Re-Engineering the Systems Engineering Process at JPL
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There are over 40 subsystems being developed for the future SLS and Orion Launch Systems at Kennedy Space Center. These subsystems are developed at the Kennedy Space Center Engineering Directorate. The Engineering Directorate at Kennedy Space Center follows a comprehensive design process which requires several different product deliverables during each phase of each of the subsystems. This Presentation describes this process with examples of where the process has been applied.
Moore’s “law” was the observation that the number of transistors in an integrated circuit doubled approximately every two years. This trend has distinctly failed to hold in recent years. The death of Moore’s law has left researchers and practitioners in the computational sciences searching for technologies to provide the speedups formerly supported by Moore’s law. Previously overlooked chip architectures and other computing technologies are now receiving more development resources. Critically, these technologies are gaining more mature software support, opening their adoption by researchers in algorithms and applications. In this article, we review some of these computing technologies, their relationship with various algorithms and applications, and their potential benefits (or pitfalls). We close with recommendations for future work by the process systems engineering community specifically.
There are over 40 subsystems being developed for the future SLS and Orion Launch Systems at Kennedy Space Center. These subsystems developed at the Kennedy Space Center Engineering Directorate follow a comprehensive design process which requires several different product deliverables during each phase of each of the subsystems. This Paper describes this process and gives an example of where the process has been applied.
Optimizing performance on work activities and processes requires metrics of performance for management to monitor and analyze in order to support further improvements in efficiency, effectiveness, safety, reliability and cost. Information systems are therefore required to assist management in making timely, informed decisions regarding these work processes and activities. Currently information systems regarding Space Shuttle maintenance and servicing do not exist to make such timely decisions. The work to be presented details a system which incorporates various automated and intelligent processes and analysis tools to capture organize and analyze work process related data, to make the necessary decisions to meet KSC organizational goals. The advantages and disadvantages of design alternatives to the development of such a system will be discussed including technologies, which would need to bedesigned, prototyped and evaluated.
This paper will provide background on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) ARMD Test Data Portal (ATDP) effort along with the rationale that motivated the ATDP team to consider implementing an agile systems engineering (SE) process. The primary motivation for using this new SE process was based on the desire to mitigate a major risk to project success. Since the agile SE process had never been used before at the NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC), utilizing this new SE process required a trailblazing effort to introduce it to NASA AFRC leadership. As a result, the ATDP team chose to adhere to the agile SE process in addition to the trusted classical waterfall SE process on ATDP. Through successful execution of this hybrid SE process during Phase I, along with demonstrating the value and rigor of the agile SE process, NASA AFRC leadership ultimately permitted the ATDP project to solely use the agile SE process for developments beyond Phase I. While it is the opinion of the authors that the classical SE process is more effective for most projects at NASA AFRC, some projects may deem that the agile SE process is more advantageous. Although this paper is focused on introducing the agile SE process to NASA AFRC, lessons learned will be valuable to other organizations as well. Details of how the ATDP team implemented the agile SE process during Phase I will be summarized, along with how the team met all required classical SE milestones. Lessons learned throughout Phase I of this effort will also be highlighted.
The System-Wide Safety project at NASA is developing the concept and a subset of supporting technologies for evolving safety management from a post-accident iterative improvement on safety performed by large commercial operators only to predictive and increasingly autonomous safety functions that are performed during operations across vehicles, airports, and services. The system of interest is the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), recommended by the National Academies for NASA to develop the concept in coordination with the broad and diverse community of stakeholders in aviation safety. Because the system context is the airspace and aviation industry, it is important to create and maintain traceability from the research work and system architecture elements developed at NASA to community-created roadmaps and aviation agency guidance.
