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A Computuerized Operator Support System Prototype

A report was published by the Idaho National Laboratory in September of 2012, entitled Design to Achieve Fault Tolerance and Resilience, which described the benefits of automating operator actions for transients. The report identified situations in which providing additional automation in lieu of operator actions would be advantageous. It recognized that managing certain plant upsets is sometimes limited by the operator’s ability to quickly diagnose the fault and to take the needed actions in the time available. Undoubtedly, technology is underutilized in the nuclear power industry for operator assistance during plant faults and operating transients. In contrast, other industry sectors have amply demonstrated that various forms of operator advisory systems can enhance operator performance while maintaining the role and responsibility of the operator as the independent and ultimate decision-maker. A computerized operator support system (COSS) is proposed for use in nuclear power plants to assist control room operators in addressing time-critical plant upsets. A COSS is a collection of technologies to assist operators in monitoring overall plant performance and making timely, informed decisions on appropriate control actions for the projected plant condition. The COSS does not supplant the role of the operator, but rather provides rapid assessments, computations, and recommendations to reduce workload and augment operator judgment and decision-making during fast-moving, complex events. This project proposes a general model for a control room COSS that addresses a sequence of general tasks required to manage any plant upset: detection, validation, diagnosis, recommendation, monitoring, and recovery. The model serves as a framework for assembling a set of technologies that can be interrelated to assist with each of these tasks. A prototype COSS has been developed in order to demonstrate the concept and provide a test bed for further research. The prototype is based on four underlying elements consisting of a digital alarm system, computer-based procedures, PI&D system representations, and a recommender module for mitigation actions. At this point, the prototype simulates an interface to a sensor validation module and a fault diagnosis module. These two modules will be fully integrated in the next version of the prototype. The initial version of the prototype is now operational at the Idaho National Laboratory using the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Human Systems Simulation Laboratory (HSSL). The HSSL is a full-scope, full-scale glass top simulator capable of simulating existing and future nuclear power plant main control rooms. The COSS is interfaced to the Generic Pressurized Water Reactor (gPWR) simulator with industry-typical control board layouts. The glass top panels display realistic images of the control boards that can be operated by touch gestures. A section of the simulated control board was dedicated to the COSS human-system interface (HSI), which resulted in a seamless integration of the COSS into the normal control room environment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DCIS integration tests for Lungmen nuclear power plant - 370

The factory acceptance tests (FAT) for distributed control and information systems (DCIS) of Lungmen nuclear power plant (LMNPP) Units 1 and 2 were separately performed by individual suppliers for their supplied scopes. The FAT also included overlap interface tests between the separately supplied scopes, but did not include an overall integration test. There were concerned by the regulator and the public over the lack of an integration test, which was believed to be indispensable to verify the correctness and completeness of a digital system of such large scale ever applied by Taiwan Power Company (Taipower). To address these concerns and enhance confidence in the DCIS, the DCIS integration tests, including reactor water level integration test, reactor pressure integration test, integration test for turbine generator and reactor protection system, integration test for proper plant response to safety and non-safety network equipment failures, and DCIS dynamic integration test, were performed at site during Unit 1| site tests. It is to be noted that these tests were beyond the post construction tests, the pre-operational tests, and the start-up tests, which are the normal industry practice and formally required by the regulator. A common goal for these integration tests is to verify the capability of the DCIS to transmit signal/data properly across various suppliers' equipment to actuate the final equipment. The methods and principle, the test purpose/test items/acceptance criteria and the test results for these tests are described. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Design of Critical Experiments Targeting Epithermal Cross Sections of Tantalum

