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DEVELOPMENT OF A SENSOR NETWORK TEST BED FOR ISD MATERIALS AND STRUCUTRAL CONDITION MONITORING

The P Reactor at the Savannah River Site is one of the first reactor facilities in the US DOE complex that has been placed in its end state through in situ decommissioning (ISD). The ISD end state consists of a grout-filled concrete civil structure within the concrete frame of the original building. To evaluate the feasibility and utility of remote sensors to provide verification of ISD system conditions and performance characteristics, an ISD Sensor Network Test Bed has been designed and deployed at the Savannah River National Laboratory. The test bed addresses the DOE-EM Technology Need to develop a remote monitoring system to determine and verify ISD system performance. Commercial off-the-shelf sensors have been installed on concrete blocks taken from walls of the P Reactor Building. Deployment of this low-cost structural monitoring system provides hands-on experience with sensor networks. The initial sensor system consists of: (1) Groutable thermistors for temperature and moisture monitoring; (2) Strain gauges for crack growth monitoring; (3) Tiltmeters for settlement monitoring; and (4) A communication system for data collection. Preliminary baseline data and lessons learned from system design and installation and initial field testing will be utilized for future ISD sensor network development and deployment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An alternative calibration method for counting P-32 reactor monitors

Radioactivation of sulfur is a common technique used to measure fast neutron fluences in test and research reactors. Elemental sulfur can be pressed into pellets and used as monitors. The {sup 32}S(n, p) {sup 32}P reaction has a practical threshold of about 3 MeV and its cross section and associated uncertainties are well characterized [1]. The product {sup 32P} emits a beta particle with a maximum energy of 1710 keV [2]. This energetic beta particle allows pellets to be counted intact. ASTM Standard Test Method for Measuring Reaction Rates and Fast-Neutron Fluences by Radioactivation of Sulfur-32 (E265) [3] details a method of calibration for counting systems and subsequent analysis of results. This method requires irradiation of sulfur monitors in a fast-neutron field whose spectrum and intensity are well known. The resultant decay-corrected count rate is then correlated to the known fast neutron fluence. The Radiation Metrology Laboratory (RML) at Sandia has traditionally performed calibration irradiations of sulfur pellets using the {sup 252}Cf spontaneous fission neutron source at the National Inst. of Standards and Technology (NIST) [4] as a transfer standard. However, decay has reduced the intensity of NIST's source; thus lowering the practical upper limits of available fluence. As of May 2010, neutron emission rates have decayed to approximately 3 e8 n/s. In practice, this degradation of capabilities precludes calibrations at the highest fluence levels produced at test reactors and limits the useful range of count rates that can be measured. Furthermore, the reduced availability of replacement {sup 252}Cf threatens the long-term viability of the NIST {sup 252}Cf facility for sulfur pellet calibrations. In lieu of correlating count rate to neutron fluence in a reference field the total quantity of {sup 32}P produced in a pellet can be determined by absolute counting methods. This offers an attractive alternative to extended {sup 252}Cf exposures because it can be performed regardless of the characterization of the exposure environment. Count rates produced by sulfur pellets are correlated to the measured quantity of separated {sup 32}P. A posteriori spectral and cross section determination can be used to correlate the quantity of phosphorus back to a neutron fluence in a reference field. This paper outlines a method for the setup, calibration, and use of the detector systems, {sup 32}P sample preparation, and analysis of the beta spectrum. An uncertainty analysis and comparison to ASTM E265 is also included. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Of the final end state for decommissioning of reactors at SRS: collaboration between stakeholders, regulators, and the Federal Government - 15279

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer (310 square-miles) United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950's, utilizing five (5) production reactors. In the early 1990's all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end-state declaration was documented in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 29,543 square-meter (318,000 square-feet) 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost-effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized / immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the up-front planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 321 kilometer (200-mile) radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight- month period as the end-state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four (4) SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons). Closure of the SRS P Reactor Area was precedent setting and sets the stage for closure of other reactors and hardened facilities. The DOE, USEPA, and SCDHEC engaged in active, up-front, and timely involvement with the SRS. The SRS CAB, elected officials, and citizens of South Carolina and Georgia met to discuss the P reactor area closure and associated risks. Early public involvement gave SRS and the regulators assurance that the selected decision was valid and would not be overturned. Public input improved the process and ensured that the important decision on the final end-state of the reactor facilities was not made in isolation. ISD of P Reactor will provide adequate protection of human health and the environment and the lowest cost since short-term risk is minimized to remedial workers from exposure to contaminated equipment and facilities by leaving the reactor vessel in place allowing for radiological decay over time. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

