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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2003

NASA Materials Related Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. They have been passed down from father to son, mother to daughter, teacher to pupil, and older to younger worker. Lessons Learned have also been the basis for the nation s accomplishments for more than 200 years. Both government and industry have long recognized the need to systematically document and utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. Through the knowledge captured and recorded in Lessons Learned from more than 80 years of flight in the Earth s atmosphere, NASA s materials researchers are constantly working to develop stronger, lighter, and more durable materials that can withstand the challenges of space. The Agency s talented materials engineers and scientists continue to build on that rich tradition by using the knowledge and wisdom gained from past experiences to create futuristic materials and technologies that will be used in the next generation of advanced spacecraft and satellites that may one day enable mankind to land men on another planet or explore our nearest star. These same materials may also have application here on Earth to make commercial aircraft more economical to build and fly. With the explosion in technical accomplishments over the last decade, the ability to capture knowledge and have the capability to rapidly communicate this knowledge at lightning speed throughout an organization like NASA has become critical. Use of Lessons Learned is a principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous improvement.

Garcia, Danny↗
NASA NTRS1998

Factors Related to Successful Engineering Team Design

The perceptions of a sample of 49 engineers and scientists from NASA Langley Research Center toward engineering design teams were evaluated. The respondents rated 60 team behaviors in terms of their relative importance for team success. They also completed a profile of their own perceptions of their strengths and weaknesses as team members. Behaviors related to team success are discussed in terms of those involving the organizational culture and commitment to the team and those dealing with internal team dynamics. The latter behaviors included the level and extent of debate and discussion regarding methods for completing the team task and the efficient use of team time to explore and discuss methodologies critical to the problem. Successful engineering teams may find their greatest challenges occurring during the early stages of their existence. In contrast to the prototypical business team, members on an engineering design share expertise and knowledge which allows them to deal with task issues sooner. However, discipline differences among team members can lead to conflicts regarding the best method or approach to solving the engineering problem.

Nowaczyk, Ronald H.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Turning Operational Lessons Learned into Design Reality

The capabilities and limitations of a particular system design are well known by the people who operate it. Operational workarounds, operational notes and lessons learned are traditional methods for dealing with and documenting design shortcomings. The beginning of each new program brings the hope that hard-learned lessons will be incorporated into the next new system. But often operations personnel find their well-intentioned efforts frustrated by an inability to have their inputs considered by design personnel who have strictly-scoped requirements that are coupled with ambitious cost and schedule targets. There is a way for operational inputs to make it into the design, but the solution involves a combination of organizational culture and technical data. Any organization that utilizes this approach can realize significant benefits over the life cycle of their project.

Brady, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Technical Excellence and Communication: The Cornerstones for Successful Safety and Mission Assurance Programs

The paper describes the role of technical excellence and communication in the development and maintenance of safety and mission assurance programs. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organization is used to illustrate philosophies and techniques that strengthen safety and mission assurance efforts and that contribute to healthy and effective organizational cultures. The events and conditions leading to the development of the MSFC S&MA organization are reviewed. Historic issues and concerns are identified. The adverse effects of resource limitations and risk assessment roles are discussed. The structure and functions of the core safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions are presented. The current organization s mission and vision commitments serve as the starting points for the description of the current organization. The goals and objectives are presented that address the criticisms of the predecessor organizations. Additional improvements are presented that address the development of technical excellence and the steps taken to improve communication within the Center, with program customers, and with other Agency S&MA organizations.