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are collaborating to develop a capability to test the epithermal/intermediate cross sections of tantalum (Ta) at the SNL critical experiments facility using the Seven Percent Critical Experiment (7uPCX) fuel. The Sandia Critical Experiments (SCX) Program provides a specialized facility for performing water moderated and reflected critical experiments with UO 2 fuel rod arrays. A history of safe reactor operations and flexibility in reactor core configuration has resulted in the completion of several benchmark critical experiment evaluations that are published in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. The critical experiments described here are scheduled to be performed at SCX in fiscal year 2023. Currently, fabrication details for the needed new equipment are being finalized for completion of the procurement process. The experiments will then be executed and documented for publication consideration by the ICSBEP.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Software Dependability for Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants - Lessons Learnt from a DOE Sponsored Project

This paper discusses the lessons learnt from a sponsored study undertaken under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy by a team of scientists at the Ohio State University in collaboration with Technology Resources and experts around the world. This paper makes recommendations for future research and studies based on these lessons learnt. The purpose of the research was to provide a software dependability quantification framework that would allow its evaluation along the software development life cycle for safety critical instrumentation and control systems (I and C) such as those found in nuclear power plants. A typical example of safety critical system is the reactor protection system. The research funded by the Department of Energy built on preliminary research carried out for the US NRC that had focused solely on software reliability quantification. Quantification of software dependability is important for safety critical I and C because the regulatory framework in use in the United States for nuclear power plants is risk informed. Quantification of risk requires quantification of all contributors to risk and those include instrumentation and control systems. The purpose of the study was to help developers of software-based I and C with an early evaluation of the potential risk an application would represent at different stages of the software development life cycle by building gates at the end of each life cycle phase. Life cycle phases of software development comprehend phases such as requirements, design, coding and test. The gates' function would be to stop development from moving forward if the assessed dependability objective for that phase were not met. Gates thresholds were to be defined based on measurements collected during the life cycle phase under evaluation and phases that preceded it and an understanding of the mechanisms that would lead to threatening the dependability objectives. The information contained in the gates would in addition help steer the development towards areas that needed improvement. The following are four high level conclusions to our study. First the study demonstrates a lack of consensus on mechanisms that will threaten the dependability attributes. This lack of consensus should be resolved. The lack of consensus appears for all measures to the exception of reliability. Second, measures should be developed for software availability and safety. Third, for all dependability attributes (with the exception of reliability) consistency of the measurement threads should evaluated and measurement-based development gates derived. Finally our ability to perform such type of research depends in a significant manner on access to vendor and/or utility data. The licensing environment and the first-of-a-kind nature of current software-based applications for nuclear I and C make it difficult to collect the relevant data. An approach which would either increase access to data by providing 'immunity' to the vendor or utility or the development of a software-based I and C for the sole purpose of data collection for research should be investigated. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Identification and repair of intermittent cable faults in nuclear power plants - 131

The nuclear industry uses cable circuits as an integral part of a plant's reactor protection system (RPS), instrumentation and control (I and C) and power distribution systems. The reliability of these systems is critical for continued operation of the world's aging nuclear fleet, as well as for safe shutdown of the reactor. When intermittent faults occur in cable circuits, the symptom of the problem often appears and disappears in milliseconds while the aftereffects can result in spurious alarms and automatic actuation of safety systems. Problems are compounded when component degradation causes a cable circuit to transmit inaccurate information that does not represent actual plant operating conditions. The root cause of intermittent cable circuit operation can include degradation of cable and connectors from heat, humidity, radiation, and vibration. Unlike hard faults (which are constant open or short circuits), intermittent faults are defined as a temporary change in impedance that may only last for a few milliseconds. While less disruptive than hard faults, signal spiking from intermittent faults can often lead to alarm conditions and reactor trips. A soft fault is defined as a subtle variation the electrical characteristics of the circuit that still permit the continued operation of the circuit. A soft fault may be a precursor to a hard fault due to continued degradation of the fault over time. The focus of this paper is the description of a cable testing system that can be connected to an active, low frequency circuit and continuously monitor electrical characteristics using the time domain reflectometry (TDR) technique until an intermittent impedance change occurs. This technique uses the difference in frequency response of the circuit and the TDR to isolate the TDR signature from the active circuit data . When a momentary impedance change occurs that exceeds a preconfigured limit threshold, the distance to fault data is automatically overlaid with the healthy baseline reference and stored in a database for diagnosis and repair. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Finite-Test-Case Development to Demonstrate Logical Integrity of Software in DRPS