An Overview on the role of nuclear data: analysis and evaluation - invited Eugene P. Wigner Reactor Physicist Award Winner

The design and calculation of a nuclear system requires the generation of cross-section libraries in the multi-group or continuous-energy form that is suitable for use in reactor physics computer codes. These working libraries are derived from general purpose libraries, named evaluated nuclear data libraries that are constructed based on data evaluations using physical models and theories. Presently, the most common used evaluated nuclear data libraries are the ENDF/B, JEFF, JENDL, CENDL, and BROND. These general purpose nuclear data libraries are the backbone of any design involving neutron-target interactions. The data for neutron interaction in these libraries spans from fractions of electron-volts (eV), that is 10-5 eV, up to millions of electron-volts (MeV), that is 20 MeV or even higher energies. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview on the approach used to generate nuclear data for practical applications especially in the resonance energy region. (authors)

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Resonance Self-Shielding Using Deterministic Transport Methods with Pointwise Cross Sections (Invited) - Eugene P. Wigner Reactor Physics Award

The difficulty of predicting resonance absorption has been recognized since the birth of reactor physics. A paper published by Wigner, et al. in 1955 describes pioneering theoretical work done in 1941 to provide an estimate for the resonance absorption in heterogeneous uranium lattices. This work introduced many fundamental concepts, including the narrow resonance (NR) approximation and the Wigner rational expression for the escape probability from a fuel lump, and it established an equivalence relation for resonance absorption in homogeneous and heterogeneous systems. During the 1960's, Bondarenko proposed an approach in which resonance shielding factors are precomputed and parametrized as a function of the background cross section by using the NR approximation and equivalence theory. This provided an efficient technique for treating resonance absorption in reactor lattices. The Bondarenko method and its modern variations (e.g., certain subgroup techniques) have become the predominate method for resonance shielding calculations in reactor physics. However, this approach has several limitations, most of which are well known, such as the treatment of resonance interference effects and its reliance on homogeneous-heterogeneous equivalence theory relationships. Other limitations are more subtle and less generally recognized, such as neglecting the impact of self-shielding the multigroup (MG) elastic removal cross section and the effects of directionally dependent shielding on the total cross section. This paper and the accompanying presentation apply deterministic solutions of the continuous energy (CE) neutron transport equation to examine common approximations made in resonance methods for a uniform lattice. The calculated fine-structure spectra are used to calibrate the impact of the approximations and describe how results from CE flux solution can be incorporated in the Bondarenko self-shielding method to improve the accuracy. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Determination of the Distribution and Inventory of Radionuclides within a Savannah River Site Waterway - 13202

An investigation was conducted to evaluate the radionuclide inventory within the Lower Three Runs (LTR) Integrator Operable Unit (IOU) at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Savannah River Site (SRS). The scope of this effort included the analysis of previously existing sampling and analysis data as well as additional stream bed and flood plain sampling and analysis data acquired to delineate horizontal and vertical distributions of the radionuclide as part of the ongoing SRS environmental restoration program, and specifically for the LTR IOU program. While cesium-137 (Cs-137) is the most significant and abundant radionuclide associated with the LTR IOU it is not the only radionuclide, hence the scope included evaluating all radionuclides present and includes an evaluation of inventory uncertainty for use in sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. The scope involved evaluation of the radionuclide inventory in the P-Reactor and R-Reactor cooling water effluent canal systems, PAR Pond (including Pond C) and the flood plain and stream sediment sections of LTR between the PAR Pond Dam and the Savannah River. The approach taken was to examine all of the available Sediment and Sediment/Soil analysis data available along the P- and R-Reactor cooling water re-circulation canal system, the ponds situated along those canal reaches and along the length of LTR below Par Pond dam. By breaking the IOU into a series of sub-components and sub-sections, the mass of contaminated material was estimated and a representative central concentration of each radionuclide was computed for each compartment. The radionuclide inventory associated with each sub-compartment was then aggregated to determine the total radionuclide inventory that represented the full LTR IOU. Of special interest was the inventory of Cs-137 due to its role in contributing to the potential dose to an offsite member of the public. The overall LTR IOU inventory of Cs-137 was determined to be 2.87 E+02 GBq, which is similar to two earlier estimates. This investigation provides an independent, ground-up estimate of Cs-137 inventory in LTR IOU utilizing the most recent field data. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk-Based Remediation Approach for Cs-137 Contaminated Sediment/Soils at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Lower Three Runs Tail (U) - 13348 - SRNS-RP-2012-00546