Malone, Roy W.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Dryden Flight Research Center Critical Chain Project Management Implementation

In Fiscal Year 2011 Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) implemented a new project management system called Critical Chain Project Management (CCPM). Recent NASA audits have found that the Dryden workforce is strained under increasing project demand and that multi-tasking has been carried to a whole new level at Dryden. It is very common to have an individual work on 10 different projects during a single pay period. Employee surveys taken at Dryden have identified work/life balance as the number one issue concerning employees. Further feedback from the employees indicated that project planning is the area needing the most improvement. In addition, employees have been encouraged to become more innovative, improve job skills, and seek ways to improve overall job efficiency. In order to deal with these challenges, DFRC management decided to adopt the CCPM system that is specifically designed to operate in a resource constrained multi-project environment. This paper will discuss in detail the rationale behind the selection of CCPM and the goals that will be achieved through this implementation. The paper will show how DFRC is tailoring the CCPM system to the flight research environment as well as laying out the implementation strategy. Results of the ongoing implementation will be discussed as well as change management challenges and organizational cultural changes. Finally this paper will present some recommendations on how this system could be used by selected NASA projects or centers.

Hines, Dennis O.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Elements of Engineering Excellence

The inspiration for this Contract Report (CR) originated in discussions with the director of Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Engineering who asked that we investigate the question: "How do you achieve excellence in aerospace engineering?" Engineering a space system is a complex activity. Avoiding its inherent potential pitfalls and achieving a successful product is a challenge. This CR presents one approach to answering the question of how to achieve Engineering Excellence. We first investigated the root causes of NASA major failures as a basis for developing a proposed answer to the question of Excellence. The following discussions integrate a triad of Technical Understanding and Execution, Partnership with the Project, and Individual and Organizational Culture. The thesis is that you must focus on the whole process and its underlying culture, not just on the technical aspects. In addition to the engineering process, emphasis is given to the need and characteristics of a Learning Organization as a mechanism for changing the culture.

Blair, J. C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Performance Support System to Aid in Anomaly Resolution: Concept of Operations

As missions progress into deep space, communication delays and disruptions will disenable the crew’s reliance on Earth experts. There are also limitations in the amount of data that can be downlinked to the ground. It is prudent to assume that critical, complex vehicle or habitat sub-systems will malfunction at a time when a lunar or Mars’ crew cannot rely on the Earth-Support team to detect, diagnose and resolve the problem and it is impractical to expect a small crew to step-in with the same level of expertise as 50+ authorities. The crew will need novel processes and advanced technological support to independently identify and resolve safety- and time-critical anomalies. That a self-reliant crew is unable to respond appropriately to time-critical anomalies is a significant risk to crew safety and mission success. This risk is driven by several factors; novel and unanticipated anomalies would not have been trained pre-flight, the crew could forget their pre-flight training or spaceflight stressors could impair the crew’s problem-solving ability. At last year’s IWS, Beard reported that a single spaceflight stressor (elevated CO2) could undermine the crew’s ability to independently respond to emergencies. Concept of Operations (ConOps) provide a common view of future system functions to all stakeholders. For the current project, a ConOps was developed that describes the operational processes, practices and capabilities needed by a crew of astronauts on deep space missions to autonomously respond to anticipated and unanticipated anomalies. It is crucial to recognize that, as of August 2018 existing technologies are unable to effectively support crew anomaly response to unanticipated events. “Intelligent technology” has not reached a maturity level that permits generalizing a solution to novel situations. For example, to train intelligent technology requires volumes of data that do not exist. The complexities involved in a manned mission to Mars cannot be compared to sending rovers to Mars using scripted software. This ConOps proposes a Crew Performance Support System (CPSS) that will push NASA and its industry partners toward what will be required for a safe and successful manned mission to Mars. Anomaly resolution during a deep space mission will take place within a dynamic, or changing, context. The figure to the left shows five broad contextual variables: the organizational culture, mission context, system characteristics, team characteristics and individual characteristics. The yellow arrow indicates that spaceflight and task-related stressors can affect system, team and individual crewmember characteristics and therefore anomaly response potential. The figure depicts a protective umbrella of Human-System Integration (HSI) principles that should be instituted during CPSS development including a balanced workload, shared situation awareness and building an appropriate level of trust in the automation. The figure also depicts two interrelated and cooperative components, an HSI Data System and other Enabling Capabilities will be required to support crew anomaly response and Earth-Support situation awareness. As we journey from ISS to Gateway to Mars, multiple, simultaneous and integrated research and development efforts (i.e., support systems co-evolution) must be implemented to meet the problem-solving challenges a self-reliant crew will face on a Mars’ mission. The crossovers between the capabilities are just as important as the discrete capabilities themselves. As the capabilities mature, the lines between the support subdomains will blur and an integrated system will emerge. The ConOps summarizes current knowledge about how highly trained people solve anomalies in safety- and time-critical situations, describes a group of capabilities that could help to reduce the extant risk and documents requirements levied on additional systems that provides critical inputs to the CPSS. Scenarios are used to promote a shared understanding of processes, practices and technological goals needed for safe and productive manned missions beyond LEO.