Reactor protection system (RPS) in nuclear power plant (NPP) is in the process of digitalization in response to advanced features of digital systems. In this context, software integrity in the RPS becomes an important issue since it may cause common-cause failure. Therefore, to guarantee the safety of NPPs, the integrity of the software need to be properly demonstrated or assessed. There are three typical approaches for software reliability quantification: software reliability growth model (SRGM), Bayesian belief network (BBN), and test-based method. Basically, SRGM is difficult to apply to the safety-critical software because not only sufficient failure sets are unavailable but consequence of system failure is also unacceptable. Then the result obtained through the BBN model may have large uncertainty, so it produces difficulties in integrity demonstration of safety-critical software. Thus, the BBN result need to be complemented or verified by test-based method. Currently, for the integrity demonstration of safety-critical software, black-box test which feeds inputs and examines just outputs whether they succeeded or failed is considered based on trajectory-form-of-input (a series of successive values for the input variables that occur during the operation of the software over time). Usually these trajectory-inputs are randomly sampled from operational profile. In this approach, however, there are some practical difficulties. Therefore, we proposed a new test method for safety-critical software in digitalized reactor protection system (DRPS). The main contents described in this paper are about basic concepts under development of finite-test-cases by which the integrity of the software logic can be verified. It should be noted that the influence of the environments, such as operating system and other hardware, are not considered since the method focuses on software logic only. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NRC technical basis for evaluation of its position on protection against common cause failure in digital systems used in nuclear power plants - 378

Digital technology has advantages over analog systems, including automated monitoring and alerts for standby safety functions, and predictive algorithms to maintain critical safety systems. Additionally, digital technology generally has higher reliability and can be designed to reduce single point vulnerabilities. For these reasons many nuclear plants have applied digital technology to safety and non-safety related applications, including reactor protection system, feedwater and turbine controls, etc. with a corresponding significant improvement in trip reduction. Nonetheless, digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems also present potential new vulnerabilities that need to be assessed, including potential failures due to increased complexity of digital systems, the introduction of unique failure modes due to software (including software common cause failure (CCF)), and limited operating history of digital systems in nuclear safety related applications compared to analog systems. The fact that software is intangible means that common methods, such as analysis or testing, used for detecting CCF may not be effective when applied to software. Consequently, digital technology is perceived to pose a potential risk from the introduction of undetected systematic faults that could result in CCF. Despite the I and C system upgrades and modifications performed to date, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry stakeholders have identified the need to modernize the regulatory infrastructure to efficiently address risks associated with the use of digital technology for nuclear safety applications and address regulatory uncertainties. The NRC's current position on CCF is guided by the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) on SECY 93-087. The SRM provides specific acceptance criteria for the evaluation of CCF, which the staff implemented in the Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19. However, industry stakeholders have proposed using methods to characterize the likelihood of software CCF and eliminate it from further consideration in a defense-in-depth and diversity analysis. The NRC's current position does not consider these alternatives, and thus corresponding acceptance criteria is not currently available. The work discussed in this paper assesses the underlying technical basis associated with CCF, provides technical support for updating the NRC position and considers proposed methods for addressing potential CCF in digital systems while enhancing efficiency, clarity, and confidence. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Importance Ranking of Software Dependability Attributes in the Nuclear Industry

