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Hypervelocity Impact Performance of Open Cell Foam Core Sandwich Panel Structures

Metallic foams are a relatively new class of materials with low density and novel physical, mechanical, thermal, electrical and acoustic properties. Although incompletely characterized, they offer comparable mechanical performance to traditional spacecraft structural materials (i.e. honeycomb sandwich panels) without detrimental through-thickness channeling cells. There are two competing types of metallic foams: open cell and closed cell. Open cell foams are considered the more promising technology due to their lower weight and higher degree of homogeneity. Leading micrometeoroid and orbital debris shields (MMOD) incorporate thin plates separated by a void space (i.e. Whipple shield). Inclusion of intermediate fabric layers, or multiple bumper plates have led to significant performance enhancements, yet these shields require additional non-ballistic mass for installation (fasteners, supports, etc.) that can consume up to 35% of the total shield weight [1]. Structural panels, such as open cell foam core sandwich panels, that are also capable of providing sufficient MMOD protection, represent a significant potential for increased efficiency in hypervelocity impact shielding from a systems perspective through a reduction in required non-ballistic mass. In this paper, the results of an extensive impact test program on aluminum foam core sandwich panels are reported. The effect of pore density, and core thickness on shielding performance have been evaluated over impact velocities ranging from 2.2 - 9.3 km/s at various angles. A number of additional tests on alternate sandwich panel configurations of comparable-weight have also been performed, including aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels (see Figure 1), Nomex honeycomb core sandwich panels, and 3D aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels. A total of 70 hypervelocity impact tests are reported, from which an empirical ballistic limit equation (BLE) has been derived. The BLE is in the standard form suitable for implementation in risk analysis software, and includes the effect of panel thickness, core density, and facesheet material properties. A comparison between the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panel structures and common MMOD shielding configurations is made for both conservative (additional 35% non-ballistic mass) and optimistic (additional mass equal to 30% of bumper mass) considerations. Suggestions to improve the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panels are made, including the use of outer mesh layers, intermediate fabric/composite layers, and varying pore density.

Ryan, Shannon↗

Preliminary Experimental Investigation of Multi-Shock Shield Performance Against Meteoritic Other Lithic Projectiles

The protection capabilities of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shields are invariably linked to the physical properties of the impactor. Regardless of the shield type, or bumper material employed, the general principles of purposefully designed multi-walled MMOD protection relies on the ability to disrupt, shock, melt, and/or vaporize the projectile before it interacts with a critical spacecraft component. Here, we begin to study the influence of projectile heterogeneity on the performance of multi-shock shields by conducting hypervelocity impact tests using meteorite and a variety of other rock-like (i.e., lithic) materials. Testing was conducted using a .17 caliber two-stage light-gas gun, launching cylindrical lithic projectiles between 5.66 and 7.06 km/s. Shield layups included three layers of Nextel and one layer of graphite composite as a rear wall, with each layer having a 35 mm standoff. After testing a comparison of rear wall and witness plate damage was made to separate tests conducted using spherical Al projectiles of similar mass. It was observed that the more heterogenous meteorite projectile gave rise to notably more damage to the witness plate than an Al projectile of equivalent mass, while the other, more homogeneous lithic projectiles, did not.

meteorite↗

Determine ISS Soyuz Orbital Module Ballistic Limits for Steel Projectiles Hypervelocity Impact Testing

A new orbital debris environment model (ORDEM 3.0) defines the density distribution of the debris environment in terms of the fraction of debris that are low-density (plastic), medium-density (aluminum) or high-density (steel) particles. This hypervelocity impact (HVI) program focused on assessing ballistic limits (BLs) for steel projectiles impacting the enhanced Soyuz Orbital Module (OM) micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shield configuration. The ballistic limit was defined as the projectile size on the threshold of failure of the OM pressure shell as a function of impact speeds and angle. The enhanced OM shield configuration was first introduced with Soyuz 30S (launched in May 2012) to improve the MMOD protection of Soyuz vehicles docked to the International Space Station (ISS). This test program provides HVI data on U.S. materials similar in composition and density to the Russian materials for the enhanced Soyuz OM shield configuration of the vehicle. Data from this test program was used to update ballistic limit equations used in Soyuz OM penetration risk assessments. The objective of this hypervelocity impact test program was to determine the ballistic limit particle size for 440C stainless steel spherical projectiles on the Soyuz OM shielding at several impact conditions (velocity and angle combinations). This test report was prepared by NASA-JSC/ HVIT, upon completion of tests.