HSIA risk↗
DOE OSTI2022

Domestic Extremism: How to Counter Threats Posed to Critical Assets

Although facilities with sensitive information, hazardous materials, critical infrastructure, or other sensitive items have security measures in place to protect those critical assets, the threat of domestic extremism (DE) has challenged those security measures in new ways. The project described in this brief report used focus groups to identify best practices, tools, or techniques relevant to preventing or countering DE and sought to identify gaps in security measures. Five focus groups with twenty-two subject matter experts from government, healthcare, and other stakeholder groups were conducted to understand how organizations protect critical assets against the DE threat. The results of the focus groups underscore the importance of organizational culture, codes of conduct, and behavior observation programs in prevention of DE events. In addition, results emphasized the value of multidisciplinary teams, employee assistance programs, and regular threat assessment as resources when responding to DE incidents. However, monitoring of social media and lack of adequate resources remain challenges when attempting to prevent or counter the DE threat.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Impact of Cultural Values and Organizational Processes on Nuclear Security Operations

Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
NASA NTRS2000

Culture in the cockpit: do Hofstede's dimensions replicate?

Survey data collected from 9,400 male commercial airline pilots in 19 countries were used in a replication study of Hofstede's indexes of national culture. The analysis that removed the constraint of item equivalence proved superior, both conceptually and empirically, to the analysis using Hofstede's items and formulae as prescribed, and rendered significant replication correlations for all indexes (Individualism-Collectivism .96, Power Distance .87, Masculinity-Femininity .75, and Uncertainty Avoidance .68). The successful replication confirms that national culture exerts an influence on cockpit behavior over and above the professional culture of pilots, and that "one size fits all" training is inappropriate.

Non-NASA Center↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 117: Panel: Operational Excellence Through a Strong Safety Culture (R9.1)

This panel focused on the what the Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors are doing to promote safety and excellence. The Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) is crucial, but additional support provided by the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG), DOE, and environmental, safety, and health (ES and H) professionals in the field are equally imperative. The panelists discussed the importance of sharing lessons learned as well as are developing performance metrics to track operational and safety successes. This panel focused on current trends in building a strong operational safety culture and will include results from recent national workshops. Safety culture is the foundation of strong operational performance. Panel discussion included best practices from industry, DOE, and US NRC and also review tools being used to measure and evaluate safety culture programs. Panelists with presentations: Strong Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence (Kliss McNeel, Patricia Hughes); Safety Culture (Patricia Allen); DOE Safety Culture Improvement (Julie Goeckner); Supporting Safety Culture on the Front Line (Jan Preston); Interdependence of Safety Culture and Organizational Performance (Rizwan Shah)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Addressing Human and Organizational Factors In Nuclear Industry Modernization: A Sociotechnically-Based Strategic Framework