With the current transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants, the number and variety of software-based systems has significantly increased. Due to the sophisticated nature and the increasing complexity of software, a significant challenge faced by the nuclear industry is the trust one can place in software-based systems once they have been developed. The trust placed in software is typically termed software dependability, a qualifier which encompasses different attributes such as software reliability, safety, security, availability and maintainability. It is recognized that these attributes relate to each other in different ways under various scenarios. The detailed dependencies between software dependability attributes can be found in a previous study. With limited time and budget resources, which dependability attribute should be given the highest priority when certifying software-based systems in the nuclear industry is a fundamental question that needs to be answered. This paper addresses this problem using stakeholders' opinion elicitation. A comprehensive questionnaire was designed to elicit the goals that should be fulfilled by the nuclear industry and to collect the relative importance of the various dependability attributes for each goal. We then used the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to analyze the data and obtained the relative importance ranking of software dependability attributes in the context of a reactor protection system. The results will provide guidance to resource allocation for the certification of software dependability in the nuclear industry. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Lectin Receptor-Like Kinases: The Sensor and Mediator at the Plant Cell Surface

Lectin receptor-like kinases (LecRLKs), a plant-specific receptor-like kinase (RLK) sub-family, have been recently found to play crucial roles in plant development and responses to abiotic and biotic stresses. In this review, we first describe the classification and structures of Lectin RLKs. Then we focus on the analysis of functions of LecRLKs in various biological processes and discuss the status of LecRLKs from the ligands they recognize, substrate they target, signaling pathways they are involved in, to the overall regulation of growth-defense tradeoffs. LecRLKs and the signaling components they interact with constitute recognition and protection systems at the plant cell surface contributing to the detection of environmental changes monitoring plant fitness.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Safety Analysis Code System, Version 5

The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 computer code is developed by Argonne National Laboratory for thermal, hydraulic, and neutronic analysis of power and flow transients in liquidmetal- cooled nuclear reactors (LMRs). SAS4A was developed to analyze severe core disruption accidents with coolant boiling and fuel melting and relocation, initiated by a very low probability coincidence of an accident precursor and failure of one or more safety systems. SASSYS-1, originally developed to address loss-of-decay-heat-removal accidents, has evolved into a tool for margin assessment in design basis accident (DBA) analysis and for consequence assessment in beyond-design-basis accident (BDBA) analysis. SAS4A contains detailed, mechanistic models of transient thermal, hydraulic, neutronic, and mechanical phenomena to describe the response of the reactor core, its coolant, fuel elements, and structural members to accident conditions. The core channel models in SAS4A provide the capability to analyze the initial phase of core disruptive accidents, through coolant heat-up and boiling, fuel element failure, and fuel melting and relocation. Originally developed to analyze oxide fuel clad with stainless steel, the models in SAS4A have been extended and specialized to metallic fuel with advanced alloy cladding. SASSYS-1 provides the capability to perform a detailed thermal/hydraulic simulation of the primary and secondary sodium coolant circuits and the balance-ofplant steam/water circuit. These sodium and steam circuit models include component models for heat exchangers, pumps, valves, turbines, and condensers, and thermal/hydraulic models of pipes and plena. SASSYS-1 also contains a plant protection and control system modeling capability, which provides digital representations of reactor, pump, and valve controllers and their response to input signal changes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Graded approach for assessing digital system failure susceptibilities - 305