Lower Three Runs is a large blackwater stream that runs through the eastern and southern portion of the Savannah River Site. The Lower Three Runs watershed includes two SRS facility areas: P Area (P Reactor) and R Area (R Reactor) that provided effluent discharges to Lower Three Runs. During reactor operations, effluent discharges were well above natural (pre-industrial) or present day stream discharges. The watershed contains a 2,500-acre mainstream impoundment (PAR Pond), several smaller pre-cooler ponds, and a canal system that connects the pre-cooler ponds and discharges surface water to PAR Pond. From the PAR Pond dam, Lower Three Runs flows approximately 36 kilometers braiding through bottom-land/flood-plain forests before it enters the Savannah River. About eight kilometers downstream from the PAR Pond dam, the SRS boundary narrows (termed the Lower Three Runs tail) providing a limited buffer of DOE property for the Lower Three Runs stream and associated flood-plain. Previous screening characterization efforts revealed Cs-137 contamination in the sediment/soils of the flood-plain. As a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus package, a comprehensive characterization effort was executed on the sediment/soils of the Lower Three Runs tail flood-plain providing a comprehensive look at the contaminant signature of the area. As a follow-up to that characterization, a regulatory decision Core Team, comprised of members of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Environmental Protection Agency - Region IV, and DOE, conducted negotiations on a risk-based approach to address the level of contamination found in the tail flood-plain as an early action that provided a long-term solution to exposure scenarios. For evaluation purposes, the adolescent trespasser was selected as the most likely human receptor for the Lower Three Runs tail portion because of the natural attractiveness of the area for recreational activities (i.e., hunting, fishing, hiking etc.) and access from public property. Exposure of the adolescent trespasser to Cs-137 contaminated sediment/soil at concentrations greater than 23.7 pico curies per gram have been calculated to result in an unacceptable cancer risk (> 1 x 10{sup -4}). Comparing the characterization sampling results conducted in 2009 with the benchmark concentration of 23.7 pCi/g, identified elevated risk levels along three sampling areas in the Lower Three Runs tail portion. On January 5, 2012, it was agreed by the core team that a Removal Action in the Lower Three Runs tail was to be conducted for the identified soil/sediment locations in the three identified areas that exceed the 1 x 10{sup -4} risk (23.7 pCi/g) for the adolescent trespasser receptor. The addition of Land Use Controls following the Removal Action was appropriate to protect human health and the environment. A systematic screening matrix was initiated at the identified hot spots (i.e., sampling points with Cs-137 activities greater than 23.7 pCi/g) to identify the limits of the excavation area. Sediment/soil within the defined removal areas would be excavated to the depth necessary to achieve the cleanup goal and disposed of in a CERCLA Off-Site Rule approved disposal facility. It was agreed that this removal action would adequately reduce the volume of available Cs-137 in the Lower Three Runs tail and consequently residual activities of the Cs-137 would decay over time reducing the amount of Cs-137 available in the tail which would curtail risk. The Land Use Controls consist of installation of an additional seven miles of fencing at major road crossings, utility easements, and at areas that showed a higher probability of access. In addition, signs were placed along the entire SRS perimeter of the Lower Three Runs tail approximately every 200 feet. Sign posts included both a No Trespassing sign and a Contaminant Warning sign. The project initiated a subcontract for both the removal action and the installation of fencing and signs on May 1, 2012. All field activities were completed by July 26, 2012. The project excavated and disposed of over 2700 cubic yards of contaminated sediment/soil, erected approximately seven miles of fence and placed over 2,000 signs demonstrating DOE's commitment to protect human health and act as a good neighbor to residents in the area. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TESTING AND ANALYSIS OF CAP CONCRETE STRESS AND STRAIN DUE TO SHRINKAGE, CREEP, AND EXPANSION FINAL REPORT

