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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Towards Malware Detection via CPU Power Consumption: Data Collection Design and Analytics

This paper presents an experimental design and data analytics approach aimed at power-based malware detection on general-purpose computers. Leveraging the fact that malware executions must consume power, we explore the postulate that malware can be accurately detected via power data analytics. Our experimental design and implementation allow for programmatic collection of CPU power profiles for fixed tasks during uninfected and infected states using five different rootkits. To characterize the power consumption profiles, we use both simple statistical and novel, sophisticated features. We test a one-class anomaly detection ensemble (that baselines non-infected power profiles) and several kernel-based SVM classifiers (that train on both uninfected and infected profiles) in detecting previously unseen malware and clean profiles. The anomaly detection system exhibits perfect detection when using all features and tasks, with smaller false detection rate than the supervised classifiers. The primary contribution is the proof of concept that baselining power of fixed tasks can provide accurate detection of rootkits. Moreover, our treatment presents engineering hurdles needed for experimentation and allows analysis of each statistical feature individually. This work appears to be the first step towards a viable power-based detection capability for general-purpose computers, and presents next steps toward this goal.

Bridges, Robert↗
DOE OSTI2016

Sandbox for Mac Malware v 1.0

This software is an analyzer for automated sandbox analysis of malware on the OS X operating system. It runs inside an OS X virtual machine to collect data about what happens when a given file is opened or run. As of August 2014, there was no sandbox software for Mac OS X malware, as it requires different methods from those used on the Windows OS (which most sandboxes are written for). This software adds OS X analysis capabilities to an existing open-source sandbox, Cuckoo Sandbox (http://cuckoosandbox.org/), which previously only worked for Windows. The analyzer itself can take many different types of files as input: the traditional Mach-O and FAT executables, .app files, zip files, Python scripts, Java archives, and web pages, as well as PDFs and other documents. While the file is running, the analyzer also simulates rudimentary human interaction with clicks and mouse movements in order to bypass the tests some malware use to see if they are being analyzed. The analyzer outputs several different kinds of data: function call traces, network captures, screenshots, and all created and modified files. This work also includes a static analysis Cuckoo module for Mach-O binary files. It extracts file structures, code library imports and exports, and signatures. This data can be used along with the analyzer results to create signatures for malware.

Walkup, Elizabeth↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Dynamic Hierarchical Attention Framework for Multimodal Malware Detection

The increasing use of Android in the worldwide mobile ecosystem has come along with a significant increase in advanced malware, highlighting the critical necessity for efficient, scalable, and adaptable detection systems. Despite recent advancements in machine learning improving malware detection, the majority of current solutions are limited to one, two, or three data modalities, hence neglecting the comprehensive behavioral spectrum of contemporary multi-vector threats. This thesis presents the first comprehensive multimodal framework for Android malware detection, which combines textual, time-series (temporal), graph-based (structural), and visual information using an innovative hierarchical attention mechanism and Dynamic Fusion Controller (DFC). Our methodology consistently classifies and processes modalities as either sequential or structural, facilitating content-adaptive weighting and resilient cross-modal representation learning. We advance the implementation of cutting-edge time series techniques, such as MiniRocket, for malware detection, hence creating new opportunities for temporal analysis in cybersecurity. Comprehensive experimental assessment shows that our framework performs exceptionally well, with 99.46% classification accuracy and 97.15% detection accuracy, significantly outperforming existing approaches through effective multimodal integration and hierarchical attention mechanisms.

Nazmin, Tamanna↗
DOE OSTI2017

Order priors for Bayesian network discovery with an application to malware phylogeny