The modernization of nuclear power plants will require an advanced concept of operations, involving an integrated set of tightly coupled systems in which all stakeholders act in a coordinated manner. For this modernization effort to be enabled, we developed a human and organizational factors approach, based on a broad sociotechnical framework. Starting from core human factors principles, we conducted a literature review of the methods and approaches relevant to the modernization problem. These included core disciplines such as cognitive systems engineering, systems theoretic accident modeling and processes (STAMP), human systems integration, resilience engineering, and macroergonomics but also related topics of safety culture and organizational change. From this literature, we developed a conceptual framework centered around the work system with its four interacting components: people, technology, process, and governance. In an effective work system, these four components are jointly optimized according to three systems criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. System failure may result from excessive emphasis on any one criterion. The actual work of attaining joint optimization in a given work system can be accomplished by utilizing three high level functions: knowledge elicitation, knowledge representation, and cross-functional integration. We illustrated the utility of this approach by applying it to practical problems and case studies. The complete report is available in [1]; this paper is a description of our approach and report contents.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addressing Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Industry Modernization: A Sociotechnically Based Strategic Framework

The modernization of nuclear power plants will require an advanced concept of operations, involving an integrated set of tightly coupled systems in which all stakeholders act in a coordinated manner. For this modernization effort to be enabled, we developed a human and organizational factors approach based on a broad sociotechnical framework. Starting from core human factors principles, we conducted a literature review of the methods and approaches relevant to the modernization problem. These included not only core disciplines such as cognitive systems engineering, systems theoretic accident modeling and processes, human systems integration, resilience engineering, and macroergonomics but also related topics of safety culture and organizational change. From this literature, we developed a conceptual framework centered around the work system with its four interacting components: people, technology, process, and governance. In an effective work system, these four components are jointly optimized according to three systems criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. System failure may result from excessive emphasis on any one criterion. The actual work of attaining joint optimization in a given work system can be accomplished by utilizing three high-level functions: knowledge elicitation, knowledge representation, and cross-functional integration. Finally, we illustrated the utility of this approach by applying it to practical problems and case studies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRS1987

Strategies for Revitalizing Organizations: Regaining the Competitive Edge

During the last decade, the United States has lost competitive stature in the world. Challenged daily by a technically sophisticated and vitalized global economy, industry and Government are examining quality and productivity initiatives with which to meet the foreign competitive challenge. At stake are our quality of life and our standard of living for the remainder of this century and beyond. Being competitive is an ongoing process, tuned to an awareness and understanding of the dynamics of the world marketplace and to the changing nature of the work environment. Solutions to America's quality and productivity problems do not exist independently within any organization or industry or at any given level of society. Success depends on commitment, partnership, meshing of goals and responsibilities, mutual respect and understanding, and a desire to be first. A change in organizational management culture is required. Traditional authoritarian management practices must give way to enlightened leadership initiatives that stress employee involvement and participation. There must be a lessening of adversarial relationships between management and labor and between industry and Government. Quality and productivity are understood to be the end result of an integrated process which begins with vigorous, committed leadership and ends with a satisfied customer. The essential elements in the revitalization process are organized in this report into seven strategies which represent the major findings of the Second NASA Symposium on Quality and Productivity. Each strategy is then broken down into its principal themes which are presented as recommendations. No one strategy can stand apart from any other; all are interrelated and work together.

Nysmith, C. Robert↗
NASA NTRS1991

An evaluation of the total quality management implementation strategy for the advanced solid rocket motor project at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center

An evaluation of the NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) strategy to implement Total Quality Management (TQM) in the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) Project is presented. The evaluation of the implementation strategy reflected the Civil Service personnel perspective at the project level. The external and internal environments at MSFC were analyzed for their effects on the ASRM TQM strategy. Organizational forms, cultures, management systems, problem solving techniques, and training were assessed for their influence on the implementation strategy. The influence of ASRM's effort was assessed relative to its impact on mature projects as well as future projects at MSFC.

Schramm, Harry F.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Ten steps to successful software process improvement

This paper identifies ten steps for managing change that address organizational and cultural issues. Four of these steps are critical, that if not done, will almost guarantee failure. This ten-step program emphasizes the alignment of business goals, change process goals, and the work performed by the employees of an organization.

software process improvement↗