Lyons, Frankel↗

Hypervelocity Impact Study for Migration from Kevlar® KM2® 705 to KM2® Plus 775: Material Property Measurement and Evaluation as a Ballistic Enhancement in Whipple Shields

Dupont™, the manufacturer of Kevlar®, has begun migrating from KM2® to KM2® Plus for ballistic textiles. Kevlar® KM2® has become an essential element of numerous meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shield systems primarily as a multi-layer insulation (MLI) enhancement, and as such, the migration has implications for numerous system level risk assessments for future vehicles that will need to use the newer KM2® Plus fiber system. While the chemical makeup of the two fabrics are identical, differences in processing have yielded higher tenacities and toughness for the KM2® Plus system. To address this migration, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group in NASA Exploration Sciences at Johnson Space Center (JSC) has worked with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and the MPCV European Service Module (MPCV-ESM) group of the European Space Agency (ESA) with its contractors Airbus and Thales Alenia Space-Italy (TAS-I) to study how KM2® Plus in the woven form of 850 denier 775 compares with KM2® in the woven form of 850 denier 705. The two forms of Kevlar® fabrics have been compared by direct-impact with a known mass and as the rear wall in Whipple shields using the two-stage, light-gas-gun at the Remote Hypervelocity Test Laboratory (RHTL) of NASA JSC White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). From these examinations, it has been found that KM2® Plus does in fact improve the ballistic performance as a ballistic enhancement of MLI with an estimated improvement of 9.5±6.1% between the two fabrics, and on a mass basis, the estimated mass of KM2® Plus 775 is 3.6±0.7% lighter than KM2 705, which means the mass performance improvement is even higher.

Joshua E Miller↗

BUMPER: A Tool for Analyzing Spacecraft Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

“Bumper” is a computer program for analyzing spacecraft micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk. Bumper was developed in the late-1980s and has been continuously maintained and used since. The user base has grown from a few government entities now include numerous commercial entities as well. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group is responsible for all aspects of the Bumper software. Bumper has been used to characterize MMOD risk on many spacecraft. All of the International Space Station (ISS) modules, visiting vehicles and numerous external components and systems have been analyzed. Bumper was used to analyze the Space Shuttle, Orion, and many space probes, telescopes and satellites. Bumper is also being used to analyze future spacecraft such as the Deep Space Gateway (DSG) and Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions. The Bumper Configuration Control Board (CCB) ensures that all changes to the code are approved, reviewed, and documented. The current Bumper version – “Bumper 3” – is a Fortran executable that utilizes a 64-bit architecture. Bumper has numerous features that make it a powerful tool for analyzing spacecraft MMOD risk. Bumper uses the latest orbital debris and meteoroidenvironment models. Bumper also has a large library of ballistic limit “damage” equations available that can be used for a wide variety of MMOD shielding configurations. Bumper can also handle large spacecraft finite elementmodels (FEMs) and conducts checks of the model. This paper introduces Bumper and the MMOD risk analysis process using a simplified cube-shaped spacecraft model

hypervelocity↗

Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA's Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs

Over the past 50 years, various NASA communities have contributed significantly to maturing NASA s meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD)1 programs to their current state. As a result of these community efforts, and to NASA s credit, NASA s MMOD programs and models are now widely used and respected by the providers and users of both government and commercial satellites, nationally as well as internationally. Satellites have been redesigned to protect critical components from MMOD damage by moving critical components from exterior surfaces to deep inside a satellite s structure. Orbits are monitored and altered to minimize the risk of collision with tracked orbital debris. MMOD shielding added to the International Space Station (ISS) protects critical components and astronauts from potentially catastrophic damage that might result from smaller, untracked debris and meteoroid impacts. The space shuttle, as it orbited Earth, and whether docked to the ISS or not, was optimally oriented to protect its fragile thermal protection and thermal radiation systems from MMOD damage. In addition, astronauts inspected its thermal protection system for MMOD damage before the shuttle reentered Earth s atmosphere; Orion, NASA s capsule to carry astronauts to low Earth orbit, includes designs to mitigate the threat of MMOD damage and provide increased safety to the crew. When a handful of reasonable assumptions are used in NASA s MMOD models, scenarios are uncovered that conclude that the current orbital debris environment has already reached a "tipping point." That is, the amount of debris - in terms of the population of large debris objects, as well as overall mass of debris in orbit - currently in orbit has reached a threshold where it will continually collide with itself, further increasing the population of orbital debris. This increase will lead to corresponding increases in spacecraft failures, which will only create more feedback into the system, increasing the debris population growth rate. The increase thus far has been most rapid in low Earth orbit (LEO), with geosynchronous Earth orbits (GEOs) potentially suffering the same fate, but over a much longer time period. The exact timing and pace of this exponential growth are uncertain, but the serious implications of such a scenario require careful attention because of the strategic importance of U.S. space operations. The Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget contracted with the National Research Council for a study to perform three tasks: review NASA s MMOD programs and efforts, recommend in which of those NASA should increase or decrease its effort or change focus, and determine whether NASA should pursue work in any new MMOD areas. The official letter requesting the study and the full statement of task for the Committee for the Assessment of NASA s Orbital Debris Programs are in Appendixes A and B, respectively.

