Neutron Detection Counting and Measurement for Emergency Response
Presentation to be presented during the NNSA Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program (MSIPP) Nuclear Security Science and Technology Consortium (NSSTC) seminar series.
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Presentation to be presented during the NNSA Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program (MSIPP) Nuclear Security Science and Technology Consortium (NSSTC) seminar series.
Precise soil water content (SWC) measurement is crucial for effective water resource management. This study utilizes the Cosmic-Ray Neutron Sensor (CRNS) for area-averaged SWC measurements, emphasizing the need to consider all hydrogen sources, including time-variable plant biomass and water content. Near Mead, Nebraska, three field sites (CSP1, CSP2, and CSP3) growing a maize–soybean rotation were monitored for 5 (CSP1 and CSP2) and 13 (CSP3) years. Data collection included destructive biomass water equivalent (BWE) biweekly sampling, epithermal neutron counts, atmospheric meteorological variables, and point-scale SWC from a sparse time domain reflectometry (TDR) network (four locations and five depths). In 2023, dense gravimetric SWC surveys were collected eight (CSP1 and CSP2) and nine (CSP3) times over the growing season (April to October). The N0 parameter exhibited a linear relationship with BWE, suggesting that a straightforward vegetation correction factor may be suitable (fb). Results from the 2023 gravimetric surveys and long-term TDR data indicated a neutron count rate reduction of about 1% for every 1 kg m−2 (or mm of water) increase in BWE. This reduction factor aligns with existing shorter-term row crop studies but nearly doubles the value previously reported for forests. This long-term study contributes insights into the vegetation correction factor for CRNS, helping resolve a long-standing issue within the CRNS community.
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Rocky Flats are hemisphere shells of bare HEU. Planet is a vertical lift assembly at the DAF. MUSiC is a set of experiments using the Rocky Flats hemisphere shells and the Planet lift assembly.
A traditional safeguards neutron coincidence counting system, the Neutron Coincidence Collar, has been modified to incorporate individual preamplifiers on each of its 18 3He tubes in active interrogation mode. When used with list mode data acquisition (LMDA) and analysis, a signal from each 3He tube can be recorded and analyzed to allow a spatial response measurement to be performed on an item based on count rate and 3He tube location within the system. The ultimate goal of this project is to demonstrate the capabilities of a list mode response matrix for the nondestructive assay of fresh nuclear fuel assemblies. To enable partial defect detection of fuel pin locations and absences within an assembly, the project aims to extend well-established correlated neutron analysis techniques on a preexisting Neutron Coincidence Collar by extracting a greater number of useful signatures from the system than are currently generated. LMDA, combined with the addition of multiple preamplifiers, facilitates this capability by increasing the number of simultaneous signals that can be measured; this allows an in-depth analysis of neutron coincidence events to determine a fissioning item’s location based on the measured doubles count rate in various channel logic coincidence combinations. All of this can be done from a single measurement pulse train in offline analysis, which is the major benefit provided by LMDA. Through various stages of development and testing, a Mirion Technologies model JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar has been successfully retrofit with modern electronics designed in-house at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, matching preexisting JAB-01 electronics performance, while maintaining the original system footprint. This paper presents these various stages of development and experimental evaluation of the proof of concept system.
This report was prepared for the Safeguards Program of the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D). The report presents the development of the neutron nondestructive assay system, the List Mode Collar (LMCL) for the project OR16-List Mode for Collar-PD1La “List Mode Response Matrix for Advanced Correlated Neutron Analysis for Nuclear Safeguards.” The new list mode electronics developed under this project, and a spatial analysis concept called the List Mode Response Matrix are also described in this report. Analysis algorithms based on classification methods are published in a separate report. This research addresses the need to expand the capabilities of current nondestructive assay systems used for nuclear safeguards applications and considers the sustainability of safeguards technologies by the development of a “retrofit” concept using electronics based on modern standards. Furthermore, employing list mode data acquisition enabled the development of a spatial analysis concept and empirical measurement of a spatial response not previously used for safeguards neutron counting applications or measured in a traditional neutron collar detector and, therefore, provides new capability.