In-situ decommissioning of Reactors P- and R- at the Savannah River Site will require filling the reactor vessels with a special concrete based on materials such as magnesium phosphate, calcium aluminate or silica fume. Then the reactor vessels will be overlain with an 8 ft. thick layer of Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC) steel reinforced concrete, called the 'Cap Concrete'. The integrity of this protective layer must be assured to last for a sufficiently long period of time to avoid ingress of water into the reactor vessel and possible movement of radioactive contamination into the environment. During drying of this Cap Concrete however, shrinkage strains are set up in the concrete as a result of diffusion and evaporation of water from the top surface. This shrinkage varies with depth in the poured slab due to a non-uniform moisture distribution. This differential shrinkage results in restraint of the upper layers with larger shrinkage by lower layers with lesser displacements. Tensile stresses can develop at the surface from the strain gradients in the bulk slab, which can lead to surface cracking. Further, a mechanism called creep occurs during the curing period or early age produces strains under the action of restraining forces. To investigate the potential for surface cracking, an experimental and analytical program was started under TTQAP SRNL-RP-2009-01184. Slab sections made of Cap Concrete mixture were instrumented with embedded strain gages and relative humidity sensors and tested under controlled environmental conditions of 23 C and relative humidities (RH) of 40% and 80% over a period of 50 days. Calculation methods were also developed for predictions of stress development in the full-scale concrete placement over the reactor vessels. These methods were evaluated by simulating conditions for the test specimens and the calculation results compared to the experimental data. A closely similar test with strain gages was performed by Kim and Lee for a concrete mixture that did not employ humidity sensors and the admixtures used in this program. Yuan and Wan tried to predict the shrinkage strains and stresses in the Kim and Lee experiment, but did not include a creep analysis. Grasley and Lange conducted full restraint load tests on a concrete prism instrumented with humidity sensors over a 7 day curing period. The hypothetical case of full-scale placement of the Cap Concrete was also analyzed using the developed analytical methods. The calculation performed in this report is for scoping purposes only.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DETERMINATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND INVENTORY OF RADIONUCLIDES WITHIN A SAVANNAH RIVER SITE WATERWAY

An investigation was conducted to evaluate the radionuclide inventory within the Lower Three Runs (LTR) Integrator Operable Unit (IOU) at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Savannah River Site (SRS). The scope of this effort included the analysis of previously existing sampling and analysis data as well as additional streambed and floodplain sampling and analysis data acquired to delineate horizontal and vertical distributions of the radionuclide as part of the ongoing SRS environmental restoration program, and specifically for the LTR IOU program. While cesium-137 (Cs-137) is the most significant and abundant radionuclide associated with the LTR IOU it is not the only radionuclide, hence the scope included evaluating all radionuclides present and includes an evaluation of inventory uncertainty for use in sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. The scope involved evaluation of the radionuclide inventory in the P-Reactor and RReactor cooling water effluent canal systems, PAR Pond (including Pond C) and the floodplain and stream sediment sections of LTR between the PAR Pond Dam and the Savannah River. The approach taken was to examine all of the available Sediment and Sediment/Soil analysis data available along the P- and R-Reactor cooling water re-circulation canal system, the ponds situated along those canal reaches and along the length of LTR below Par Pond dam. By breaking the IOU into a series of sub-components and sub-sections, the mass of contaminated material was estimated and a representative central concentration of each radionuclide was computed for each compartment. The radionuclide inventory associated with each sub-compartment was then aggregated to determine the total radionuclide inventory that represented the full LTR IOU. Of special interest was the inventory of Cs-137 due to its role in contributing to the potential dose to an offsite member of the public. The overall LTR IOU inventory of Cs-137 was determined to be 75.5 Ci, which is similar to two earlier estimates. This investigation provides an independent, ground-up estimate of Cs-137 inventory in LTR IOU utilizing the most recent field data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - 11052