Source record↗

Bumper: A Tool for Analyzing Spacecraft Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

“Bumper” is NASA’s computer program for analyzing spacecraft micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk. Bumper was developed in the late-1980s and has been continuously used and maintained since. The user base has grown from a few government entities to now include numerous commercial entities as well. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team is responsible for all aspects of the Bumper software. Bumper has been used to characterize MMOD risk on hundreds of spacecraft. All of the International Space Station (ISS) modules, visiting vehicles and numerous external components and systems have been analyzed. Bumper was used to analyze each of the Space Shuttle missions since STS-50. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) MMOD shielding is being developed using Bumper as well. Bumper has also been used on numerous telescopes (Hubble, James Webb, and Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescopes), scientific probes (Stardust, New Horizons, Parker Solar Probe), and Earth observation satellites (Landsat, Joint Polar Satellite System). Bumper is also being used to analyze the micrometeoroid risk and support design of the Deep Space Gateway (DSG) and Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions. The HVIT Bumper Configuration Control Board (CCB) ensures that all changes to the code are approved, reviewed, and documented. Most of the changes are made to add new MMOD damage “ballistic limit equations” (BLEs). BLEs are typically added in response to completion of a hypervelocity impact (HVI) test series and development of an associated BLE. Other less frequent changes include updates of the debris or meteoroid environment models, feature enhancements, and feature retirement. Some BLEs are commercially sensitive and/or proprietary, so the CCB also manages code user-version control and software distribution. The current version – “Bumper 3” – is a FORTRAN executable that utilizes a 64-bit architecture. Bumper 3 has numerous features that make it a powerful tool for analyzing spacecraft MMOD risk. Bumper uses the latest orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment models. Bumper also easily processes large spacecraft geometry models, recognizes hidden surfaces, permits BLE assignment by name or number, and conducts quality checks of the spacecraft geometry model. Bumper 3 can also be used to estimate the effects of particle penetration through thin, high-standoff distance hardware components such as solar arrays and radiators. This is done using a special HVIT-developed technique know as the “3-Part Analysis.” The paper introduces the Bumper 3 MMOD risk analysis code and provides an example MMOD risk assessment showing Bumper’s role in the overall MMOD protection design process.

Lear, Dana M.↗

Analytic Ballistic Performance Model of Whipple Shields

The dual-wall Whipple shield is the shield of choice for lightweight, long-duration flight. The shield uses an initial sacrificial wall to initiate fragmentation and melt an impacting threat that expands over a void before hitting a subsequent shield wall of a critical component. The key parameters to this type of shield are the rear wall and its mass which stops the debris, as well as the minimum pressure generated under threat particle impact of the sacrificial wall and the amount of void that is available for expansion. Ensuring the minimum pressure is sufficiently high to achieve large scale fragmentation/melt of the threat particle enables the expansion of the threat and reduces the momentum flux of the debris on the rear wall. Three key factors in the minimum pressure achieved are the thickness of the sacrificial wall relative to the characteristic dimension of the impacting particle, the density and material cohesion contrast of the sacrificial wall relative to the threat particle and the impact speed. The mass of the rear wall and the sacrificial wall are desirable to minimize for launch costs and dynamic concerns making it important to have an understanding of the effects of density contrast and impact speed. In this paper a fourth key parameter is identified related to fragmentation, which corresponds to the ratio of the size of the projectile relative to the transition from brittle to ductile hole growth in the projectile. Ballistic limit equations have been developed to define the failure limits of a MMOD shield, generally in terms of projectile diameter (or mass), impact velocity, and angle. Within the range of impact velocities relevant for Earth-orbiting spacecraft, three distinct regions of penetration phenomenology have been identified for Whipple shields: center dot Low velocity: the projectile is eroded (and possibly deformed) during its passage through the bumper plate, but is not fragmented. Thus, perforation of the rear wall is by a fragment with a mass and speed equal to or less than the original impactor. center dot Intermediate (shatter) velocity: impact velocities are sufficient to induce projectile fragmentation upon impact with the bumper plate, resulting in a coarse debris cloud with large solid fragments. Increasing velocity within the shatter regime results in increased fragmentation, and eventually melting, of the projectile and bumper fragments, generating a finer and more evenly dispersed debris cloud. Failure of the rear wall is a complicated combination of modes observed at low- and hypervelocity. center dot Hypervelocity: the projectile and holed-out bumper material is completely, or nearly completely, melted and/or vaporized by the initial impact. The resultant debris cloud impacts over a dispersed area of the rear wall, loading it impulsively and inducing failure through rupture or petalling. While each of these regimes are well observed with extensive empirical methods to describe these regions, differences in impactor materials, configurations of shields and questions about the limitations of the attainable impact speeds have left questions that are difficult to answer from completely empirical methods.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA Tech Briefs, September 2013

