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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2023

Information and Best Practices Related to NASA Nuclear Flight Safety for Space Flights Involving Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate a repeatable and robust process that promotes clear and effective interfaces between activities and stakeholders focused on meeting nuclear flight safety requirements for missions utilizing space nuclear systems (SNS), within the context of NASA’s broader nuclear-related activities and interfaces. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, requires that the NASA project manager “incorporate nuclear flight safety considerations starting with program or project formulation through the point at which the SNS or other radioactive material no longer has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere.” NASA’s use of SNS inherently involves partnering with other stakeholders to conduct a range of related activities that interface with nuclear flight safety. From a categorical perspective these include: (i) meeting the authorities and licensing requirements for possession and use of nuclear material, as governed by other Federal authorities; (ii) conducting National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities for nuclear-enabled missions; (iii) meeting Federal nuclear launch authorization requirements; (iv) conducting radiological contingency planning activities, including those associated with international commitments; (v) performing risk communication and public outreach activities; and (vi) ensuring decommissioning and disposal strategies reflect National policies and interests. It is the intent of this handbook to promote an effective interface between nuclear flight safety and these interrelated categorical activities. In addition to activities undertaken with partnering agencies, there are individual nuclear-related activities and programs that have a nexus to nuclear flight safety, and these include: (i) applicable NASA Standing Review Boards; (ii) the US Department of Energy nuclear safety activities conducted in partnership with NASA under Memoranda of Understanding; (iii) the Department of Defense’s Range Safety activities; (iv) NASA’s general involvement in interagency and international dialogues regarding nuclear safety; (v) the NASA-administered Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board; (vi) NASA’s program and project governance activities and nuclear-specific Technical Discipline Team activities under the Office of the Chief Engineer; and others. It is the intent of this handbook to promote effective leveraging of these additional interrelated organizational activities, as appropriate.

Donald Helton↗
NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 7: Literature review. Part 1: Literature search and evaluation

A review of the literature used in conducting the manned space flight nuclear system safety study is presented. The objectives of the presentation are to identify and evaluate for potential application to study the existing related literature and to provide the information required to include the related literature in the NASA Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. More than 15,000 documents were evaluated and identification forms were prepared for 850 reports.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2023

Technical Basis Related to the Posture of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance for the Launch of Radioactive Material Other than Space Nuclear Systems: Volume 1–Overview of Analysis and Results

NASA has launched and reentered payloads containing radioactive material for over 50 years. The isotopes, their quantity, and their form have varied significantly. The handling of this material prior to its integration into the spacecraft at the launch Center (and after its return to Earth after flight, if applicable) falls under the purview of the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, while after the radioactive material is integrated into the spacecraft at the launch Center, it falls under the purview of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance’s (OSMA) Nuclear Flight Safety Program. Historically, OSMA concurrence was required for any launch or reentry involving radioactive material. However, OSMA recently revisited this posture due to changes in the Federal policy in this area, and the significant accrued experience. The current report represents the more quantitative study envisioned in the recent change in posture. More specifically, this document addresses the potential risks and other considerations associated with launching small quantities of radioactive material (below the level requiring the Federally-mandated process in National Security Presidential Memorandum- (NSPM-) 20, “Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems” (USG, 2019) to provide the technical basis for when such activities require OSMA concurrence versus notification, as it relates to nuclear flight safety.

Don Helton↗
NASA NTRS1992

The past as prologue - A look at historical flight qualifications for space nuclear systems

Currently the U.S. is sponsoring production of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) for the Cassini mission to Saturn; the SP-100 space nuclear reactor power system for NASA applications; a thermionic space reactor program for DoD applications as well as early work on nuclear propulsion. In an era of heightened public concern about having successful space ventures it is important that a full understanding be developed of what it means to 'flight qualify' a space nuclear system. As a contribution to the ongoing work this paper reviews several qualification programs, including the general-purpose heat source radioisotope thermoelectric generators (GPHS-RTGs) as developed for the Galileo and Ulysses missions, the SNAP-10A space reactor, the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA), the F-1 chemical engine used on the Saturn-V, and the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs). Similarities and contrasts are noted.

Gary L Bennett↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Radiation Effects Considerations for Instrumentation and Control in Space Nuclear Systems

Radiation effects in electrical, electronic, electro-motive, and electro-optical (EEEE) hardware encompass a complex variety of interactions, processes, environments, and an evolving landscape of relevant hardware. Appropriately mitigating the effects of radiation in sensors, data acquisition, and control hardware is among the most significant challenges associated with deploying space nuclear power and propulsion systems. The expertise within EEEE radiation effects disciplines require working knowledge that is at least as complex and diverse as the problem itself, but that should not dissuade stakeholders and engineers in adjacent disciplines from attempting to understand the general principles associated with the problem at hand. This brief overview seeks to bring to the foreground a set of relevant topics that are of special importance for space nuclear propulsion applications that involve high rates of neutron and gamma radiation. The unique set of environments and design requirements for space nuclear systems mean that the experience and utility for methods applied to typical spaceflight hardware or terrestrial nuclear systems must not be applied naively. Forward consideration on the applicability of testing methods applied to either existing or bespoke hardware is likely to drive early decisions on system-wide radiation effects mitigation strategies, and will influence procurement requirements for providers of radiation tolerant hardware who are unlikely to have experience in this unique set of environments. Radiation hardness assurance (RHA) guidance should be adapted and emphasize the importance of hardware testing in the relevant environment. These must consider the combined effects of temperature, total ionizing dose (TID), non-ionizing/displacement damage (TNID/DD), and single event effects (SEE), and should consider the impacts of flux (rate) in addition to cumulative effects.

Radiation↗
NASA NTRS1975

Nuclear system that burns its own wastes shows promise

A nuclear fission energy system, capable of eliminating a significant amount of its radioactive wastes by burning them, is described. A theoretical investigation of this system conducted by computer analysis, is based on use of gaseous fuel nuclear reactors. Gaseous core reactors using a uranium plasma fuel are studied along with development for space propulsion.

Atchison, K.↗
NASA NTRS2015

The NASA Advanced Exploration Systems Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Project

The fundamental capability of Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) is game changing for space exploration. A first generation NTP system could provide high thrust at a specific impulse (Isp) above 900 s, roughly double that of state of the art chemical engines. Characteristics of fission and NTP indicate that useful first generation systems will provide a foundation for future systems with extremely high performance. The role of a first generation NTP in the development of advanced nuclear propulsion systems could be analogous to the role of the DC-3 in the development of advanced aviation systems.

Houts, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Multimegawatt nuclear power systems for nuclear electric propulsion

Results from systems analysis studies of multimegawatt nuclear power systems are presented for application to nuclear electric propulsion. Specific mass estimates are presented for nearer term SP-100 reactor-based potassium Rankine and Brayton power systems for piloted and cargo missions. Growth SP-100/Rankine systems were found to range from roughly 7 to 10 kg/kWe specific mass depending on full power life requirements. The SP-100/Rankine systems were also found to result in a 4-kg/kWe savings in specific mass over SP-100/Brayton systems. The potential of advanced, higher temperature reactor and power conversion technologies for achieving reduced mass Rankine and Brayton systems was also investigated. A target goal of 5 kg/kWe specific mass was deemed reasonable given either 1400 K potassium Rankine with 1500 K lithium-cooled reactors or 2000 K gas cooled reactors with Brayton conversion.

George, Jeffrey A.↗