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Initiating Event Rates at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: 1988–2016

Analyzing initiating event rates is important because it indicates performance among plants and also provides inputs to several U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) risk-informed regulatory activities. This report presents an analysis of initiating event frequencies at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants from calendar year 1988 through 2016 as reported in licensee event reports. Engineers with nuclear power plant experience reviewed each event report since the last update to this report for the presence of valid scrams or reactor trips at power. To be included in the study, an event had to meet all of the following criteria: (1) the event includes an unplanned reactor trip (not a scheduled reactor trip on the daily operations schedule), (2) the sequence of events started when reactor is critical and at or above the point of adding heat, (3) the event occurred at a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant (excluding Fort St. Vrain and LaCrosse), and (4) the event was reported by a licensee event report. Sixteen initiating event groupings are trended and displayed. For some of the categories as relevant initiators are plotted separately for boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors. P values are given for the possible presence of a trend over the most recent 10 years. Statistically significant decreasing trends were identified for BWR loss of heat sink and general transients.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Physics and technology considerations for the deuterium–tritium fuel cycle and conditions for tritium fuel self sufficiency

The tritium aspects of the DT fuel cycle embody some of the most challenging feasibility and attractiveness issues in the development of fusion systems. The review and analyses in this paper provide important information to understand and quantify these challenges and to define the phase space of plasma physics and fusion technology parameters and features that must guide a serious R&D in the world fusion program. We focus in particular on components, issues and R&D necessary to satisfy three 'principal requirements': (1) achieving tritium self-sufficiency within the fusion system, (2) providing a tritium inventory for the initial start-up of a fusion facility, and (3) managing the safety and biological hazards of tritium. A primary conclusion is that the physics and technology state-of-the-art will not enable DEMO and future power plants to satisfy these principal requirements. We quantify goals and define specific areas and ideas for physics and technology R&D to meet these requirements. A powerful fuel cycle dynamics model was developed to calculate time-dependent tritium inventories and flow rates in all parts and components of the fuel cycle for different ranges of parameters and physics and technology conditions. Dynamics modeling analyses show that the key parameters affecting tritium inventories, tritium start-up inventory, and tritium self-sufficiency are the tritium burn fraction in the plasma (f b ), fueling efficiency (η f ), processing time of plasma exhaust in the inner fuel cycle (t p ), reactor availability factor (AF), reserve time (tr) which determines the reserve tritium inventory needed in the storage system in order to keep the plant operational for time t r in case of any malfunction of any part of the tritium processing system, and the doubling time (t d ). Results show that η f f b > 2% and processing time of 1–4 h are required to achieve tritium self-sufficiency with reasonable confidence. For η f f b = 2% and processing time of 4 h, the tritium start-up inventory required for a 3 GW fusion reactor is ~11 kg, while it is <5 kg if η f f b = 5% and the processing time is 1 h. To achieve these stringent requirements, a serious R&D program in physics and technology is necessary. The EU-DEMO direct internal recycling concept that carries fuel directly from the plasma exhaust gas to the fueling systems without going through the isotope separation system reduces the overall processing time and tritium inventories and has positive effects on the required tritium breeding ratio (TBR R ). A significant finding is the strong dependence of tritium self-sufficiency on the reactor availability factor. Simulations show that tritium self-sufficiency is: impossible if AF < 10% for any η f f b , possible if AF > 30% and 1% ≤ η f f b ≤ 2%, and achievable with reasonable confidence if AF > 50% and η f f b > 2%. These results are of particular concern in light of the low availability factor predicted for the near-term plasma-based experimental facilities (e.g. FNSF, VNS, CTF), and can have repercussions on tritium economy in DEMO reactors as well, unless significant advancements in RAMI are made. There is a linear dependency between the tritium start-up inventory and the fusion power. The required tritium start-up inventory for a fusion facility of 100 MW fusion power is as small as 1 kg. Since fusion power plants will have large powers for better economics, it is important to maintain a 'reserve' tritium