Owner/operators of nuclear plants must be able to identify and assess susceptibilities to digital system failures and unintended behaviors that could lead to plant system malfunctions, including common-cause failures (CCFs) of multiple controlled components that may impact overall plant safety. Nuclear plant designers and regulators often assess and manage potential failure modes by assuming the failure occurs and showing by analysis that the results are acceptable. In 2016 EPRI published a guideline on Methods for Assuring Safety and Dependability when Applying Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems (EPRI 3002005326), which takes a more holistic approach that considers digital system failure modes from the perspective of their impact on plant risk and includes a graded approach based on safety significance. This paper describes that graded approach. The methodology in EPRI 3002005326 systematically identifies potential I and C vulnerabilities that could lead to significant malfunctions of controlled components and systems, including common-cause failures (CCF), and discusses in detail methods to protect against them. It considers both preventive measures that reduce the likelihood of failures, and plant systems and features that mitigate the effects of component failures and misbehaviors. Coping analysis is then performed as appropriate to provide additional assurance of protection. The safety significance based graded approach is an important feature in that it can help users focus attention on overall plant safety, including potentially risk-significant scenarios that might not be considered in traditional safety analyses. The purpose is to help the user ensure that modifications to the I and C that could potentially be safety significant are treated appropriately and at the same time not waste valuable resources on excessive protection against changes that have little or no impact on safety. The graded approach allows the design engineer to tailor the rigor of the preventive, limiting, and mitigative measures commensurately with the effects the I and C modification has on overall plant safety. The graded approach focuses on safety significance impact, which is effectively a qualitative measure of the potential change in safety (or risk) caused by a proposed I and C modification, as compared to the I and C that is being replaced. Safety significance impact should not be confused with importance to safety or risk significance. It is possible that an upgrade to safety-related and/or risk-significant I and C systems may have little or no safety significant impact and vice versa. The approach considers three factors that influence the impact on safety significance of a proposed I and C modification: context, likelihood of failure, and consequences of failure. The most significant of the three factors is context - what the I and C is connected to, both directly and indirectly, including its potential effects on plant systems that respond to transients or accidents. The graded approach is particularly helpful in assessing potential CCFs resulting from digital I and C failures, and shows why the most problematic CCFs will be those that can affect multiple plant systems. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗

Nuclear Power Plant Physical Protection Recommendation Document

This document is aimed at providing guidance to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security’s (INS) country and regional teams for implementing effective physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) to prevent the radiological consequences of sabotage. This recommendation document includes input from the Physical Protection Functional Team (PPFT), the Response Functional Team (RFT), and the Sabotage Functional Team (SFT) under INS. Specifically, this document provides insights into increasing and sustaining physical protection capabilities at INS partner countries’ NPP sites. Nuclear power plants should consider that the intent of this document is to provide a historical context as well as technologies and methodologies that may be applied to improve physical protection capabilities. It also refers to relevant guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Control and Protection system Design Methods for Modular HTGRs

The project supported the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in identifying and evaluating the regulatory implications concerning the control and protection systems proposed for use in the Department of Energy's (DOE) Next-Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP). The NGNP, using modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technology, is to provide commercial industries with electricity and high-temperature process heat for industrial processes such as hydrogen production. Process heat temperatures range from 700 to 950 C, and for the upper range of these operation temperatures, the modular HTGR is sometimes referred to as the Very High Temperature Reactor or VHTR. Initial NGNP designs are for operation in the lower temperature range. The defining safety characteristic of the modular HTGR is that its primary defense against serious accidents is to be achieved through its inherent properties of the fuel and core. Because of its strong negative temperature coefficient of reactivity and the capability of the fuel to withstand high temperatures, fast-acting active safety systems or prompt operator actions should not be required to prevent significant fuel failure and fission product release. The plant is designed such that its inherent features should provide adequate protection despite operational errors or equipment failure. Figure 1 shows an example modular HTGR layout (prismatic core version), where its inlet coolant enters the reactor vessel at the bottom, traversing up the sides to the top plenum, down-flow through an annular core, and exiting from the lower plenum (hot duct). This research provided NRC staff with (a) insights and knowledge about the control and protection systems for the NGNP and VHTR, (b) information on the technologies/approaches under consideration for use in the reactor and process heat applications, (c) guidelines for the design of highly integrated control rooms, (d) consideration for modeling of control and protection system designs for VHTR, and (e) input for developing the bases for possible new regulatory guidance to assist in the review of an NGNP license application. This NRC project also evaluated reactor and process heat application plant simulation models employed in the protection and control system designs for various plant operational modes and accidents, including providing information about the models themselves, and the appropriateness of the application of the models for control and protection system studies. A companion project for the NRC focused on the potential for new instrumentation that would be unique to modular HTGRs, as compared to light-water reactors (LWRs), due to both the higher temperature ranges and the inherent safety features.

