vertical strip are utilized to estimate the rate of corrosion degradation. An independent review of the ISI program methodology, results, and path forward was held in August 2009. The review recommended statistical sampling of the tanks to improve the confidence of the single strip inspection program. The statistical sampling plan required that SRS increase the amount of area scanned per tank. Therefore, in addition to the baseline vertical strip that is obtained for historical comparisons, four additional randomly selected vertical strips are inspected. To date, a total of 104 independent vertical strips along the height of the primary tank have been completed. A statistical analysis of the data indicates that at this coverage level there is a 99.5% confidence level that one of the worst 5% of all the vertical strips was inspected. That is, there is a relatively high likelihood that the SRS inspection program has covered one of the most corroded areas of any of the Type III/IIIA waste tanks. These data further support the conclusion that there are no significant indications of wall thinning or pitting. Random sampling will continue to increase the confidence that one of the worst 5% has been inspected. In order to obtain the additional vertical strips, and minimize budget and schedule impacts, data collection speed for the UT system was optimized. Prior to 2009, the system collected data at a rate of 32 square centimeters per minute. The scan rate was increased to 129 - 160 square centimeters per minute by increasing the scanner step and pixel sizes in the data acquisition set-up. Laboratory testing was utilized to optimize the scan index/pixel size such that the requirements for wall thinning and pit detection were still maintained. SRS continues to evaluate improvements to ultrasonic equipment.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