Topics include: ISS Ammonia Leak Detection Through X-Ray Fluorescence; A System for Measuring the Sway of the Vehicle Assembly Building; Fast, High-Precision Readout Circuit for Detector Arrays; Victim Simulator for Victim Detection Radar; Hydrometeor Size Distribution Measurements by Imaging the Attenuation of a Laser Spot; Quasi-Linear Circuit; High-Speed, High-Resolution Time-to-Digital Conversion; Li-Ion Battery and Supercapacitor Hybrid Design for Long Extravehicular Activities; Ultrasonic Low-Friction Containment Plate for Thermal and Ultrasonic Stir Weld Processes; High-Powered, Ultrasonically Assisted Thermal Stir Welding; Next-Generation MKIII Lightweight HUT/Hatch Assembly; Centrifugal Sieve for Gravity-Level-Independent Size; Segregation of Granular Materials; Ion Exchange Technology Development in Support of the Urine Processor Assembly; Nickel-Graphite Composite Compliant Interface and/or Hot Shoe Material; UltraSail CubeSat Solar Sail Flight Experiment; Mechanism for Deploying a Long, Thin-Film Antenna From a Rover; Counterflow Regolith Heat Exchanger; Acquisition and Retaining Granular Samples via a Rotating Coring Bit; Very-Low-Cost, Rugged Vacuum System; Medicine Delivery Device With Integrated Sterilization and Detection; FRET-Aptamer Assays for Bone Marker Assessment, C-Telopeptide, Creatinine, and Vitamin D; Multimode Directional Coupler for Utilization of Harmonic Frequencies from TWTAs; Dual-Polarization, Multi-Frequency Antenna Array for use with Hurricane Imaging Radiometer; Complementary Barrier Infrared Detector (CBIRD) Contact Methods; Autonomous Control of Space Nuclear Reactors; High-Power, High-Speed Electro-Optic Pockels Cell Modulator; Covariance Analysis Tool (G-CAT) for Computing Ascent, Descent, and Landing Errors; Enigma Version 12; Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Shield Ballistic Limit Analysis Program; Spitzer Telemetry Processing System; Planetary Protection Bioburden Analysis Program; Wing Leading Edge RCC Rapid Response Damage Prediction Tool (IMPACT2); ISSM: Ice Sheet System Model; Automated Loads Analysis System (ATLAS); Integrated Main Propulsion System Performance Reconstruction Process/Models. Phoenix Telemetry Processor; Contact Graph Routing Enhancements Developed in ION for DTN; GFEChutes Lo-Fi; Advanced Strategic and Tactical Relay Request Management for the Mars Relay Operations Service; Software for Generating Troposphere Corrections for InSAR Using GPS and Weather Model Data; Ionospheric Specifications for SAR Interferometry (ISSI); Implementation of a Wavefront-Sensing Algorithm; Sally Ride EarthKAM - Automated Image Geo-Referencing Using Google Earth Web Plug-In; Trade Space Specification Tool (TSST) for Rapid Mission Architecture (Version 1.2); Acoustic Emission Analysis Applet (AEAA) Software; Memory-Efficient Onboard Rock Segmentation; Advanced Multimission Operations System (ATMO); Robot Sequencing and Visualization Program (RSVP); Automating Hyperspectral Data for Rapid Response in Volcanic Emergencies; Raster-Based Approach to Solar Pressure Modeling; Space Images for NASA JPL Android Version; Kinect Engineering with Learning (KEWL); Spacecraft 3D Augmented Reality Mobile App; MPST Software: grl_pef_check; Real-Time Multimission Event Notification System for Mars Relay; SIM_EXPLORE: Software for Directed Exploration of Complex Systems; Mobile Timekeeping Application Built on Reverse-Engineered JPL Infrastructure; Advanced Query and Data Mining Capabilities for MaROS; Jettison Engineering Trajectory Tool; MPST Software: grl_suppdoc; PredGuid+A: Orion Entry Guidance Modified for Aerocapture; Planning Coverage Campaigns for Mission Design and Analysis: CLASP for DESDynl; and Space Place Prime.

