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DISCOVR strain pipeline screening – Part II: Winter and summer season areal productivities and biomass compositional shifts in climate-simulation photobioreactor cultures

Assessing the seasonal biomass productivity and compositional shift dynamics under simulated outdoor culture conditions of the top 22 algae strains selected during Tier I flask screening is an important step in the further prioritization of strains with regard to outdoor pond cultivation. These top 22 strains were subjected to Tier II testing in the PNNL Laboratory Environmental Algae Pond Simulator (LEAPS) photobioreactors, simulating light and temperature conditions of 20 cm deep outdoor ponds during the Arizona winter and summer season. All strains were grown in two consecutive nutrient-replete batch culture experiments at their particular optimal medium salinity to quantify their respective seasonal linear-phase areal biomass productivities. To determine biomass compositional shifts in response to nutrient-depletion, the LEAPS cultures were allowed to enter a 9-day nutrient depletion phase at the end of the second batch run. The following strains were evaluated in winter-season climate-simulated cultures and are listed in the order from highest (7.9 g m -2 day -1 ) to lowest (2.3 g m -2 day -1 ) areal N-replete biomass productivity: Monoraphidium minutum 26B-AM, Tetraselmis striata LANL1001, Chlorella vulgaris LRB AZ-1201, Micractinium reisseri NREL14-F2, Monoraphidium sp. MONOR1, Chlorella vulgaris NREL4-C12, Scenedesmus obliquus UTEX393, Scenedesmus acutus LRB-AP-0401, Nannochloropsis oceanica CCAP849/10, and Stichococcus minutus CCALA727. The following strains were evaluated in summer-season climate-simulated cultures and are listed in the order from highest (31.8 g m -2 day -1 ) to lowest (14.2 g m -2 day -1 ) areal N-replete biomass productivity: Picochlorum renovo NREL39-A8, Scenedesmus obliquus UTEX393, Porphyridium cruentum CCMP675, Picochlorum celeri TG2-WT-CSM/EMRE, Chlorella sorokiniana DOE1116, Stichococcus minor CCMP819, Picochlorum oklahomensis CCMP2329, Chlorella sorokiniana DOE1412 (UTEXB3016), Scenedesmus rubescens NREL46B-D3, Picochlorum soloecismus DOE101, Tetraselmis striata LANL1001, Scenedesmus obliquus DOE 0152.z, and Agmenellum quadruplicatum UTEX2268. All LEAPS cultures experienced a significant reduction in areal biomass productivity in response to nutrient-depletion, from 7-16% in the winter season simulation and up to 1-60% in the summer season simulation. Finally, for 10 of the strains tested, the carbohydrate content more than doubled upon nutrient depletion, and for 9 strains, the lipid content increased by over 50% of the initial content.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Developing a Marine Energy Workforce Pipeline

Marine Energy is a nascent, but growing industry and will need a strong workforce to be successful. This paper examines the resources and programs needed to achieve the industry's goals.

education↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

PipeSight: A High-Performance Computing Platform for Pipeline Integrity Management

