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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2015

ASCR Cybersecurity for Scientific Computing Integrity - Research Pathways and Ideas Workshop

At the request of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science (SC) Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program office, a workshop was held June 2-3, 2015, in Gaithersburg, MD, to identify potential long term (10 to +20 year) cybersecurity fundamental basic research and development challenges, strategies and roadmap facing future high performance computing (HPC), networks, data centers, and extreme-scale scientific user facilities. This workshop was a follow-on to the workshop held January 7-9, 2015, in Rockville, MD, that examined higher level ideas about scientific computing integrity specific to the mission of the DOE Office of Science. Issues included research computation and simulation that takes place on ASCR computing facilities and networks, as well as network-connected scientific instruments, such as those run by various DOE Office of Science programs. Workshop participants included researchers and operational staff from DOE national laboratories, as well as academic researchers and industry experts. Participants were selected based on the submission of abstracts relating to the topics discussed in the previous workshop report [1] and also from other ASCR reports, including "Abstract Machine Models and Proxy Architectures for Exascale Computing" [27], the DOE "Preliminary Conceptual Design for an Exascale Computing Initiative" [28], and the January 2015 machine learning workshop [29]. The workshop was also attended by several observers from DOE and other government agencies. The workshop was divided into three topic areas: (1) Trustworthy Supercomputing, (2) Extreme-Scale Data, Knowledge, and Analytics for Understanding and Improving Cybersecurity, and (3) Trust within High-end Networking and Data Centers. Participants were divided into three corresponding teams based on the category of their abstracts. The workshop began with a series of talks from the program manager and workshop chair, followed by the leaders for each of the three topics and a representative of each of the four major DOE Office of Science Advanced Scientific Computing Research Facilities: the Argonne Leadership Computing Facility (ALCF), the Energy Sciences Network (ESnet), the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center (NERSC), and the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF). The rest of the workshop consisted of topical breakout discussions and focused writing periods that produced much of this report.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Operational Research, Experimentation, Innovation, and Integration (COREII)

The Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response Office (CESER) has partnered with Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and energy companies to develop COREII. This research initiative aims to align with the national cybersecurity strategy, enhance the resilience of critical energy infrastructure, facilitate efforts to improve grid-enhancing technologies (GET) and major effects from other critical and emerging technologies, and to enable discovery of innovative solutions for emerging cybersecurity challenges

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Challenges of future high power wireless power transfer for light-duty electric vehicles----technology and risk management

Wireless power transfer is a state-of-the-art technology with the advantage of convenience and flexibility, as well as the capability of enabling fully automated charging. With power transfer levels increasing beyond 100 kW, many technical and risk management challenges emerge. Here, instead of focusing on the progress review of wireless power transfer technology, this paper discusses the future challenges and risks for high power wireless charging for light-duty electric vehicles. Aiming at 200 kW or higher wireless power transfer, we discuss technology and risk management challenges in the area of electromagnetic safety, resonant frequency determination, and cybersecurity risks in detail. As potential solutions to overcome these challenges, the latest technologies with an emphasis on advanced shielding solutions and recent progress on SiC converters from both industrial and academic institutions are reviewed, and some perspectives and propositions are provided.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2015

ASCR Cybersecurity for Scientific Computing Integrity

The Department of Energy (DOE) has the responsibility to address the energy, environmental, and nuclear security challenges that face our nation. Much of DOE’s enterprise involves distributed, collaborative teams; a significant fraction involves “open science,” which depends on multi-institutional, often international collaborations that must access or share significant amounts of information between institutions and over networks around the world. The mission of the Office of Science is the delivery of scientific discoveries and major scientific tools to transform our understanding of nature and to advance the energy, economic, and national security of the United States. The ability of DOE to execute its responsibilities depends critically on its ability to assure the integrity and availability of scientific facilities and computer systems, and of the scientific, engineering, and operational software and data that support its mission.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Consequence Prioritization Process for Potential High Consequence Events (HCE)

This document describes the process for Consequence Prioritization, the first phase of the Consequence-Driven Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) framework. The primary goal of Consequence Prioritization is to identify potential disruptive events that would significantly inhibit an organization’s ability to provide the critical services and functions deemed fundamental to their business mission. These disruptive events, defined as High Consequence Events (HCE), include both events that have occurred or could be realized through an attack of critical infrastructure owner assets. While other efforts have been initiated to identify and mitigate disruptive events at the national security level, such as Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41), this process is intended to be used by individual organizations to evaluate events that fall below the threshold for a national security. Described another way, Consequence Prioritization considers threats greater than those addressable by standard cyber-hygiene and includes the consideration of events that go beyond a traditional continuity of operations (COOP) perspective. Finally, Consequence Prioritization is most successful when organizations adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, engaging both cyber security and engineering expertise, as in-depth engineering perspectives are required to recognize and characterize and mitigate HCEs. Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the prioritization process.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2017

2017 BEA Self-Assessment Report for Idaho National Laboratory

This report provides Battelle Energy Alliance’s (BEA) self-assessment of performance for the period of October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017, as evaluated against the goals, performance objectives, and notable outcomes defined in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP). BEA took into consideration and consolidated all input provided from internal and external sources (e.g., Contractor Assurance System [CAS], program and customer feedback, external and independent reviews, and Department of Energy [DOE] Idaho Operations Office [ID] quarterly PEMP reports and Quarterly Evaluation Reports). After considering the information related to performance during the rating period, including feedback from the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Idaho Operations Office (ID), and other programmatic sponsors, BEA has self-assessed the Laboratory’s performance at a grade of A, an adjectival rating of “Excellent.” Table 1 documents BEA’s assessment of performance to the goals and individual performance Objectives. Table 2 documents completion of the Notable Outcomes. A more-detailed assessment of performance for each individual performance objective is documented in the closeout reports (see the PEMP reporting system). Table 3 includes an update to “Performance Challenges” as reported in the FY 2016 Self-Assessment Report.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