Source record↗

NASA Tech Briefs, June 2014

Topics include: Real-Time Minimization of Tracking Error for Aircraft Systems; Detecting an Extreme Minority Class in Hyperspectral Data Using Machine Learning; KSC Spaceport Weather Data Archive; Visualizing Acquisition, Processing, and Network Statistics Through Database Queries; Simulating Data Flow via Multiple Secure Connections; Systems and Services for Near-Real-Time Web Access to NPP Data; CCSDS Telemetry Decoder VHDL Core; Thermal Response of a High-Power Switch to Short Pulses; Solar Panel and System Design to Reduce Heating and Optimize Corridors for Lower-Risk Planetary Aerobraking; Low-Cost, Very Large Diamond-Turned Metal Mirror; Very-High-Load-Capacity Air Bearing Spindle for Large Diamond Turning Machines; Elevated-Temperature, Highly Emissive Coating for Energy Dissipation of Large Surfaces; Catalyst for Treatment and Control of Post-Combustion Emissions; Thermally Activated Crack Healing Mechanism for Metallic Materials; Subsurface Imaging of Nanocomposites; Self-Healing Glass Sealants for Solid Oxide Fuel Cells and Electrolyzer Cells; Micromachined Thermopile Arrays with Novel Thermo - electric Materials; Low-Cost, High-Performance MMOD Shielding; Head-Mounted Display Latency Measurement Rig; Workspace-Safe Operation of a Force- or Impedance-Controlled Robot; Cryogenic Mixing Pump with No Moving Parts; Seal Design Feature for Redundancy Verification; Dexterous Humanoid Robot; Tethered Vehicle Control and Tracking System; Lunar Organic Waste Reformer; Digital Laser Frequency Stabilization via Cavity Locking Employing Low-Frequency Direct Modulation; Deep UV Discharge Lamps in Capillary Quartz Tubes with Light Output Coupled to an Optical Fiber; Speech Acquisition and Automatic Speech Recognition for Integrated Spacesuit Audio Systems, Version II; Advanced Sensor Technology for Algal Biotechnology; High-Speed Spectral Mapper; "Ascent - Commemorating Shuttle" - A NASA Film and Multimedia Project DVD; High-Pressure, Reduced-Kinetics Mechanism for N-Hexadecane Oxidation; Method of Error Floor Mitigation in Low-Density Parity-Check Codes; X-Ray Flaw Size Parameter for POD Studies; Large Eddy Simulation Composition Equations for Two-Phase Fully Multicomponent Turbulent Flows; Scheduling Targeted and Mapping Observations with State, Resource, and Timing Constraints;

Source record↗

Bumper 3 Update for IADC Protection Manual

The Bumper code has been the standard in use by NASA and contractors to perform meteoroid/debris risk assessments since 1990. It has undergone extensive revisions and updates [NASA JSC HITF website; Christiansen et al., 1992, 1997]. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied BUMPER to risk assessments for Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) space suits, and other spacecraft (e.g., LDEF, Iridium, TDRS, and Hubble Space Telescope). Bumper continues to be updated with changes in the ballistic limit equations describing failure threshold of various spacecraft components, as well as changes in the meteoroid and debris environment models. Significant efforts are expended to validate Bumper and benchmark it to other meteoroid/debris risk assessment codes. Bumper 3 is a refactored version of Bumper II. The structure of the code was extensively modified to improve maintenance, performance and flexibility. The architecture was changed to separate the frequently updated ballistic limit equations from the relatively stable common core functions of the program. These updates allow NASA to produce specific editions of the Bumper 3 that are tailored for specific customer requirements. The core consists of common code necessary to process the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment models, assess shadowing and calculate MMOD risk. The library of target response subroutines includes a board range of different types of MMOD shield ballistic limit equations as well as equations describing damage to various spacecraft subsystems or hardware (thermal protection materials, windows, radiators, solar arrays, cables, etc.). The core and library of ballistic response subroutines are maintained under configuration control. A change in the core will affect all editions of the code, whereas a change in one or more of the response subroutines will affect all editions of the code that contain the particular response subroutines which are modified. Note that the Bumper II program is no longer maintained or distributed by NASA.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment With Bumper 3