The Phase I feasibility study completed as part of this project has led to a number of innovative technologies being developed and has laid the foundation for a successful Phase II effort to commercialize a platform for managing the integrity of pipelines for the damage mechanisms of the new, hybrid-energy based economy. To ground the development efforts and direction of the project, an extensive market research and customer discovery effort was undertaken early in Phase I. Through this effort, a number of pipeline owners and operators were interviewed, and the following key findings were discovered about the pipeline industry: • Small pipeline operators do not have the central engineering groups necessary to perform their own independent analysis of inspection data, but instead rely on summarized tally sheets provided to them by inspection service providers. • The time it takes to go from an inspection to a completed engineering assessment, even for small segments of pipeline, can take anywhere from 30-120 days. During this delay, critical threats can (and have been known to) cause failures. • Uncertainty is often not accounted for in the assessment of pipeline integrity. The tally sheets provided by third-party service providers are almost always deterministic in nature, identifying threats that present a concern only to the current (not the future) integrity of the pipeline. • It is uncommon to apply the latest technologies to perform advanced assessments of damaged pipelines. There is a desire to use more advanced analysis capabilities to assess threats. Many pipeline operators indicated that they would often excavate a pipeline to perform an inspection and find that the damage was not as bad as they anticipated, thus using limited resources unnecessarily. Companies are not consistent in their use of inspection data to determine corrosion rates, and those that do only calculate deterministic corrosion rates. • The industry has prominently relied on time-based inspections but has recently started to transition to risk-based inspections. However, there appears to be no uniform guidance on how to do so while properly accounting for all sources of uncertainty. • Companies are not storing inspection data in a manner that allows for the ready determination of temporal trends. • Predictive maintenance principles and practices are beginning to be used by early adopters • Some pipelines are being re-purposed to transport different process fluids than they were designed for, e.g., H 2 and CO 2 rich process streams to serve the new hybrid-energy based economy, which are presenting new integrity concerns for the existing pipeline network that crisscrosses the United States. As a result of these discoveries, we were able to target the development efforts in Phase I to best serve the needs of the industry. In Phase I, we developed a way to correlate multiple large-scale scans of the pipeline to determine a probabilistic corrosion rate that accounts for all sources of error and uncertainty in the inspection process. This probabilistic corrosion rate can be used to predict the future thickness distribution of the pipe wall. We demonstrate how this analysis may be performed in an analytical fashion and has been implemented in such a manner that it can be readily distributed using GPU computing through integration of the Kokkos programming model. We also make a very novel extension of the analytical corrosion rate model to Bayesian Networks (an explainable AI technique) that can account for non-parametric distributions of corrosion rates. With the predictions made above for the probabilistic corrosion rate and corresponding future distribution of the pipe wall thickness, we can assess the integrity of the pipeline through the use of a probabilistic engineering assessment. We developed a novel screening data analysis approach that can rapidly identify ‘hotspots’ (local thin areas) where the integrity of the pipeline is a concern. Once more, we implemented this screening approach in C++ to leverage GPU computing via the Kokkos programming model. After the critical hotspots are identified, we developed a program that can automatically generate an advanced finite element model of the damaged regions. Since the number of damaged regions that require advanced analysis can number in the thousands, we integrated an open-source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on the cloud. Initially, these advanced numerical models were only designed to account for loading due to internal pressure. However, in a slight pivot from the initial Phase I proposal, we developed a complete pipe stress analysis program (called Simflex) which can simulate the complete pipeline and its response to thermal expansion, pressure, thermal bowing, weight, wind, earthquake, support displacement, support friction and external forces. This pipe stress analysis program was written generically, to handle any piping system, but contains the features needed to model long pipelines (i.e., it incorporates a model for soil mechanics and can account for the nonlinear boundary conditions necessary to simulate long underground pipelines). This pipe stress analysis program can simulate any segment of the pipeline (simple or complex) under any set of conditions and loads, to determine the supplemental loads (axial forces and bending moments) at the location of damage. This enables the most accurate state of stress to be accounted for in the pipeline, which can prove critical when evaluating the integrity of a damaged region. In the process of developing the technologies to perform the integrity assessment of the pipeline, we also extended one of the industry standard approaches for performing the assessment of local thin areas that extend more in the circumferential direction than the longitudinal direction of the pipeline. This approach was presented to the API 579-1/AS ME FFS-1 steering committee in November 2021 for consideration in the next edition of the industry standard for Fitness-For-Service (expected to be released in 2023). To help pipeline operators make decisions with the results on any integrity assessment, we developed a new approach to the life-cycle management of pipelines which uses a Bayesian Decision Network. The network is designed to help pipeline operators plan and prioritize inspection activities and ultimately make smarter, more cost-effective decisions. The Bayesian approach accounts for all sources of uncertainty and carries them through to the final optimal decisions, providing a probabilistic framework for optimizing inspection intervals. The proof-of-concept networks developed in the feasibility study are complete, verified, and are focused on a subset of the pipeline. To expand this novel approach to the scale necessary for an entire network of pipelines in Phase II, we will leverage the DOE-funded Bengi solver for industrial-scale decision making with Bayesian Networks [22]. Once implemented, we will be able to provide the pipeline industry with a much-needed tool for optimal inspection planning using truly explainable artificial intelligence (XAI). To handle all of these advanced capabilities into a cloud-based platform, the architecture of the Equity Engineering Cloud (EEC) was extended to include Argo Workflows, a framework capable of distributing and managing a massive number of jobs that consume their own resources, such that thousands of serial finite element simulations can be run in parallel. As part of this substantial undertaking, we also integrated Argo Continuous Delivery (CD) into the EEC, to aid with the rapid prototyping and iterations that will be imperative to the success of the PipeSight platform’s Agile development process in Phase II. As part of the pipe stress analysis program, we also developed a custom visualizer that leverages the DOE-funded VTK visualization library. We added custom contouring capabilities and a means for interacting visually with both the inputs and outputs of the pipe stress analysis program. We also developed routines for automating the post-processing of the finite element simulations to determine if any failure criteria are met and to visualize the deformations, stresses and strains in ParaView using the exodus II file format (a subset of netCDF).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Studies for the requirements of automatic and remotely controlled shutoff valves on hazardous liquids and natural gas pipelines with respect to public and environmental safety