2016 Technology Transfer Annual Report

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) multiprogram national laboratory that conducts research and development in all DOE mission areas. Like all other national laboratories, INL has a statutory, technology transfer mission to make its capabilities and technologies available to federal agencies, state and local governments, universities and industry. To fulfill this mission, INL encourages its scientific, engineering and technical staff to disclose new inventions and creations to ensure the resulting intellectual property is captured, protected and made available to others who might benefit from it.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Methodology Development for Cybersecurity Robustness and Vulnerability Assessment of University Research Reactors

In 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) formed a working group in collaboration with the Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR) group to review cyber security programs at US nuclear nonpower reactor (NPR) facilities. Following their review of cyber security at four different university NPR (i.e. university research reactor (URR)) facilities, the NRC staff made recommendations for improvements at URR including 1) augmenting the URR licensees’ understanding of the protective features provided with their physical security systems, 2) educating URR facility staff on cyber security issues, and 3) developing guidance to help the URR facilities maintain adequate cyber security going forward. This three-year project to develop and implement a cyber-security risk assessment methodology and defense-in-depth mitigation strategy for application at URR facilities provides solutions effectively addressing each of the recommendations given in the NRC review referenced above. In support of this project, cyber security documentation and guidance from the NRC, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were reviewed. Most of this documentation did not take the unique resources, configuration, and infrastructure associated with URR facilities into account. The NRC-TRTR effective practices document provides useful guidance for implementing cyber security protections at URR, but lacks a structured framework for systematically auditing facility digital control assets (DCA) and evaluating associated cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and risk. The outcomes from this project, therefore, seek to build on the general resources above by providing a straightforward DCA auditing and risk assessment methodology, as well as mitigation strategies, that may be implemented to address the risk of cyber-attack at URR facilities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Laboratory Agenda 2018: Changing the world's energy future and securing our critical infrastructure

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a vision of changing the world’s energy future and securing our nation’s critical infrastructure. INL’s mission involves discovering, demonstrating, and securing innovative nuclear energy solutions and other clean energy sources. The Laboratory also has a mission focused on protecting the nation’s power grids and other vital systems against man-made and natural threats. Completing our mission and fulfilling our vision requires carefully charting our path and priorities, building and strengthening our core capabilities, focusing on key research and development (R&D) and mission-support initiatives, assessing our performance, and correcting our priorities when necessary. INL’s Laboratory Agenda articulates INL’s priorities, goals, and initiatives to deliver our mission and vision efficiently, effectively, and collaboratively. It describes our commitment to simultaneous excellence in science and technology, management and operations, and community service, and sets priorities for Laboratory investments.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

2016 Annual Laboratory Agenda, Idaho National Laboratory

The INL Lab Agenda provides a structured framework championed by the Leadership and Management Team that identifies the critical outcomes, strategic initiatives, and near-term research and development (R&D) and mission support activities necessary to accomplish INL strategic objectives for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and other DOE programs and federal agencies, and delivers on INL’s commitment to simultaneous excellence in science and technology (S&T), operations, and community service.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

DOE Fffice of Nuclear Energy cybersecurity research, development and demonstration program plan

This document describes the Cybersecurity Research Development and Demonstration (RD&D) Program, established by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) to provide sciencebased methods and technologies necessary for cost-effective, cyber-secure digital instrumentation, control and communication in collaboration with nuclear energy stakeholders. It provides an overview of program goals, objectives, linkages to organizational strategies, management structure, and stakeholder and cross-program interfaces.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry

Large, modern industrial facilities often incorporate thousands of digital assets in their operational technology. Regulated facilities, such as nuclear power plants (NPPs), maintain robust cybersecurity and configuration management programs that often use bills of materials (BOMs) for these assets, including make, model, and version of hardware, firmware, and software. However, these BOMs typically capture only first- or second-tier information provided by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Unfortunately, as indicated by the increasing number and sophistication of software supply chain attacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying all the potential vulnerabilities and risks in software applications. Software BOMs (SBOMs) provide detailed enumeration of components and dependencies within the product or devices, including firmware. SBOMs can be combined with vulnerability data sources and vendor vulnerability attestations to improve vulnerability management and enable rapid identification of affected components when new software vulnerabilities are discovered. Ideally, SBOMs are created by the OEM prior to installation. However, since this practice is not yet commonplace and since NPPs are typically slow to adopt new technology, most NPPs do not incorporate SBOMs into their asset or configuration management programs. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated by NPPs on existing digital assets to provide further insight into risk management decisions. This report provides an overview of the current SBOM ecosystem and recommends guidance on how to get started in a “crawl, walk, run” manner to develop and implement a sustainable SBOM program for digital assets in an NPP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Engineering-In Cybersecurity

Cyber-Informed Engineering is a framework which allows engineers to build resiliency to the impacts of cyber attack into engineered systems starting in the early design phases. This article introduces the framework and provides a description of some of its principles and resources for learning more.

42 ENGINEERING↗