Advancing neutron detection and analysis techniques for complex radiation environments is an ongoing focus in nuclear instrumentation and monitoring. This proposal presents research and development of a generalized real-time neutron monitoring and analysis system, applicable to any detector capable of producing time-tagged neutron count data. While the work is demonstrated using the Neutron Multiplication Analysis Detector (NoMAD), a modular 15-tube helium-3 (He-3) array, due to its availability, spatial resolution, and flexible deployment, the methods developed are extensible to other systems, including organic scintillators and fast digital detectors. This research investigates two complementary analytical techniques for real-time characterization of neutron emitting sources: neutron multiplicity estimation based on the Hage-Cifarelli formalism and spatial localization using supervised machine learning applied to spatial count rate patterns. These methods are designed to operate under dynamic, evolving conditions such as fuel debris retrieval or reactor startup, where neutron-emitting material geometries may be partially unknown or changing over time. By integrating statistical neutron emission data with spatial localization, this research aims to develop and evaluate methods for real time neutron monitoring, source characterization, and material verification. Key contributions include implementation of a low-latency data pipeline for continuous neutron multiplicity analysis, development and validation of machine learning models for spatial inference, and experimental evaluation of system performance under variable measurement conditions. The outcomes are intended to support applications in nuclear safeguards, verification, emergency response, and reactor startup.
This report documents the analysis of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) measurements for 23 boiling water reactor spent fuel assemblies that were performed in Finland under Action Sheet 65, which is an international collaboration on spent fuel safeguards verification methods in the context of the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation/repository system. PNAR measures the passive neutron and gamma emission rates from each of the spent fuel assemblies like a Fork detector, and it also measures the PNAR ratio, which is expected to correlate with the net neutron multiplication of the measured fuel assembly. The analysis was performed with the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation and Depletion (ORIGEN) Data Analysis Module, which was originally developed for predicting Fork detector spent fuel measurement signals in real time and has been integrated into the Integrated Review and Analysis Package developed by Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The module includes the ORIGEN burnup analysis code and integrates detector response functions pregenerated using the MCNP Monte Carlo transport code to predict the detector signals in several seconds per assembly. In this study, new response functions specific to the analyzed PNAR measurements were generated for the ORIGEN Module. The study also analyzes the impact of using detailed fuel design and operation information vs. standard safeguards information on the results calculated with the ORIGEN Module. Using detailed information reduced the standard deviation of the relative differences between calculated and measured neutron count rates among the 23 assemblies from ~10% to ~4%. The results obtained using standard safeguards information for these PNAR measurements were similar to those obtained for the Fork detector. A clear trend was found between the calculated net neutron multiplications and the measured PNAR ratios of the 23 assemblies. An uncertainty assessment of the calculations was also performed to estimate the potential impact of the accuracy and the completeness of declaration information on the calculated results for the count rates and net neutron multiplications. The ORIGEN Module predictions for PNAR signals and net neutron multiplication are expected to directly support the safeguards inspectors’ efforts to verify operator declarations of a spent fuel assembly in real time in safeguards practices.
The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument designed to determine the residual fissile mass in irradiated fuel assemblies for safeguards verification purposes. This is done by actively interrogating an assembly with a neutron source and measuring the total (Singles) and correlated (Doubles) neutron count rates resulting from induced fissions in the irradiated nuclear fuel and relating those rates to the residual fissile mass using calibration curves. Comprehensive NDA measurements of the irradiated fuel inventory at Israeli Research Reactor 1 (IRR-1) were taken with the AEFC to validate a set of previously developed calibration curves. During the campaign, measurements were acquired of 32 standard fuel assemblies and three control assemblies in just nine days. This is a significant majority of the research reactor's irradiated fuel inventory and the largest data set gathered by the AEFC to date. Many of the fuel assemblies measured during the campaign had much shorter cooling times than those assemblies previously measured with the instrument. Calibration curves developed from previous AEFC deployments were used to determine the residual 235 U mass in the measured standard fuel assemblies. The results of the campaign demonstrated that the AEFC can be used to estimate the 235 U mass remaining in a large number of irradiated fuel assemblies with 1%–5% uncertainty in a reasonable amount of time despite operating in a high dose environment.