Here, Bayesian networks have been used extensively to model and discover dependency relationships among sets of random variables. We learn Bayesian network structure with a combination of human knowledge about the partial ordering of variables and statistical inference of conditional dependencies from observed data. Our approach leverages complementary information from human knowledge and inference from observed data to produce networks that reflect human beliefs about the system as well as to fit the observed data. Applying prior beliefs about partial orderings of variables is an approach distinctly different from existing methods that incorporate prior beliefs about direct dependencies (or edges) in a Bayesian network. We provide an efficient implementation of the partial-order prior in a Bayesian structure discovery learning algorithm, as well as an edge prior, showing that both priors meet the local modularity requirement necessary for an efficient Bayesian discovery algorithm. In benchmark studies, the partial-order prior improves the accuracy of Bayesian network structure learning as well as the edge prior, even though order priors are more general. Our primary motivation is in characterizing the evolution of families of malware to aid cyber security analysts. For the problem of malware phylogeny discovery, we find that our algorithm, compared to existing malware phylogeny algorithms, more accurately discovers true dependencies that are missed by other algorithms.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Living-off-the-land Techniques Unlikely to Supplant Energy Sector-Focused OT-Specific Malware

Despite increased reports of energy sector-focused threat actors using living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques, it is unlikely LOTL techniques will wholly supplant malware in energy sector operational technology (OT)-focused cyber operations. Threat actors leverage LOTL techniques to access energy sector networks, abstracting process information and maintaining persistence. Although threat actors using LOTL techniques have successfully interrupted energy sector industrial control environments, designed features of OT-specific malware likely increase the cyber-physical impact of an attack and delay recovery of critical functions and services. Malicious actors will very likely continue to use LOTL techniques for stealth, while designing malware to bolster final impacts on cyber-physical systems in energy sector OT environments.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

AI ATAC 1: An Evaluation of Prominent Commercial Malware Detectors

This work presents an evaluation of six prominent commercial endpoint malware detectors, a network malware detector, and a file-conviction algorithm from a cyber technology vendor. The evaluation was administered as the first of the Artificial I ntelligence Applications t o Autonomous Cybersecurity (AI ATAC) prize challenges, funded by / completed in service of the US Navy. The experiment employed 100K files (50/50% benign/malicious) with a stratified distribution of file types, including ~1K zero-day program executables (increasing experiment size two orders of magnitude over previous work). We present an evaluation process of delivering a file to a fresh virtual machine donning the detection technology, waiting 90s to allow static detection, then executing the file and waiting another period for dynamic detection; this allows greater fidelity in the observational data than previous experiments, in particular, resource and time-to-detection statistics. To execute all 800K trials (100K files × 8 tools), a software framework is designed to choreograph the experiment into an automated, time-synced, and reproducible workflow with substantial parallelization. Software with base classes for this framework are provided. A cost-benefit model was configured to integrate the tools’ detection statistics into a comparable quantity by simulating costs of use. This provides a ranking methodology for cyber competitions and a lens for reasoning about the varied statistical results. The results provide insights on state of commercial malware detection.

Bridges, Robert↗
DOE OSTI2022

Heartbeat: Detecting Malware by Periodic Power Signal Injection and Monitoring

Rootkits and other stealthy malware attempt to conceal their presence on a computer by making changes to the host computer’s operating environment. ORNL’s Heartbeat technology detects these changes, and thus the malware itself. Heartbeat operates by directly monitoring the DC power consumption of the computer while a set of operations, the “heartbeat,” is executed periodically. These operations exercise parts of the operating system that are common targets of malware tampering. The power consumption during these heartbeat events is monitored and then compared to a previously learned baseline, with any significant deviation detected and analyzed. This technology has been tested and validated in a laboratory environment, and ORNL is currently seeking a deployment partner to allow for further in-context development and testing of this technology.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2015

Statistical fingerprinting for malware detection and classification

A system detects malware in a computing architecture with an unknown pedigree. The system includes a first computing device having a known pedigree and operating free of malware. The first computing device executes a series of instrumented functions that, when executed, provide a statistical baseline that is representative of the time it takes the software application to run on a computing device having a known pedigree. A second computing device executes a second series of instrumented functions that, when executed, provides an actual time that is representative of the time the known software application runs on the second computing device. The system detects malware when there is a difference in execution times between the first and the second computing devices.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Heartbeat Malware Detection

Legacy signature or heuristics-based solutions for malware infections and cyber-attacks are unable to keep up with the flood of new polymorphic malware samples, or to address the powerful and stealthy tactics of kernel-level rootkits. Heartbeat responds to this problem by focusing instead on the physical behavior of the device being protected, under the hypothesis that malware infection will produce a measurable change in the power consumption state of a device that can be picked up by an outside detector.