The Bumper 3 computer code is the primary tool used by NASA for micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk analysis. Bumper 3 (and its predecessors) have been used to analyze a variety of manned and unmanned spacecraft. The code uses NASA's latest micrometeoroid (MEM-R2) and orbital debris (ORDEM 3.0) environment definition models and is updated frequently with ballistic limit equations that describe the hypervelocity impact performance of spacecraft materials. The Bumper 3 program uses these inputs along with a finite element representation of spacecraft geometry to provide a deterministic calculation of the expected number of failures. The Bumper 3 software is configuration controlled by the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group. This paper will demonstrate MMOD risk assessment techniques with Bumper 3 used by NASA's HVIT Group. The Permanent Multipurpose Module (PMM) was added to the International Space Station in 2011. A Bumper 3 MMOD risk assessment of this module will show techniques used to create the input model and assign the property IDs. The methodology used to optimize the MMOD shielding for minimum mass while still meeting structural penetration requirements will also be demonstrated.

Hyde, J.↗

Simulated Galactic Cosmic Ray and Solar Particle Event Radiation Effects on Inflatable Habitat, Composite Habitat, Space Suit and Space Hatch Cover Materials

The effect of particle radiation representative of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) and solar particle event (SPE) radiation on polymeric materials used in deep space mission environments is largely unknown. For NASA, this uncertainty represents an unquantified mission risk. To better quantify this risk, selected polymeric materials used in inflatable habitats, composite habitats, space suits and space hatch covers are irradiated at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, after which changes in relevant end-use properties are measured. The irradiated materials are lightweight candidates having critical functions such as ripstops, permeation barriers, micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD) shield layers and restraint layers.The effect of several types of particle radiation are evaluated. To evaluate GCR effects, high-energy (1 GeV) protons and iron nucleons are used. To evaluate SPE effects, intermediate energy (ca. 20 to 40 MeV) protons are used. In addition, two mission scenarios are evaluated: a Mars mission cycle (space suit materials) and a worst-case 50 year deep space mission cycle (all materials). Lastly, a common polymer (high density polyethylene (HDPE)) is subjected to accelerated aging and radiation exposure to determine if a combined physical aging/radiation effect exists.The level of radiation induced property change observed in this study after exposure of polymers to kGy levels of intermediate and high energy ions is often significant and is quantitatively comparable to the level of change reported for similar materials exposed to MGy levels of low energy protons, electrons and gamma-radiation. This suggests that intermediate and high energy ions encountered in space may cause more damage than low energy forms of radiation due to displacement and linear energy transfer (LET) effects. For these reasons, it is recommended that final approval for mission use be made by the appropriate NASA material and structural review boards to ensure radiation induced changes in candidate materials do not interfere with their engineering function in the intended mission application. Since the materials tested in this report received doses exceeding actual mission doses, the results are considered conservative as a first approximation. However, caution must be exercised when evaluating radiation effects in the absence of other secondary factors know to contribute to degradation. In the addition to radiation type and energy, the results presented in this study show that molecular composition, orientation, stress and physical aging can also contribute to or influence degradation. Other factors such as polymer formulation, secondary radiation effects, stress, exposure to elevated temperature, thermal cycling and exposure to ozone were not investigated here, but must be considered when performing a comprehensive evaluation of a polymeric materials suitability for service in a space radiation environment. Only when the total sum of these factors operating in concert with radiation are accounted for, can accurate assessments of a material's suitability be made.