Interest in safeguards verification measurements using passive thermal neutron counting to assay 235 U content in large 30B UF 6 canisters has grown in recent years. Here, the prohibitively high cost and impracticality of using reference 30B calibration cylinders extensively will likely make accurate simulations of increasing interest. Accuracy of the simulated response will define the confidence in the predicted response and the extent to which simulations can reasonably be relied upon. With 234 U driven 19 F(α, n) reactions being the main neutron source in low enriched UF 6 the uncertainties of the 19 F(α, n) energy spectrum and the thick target yield of 234 U in UF 6 propagate into the uncertainty in the predicted response and represent a major influence of basic nuclear data. Here sensitivity of the simulated total (Singles) and coincidence (Doubles) count rates are assessed for the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter using six potential 19 F(α, n) neutron energy spectra over a range of enrichments and material distributions. The results indicate that variations in the Singles and Doubles due to simulated (α, n) neutron spectrum are less than 1.5% for this set of simulated neutron spectra, with dependence varying inversely with enrichment. Singles uncertainty is only slightly less than that of the thick target 19 F(α, n) yield corresponding to the primary neutron source, whereas the 19 F(α, n) yield dependence of the Doubles is reduced by the non-negligible 238 U(SF) coincident neutron emissions. Based on available thick target 19 F(α, n) yield estimates the uncertainty is on the order of 5%, establishing this as the main nuclear data limitation when simulating thermal neutron detectors response for 30B UF 6 storage cylinders. Based on these findings, it appears that the measurement and evaluation of the thick target 19 F(α, n) yield for uranium hexafluoride is due.
We have developed a Compact Fast Neutron Spectrometer (CFNS) for passive assay of special nuclear material (SNM) through the observation of fast neutrons. The CFNS consists of eight organic glass scintillators (OGS) coupled to silicon photomultipliers and a waveform digitizer, which are integrated within a human-portable box. The CFNS determines the neutron energy profile by spectrum unfolding using the Maximum-Likelihood Expectation Maximization method. The detector acquisition system was optimized to have a dynamic range of up to 10 MeV neutron energy. Bulk special nuclear material (SNM) measurements from the National Criticality Experiments Research Center were analyzed for SNM validation/examination. Additionally, the results show that the CFNS can be used to distinguish between fission and (α, n) neutron emitters, regardless of intervening material type (Cu and polyethylene) and thickness, by taking the ratio of neutron counts at different regions in the unfolded energy spectrum. Additionally, by fitting an exponential curve to the unfolded energy spectrum of PuO 2 and Pu neutron emitters, the CFNS showed the ability of distinguishing between pure Pu oxide, pure Pu metal and mixed oxide-metal configurations.
Neutrinos are among a handful of particles in the Standard Model of particle physics whose properties have not yet been fully measured. Neutrino oscillations, discovered in the late 1990s, still have yet to be fully characterized. Early evidence suggests that neutrinos and antineutrinos may undergo neutrino oscillations differently. So, multiple collaborations are building and operating kTon-scale particle detectors to try to measure this CP violation in the neutrino sector of the Standard Model. Measuring neutrino and antineutrino energies is essential to characterizing oscillation phenomena. But neutrons interfere with (anti)neutrino energy measurements because they are hard to detect in (anti)neutrino detectors. Furthermore, there are very few measurements of neutrons produced by (anti)neutrinos in the energy range of interest to accelerator-based oscillation experiments. The MINERvA collaboration initially tried to fill this gap by measuring the rate of neutron-induced activity i n plastic. The data deviated significantly from leading model predictions, but it could not be determined which models needed to be tuned. MINERvA’s first neutron counting result also cannot be compared to future models because it was not suitable for unsmearing. This thesis first expands upon MINERvA’s first foray into neutron detection at higher antineutrino energy. Neutron detection efficiency is enhanced by advances in analysis algorithms. Then, an unsmeared cross section for producing two or more neutrons is measured. Existing antineutrino interaction models again over-predict the rate of neutron production by antineutrinos. Preliminary neutron production rate measurements in MINERvA’s iron and lead targets suggest that models are also over-predicting neutron production in heavier nuclei.
