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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKIT FOR PLANT RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION

This paper presents the development of methods and tools that are being designed to optimize plant operations (e.g., maintenance/replacement schedules and optimal maintenance postures for plant components) in a manner that is more cost effective than current approaches and makes better use of available component health and cost data. These methods include both data- and model-based optimization methods. Model-based optimization methods directly include reliability and cost models to determine an optimal plant operational strategy. We consider gradient-based and evolutionary (based on genetic algorithms) optimization methods. The second class of methods target more specific use cases (e.g., project schedule optimization) and are not based on reliability models directly, but they require specific component reliability and cost data. This class of methods is based on variants of the knapsack problem with an aim to determine an optimal project schedule that maximizes the overall NPV. This paper also presents multi-objective methods designed to identify an optimal maintenance posture based on a Pareto frontier analysis. Rather than dictating the “right” tradeoff (i.e., identify the absolute best posture), we show how it is possible to perform a trade space exploration approach (i.e., identify value and costs of several postures and let the analysis account for desired value and cost metrics). This is performed by identifying maintenance postures that maximize value (e.g., system availability) and minimize operational costs, i.e., the Pareto frontier in a value-cost trade space. For all these methods we present detailed applicative examples that show their validity from a decision-making perspective.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Potential Ergonomic Injury Risk in the Nuclear Material Processing Glovebox Environment [Capstone Project]

Gloveboxes are isolation barriers that are used within many different industries such as pharmaceuticals, electronic parts fabrication, nuclear, and biological. The research on glovebox ergonomics is currently limited with few ergonomic professionals that focusing exclusively on glovebox working environments. There is existing documentation on occupational injuries, such as musculoskeletal disorders (MSD), sustained as a direct result of working in gloveboxes. The main elements that pose ergonomic risks to glovebox workers are operational repetition, duration, force, vibration, lifting heavy (more than 15lbs with two hands) objects, and awkward postures. This paper examines a small sample of the potential causal or risk factors that lead to the ergonomic injuries. A meta-analysis utilizing a random effect model is used to examine data from several studies which focus on, dexterity and strength changes as result of glove thickness, and robotic assistive technology as a means to improve postural mechanics. With the meta-analysis technique, similar data sets from different research studies can be coalesced into a single weighted, statistically significant result for subsequent consideration. The results from the analysis show that increased glove thickness results in decreased dexterity for operators thus increasing ergonomic risk factors such as task duration. It is also shown that glove thickness decreases grip strength but a similar decrease in pinch strength is not definitively demonstrated. With decreased grip strength, operators will need to exert more force (a known ergonomic risk factor) on processing tools, etc. during operations thus increasing the risk of ergonomic injury. The use of robotic assistive technology as a means to improve operator posture (risk factor) was also examined. Although it may be intuitively assumed that human-robotic collaboration would be beneficial in reducing risk factors, the result from this study’s analysis was not statistically significant. It is inferred that with additional directed research on this topic another study/analysis could be statistically significant demonstrating the benefits of the technology.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Physical Security of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize the security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD is leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions, including dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios are modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures are modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber Informed Engineering Cie Analysis Tool

Main Benefits: • Collaborate on assessment via the web and access and share assessments on your mobile device. • Helps you maximize your cybersecurity investment and resources • Saves you significant time and money by eliminating the requirement to research each government and industry standard in order to understand your cybersecurity posture • Contains easy to follow, step by step instructions to guide you through the process of identifying the cybersecurity posture of your organization • Provides a place to begin with cybersecurity improvement and a way to prioritize your tasks and budgets. • Covers all major cyber relevant topic areas for a comprehensive assessment of your organization’s cybersecurity posture. • Dives deep into the details of each topic area. • Contributes to the organization's risk management and decision-making process • Highlights vulnerabilities and gaps in your organization's IT and control systems. • Raises awareness and facilitates discussion on cybersecurity within your organization • Educates the controls system community on cyber security.