Jess M. Waller↗

Inflatable Softgoods Testing Capability Development for Habitation

The Habitation Systems Development Office (HP40) at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center supports systems engineering, integration, and project management for next generation space habitats. The office is responsible for formulation activities for Lunar Surface Habitat and Mars Transit Habitat. HP40 also manages commercial partnerships for exploration habitat development. The Lunar Surface Habitat is intended to initially support a minimum of two crew on the lunar surface for an approximately 30-day mission, with the ability to accommodate four crew for short durations. The Mars Transit Habitat will transport four crew to and from Mars orbit on a potentially 1,200 day mission. Both concepts are envisioned to leverage inflatable softgoods as the primary structural material for the habitation portion of the architecture. Inflatable softgoods are a complex, multi-material system consisting of multiple layers which perform specific functions. A bladder layer (polymer) contains the habitat’s atmosphere. The bladder is indexed to a woven restraint layer, usually Kevlar or Vectran, which serves as the structural layer. The remaining outer layers are for micro-meteoroid orbital debris (MMOD) shielding, protection from atomic Oxygen (if the material system is to be deployed in low earth orbit), and thermal insulation. The primary advantage of inflatable softgoods is that they can offer a larger volume per unit mass relative to a rigid metal structure. Inflatable softgoods have a strong development heritage within NASA, beginning with work in the 1960s in partnership with Goodyear Aerospace and continuing with Johnson Space Center’s TransHab project in the 1990s . Some development efforts subsequently transitioned into the private sector to mature the material technology for flight applications, including human habitation. In August 2022, NASA published its guidelines for certification of crewed inflatable softgoods structures (JSC-67721). This document outlines a series of tests which will be needed to certify inflatable softgoods material systems for use in crewed mission applications. It includes burst testing at the subscale and full-scale to determine the ultimate burst pressure of the softgoods architecture. Creep (long term deformation of the material under stress) is a key failure mode which must be characterized. Creep testing at the component and module levels is also recommended to generate time to failure curves and verify that the inflatable system has a predicted operational life which exceeds mission parameters. ET (Test Engineering) at MSFC and HP40 have worked together to establish softgoods testing capabilities for the center. This includes the ability to conduct module level burst tests and creep tests. The poster will highlight these capabilities and provide examples of testing which has been performed to date by ET. NASA MSFC anticipates that these test capabilities will continue to offer critical support for companies pursuing inflatable softgoods for exploration applications (lunar surface habitation, Mars transit) as well as commercial low earth orbit platforms.

habitation↗

Honeycomb vs. Foam: Evaluating a Potential Upgrade to ISS Module Shielding for Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris

The presence of a honeycomb core in a multi-wall shielding configuration for protection against micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle impacts at hypervelocity is generally considered to be detrimental as the cell walls act to restrict fragment cloud expansion, creating a more concentrated load on the shield rear wall. However, mission requirements often prevent the inclusion of a dedicated MMOD shield, and as such, structural honeycomb sandwich panels are amongst the most prevalent shield types. Open cell metallic foams are a relatively new material with novel mechanical and thermal properties that have shown promising results in preliminary hypervelocity impact shielding evaluations. In this study, an ISS-representative MMOD shielding configuration has been modified to evaluate the potential performance enhancement gained through the substitution of honeycomb for open cell foam. The baseline shielding configuration consists of a double mesh outer layer, two honeycomb sandwich panels, and an aluminum rear wall. In the modified configuration the two honeycomb cores are replaced by open-cell foam. To compensate for the heavier core material, facesheets have been removed from the second sandwich panel in the modified configuration. A total of 19 tests on the double layer honeycomb and double layer foam configurations are reported. For comparable mechanical and thermal performance, the foam modifications were shown to provide a 15% improvement in critical projectile diameter at low velocities (i.e. 3 km/s) and a 3% increase at high velocities (i.e. 7 km/s) for normal impact. With increasing obliquity, the performance enhancement was predicted to increase, up to a 29% improvement at 60 (low velocity). Ballistic limit equations have been developed for the new configuration, and consider the mass of each individual shield component in order to maintain validity in the event of minor configuration modifications. Previously identified weaknesses of open cell foams for hypervelocity impact shielding such as large projectile diameters, low velocities, and high degrees of impact obliquity have all been investigated, and found to be negligible for the double-layer configuration.

