SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Operational Risk”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1992

Cost, capability, and risk for planetary operations

The three key factors for flight projects - cost, capability, and risk - are examined with respect to their interplay, the uplink process, cost drivers, and risk factors. Scientific objectives are translated into a computer program during the uplink process, and examples are given relating to the Voyager Interstellar Mission, Galileo, and the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby. The development of a multimission sequence system based on these uplinks is described with reference to specific subsystems such as the pointer and the sequence generator. Operational cost drivers include mission, flight-system, and ground-system complexity, uplink traffic, and work force. Operational risks are listed in terms of the mission operations, the environment, and the mission facilities. The uplink process can be analyzed in terms of software development, and spacecraft operability is shown to be an important factor from the initial stages of spacecraft development.

Mclaughlin, William I.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Innovations in Spacecraft Proximity & Navigation Lighting

New spacecraft bound for the Moon and Mars should be exploring lighting technologies that can reduce safety risks while increasing capability. The operational lighting environment for these new missions will not have the forgiving 90 minute orbit of the International Space Station. Advances in solid state lighting and optics design are yielding new form factors for lamps that have the potential to reduce operational risk for both humans and imaging systems that are impacted by high contrast lighting environments. This project evaluated light source form factors and control innovations for spacecraft exterior proximity and navigation lighting by building a demonstration test rig and testing the effectiveness of the light sources and their controls to increase visibility and usability.

Clark, Toni A.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of Space Mission Integrated Operations Scenarios

Integrated Operations Scenarios (IOS) describe nominal operations planned for a space mission. Operational scenarios are key to an operations concept, as they help identify issues and drivers on the operations system. This paper covers the tools, processes, and inputs that feed into an IOS product, and how IOS iterations during a mission lifecycle can buy down operational risks. A case used for this paper is nominal operations for an initial crewed Artemis mission that includes cross-program sequence of tasks required to accomplish end to end functions from launch through transit, on-orbit operations, to safely return to Earth. An IOS product serves as a reference for discussions during requirements development, task and risk analyses, concept of operations development, and as foundation to prepare space mission flight plans.

integrated operations scenarios↗

NASA NTRS1983

The measurement of operator workload in the Mark IVA DSCC monitor and control subsystem

An operator workload measurement methodology is presented which will be used in support of the Mark IVA operational test and evaluation plan. Three operator workload measures are suggested: operator ratings, primary task work measures, and information processing time measures. A method of validating the workload measures using secondary task work measures is presented. It is expected that operations testing using these measures will assist in establishing the time required to perform essential operational activities and will indicate high risk operations areas due to potential operator overload.

Lemay, M.↗

NASA NTRS2021

Positive Train Control (PTC) Study: An Analysis of PTC-Related Reports Submitted to the Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS)

A supplemental analysis of reports submitted to the voluntary Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS) was conducted to identify the potential operational risks associated with the integration and operation of Positive Train Control (PTC) systems. This study identified four areas that may merit further investigation by FRA and rail carriers: System/Paperwork synchronization, training, PTC acceptance, and alerting mechanisms.

C3RS↗

NASA NTRS2013

Approach and Entry, Descent, and Landing Operations for the Mars Science Laboratory Mission

On August 5th, 2012, at 10:31 PM PDT, the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) rover Curiosity landed safely within Gale Crater. Her successful landing de-pended not only upon the flawless execution of the numerous critical activities during the seven minute entry, descent, and landing (EDL), but also upon the operational preparations and decisions made by the flight team during approach, the final weeks, days, and hours prior to landing. During this period, decisions made by the flight team balanced operational risk to the spacecraft in flight with any resulting risks incurred during EDL as a result of those decisions. This pa-per summarizes the operations plans made in preparation for Approach and EDL and the as flown decisions and actions executed that balanced the operational and EDL risks and prepared the vehicle for a successful landing.

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)↗

NASA NTRS2018

Annex H - SORA & UTM

This is a briefing to provide an overview of the contents of the Annex H of the Specific Operation Risk Assessment (SORA) document. This annex focuses on the application of UTM to SORA methodology.

