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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2006

STS-121: Discovery L-2 Countdown Status Briefing

Bruce Buckingham from NASA Public Affairs introduces Pete Nicolenko, NASA Test Director, and Kathy Winters, Shuttle Weather Officer. During this STS-121 two days before launch countdown briefing, Pete Nicolenko says that there are no issues of concern and that they are on schedule for launch. He then presents and discusses an Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) video. The OPF topics of discussion include: 1) Wheel and tire installation; 2) Gap filler installation; 3) Booster build-up; 4) Transport of External Tank (ET) 119; 5) ET to Shuttle Rocket Booster (SRB) Mate operation; 6) Roll-over of Discovery out of OPF to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB); and 7) Roll-out to the pad. Kathy Winters gives her weather forecast for the STS-121 launch. The video ends with a question and answer period from the media.

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NASA NTRS2013

Launch and Assembly Reliability Analysis for Mars Human Space Exploration Missions

NASA s long-range goal is focused upon human exploration of Mars. Missions to Mars will require campaigns of multiple launches to assemble Mars Transfer Vehicles in Earth orbit. Launch campaigns are subject to delays, launch vehicles can fail to place their payloads into the required orbit, and spacecraft may fail during the assembly process or while loitering prior to the Trans-Mars Injection (TMI) burn. Additionally, missions to Mars have constrained departure windows lasting approximately sixty days that repeat approximately every two years. Ensuring high reliability of launching and assembling all required elements in time to support the TMI window will be a key enabler to mission success. This paper describes an integrated methodology for analyzing and improving the reliability of the launch and assembly campaign phase. A discrete event simulation involves several pertinent risk factors including, but not limited to: manufacturing completion; transportation; ground processing; launch countdown; ascent; rendezvous and docking, assembly, and orbital operations leading up to TMI. The model accommodates varying numbers of launches, including the potential for spare launches. Having a spare launch capability provides significant improvement to mission success.

Cates, Grant R.↗
NASA NTRS2001

STS-105 Countdown Status Briefing

Bruce Buckingham, NASA Public Affairs, introduces Steve Altemus, NASA Test Director, and Glenn Chin, STS-105 Mission Manager, in this STS-105 prelaunch press conference. An overview is given of the launch countdown, payload status, and weather forecast. The men then answer questions from the press.

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NASA NTRS2005

Launch Commit Criteria Monitoring Agent

The Spaceport Processing Systems Branch at NASA Kennedy Space Center has developed and deployed a software agent to monitor the Space Shuttle's ground processing telemetry stream. The application, the Launch Commit Criteria Monitoring Agent, increases situational awareness for system and hardware engineers during Shuttle launch countdown. The agent provides autonomous monitoring of the telemetry stream, automatically alerts system engineers when predefined criteria have been met, identifies limit warnings and violations of launch commit criteria, aids Shuttle engineers through troubleshooting procedures, and provides additional insight to verify appropriate troubleshooting of problems by contractors. The agent has successfully detected launch commit criteria warnings and violations on a simulated playback data stream. Efficiency and safety are improved through increased automation.

Semmel, Glenn S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Product Lifecycle Management and the Quest for Sustainable Space Explorations

Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) is an outcome of lean thinking to eliminate waste and increase productivity. PLM is inextricably tied to the systems engineering business philosophy, coupled with a methodology by which personnel, processes and practices, and information technology combine to form an architecture platform for product design, development, manufacturing, operations, and decommissioning. In this model, which is being implemented by the Engineering Directorate at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Marshall Space Flight Center, total lifecycle costs are important variables for critical decision-making. With the ultimate goal to deliver quality products that meet or exceed requirements on time and within budget, PLM is a powerful concept to shape everything from engineering trade studies and testing goals, to integrated vehicle operations and retirement scenarios. This paper will demonstrate how the Engineering Directorate is implementing PLM as part of an overall strategy to deliver safe, reliable, and affordable space exploration solutions. It has been 30 years since the United States fielded the Space Shuttle. The next generation space transportation system requires a paradigm shift such that digital tools and knowledge management, which are central elements of PLM, are used consistently to maximum effect. The outcome is a better use of scarce resources, along with more focus on stakeholder and customer requirements, as a new portfolio of enabling tools becomes second nature to the workforce. This paper will use the design and manufacturing processes, which have transitioned to digital-based activities, to show how PLM supports the comprehensive systems engineering and integration function. It also will go through a launch countdown scenario where an anomaly is detected to show how the virtual vehicle created from paperless processes will help solve technical challenges and improve the likelihood of launching on schedule, with less hands-on labor needed for processing and troubleshooting.