This paper summarizes the analysis of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) measurements using the ORIGEN data analysis module for 23 boiling water reactor spent fuel assemblies that were performed in Finland under an international collaboration on spent fuel safeguards verification methods. PNAR is part of the proposed integrated nondestructive system to be used for safeguards verifications at the planned Finnish encapsulation facility. Besides measuring passive neutron and gamma emission rates from an assembly like a Fork detector, PNAR also measures the PNAR ratio, which is expected to correlate with the fissile content in the assembly. The emission rates and PNAR ratio can be used to verify the operator declarations and the fissile content of an assembly, respectively. The analysis was performed using the ORIGEN Data Analysis Module, which was originally developed for predicting Fork detector neutron and gamma signals for spent fuel measurements and has been integrated into the Integrated Review and Analysis Package developed by Euratom and the IAEA. The Module includes the ORIGEN burnup analysis code and integrates detector response functions pre-generated using MCNP to predict detector signals in several seconds per assembly. In this study, new response functions specific to PNAR measurements were generated for ORIGEN Module. The study also analyzes impacts of using detailed fuel design and operation information vs. standard safeguards information on results calculated by ORIGEN Module. Using detailed information reduced the standard deviation of relative differences between calculated and measured neutron count rates among the 23 assemblies from ~10% to ~4%. The results obtained using standard safeguards information for these PNAR measurements were similar to those obtained for the Fork detector. A clear trend was found between the calculated net neutron multiplications and the measured PNAR ratios of the 23 assemblies. This paper describes how ORIGEN Module calculates the expected PNAR neutron and gamma signals and PNAR ratio and how they compare with corresponding measured values.
Remote sensing of ionizing radiation has a significant role in waste management, nuclear material management and nonproliferation, and radiation safety. Robotic platforms can surpass the number of tasks that are achieved by humans. With this technique, the operator's radiation exposure can be decreased. Remote sensing allows for the evaluation and monitoring of radiological contamination. Gamma-ray and neutron sensors were integrated onto the robotic platforms. This approach allows for the radiation sensor data to be dynamically tracked and mapped thus enabling further analysis of the radiation flux in temporal and spatial domains. The goal is to complete scheduled tasks while the robot is being irradiated. To achieve this, electronic components must be shielded and radiation hardened. CZT Detector: Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT) detector technology has been a promising solution for gamma-ray and x-ray measurements. Detector data is transferred to the Odroid minicomputer that controls and powers the module via the USB. Robot Operating System (ROS) was utilized for data acquisition and data fusion. The Mariscotti method was employed for the spectrum analysis. A function was programmed in ROS for the automatic identification of photopeaks. CLYC Detector: A Cs{sub 2}LiYCl{sub 6}:Ce{sup 3+} (CLYC) detector was used for simultaneous medium-resolution gamma-ray measurements and neutron counting. A 2.54 cm diameter photomultiplier tube (PMT) was equipped with a high voltage supply and a miniature digitizer. Gamma-ray excitation: fast core-to-valence luminescence (CVL) with 1 ns decay constant, and prompt Ce{sup 3+} emission with 50 ns decay constant. Neutron excitation: slow cerium self-trapped excitation (Ce{sup 3+} STE), 1000 ns decay constant. Radiation Source Localization: Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and gradient-based methods were used to locate the position of a radiation source based on measured radiation intensities. Multi-Particle Transport Code FLUKA: Estimation of radiation damage of the electronic components is important in order to optimize the robot's operational time while it is irradiated. Displacement per atom (DPA) represents the radiation damage in materials exposed to the ionizing radiation. Various shielding layers of different thickness t were analyzed (< 5% statistical error). The model of the controller of the UAS was designed in FLUKA. Conclusion: CZT and CLYC detectors were integrated onto the robotic platforms. Radiation source localization and contour mapping using robotic platforms were studied. Functions for data analysis and fusion were developed in ROS. FLUKA code was utilized to analyze DPA values. Layers of low-density and high-density materials were used to shield the UAS electronics.