The essential elements of the design process consist of the mission definition phase that provides the system requirements, the conceptual design, the preliminary design and finally the detailed design. Mission definition is performed largely by operations analysts in conjunction with the customer. The result of their study is handed off to the systems engineers for documentation as the systems requirements. The document that provides these requirements is the basis for the further design work of the design engineers at the Lockheed-Georgia Company. The design phase actually begins with conceptual design, which is generally conducted by a small group of engineers using multidisciplinary design programs. Because of the complexity of the design problem, the analyses are relatively simple and generally dependent on parametric analyses of the configuration. The result of this phase is a baseline configuration from which preliminary design may be initiated.
Testing has long been recognized as a critical component of spacecraft development activities - yet many major systems failures may have been prevented with more rigorous testing programs. The question is why is more testing not being conducted? Given unlimited resources, more testing would likely be included in a spacecraft development program. Striking the right balance between too much testing and not enough has been a long-term challenge for many industries. The objective of this paper is to discuss some of the barriers, enablers, and best practices for developing and sustaining a strong test program and testing team. This paper will also explore the testing decision factors used by managers; the varying attitudes toward testing; methods to develop strong test engineers; and the influence of behavior, culture and processes on testing programs. KEY WORDS: Risk, Integration and Test, Validation, Verification, Test Program Development
A scheme based on starting the logic networks from the development and mission factors that are of primary concern in an aerospace system is described. This approach required identifying the primary states (design, design verification, premission, mission, postmission), identifying the attributes within each state (performance capability, survival, evaluation, operation, etc), and then developing the generic relationships of variables for each branch. To illustrate this concept, a system was used that involved a launch vehicle and payload for an earth orbit mission. Examination showed that this example was sufficient to illustrate the concept. A more complicated mission would follow the same basic approach, but would have more extensive sets of generic trees and more correlation points between branches. It has been shown that in each system state (production, test, and use), a logic could be developed to order and classify the parameters involved in the translation from general requirements to specific requirements for system elements.
A detailed description and explanation of the operational availability parameter is presented. The fundamental mathematical basis for operational availability is developed, and its relationship to a system's overall performance effectiveness is illustrated within the context of identifying specific availability requirements. Thus, in attempting to provide a general methodology for treating both hypothetical and existing availability requirements, the concept of an availability state, in conjunction with the more conventional probability-time capability, is investigated. In this respect, emphasis is focused upon a balanced analytical and pragmatic treatment of operational availability within the system design process. For example, several applications of operational availability to typical aerospace systems are presented, encompassing the techniques of Monte Carlo simulation, system performance availability trade-off studies, analytical modeling of specific scenarios, as well as the determination of launch-on-time probabilities. Finally, an extensive bibliography is provided to indicate further levels of depth and detail of the operational availability parameter.
The COBRA Prototype Main Engine Development Project was an endeavor conducted as a joint venture between Pratt & Whitney and Aerojet to conduct risk reduction in LOX/LH2 main engine technology for the NASA Space Launch Initiative (SLI). During the seventeen months of the project (April 2001 to September 2002), approximately seventy reviews were conducted, beginning with the Engine Systems Requirements Review (SRR) and ending with the Engine Systems Interim Design Review (IDR). This paper discusses some of the system engineering practices used to support the reviews and the overall engine development effort.
The objective is to look at optimization as it applies to the design process at a large aircraft company. The design process at Lockheed-Georgia is described. Some examples of the impact that optimization has had on that process are given, and then some areas that must be considered if optimization is to be successful and supportive in the total design process are indicated. Optimization must continue to be sold and this selling is best done by consistent good performance. For this good performance to occur, the future approaches must be clearly thought out so that the optimization methods solve the problems that actually occur during design. The visibility of the design process must be maintained as further developments are proposed. Careful attention must be given to the management of data in the optimization process, both for technical reasons and for administrative purposes. Finally, to satisfy program needs, provisions must be included to supply data to support program decisions, and to communicate with design processes outside of the optimization process. If designers fail to adequately consider all of these needs, the future acceptance of optimization will be impeded.