This study assesses the effectiveness of block valve closure swiftness in mitigating the consequences of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline releases on public and environmental safety. It also evaluates the technical, operational, and economic feasibility and potential cost benefits of installing automatic shutoff valves (ASVs) and remote control valves (RCVs) in newly constructed and fully replaced transmission lines. Risk analyses of hypothetical pipeline release scenarios are used as the basis for assessing: (1) fire damage to buildings and property in Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 high consequence areas (HCAs) caused by natural gas pipeline releases and subsequent ignition of the released natural gas; (2) fire damage to buildings and property in HCAs designated as high population areas and other populated areas caused by hazardous liquid pipeline releases and subsequent ignition of the released propane; and (3) socioeconomic and environmental damage in HCAs caused by hazardous liquid pipeline releases of crude oil. These risk analyses use engineering principles and fire science practices to characterize thermal radiation effects on buildings and humans and to quantify the total damage cost of socioeconomic and environmental impacts. The risk analysis approach used for natural gas pipelines is consistent with risk assessment standards developed by industry and incorporated into Federal pipeline safety regulations. Feasibility evaluations for the hypothetical pipeline release scenarios considered in this study show that installation of ASVs and RCVs in newly constructed and fully replaced natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines is technically, operationally, and economically feasible with a positive cost benefit. However, these results may not apply to all newly constructed and fully replaced pipelines because site-specific parameters that influence risk analyses and feasibility evaluations often vary significantly from one pipeline segment to another and may not be consistent with those considered in this study. Consequently, the technical, operational, and economic feasibility and potential cost benefits of installing ASVs and RCVs in newly constructed or fully replaced pipelines need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In theory, installing ASVs and RCVs in pipelines can be an effective strategy for mitigating potential consequences of unintended releases because decreasing the total volume of the release reduces overall impacts on the public and to the environment. However, block valve closure has no effect on preventing pipeline failure or stopping the product that remains inside the isolated pipeline segments from escaping into the environment. The benefits in terms of cost avoidance attributed to block valve closure swiftness increase as the time required to isolate the damaged transmission pipeline segment decreases. Block valve closure swiftness is most effective in mitigating damage resulting from a pipeline release and subsequent fire when the damaged pipeline segment is isolated and the thermal radiation produced by the fire declines in time so that emergency responders can safely begin fire fighting activities immediately upon arrival at the scene. Similarly, the avoided cost of socioeconomic and environmental damage for hazardous liquid pipeline releases without ignition increase as time required to isolate the damaged pipeline segment decreases.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Leakage Risk Assessment of CO{sub 2} Transportation by Pipeline at the Illinois Basin Decatur Project, Decatur, Illinois