UTM (Unmanned Aviation Systems)↗

NASA NTRS2008

Career Excess Mortality Risk from Diagnostic Radiological Exams Required for Crewmembers Participating in Long Duration Space Flight

NASA requires astronauts to undergo diagnostic x-ray examinations as a condition for their employment. The purpose of these procedures is to assess the astronaut s overall health and to diagnose conditions that could jeopardize the success of long duration space missions. These include exams for acceptance into the astronaut corps, routine periodic exams, as well as evaluations taken pre and post missions. Issues: According to NASA policy these medical examinations are considered occupational radiological exposures, and thus, are included when computing the astronaut s overall radiation dose and associated excess cancer mortality risk. As such, astronauts and administrators are concerned about the amount of radiation received from these procedures due to the possibility that these additional doses may cause astronauts to exceed NASA s administrative limits, thus disqualifying them from future flights. Methods: Radiation doses and cancer mortality risks following required medical radiation exposures are presented herein for representative male and female astronaut careers. Calculation of the excess cancer mortality risk was performed by adapting NASA s operational risk assessment model. Averages for astronaut height, weight, number of space missions and age at selection into the astronaut corps were used as inputs to the NASA risk model. Conclusion: The results show that the level of excess cancer mortality imposed by all required medical procedures over an entire astronaut s career is approximately the same as that resulting from a single short duration space flight (i.e. space shuttle mission). In short the summation of all medical procedures involving ionizing radiation should have no impact on the number of missions an astronaut can fly over their career. Learning Objectives: 1. The types of diagnostic medical exams which astronauts are subjected to will be presented. 2. The level of radiation dose and excess mortality risk to the average male and female astronaut will be presented.

Dodge, C. W.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Effects of Arcing Ejecta on Space Suit Materials from ISS RPCM Hot Mate/Demate During EVA

Onboard ISS, taking systems off-line when powering down to perform servicing on Remote Power Control Modules (RPCMs) introduces operational risk. An investigation lead by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was performed by a multi-center team to assess the safety of performing on-orbit replacement of RPCMs without powering down. This investigation revealed the potential for molten metal particulate generation in the event of an arcing occurrence. As RPCM replacement can be performed outside ISS during an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA), it is necessary to assess the effects of this molten metal ejecta contact with the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) Space Suit Assembly (SSA) during an arcing event. A test was devised to mimic arcing ejecta contact with samples representing various SSA cross-sections. Four areas of the SSA were chosen for test to represent the majority of the SSA cross-sections. Testing was conducted by the University of California, Riverside that generated the molten metal particles, included varying composition, size and temperature, and dropped them onto the surface of the various SSA cross-sections. Exposed SSA materials were then evaluated for degree of damage, penetration, and thermal conductance through the cross-section by ILC Dover. Results showed that the SSA Glove is most susceptible to damage from arcing events. This data will be used to make risk management decisions for future RPCM servicing operations. This testing also demonstrated the durability of the SSA design and materials to exposure to extreme environments

Linda S Hewes↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Effects of Arcing Ejecta on Space Suit Materials from ISS RPCM Hot Mate/Demate During EVA

Linda S. Hewes↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Textual and Network Analysis of Part 107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in sUAS operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the FAA Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Textual and Network Analysis of Title 14 CFR Part107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. FAA Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the Title 14 CFR Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Title 14 CFR Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Design and Testing of an Approach to Automated In-Flight Safety Risk Management for sUAS Operations

An onboard risk management automation design is presented based on run-time assurance principles, as well as the concept for In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) as described by the National Academies. The automation is designed to operate independently of the autopilot and perform real-time risk assessment spanning multiple classes of hazards, predict constraint violations, and track autopilot states. In the event of elevated risk conditions or predicted constraint violations, the automation will select from a set of available contingencies and trigger autopilot mode changes if necessary to mitigate risk exposure. The onboard automation also informs the remote operator/pilot of what the independent monitor is observing and any contingency decisions or actions that may arise during flight. Details of an implementation of this design and results of verification and validation activities, as required to meet stringent NASA software and system assurance standards, are also presented. This includes simulation and flight testing using small unmanned aircraft systems.