Hansen, Barry [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Id↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Flexible visualization of a 3rd party Intrusion Prevention (Security) tool: A use case with the ELK stack

A difficult aspect of cyber security is the ability to achieve automated real time intrusion prevention across various sets of systems. To this extent, several companies are offering comprehensive solutions that leverage an "accuracy of scale" and moving much of the intelligence and detection on the Cloud, relying on an ever-growing set of data and analytics to increase decision accuracy. Often, they provide tools to visualize the decision workflows in attack prevention (as well as tune the algorithm) but those solutions are not always practical as companies see the problem as "global" that is, from a unified Cyber-security standpoint. However, a key to a successful Cyber-security program is transparency and trust: from an experimental team viewpoint, this specifically means having the ability to immediately see what and from where, who has been blocked and being able to inform the community in case of a revoked access without the need for filing a "ticket" (that may eventually be answered) – in other words, rapid response to their user-base is essential but solutions targeting "sub-groups" in an organization are not often available. We have come up with a versatile solution leveraging the ELK stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, & Kibana) and an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) based WAF (Web Application Firewall) from Signal Sciences. Signal Science allows the streaming of detailed logs in a Logstash format suitable for custom solutions for visualization. By combining these two tools, we have strengthened our security posture and enabled individual experiments to monitor their own traffic. Specifically, the IPS WAF provides unique data such as country of origin, protocol, response code, source IP, and paths accessed. In this contribution, we will show how we engineered a visualization solution so experiment groups could access a dashboard with predefined graphs but also, where they can create individual customizable dashboards used to display blocked traffic and troubleshoot latency issues. We will discuss the details and procedures for developing and configuring these tools and how it benefits cyber security postures across our scientific based environment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Assessment for a Behind-the-Meter Solar PV System: A Use Case for the DER-CF

The world's energy production is shifting toward lower-cost, cleaner, more efficient, and sustainable sources. The increasing numbers of distributed energy resources (DERs) are allowing for the rapid transformation of electric grids toward achieving the goal of energy decarbonization. Along with cleaner and more efficient energy, however, we must also aim for a secure energy future. Solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are an important part of this transition. This paper discusses a cybersecurity risk assessment for behind-the-meter DERs using a solar PV system as a use case of the Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) developed by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. This poster presents a conference paper on the risk assessment processes and summarizes the DER-CF's use case recommendations to strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the electric grid.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2019

Demonstration of the Cybersecurity Framework through Real-world Cyber Attack

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity, provides five concurrent and continuous functions to Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover from cyber threats and vulnerabilities to buildings. Based on the core architecture and security best practices defined in the CSF guidelines, we developed the CSF webtools. The CSF webtools provide actionable functions that can be easily adopted by a facility operator to enhance their critical infrastructure security. The essence is captured in a set of “how-to” instructions for the facility operators to adopt, adapt, and apply to their critical infrastructure facilities. When considered together, these functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s cybersecurity risk management. The CSF webtools provide an easy to follow set of cybersecurity best practices, policies, and procedures to improve the cybersecurity posture of our nation’s buildings and other critical infrastructures. The CSF webtools are also designed to facilitate communication of cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive to operations levels. Finally, the CSF webtools allow the critical infrastructure operators to assess the overall cybersecurity maturity and posture. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the capabilities of the CSF webtools through an illustrative cyber-attack based on a real-world scenario.

cybersecurity framework, maturity model, critical ↗
DOE OSTI2025

FEMP Cybersecurity Arsenal

The FEMP Cyber Security Arsenal is a family of cyber security tools for the federal facility owners and operators. Using these tools, facility owners can evaluate their overall cybersecurity posture. These tools are web-based front-end tools. The tools are meant to help federal owners and operators to evaluate their overall cybersecurity posture. These tools are developed based on the NIST Cybersecurity framework, risk management framework, and DOE C2M2 architectures. Version 3 provides significant updates and features in ten areas

Ashley, Travis [Pacific Northwest National Laborat↗
DOE OSTI2021

Dose Coefficient Calculation for Use in Dosimetry Assessment of a Fission-Based Weapon

In the event of a fission-based weapon or improvised nuclear device (IND) detonation, dose coefficients can be harnessed to provide dose assessments for defense, emergency preparedness, and consequence management, as well as to prospectively inform the assessment of radiation biomarkers and development of medical prophylaxis countermeasures for defense and homeland security stakeholders and decision-makers. Although dose coefficients have previously been calculated for this group, they would apply specifically to the studied population, the 1945 Japanese cohort, after which their anthropomorphic computational phantoms were modeled. For this reason, applications to other populations may be limited, and instead, an assessment of a more standardized population is desired. We employed a series of computational human phantoms representing international reference individuals: UF/NCI voxel phantom series containing newborn, 1-, 5-, 10-, 15-, and 35-year-old males and females. Irradiation of the phantoms was simulated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code to determine organ dose coefficients under four idealized irradiation geometries at three distances from the detonation hypocenter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki using DS02 free-in-air prompt neutron and photon fluence spectra. Through these simulations, age-specific dose coefficients were determined for individual organs. Various articulated PIMAL stylized phantoms were simulated as well to estimate the effect of body posture on dose coefficients and determine the effect of posture on dosimetric estimation and reconstruction. Results additionally demonstrate that 137 Cs and the Watt fission spectra are not ideal general surrogate sources for fission weapons, which may be considered for experimental testing of medical countermeasures. Supplementary data provided tabulates the compilation of organ dose-rate coefficients in this study.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Land-Based Wind Reference Architecture