Caruso, Pamela W.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Product Lifecycle Management and the Quest for Sustainable Space Exploration Solutions

Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) is an outcome of lean thinking to eliminate waste and increase productivity. PLM is inextricably tied to the systems engineering business philosophy, coupled with a methodology by which personnel, processes and practices, and information technology combine to form an architecture platform for product design, development, manufacturing, operations, and decommissioning. In this model, which is being implemented by the Engineering Directorate at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Marshall Space Flight Center, total lifecycle costs are important variables for critical decisionmaking. With the ultimate goal to deliver quality products that meet or exceed requirements on time and within budget, PLM is a powerful tool to shape everything from engineering trade studies and testing goals, to integrated vehicle operations and retirement scenarios. This paper will demonstrate how the Engineering Directorate is implementing PLM as part of an overall strategy to deliver safe, reliable, and affordable space exploration solutions. It has been 30 years since the United States fielded the Space Shuttle. The next generation space transportation system requires a paradigm shift such that digital tools and knowledge management, which are central elements of PLM, are used consistently to maximum effect. The outcome is a better use of scarce resources, along with more focus on stakeholder and customer requirements, as a new portfolio of enabling tools becomes second nature to the workforce. This paper will use the design and manufacturing processes, which have transitioned to digital-based activities, to show how PLM supports the comprehensive systems engineering and integration function. It also will go through a launch countdown scenario where an anomaly is detected to show how the virtual vehicle created from paperless processes will help solve technical challenges and improve the likelihood of launching on schedule, with less hands-on labor needed for processing and troubleshooting. Sustainable space exploration solutions demand that all lifecycle phases be optimized. Adopting PLM, which has been used by the automotive industry for many years, for aerospace applications provides a foundation for strong, disciplined systems engineering and accountable return on investment by making lifecycle considerations variables in an iterative decision-making process. This paper combines the perspectives of the founding father of PLM, along with the experience of Engineering leaders who are implementing these processes and practices real-time. As the nation moves from an industrial-based society to one where information is a valued commodity, future NASA programs and projects will benefit from the experience being gained today for the exploration missions of tomorrow.

Caruso, Pamela W.↗
NASA NTRS2001

STS-105 Countdown Status Briefing

Joel Wells, NASA Public Affairs, introduces Steve Altemus, NASA Test Director, Glenn Chin, STS-105 Mission Manager, and Ed Priselac, Shuttle Weather Officer, in this STS-105 prelaunch press conference. An overview is given of the launch countdown, payload status (Leonardo Multipurpose Logistics Module), and weather forecast. The men then answer questions from the press.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2001

STS-104 Countdown Status Briefing

Joel Wells, NASA Public Affairs, introduces Jeff Spaulding, NASA Test Director, Gregory Horvath, STS-104 Mission Integration Engineer, and Ed Priselac, Shuttle Weather Officer, in this STS-104 prelaunch press conference. An overview is given of the launch countdown, payload status, and weather forecast. The men then answer questions from the press.

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NASA NTRS2015

Kennedy Space Center Timing and Countdown Interface to Kennedy Ground Control Subsystem

Kennedy Ground Control System (KGCS) engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are developing a time-tagging process to enable reconstruction of the events during a launch countdown. Such a process can be useful in the case of anomalies or other situations where it is necessary to know the exact time an event occurred. It is thus critical for the timing information to be accurate. KGCS will synchronize all items with Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) obtained from the Timing and Countdown (T&CD) organization. Network Time Protocol (NTP) is the protocol currently in place for synchronizing UTC. However, NTP has a peak error that is too high for today's standards. Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a newer protocol with a much smaller peak error. The focus of this project has been to implement a PTP solution on the network to increase timing accuracy while introducing and configuring the implementation of a firewall between T&CD and the KGCS network.

Protocol↗
NASA NTRS2009

Upper Atmospheric Monitoring for Ares I-X Ascent Loads and Trajectory Evaluation on the Day-of-Launch

During the launch countdown of the Ares I-X test vehicle, engineers from Langley Research Center will use profiles of atmospheric density and winds in evaluating vehicle ascent loads and controllability. A schedule for the release of balloons to measure atmospheric density and winds has been developed by the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center to help ensure timely evaluation of the vehicle ascent loads and controllability parameters and support a successful launch of the Ares I-X vehicle.