Ryan, Shannon↗

Honeycomb vs. Foam: Evaluating Potential Upgrades to ISS Module Shielding

The presence of honeycomb cells in a dual-wall structure is advantageous for mechanical performance and low weight in spacecraft primary structures but detrimental for shielding against impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris particles (MMOD). The presence of honeycomb cell walls acts to restrict the expansion of projectile and bumper fragments, resulting in the impact of a more concentrated (and thus lethal) fragment cloud upon the shield rear wall. The Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM) is a Russian research module scheduled for launch and ISS assembly in 2011 (currently under review). Baseline shielding of the MLM is expected to be predominantly similar to that of the existing Functional Energy Block (FGB), utilizing a baseline triple wall configuration with honeycomb sandwich panels for the dual bumpers and a thick monolithic aluminum pressure wall. The MLM module is to be docked to the nadir port of the Zvezda service module and, as such, is subject to higher debris flux than the FGB module (which is aligned along the ISS flight vector). Without upgrades to inherited shielding, the MLM penetration risk is expected to be significantly higher than that of the FGB module. Open-cell foam represents a promising alternative to honeycomb as a sandwich panel core material in spacecraft primary structures as it provides comparable mechanical performance with a minimal increase in weight while avoiding structural features (i.e. channeling cells) detrimental to MMOD shielding performance. In this study, the effect of replacing honeycomb sandwich panel structures with metallic open-cell foam structures on MMOD shielding performance is assessed for an MLM-representative configuration. A number of hypervelocity impact tests have been performed on both the baseline honeycomb configuration and upgraded foam configuration, and differences in target damage, failure limits, and derived ballistic limit equations are discussed.

Ryan, Shannon J.↗

Inflatable Structures: Test Results and Development Progress Since TransHab

JSC's TransHab project was the first successful development program to prove the viability of inflatable habitats for space applications. Although TransHab was cancelled in 2000, significant progress has been made this past year by JSC engineers. Since February 2005, the following test articles have been manufactured and tested: 1 - An 88-in diameter restraint layer was pressure-tested to failure and reached an ultimate pressure of 197psi. This test article demonstrated the ability to build a 35- foot diameter inflatable with a factor of safety of 4.0 at 10.2 psi. 2 - An 88-in diameter restraint layer with a window frame incorporated into the restraint layer was tested to failure and reached an ultimate pressure of 197 psi. This test article demonstrated the ability to incorporate windows and other structural penetrations in the woven restraint layer without reducing its strength. 3 - An 88-inch diameter folding demonstrator that includes a bladder, restraint layer, and all of the MMOD shell layers was manufactured and assembled. This test article demonstrated an improved and simplified shell assembly and folding technique which installs pre-folded shell sections in a controlled manner. 4 - Fifth-scale MMOD hypervelocity test articles have demonstrated fiberglass as a viable material for a MMOD bumper shield which is cheaper and more readily available than previously used materials. In addition, four different full-scale advanced shape inflatable mockups have been manufactured and evaluated for applications such as lunar habitats, airlocks, and transfer tunnels.

Johnson, Chris↗

Design Optimisation and Mass Saving of the Structure of the Orion-MPCV European Service Module

This paper presents an overview of the design optimisation measures that have been proposed and analysed in order to reduce the mass of the structure, including the MMOD (Micro-Meteoroid and Orbital Debris) protection system, of the ESM (European Service Module) for the “Orion” MPCV (Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle). Under an agreement between NASA and ESA, the NASA Orion MPCV for human space exploration missions will be powered by a European Service Module, based on the design and experience of the ATV (Automated Transfer Vehicle). The development and qualification of the European Service Module is managed and implemented by ESA. The ESM prime contractor and system design responsible is Airbus Defence and Space. Thales Alenia Space Italia is responsible for the design and integration of the ESM Structure and MMOD protection system in addition to the Thermal Control System and the Consumable Storage System. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle is a pressurized, crewed spacecraft that transports up to four crew members from the Earth’s surface to a nearby destination or staging point. Orion then brings the crew members safely back to the Earth’s surface at the end of the mission. Orion provides all services necessary to support the crew members while on-board for short duration missions (up to 21 days) or until they are transferred to another orbiting habitat. The ESM supports the crew module from launch through separation prior to re-entry by providing: in-space propulsion capability for orbital transfer, attitude control, and high altitude ascent aborts; water and oxygen/nitrogen needed for a habitable environment; and electrical power generation. In addition, it maintains the temperature of the vehicle's systems and components and offers space for unpressurized cargo and scientific payloads. The ESM has been designed for the first 2 Lunar orbit missions, EM-1 (Exploration mission 1) is an un-crewed flight planned around mid-2020, and EM-2, the first crewed flight, is planned in 2022. At the time where the first ESM is about to be weighted, the predicted mass lies slightly above the initial requirement. For future builds, mass reduction of the Service Module has been considered necessary. This is being investigated, together with other design improvements, in order to consolidate the ESM design and increase possible future missions beyond the first two Orion MPCV missions. The mass saving study has introduced new optimised structural concepts, optimisation of the MMOD protection shields, and optimised redesign of parts for manufacturing through AM (Additive Manufacturing).

Micro-Meteroids and Orbital Debris Protection Syst↗