The Illinois Basin Decatur Project (IBDP) is designed to confirm the ability of the Mt. Simon Sandstone, a major regional saline-water-bearing formation in the Illinois Basin, to store 1 million tons of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) injected over a period of three years. The CO{sub 2} will be provided by Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) from its Decatur, Illinois, ethanol plant. In order to transport CO{sub 2} from the capture facility to the injection well (also located within the ADM plant boundaries), a high-pressure pipeline of length 3,200 ft (975 m) has been constructed, running above the ground surface within the ADM plant footprint. We have qualitatively evaluated risks associated with possible pipeline failure scenarios that lead to discharge of CO{sub 2} within the real-world environment of the ADM plant in which there are often workers and visitors in the vicinity of the pipeline. There are several aspects of CO{sub 2} that make its transportation and potential leakage somewhat different from other substances, most notable is its non-flammability and propensity to change to solid (dry ice) upon strong decompression. In this study, we present numerical simulations using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) methods of the release and dispersion of CO{sub 2} from individual hypothetical pipeline failures (i.e., leaks). Failure frequency of the various components of a pipeline transportation system over time are taken from prior work on general pipeline safety and leakage modeling and suggest a 4.65% chance of some kind of pipeline failure over the three-years of operation. Following the Precautionary Principle (see below), we accounted for full-bore leakage scenarios, where the temporal evolution of the mass release rate from the high-pressure pipeline leak locations was simulated using a state-of-the-art Pipe model which considers the thermodynamic effects of decompression in the entire pipeline. Failures have been simulated at four representative locations along the pipeline route within the ADM plant. Leakage scenarios at sites along the route of the pipeline, where plant operations (e.g., vehicular and train transportation) seem to present a higher likelihood of accidental failure, for example due to vehicles or equipment crashing into the pipeline and completely severing it, were modeled by allowing them to have a double source consistent with the pipeline releasing high-pressure CO{sub 2} from both ends of the broken pipe after a full-bore offset rupture. Simulation results show that the built environment of the plant plays a significant role in the dispersion of the gas as leaking CO{sub 2} can impinge upon buildings and other infrastructure. In all scenarios simulated, the region of very high-concentration of CO{sub 2} is limited to a small area around the pipeline failure, suggesting the likelihood of widespread harmful CO{sub 2} exposure to plant personnel from pipeline leakage is low. An additional risk is posed by the blast wave that emanates from a high-pressure pipeline when it is breached quickly. We estimate the blast wave risk as low because it occurs only for a short time in the immediate vicinity of the rupture, and requires an instantaneous large-scale rupture to occur. We recommend consideration of signage and guard rails and posts to mitigate the likelihood of vehicles crashing into the pipeline. A standardized emergency response plan applicable to capture plants within industrial sites could be developed based on the IBDP that would be useful for other capture plants. Finally, we recommend carrying out coupled wellbore-reservoir blowout scenario modeling to understand the potential for hazardous conditions arising from an unexpected blowout at the wellhead.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

CO 2 Pipeline risk assessment and comparison for the midcontinent United States

For this work, a comprehensive quantitative risk assessment for the construction and operation of CO 2 transportation networks considered for the Midcontinent United States was conducted. The results showed risks associated with CO 2 pipelines were significantly less than those of other pipeline types. The assessment used four conceptual pipelines of different lengths to discuss risks operators may see. The assessment evaluated the risk associated with construction and operation using data from the US Occupational Safety Health Administration to determine the risk of injury or death for pipeline workers and data from the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration for CO 2 , natural gas distribution, natural gas transmission/gathering, and non-CO 2 hazardous liquid pipelines to develop quantitative likelihood and severity values leading to risk values. The data for the assessment covered incidents from 2010 to 2017 for CO 2 pipelines. The average risk for construction and 30 years of operation for four CO 2 pipeline configurations ranging between 79 and 1,546 miles in length was found. The construction and operational risk averaged between $\$1,400,521$ (approximately $\$0.02$/tonne of CO 2 ) for the shorter pipeline (79 miles) and $\$27,481,939$ (approximately $\$0.10$/tonne of CO 2 ) for a longer pipeline (1,546 miles). The largest risks of fatality for CO 2 pipelines comes from vehicle transport. The largest operational risk to the pipeline was due to leakage. Public pipeline opposition is also a significant risk; it was not quantified but is addressed.

03 NATURAL GAS↗