Dawson, Joel A↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adversarial Binaries: AI-guided Instrumentation Methods for Malware Detection Evasion

Adversarial binaries are executable files that have been altered without loss of function by an AI agent in order to deceive malware detection systems. Progress in this emergent vein of research has been constrained by the complex and rigid structure of executable files. Although prior work has demonstrated that these binaries deceive a variety of malware classification models which rely on disparate feature sets, a consensus as to the best approach has not been reached, either in terms of the optimization algorithms or the instrumentation methods. Furthermore, although inconsistencies in the data sets, target classifiers, and functionality verification methods make head-to-head comparisons difficult, here we extract lessons learned and make recommendations for future research.

malware obfuscation↗
DOE OSTI2024

Integrating PCTRAN with AI-Driven Host-Intrusion Detection and Secured Container Systems for Advanced Malware Analysis (Summer Internship Report)

This study presents a solution for enhancing the security of the Personal Computer Transient Analyzer (PCTRAN) PC-based Nuclear Power Plant Simulator by integrating the software with an artificial intelligence (AI)-driven host-intrusion detection system (HIDS), in addition to a secured container system, for malware analysis. PCTRAN is a Windows XP-based software package that has the ability to simulate a variety of accident and transient conditions for nuclear power plants (NPPs). It offers a high-resolution replica of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and displays the status of important parameters allowing for operator interaction. By including AI-driven HIDS for the NSSS, the framework can identify security threats in real-time, ensuring the integrity of the nuclear simulation environment. Additionally, the secured container system offers the ability to isolate and analyze malware, preventing potential threats from affecting core systems. The integration process involves extensive testing and validation in order to ensure accuracy, reliability, and compliance with security policies. This framework sets a new precedent for secure simulation and training in NPP operations, and offers insight for future advancements in cybersecurity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Towards Architecture and OS-Independent Malware Detection via Memory Forensics

In this work, we take a fundamentally different approach to the problem of analyzing a device for compromises via malware; our approach is OS and instruction architecture independent and relies only on having the raw binary data extracted from the memory dump of a device. Our system leverages a multi-hundred TB dataset of both compromised host memory dumps extracted from the MalRec dataset [8] and the first known dataset of benign host memory dumps running normal, non-compromised software. After an average of 30 to 45 seconds of pre-processing on a single memory dump, our system leverages both traditional machine learning and deep learning algorithms to achieve an average of 98% accuracy of detecting a compromised host.

Petrik, Rachel L.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Exploit, Malware And Vulnerability Scoring Application

Exploit, Malware and Vulnerability (EMV) is a way for users to create and use their own scoring schema against various configurations they might be scoring cyber issues against. This application was created to take the EMV process and develop a GUI to accomplish this task. EMV application is customizable and configurable, interfaces with STIX objects and allows exporting scored objects.

Priest, ZacharyM↗
DOE OSTI2016

Research Topics in Malware

We'll learn about the obstacles to fast and effective malware analysis and the current efforts by the community to overcome obstacles.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

2019 CyberFire West: Malware Analysis Day 2 - Part 2

Summary: Stage 1 – IT: Attacker relied on common attack methods rather than zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits. Used native system tools and custom tools to move files, capture credentials, mapping the network. Stage 2 – ICS (OT): Persistence on the IT network allowed further mapping of resources and equipment, which allowed custom malware to target specific systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Malware detection and analysis

Embodiments of the invention describe systems and methods for malicious software detection and analysis. A binary executable comprising obfuscated malware on a host device may be received, and incident data indicating a time when the binary executable was received and identifying processes operating on the host device may be recorded. The binary executable is analyzed via a scalable plurality of execution environments, including one or more non-virtual execution environments and one or more virtual execution environments, to generate runtime data and deobfuscation data attributable to the binary executable. At least some of the runtime data and deobfuscation data attributable to the binary executable is stored in a shared database, while at least some of the incident data is stored in a private, non-shared database.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