This summer I was given several opportunities at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC). The first opportunity was given to me by a Senior Propulsion Engineer, Kurtt Kloesel, to work in a specialized engineering discipline. My task was to research the Pratt & Whitney J58 engine that was used on the SR-71 Blackbird. I entered the data I collected into engine modeling software programs in order to receive certain outputs, such as net thrust. I also had to take a "crash course" in propulsion in order to better understand the research I was performing. To facilitate my understanding of propulsion principals and formulas, I worked many problems out of thermodynamics and propulsion textbooks and entered the given values of various situations into the modeling software.
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The past several decades have seen the rise of large, highly interactive systems that are on the forward edge of technology. As a result of this growth and the increased usage of digital systems (computers and software), the concept of systems engineering has gained increasing attention. Some of this attention is no doubt due to large program failures which possibly could have been avoided, or at least mitigated, through the use of systems engineering principles. The complexity of modern day weapon systems requires conscious application of systems engineering concepts to ensure producible, operable and supportable systems that satisfy mission requirements. Although many authors have traced the roots of systems engineering to earlier dates, the initial formalization of the systems engineering process for military development began to surface in the mid-1950s on the ballistic missile programs. These early ballistic missile development programs marked the emergence of engineering discipline 'specialists' which has since continued to grow. Each of these specialties not only has a need to take data from the overall development process, but also to supply data, in the form of requirements and analysis results, to the process. A number of technical instructions, military standards and specifications, and manuals were developed as a result of these development programs. In particular, MILSTD-499 was issued in 1969 to assist both government and contractor personnel in defining the systems engineering effort in support of defense acquisition programs. This standard was updated to MIL-STD499A in 1974, and formed the foundation for current application of systems engineering principles to military development programs.
This paper investigates the oversimplification of the inherently complex systems engineering process in space life support. The standard systems engineering process steps are described. The International Space Station (ISS) life support system is explained with its goals and performance criteria. Although it is not usually emphasized, the essential function of developing a hierarchy of systems and subsystems is to simplify the design process. The System Complexity Metric (SCM) shows how this di-vide-and-conquer approach also reduces the system complexity. The complete systems engineering process has many detailed steps. It is often simplified because of the effort required and the human limitations on working memory and decision span. Systems analysis demands slow, logical, and fo-cused thinking but is often bypassed in favor of quick, intuitive, subconscious “gut feel.” A study of 100 system designs found examples of 12 specific mental mistakes, such as ignoring stakeholder needs, and these mistakes are essentially oversimplifications of the systems engineering process. An analysis of space life support goals, options, criteria, and processes found 11 examples of oversimplifications in systems engineering, such as neglecting safety and cost. All these 11 oversimplifications could be traced to one or more of the 12 previously identified mental mistakes or other well-known ones, such as ig-noring sunk costs. Oversimplification of the systems engineering process is rarely noticed but is a common and harmful problem. A study of failures in 50 different space systems found that problems in systems engineering caused failures and often led to errors in design, development, and test that further contributed to failure. It seems that more diligent systems engineering could prevent many project problems and failures, but projects seem to be more guided by “gut feel” based on tradition, authority, and consensus than on the logical, rational systems engineering approach.
Systems Engineering is fundamental to good engineering, which in turn depends on the integration and application of engineering lessons learned and technical standards. Thus, good Systems Engineering also depends on systems engineering lessons learned from within the aerospace industry being documented and applied. About ten percent of the engineering lessons learned documented in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System are directly related to Systems Engineering. A key issue associated with lessons learned datasets is the communication and incorporation of this information into engineering processes. Systems Engineering has been defined (EINIS-632) as "an interdisciplinary approach encompassing the entire technical effort to evolve and verify an integrated and life-cycle balanced set of system people, product, and process solutions that satisfy customer needs". Designing reliable space-based systems has always been a goal for NASA, and many painful lessons have been learned along the way. One of the continuing functions of a system engineer is to compile development and operations "lessons learned" documents and ensure their integration into future systems development activities. They can produce insights and information for risk identification identification and characterization. on a new project. Lessons learned files from previous projects are especially valuable in risk