Reliable and rapid inspection techniques play a vital role in preventing illicit trafficking of special nuclear materials. Active interrogation systems using neutrons produced by portable, high-flux deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators are being actively developed as a secondary scanning tool for this purpose. In this study, a neutron noise analysis-based approach for detecting unshielded and shielded special nuclear materials by using a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator was evaluated. Here, this approach analyzes the fluctuation of neutron counts. Its performance was quantified with regard to time-to-detection to achieve a minimum probability of detection of 99% and a probability of false alarm of less than 1% considering various amounts of special nuclear materials and different shielding configurations. It was demonstrated that this approach could detect 17 uranium slugs in 5 s given a neutron generator yield of 8.1 × 10 7 n/s. These slugs could be detected within a reasonable time frame (200 s) when they were shielded by 10.16 cm of high-density polyethylene. The results obtained using the neutron noise analysis approach were compared with those obtained using the commonly used differential die-away analysis technique, a sensitive technique for detecting the presence of fissile materials by utilizing the prompt fission neutrons produced when the source neutrons from a neutron generator are completely diminished. For example, the time to detect 2 unshielded uranium slugs was 2.1 s when using the differential die-away analysis technique; it increased to 93 s for the neutron noise analysis approach. Although the noise analysis-based approach exhibits an overall performance which is not as good as that of differential die-away, neutron noise provides an alternative method for effective detection of special nuclear materials.
Neutron multiplicity analysis is used for many applications, including nonproliferation and criticality safety. Multiplicity detectors have advantages over total neutron counting as they provide the ability to assess both multiplication and mass in fissionable material. In addition, multiplicity detectors can generate real-time information, e.g., dose estimation. The ability to evaluate the detector efficiency in each application is of primary importance in producing meaningful analyses. Multiplicity detectors usually house 3 He tubes within a polyethylene moderator. If the tubes are located behind different thickness of polyethylene, they will have different energy responses. This paper assesses 3 He tube efficiency as a function of neutron energy for a specific multiplicity detector.
Development of a scalable flat-panel neutron radiography device is needed to meet the nondestructive testing needs of a growing industrial market. Flood field images from a Cs-137 gamma source and a Cf-252 fission neutron source were generated using a detector composed of a 3-mm-thick sheet of EJ-200, and 3-mm-thick sheet of acrylic light spreader, an 8 $\times$ 8 array of SensL MICROFJ-60035-TSV SiPMs, and an IDEAS ROSSPAD readout module. The readout module can be tiled together with similar systems to create a panel of any size, and is only limited by the number of available Ethernet ports in a switching system. A collimated gamma line image demonstrated a 90% spatial resolution of approximately 0.47 line pairs per centimeter and a 10% spatial resolution of approximately 2.32 line pairs per centimeter. A neutron edge image demonstrated a 90% spatial resolution of approximately 0.70 line pairs per centimeter and a 10% spatial resolution of approximately 3.35 line pairs per centimeter. Both of these images show the ability to generate radiographs with sub-SiPM spatial resolution. Using these readout modules, a large-scale radiographic panel can be developed by tiling ROSSPAD modules together.