Roberts, Barry C.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Safety considerations involved in testing, checkout and launch operations at Cape Kennedy

This paper concerns itself with identifying safety problems associated with launch operations conducted during preparations for manned space flights at Cape Kennedy. This includes transportation and assembly of large space vehicles in the Vehicle Assembly Building, rollout to Launch Pad 39, test, checkout, and the launch countdown. Under these broad categories, the risks of fuel and oxidizer loading, installation of pyrotechnics, and similar hazardous operations are discussed. The many aspects for fire and rescue requirements are examined. These encompass the water deluge systems on the Mobile Service Structure and the Mobile Launcher, the insulated fire and rescue tractor, slide wire escape system, fire proximity suits, self-contained breathing apparatus and emergency cutting tools. In addition, written procedures for tests, emergencies, rescue and backout, as well as certification of personnel and TV monitoring of the launch system are detailed.-

Bolger, P. H.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRS2016

Safety Characteristics in System Application of Software for Human Rated Exploration Missions for the 8th IAASS Conference

NASA and its industry and international partners are embarking on a bold and inspiring development effort to design and build an exploration class space system. The space system is made up of the Orion system, the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) system. All are highly coupled together and dependent on each other for the combined safety of the space system. A key area of system safety focus needs to be in the ground and flight application software system (GFAS). In the development, certification and operations of GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics that define the approach to ensure mission success. This paper will explore and examine the safety characteristics of the GFAS development. The GFAS system integrates the flight software packages of the Orion and SLS with the ground systems and launch countdown sequencers through the 'agile' software development process. A unique approach is needed to develop the GFAS project capabilities within this agile process. NASA has defined the software development process through a set of standards. The standards were written during the infancy of the so-called industry 'agile development' movement and must be tailored to adapt to the highly integrated environment of human exploration systems. Safety of the space systems and the eventual crew on board is paramount during the preparation of the exploration flight systems. A series of software safety characteristics have been incorporated into the development and certification efforts to ensure readiness for use and compatibility with the space systems. Three underlining factors in the exploration architecture require the GFAS system to be unique in its approach to ensure safety for the space systems, both the flight as well as the ground systems. The first are the missions themselves, which are exploration in nature, and go far beyond the comfort of low Earth orbit operations. The second is the current exploration system will launch only one mission per year even less during its developmental phases. Finally, the third is the partnered approach through the use of many different prime contractors, including commercial and international partners, to design and build the exploration systems. These three factors make the challenges to meet the mission preparations and the safety expectations extremely difficult to implement. As NASA leads a team of partners in the exploration beyond earth's influence, it is a safety imperative that the application software used to test, checkout, prepare and launch the exploration systems put safety of the hardware and mission first. Software safety characteristics are built into the design and development process to enable the human rated systems to begin their missions safely and successfully. Exploration missions beyond Earth are inherently risky, however, with solid safety approaches in both hardware and software, the boldness of these missions can be realized for all on the home planet.

capability↗
NASA NTRS1973

Skylab Rescue Space Vehicle OAT No. 1 Plugs in Test

A test is described which demonstrates the compatibility of the Skylab Rescue Space Vehicle systems, the ground support equipment, and off-site support facilities by proceeding through a simulated launch countdown, liftoff, and flight. The functions of propellant loading, umbilical ejection, holddown arm release, service arm retraction, liftoff, and inflight separation are simulated. An external power source supplies transfer power to internal, and instrument unit commands are simulated by the digital command system. The test outline is presented along with a list of references, intercommunications information, radio frequency matrix, and interface control chart.

Jevitt, S. J.↗
NASA NTRS1975

Space tug/shuttle interface compatibility study. Volume 1: Executive summary

Shuttle interfaces required for space tug accommodation are primarily involved with supporting and servicing the tug during launch countdown, flight, and postlanding; deploying and retrieving the tug on orbit; and maintaining control over the tug when it is in or near the orbiter. Each of these interface areas was investigated to determine the best physical and operational method of accomplishing the required functions, with an overriding goal of establishing simple and flexible orbiter interface requirements suitable for tug, tug payloads, IUS and other cargo. It is concluded the orbiter payload accommodations and the MSFC baseline tug are generally interface compatible. Specific minor changes to tug and orbiter interfaces were identified to provide full compatibility. A system concept for supporting and deploying tug from orbiter is described.

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NASA NTRS1981

First reusable spaceship prepared for second mission

The inspection, repair, and modification of the space shuttle Columbia prior vehicle assembly and roll out for the second space transportation system flight are described. The schedule for launch countdown and a preliminary sketch of plans for the second flight are presented.

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