Ersin Ancel↗

NASA NTRS1989

Risk analysis of space transportation during the space station era

This study addresses the operational risks of manned space transportation during the era of space station deployment along with alternative launch vehicle architectures to reduce the risks. Vehicle architectures considered included shuttle only, an additional unmanned launch vehicle, and a second manned/unmanned launch vehicle. Projections are made for the operational parameters and flight event probabilities. Using these projections and Space Station era mission models, the operability of alternative vehicle architectures are examined, and implications to future manned space program plans are summarized.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2000

Summary of Results from the Risk Management Program for the Mars Microrover Flight Experiment

On 4 July 1997, the Mars Pathfinder landed on the surface of Mars carrying the first planetary rover, known as the Sojourner. Formally known as the Microrover Flight Experiment (MFEX), the Sojourner was a low cost, high-risk technology demonstration, in which new risk management techniques were tried. This paper summarizes the activities and results of the effort to conduct a low-cost, yet meaningful risk management program for the MFEX. The specific activities focused on cost, performance, schedule, and operations risks. Just as the systems engineering process was iterative and produced successive refinements of requirements, designs, etc., so was the risk management process. Qualitative risk assessments were performed first to gain some insights for refining the microrover design and operations concept. These then evolved into more quantitative analyses. Risk management lessons from the manager's perspective is presented for other low-cost, high-risk space missions.

Shishko, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2007

Mission Risk Reduction Regulatory Change Management

NASA Headquarters Environmental Management Division supports NASA's mission to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research by integrating environmental considerations into programs and projects early-on, thereby proactively reducing NASA's exposure to institutional, programmatic and operational risk. As part of this effort, NASA established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) as a resource for detecting, analyzing, and communicating environmental regulatory risks to the NASA stakeholder community. The RRAC PC focuses on detecting emerging environmental regulations and other operational change drivers that may pose risks to NASA programs and facilities, and effectively communicating the potential risks. For example, regulatory change may restrict how and where certain activities or operations may be conducted. Regulatory change can also directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage applications of certain materials. Regulatory change can result in significant adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities due to NASA's stringent performance requirements for materials and components related to human-rated space vehicles. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented a system for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the process utilized by the RRACPC to communicate regulatory change and the associated potential risks within NASA, as well as the process for communicating and cooperating with other government agencies and industry partners, both domestic and international, to ensure mission success.

Scroggins, Sharon↗

NASA NTRS2013

Calculating and Mitigating the Risk of a Cut Glove to a Space Walking Astronaut

One of the high risk operations on the International Space Station (ISS) is conducting a space walk, or an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA). Threats to the space walking crew include airlock failures, space suit failures, and strikes from micro ]meteoroids and orbital debris (MM/OD). There are risks of becoming untethered from the space station, being pinched between the robotic arm and a piece of equipment, tearing your suit on a sharp edge, and other human errors that can be catastrophic. For decades NASA identified and tried to control sharp edges on external structure and equipment by design; however a new and unexpected source of sharp edges has since become apparent. Until recently, one of the underappreciated environmental risks was damage to EVA gloves during a spacewalk. The ISS has some elements which have been flying in the environment of space for over 14 years. It has and continues to be bombarded with MM/OD strikes that have created small, sharp craters all over the structure, including the dedicated EVA handrails and surrounding structure. These craters are capable of cutting through several layers of the EVA gloves. Starting in 2006, five EVA crewmembers reported cuts in their gloves so large they rendered the gloves unusable and in some cases cut the spacewalk short for the safety of the crew. This new hazard took engineers and managers by surprise. NASA has set out to mitigate this risk to safety and operations by redesigning the spacesuit gloves to be more resilient and designing a clamp to isolate MM/OD strikes on handrails, and is considering the necessity of an additional tool to repair strikes on non ]handrail surfaces (such as a file). This paper will address how the ISS Risk Team quantified an estimate of the MM/OD damage to the ISS, and the resulting likelihood of sustaining a cut glove in order to measure the effectiveness of the solutions being investigated to mitigate this risk to the mission and crew.

Castillo, Theresa↗