inventory in the tritium storage system to continue to fuel the plasma and avoid plant shutdown in case of malfunctions of some parts of the tritium processing lines. But our results show that a reserve time as short as 24 h leads to unacceptable reserve and start-up inventory requirements. Therefore, high reliability and fast maintainability of all components in the fuel cycle are necessary in order to avoid the need for storing reserve tritium inventory sufficient for continued fusion facility operation for more than a few hours. The physics aspects of plasma fueling, tritium burn fraction, and particle and power exhaust are highly interrelated and complex, and predictions for DEMO and power reactors are highly uncertain because of lack of experiments with burning plasma. Fueling by pellet injection on the high field side of tokamak has evolved to be the preferred method to fuel a burning plasma. Extrapolation from the DIII-D penetration scaling shows fueling efficiency expected in DEMO to be <25%, but such extrapolations are highly uncertain. The fueling efficiency of gas in a reactor relevant regime is expected to be extremely poor and not very useful for getting tritium into the core plasma efficiently. Gas fueling will nonetheless be useful for feedback control of the divertor operating parameters. Extensive modeling has been carried out to predict burn fraction, fueling requirements, and fueling efficiency for ITER, DEMO, and beyond. The fueling rate required to operate Q = 10 ITER plasmas in order to provide the required core fueling, helium exhaust and radiative divertor plasma conditions for acceptable divertor power loads was calculated. If this fueling is performed with a 50–50 DT mix, the tritium burn fraction in ITER would be ~0.36%, which is too low to satisfy the self-sufficiency conditions derived from the dynamics modeling for fusion reactors. Extrapolation to DEMO using this approach would also yield similarly low burn fraction. Extensive analysis presented shows that specific features of edge neutral dynamics in ITER and fusion reactors, which are different from present experiments, open possibilities for optimization of tritium fueling and thus to improve the burn fraction. Using only tritium in pellet fueling of the plasma core, and only deuterium for edge density, divertor power load and ELM control results in significant increase of the burn fraction to 1.8–3.6%. These estimates are performed with physics models whose results cannot be fully validated for ITER and DEMO plasma conditions since these cannot be achieved in present tokamak experiments. Thus, several uncertainties remain regarding particle transport and scenario requirements in ITER and DEMO. The safety standard requirements for protection of the public and release guidelines for tritium have been reviewed. General safety approaches including minimizing tritium inventories, reducing tritium permeation through materials, and decontaminating material for waste disposal have been suggested.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Variability of MHD instabilities in benign termination of high-current runaway electron beams in the JET and DIII-D tokamaks

Benign termination, in which magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) instabilities deconfine runaway electrons (REs) following hydrogenic injections, is a promising strategy for mitigating dangerous RE loads after disruptions. Recent experiments on the Joint European Torus (JET) have explored this scenario at higher pre-disruptive plasma currents than are achievable on other devices, revealing challenges in obtaining benign terminations at I p ≥2.5 MA. This work analyzes the evolution of these high-current RE beams and their terminating MHD events using fast magnetic sensor measurements and EFIT equilibrium reconstructions for approximately 40 JET and 20 DIII-D tokamak discharges. On JET, unsuccessful non-benign terminations occur at low edge safety factor (q edge ≈ 2), and are preceded by intermittent, non-terminating MHD events at higher rational qedge. Trends in the internal inductance I i indicate more peaked RE current profiles in the high-I p non-benign population, which may hinder successful recombination through re-ionization of the companion plasma. In contrast, benign terminations on JET typically occur at higher q edge ≥3 and exhibit less peaked RE current profiles. DIII-D displays a broader range of terminating edge safety factors, again correlated with the measured values. Across both tokamaks, the RE current peaking is therefore found to determine which MHD instability boundary is encountered, a result confirmed by linear resistive MHD modeling with the CASTOR3D code. Measured growth rates are similar for benign and non-benign cases, indicating that ideal MHD timescales at low density after hydrogenic injection do not alone explain efficient RE deconfinement. Instead, non-benign cases are most readily characterized by their comparably lower overall MHD perturbation amplitudes δB. These observations suggest that the interplay between ideal and resistive dynamics governs the termination process, with implications for extrapolating benign RE termination to high-I p reactor scenarios.