08 HYDROGEN↗

The Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant Sustainability Program of Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting System Upgrades

UEIP has been working on a comprehensive sustainability program that includes establishing a site sustainability working group, information gathering, planning, organizing, developing schedule and estimated costs, trhough joint UEIP-US DOE/NNSA National Laboratory sustainability contracts. Considerable efforts have been necessary in the sustainability planning, monitoring, and control of the scope of work using tools such as Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Project and SAP R/3. While information interchanges within the sustainability program provides adequate US assurances that US funds are well spent through its quarterly reporting methodology, proper information security and protection measures are taken throughout the process. Decommissioning of outdated equipment has also become part of determining sustainability requirements and processes. The site’s sustainability program has facilitated the development of a transition plan toward eventual full Russian funding of sustaining nuclear security upgrades.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AP1000{sup R} design robustness against extreme external events - Seismic, flooding, and aircraft crash

Both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) require existing and new nuclear power plants to conduct plant assessments to demonstrate the unit's ability to withstand external hazards. The events that occurred at the Fukushima-Dai-ichi nuclear power station demonstrated the importance of designing a nuclear power plant with the ability to protect the plant against extreme external hazards. The innovative design of the AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant provides unparalleled protection against catastrophic external events which can lead to extensive infrastructure damage and place the plant in an extended abnormal situation. The AP1000 plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance and safety. The plant's compact safety related footprint and protection provided by its robust nuclear island structures prevent significant damage to systems, structures, and components required to safely shutdown the plant and maintain core and spent fuel pool cooling and containment integrity following extreme external events. The AP1000 nuclear power plant has been extensively analyzed and reviewed to demonstrate that it's nuclear island design and plant layout provide protection against both design basis and extreme beyond design basis external hazards such as extreme seismic events, external flooding that exceeds the maximum probable flood limit, and malicious aircraft impact. The AP1000 nuclear power plant uses fail safe passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems (such as AC power, component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC). The plant has been designed to protect systems, structures, and components critical to placing the reactor in a safe shutdown condition within the steel containment vessel which is further surrounded by a substantial 'steel concrete' composite shield building. The containment vessel is not affected by external flooding, and the shield building design provides hazard protection beyond that provided by a comparable reinforced concrete structure. The intent of this paper is to demonstrate the robustness of the AP1000 design against extreme events. The paper will focus on the plants ability to withstand extreme external events such as beyond design basis flooding, seismic events, and malicious aircraft impact. The paper will highlight the robustness of the AP1000 nuclear island design including the protection provided by the unique AP1000 composite shield building. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Overview of the preliminary design of the ITER plasma control system

An overview of the Preliminary Design of the ITER Plasma Control System (PCS) is described here, which focusses on the needs for 1st plasma and early plasma operation in hydrogen/helium (H/He) up to a plasma current of 15 MA with moderate auxiliary heating power in low confinement mode (L-mode). Candidate control schemes for basic magnetic control, including divertor operation and kinetic control of the electron density with gas puffing and pellet injection, were developed. Commissioning of the auxiliary heating systems is included as well as support functions for stray field topology and real-time plasma boundary reconstruction. Initial exception handling schemes for faults of essential plant systems and for disruption protection were developed. The PCS architecture was also developed to be capable of handling basic control for early commissioning and the advanced control functions that will be needed for future high performance operation. A plasma control simulator is also being developed to test and validate control schemes. To handle the complexity of the ITER PCS, a systems engineering approach has been adopted with the development of a plasma control database to keep track of all control requirements.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Evaluation of Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the DC Distribution System at a Nuclear Power Plant

Inherent in designing and maintaining short-circuit protection in a DC distribution system protection is knowing what the contributions are from the station battery and battery charger(s), the major sources of direct current to a fault on the DC distribution system. There is an extensive amount of literature dealing with this subject in the form of industry guidance or standards, journal articles, and test reports. The purpose of this BNL technical report is to review these sources and summarize the information that is relevant to better understanding the expected contributions from batteries and battery chargers in response to a fault on a DC distribution system at a nuclear power plant.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