This report describes a summary and the final deliverables for the Wind Reference Architecture project funded by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Wind Energy Technology Office (WETO). The project objective was to further refine the reference architecture of the existing wind power plant reference architecture developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) by expanding the wind turbine generator (WTG) into a separate individual wind turbine reference architecture. Additional details regarding the wind turbine system and how it integrates with a wind power plant were researched and reflected in the reference architecture. This addition is important because it allows researchers to understand the components and devices in a wind turbine, how they function and how a wind turbine integrates into a wind power plant to be able to perform cybersecurity evaluations on the system. The communication and control systems were the focus while developing this reference architecture to understand the cybersecurity posture of a wind turbine and power plant. The information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems perspective are integral in helping improve the cybersecurity posture by creating a starting point to study how wind energy can be safely designed and deployed in our power grid from an integrated systems standpoint. A holistic wind power plant and turbine reference architecture and simulation was developed and made open-sourced for further research efforts.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗
DOE OSTI2020

INTEGRATION OF FLEX EQUIPMENT AND OPERATOR ACTIONS IN PLANT FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELS WITH DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

The overall operation and maintenance cost to protect nuclear power plants accounts for approximately 7% of the total cost of power generation, with labor accounting for half of this cost. In the current research, from interaction with utilities and other stakeholders, it was determined that physical security forces account for nearly 20% of the entire workforce at several nuclear power plants. Labor costs continue to rise in the U.S., so any measures to reduce the cost of operating a nuclear power plant will need to include a reduction in labor. The physical security pathway within the DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability program aims to lower the cost of physical security through directed research into modeling and simulation, application of advanced sensors or deployment of advanced weapons. This report presents a modeling and simulation framework for integrating Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX) portable equipment performance with Force on Force models of a plant’s physical security posture. The generic framework is described in detail, followed by a case study of modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical nuclear power plant. Two different FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial Force on Force tool are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in INL’s dynamic modeling tool EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework integrating FLEX equipment with Force on Force models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Methodology and Application of Physical Security Effectiveness Based on Dynamic Force-on-Force Modeling

This report describes the research and development being performed at INL towards a dynamic modeling and simulation framework to enable physical security optimization at commercial nuclear power plants. The framework is based on the dynamic modeling tool EMRALD and is demonstrated for applications that can result in physical security optimization. Two main applications are presented: 1. Integrating FLEX portable equipment performance with FOF models of a plant’s physical security posture, and 2. Location optimization of bullet resistant enclosure. The generic framework for modeling FLEX portable equipment is described in detail, followed by a case study modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical PWR. Two distinct FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial FOF tool, AVERT, are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. Thermal-hydraulic analysis of FLEX performance is performed in RELAP5 and integrated with the EMRALD simulations to provide more realistic timelines in the models. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security. The objective of location optimization of BRE is to determine the best location in the plant for a new BRE being planned by the plant to enhance their physical security effectiveness. The plant physical security FOF model is integrated with EMRALD that performs Monte Carlo simulation to run different attack scenarios and a discrete set of potential BRE locations. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine the most effective location for the BRE. The optimization approach can be extended to wide applications such as location optimization of remotely operated weapons and other strategic fixed assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS BASED ON DYNAMIC FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELING

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants (NPPs). It reviews the conservatisms in conventional physical security posture and regulations. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The dynamic assessment methodology leverages EMRALD to process results of force-on-force (FOF) simulations and crediting safety mitigation actions from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models as well as diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) mitigation strategies. Timing information from these simulations are compared against the available time to perform mitigations obtained from Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5) simulations. To illustrate the methodology, a station blackout (SBO) attack scenario was modeled in commercially available FOF simulation tools. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes and as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD, and were dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. RELAP5 simulations incorporating human and hardware uncertainties were performed to estimate the distribution of time-to-core damage. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, plant mitigation strategies provide significantly high-likelihood of preventing radiological release. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