MHD instabilities↗

A New Approach to Predict Hydrogeological Parameters Using Shear Waves from the Multichannel Analysis of Surface Waves Method

For near-surface contaminant characterization, the accurate prediction of hydrogeological parameters in anisotropic and heterogeneous environments has been a challenge since the last decades. However, recent advances in near-surface geophysics have facilitated the use of geophysical data for hydrogeological characterization in the last few years. A pseudo 3-D high resolution P-wave shallow seismic reflection survey was performed at the P Reactor Area, Savannah River Site, South Carolina in order to delineate and predict migration pathways of a large contaminant plume including trichloroethylene. This contaminant plume originates from the northwest section of the reactor facility that is located within the Upper Atlantic Coastal Plain. The data were collected with 40 Hz geophones, an accelerated weight-drop as seismic source and 1 m receiver spacing with near- and far-offsets of 0.5 and 119.5 m, respectively. In such areas with near-surface contaminants, a detailed subsurface characterization of the vadose zone hydraulic parameters is very important. Indeed, an inexpensive method of deriving such parameters by the use of seismic reflection surveys is beneficial, and our approach uses the relationship between seismic velocity and hydrogeological parameters together with empirical observations relating porosity to permeability and hydraulic conductivity. Shear wave velocity ( V s ) profiles were estimated from surface wave dispersion analysis of the seismic reflection data and were subsequently used to derive hydraulic parameters such as porosity, permeability, and hydraulic conductivity. Additional geophysical data including core samples, vertical seismic profiling, surface electrical resistivity tomography, natural gamma and electrical resistivity logs allowed for a robust assessment of the validity and geological significance of the estimated V s and hydrogeological models. The results demonstrate the usefulness of this approach for the upper 15 m of shallow unconsolidated sediments even though the survey design parameters were not optimal for surface wave analysis due to the higher than desired frequency geophones.

Engineering↗

ASME Design Code Rule Changes for Nuclear Graphite

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code (ASME BPVC) Section III, Division 5, Article HHA-3000 outlines graphite core component and graphite core assembly design guidelines. Graphite core components are defined as ?components manufactured from graphite that are installed to form a graphite core assembly within the reactor pressure vessel of a high temperature, graphite moderated fission reactor.? (p. 413) Graphites? inherent defect distributions do not allow for deterministic material reliability. Rather, graphite has variable strength distributions which change by grade. Article HHA-3000 outlines two semi-probabilistic methods, the full and simplified assessments, which set design load limit targets for each of three component structural reliability classes. The Design Task Group was officially recognized as a specialized task group within ASME November of 2023, though we?ve been collaborating since 2022. The purpose of the Design Task Group is to correct, clarify, and make HHA-3000 function as intended. The Design Task Group will sunset once we?ve achieved our objectives. The Design Task Group was specifically told to not write new Code. While there may be more precise and more accurate methods to determine reliability targets, the current methods are conservative, relatively simple to implement, and have thus far been considered satisfactory for setting design reliability targets. Much of the ground-work to write proposal files and background documents for records to make the changes needed to achieve our objective have been completed. The Design Task Group has documented much of their work through papers, presentations, and memorandums. Three memorandums in which INL team members had substantial contributions are found in the Appendices: FEA Modeling for the Baseline Program, Evaluating the Effects on Margin of Updating the Threshold and Shape Parameters in the Full Assessment, and Interpretations of the Full and Simplified Assessments in ASME BPVC. Most of the on-going work to achieve the Design Task Group?s objective will be addressing comments on existing records and moving records through the balloting process. The Design Task Group met bi-weekly mostly through the end of FY2023. Since February 2024, the Design Task Group has mostly been completed with solving and documenting the technical issues associated with the assessments. Unless new tasks are identified, the remaining work of the Design Task Group will be political and editorial.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