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EPOXI and Stardust NExT: The Management Challenges of Two Comet Flybys in Three Months

The EPOXI and Stardust NExT missions were missions of opportunity utilizing the Deep Impact and Stardust spacecraft, respectively. These new missions took advantage of the cost savings of utilizing spacecraft that were already flying for new science investigations. Both were retargeted to fly by an additional comet. EPOXI visited Hartley 2, significantly smaller than the other Jupiter family comets visited previously. Stardust NExT flew by Tempel 1, providing a second look at the comet previously studied by Deep Impact in 2005. Both projects were part of NASA's Discovery Program. In order to further save costs, the projects were combined into a single project office at JPL. This provided some efficiencies due to the similarity of the missions, but having the flybys space only three months apart posed challenges for the project management team to ensure each project was ready for its critical event and ensuring each received the proper support from the management team. The project office relied on an integrated calendar for tracking and scheduling meetings, reviews, and other key events. The project management team also coordinated their availability for both projects to maintain involvement with each team to ensure effective risk identification and management.

NExT (New Exploration of Tempel 1)↗

Human Exploration System Test-Bed for Integration and Advancement (HESTIA) Support of Future NASA Deep-Space Missions

The Engineering Directorate at the NASA - Johnson Space Center is outfitting a 20-Foot diameter hypobaric chamber in Building 7 to support future deep-space Environmental Control & Life Support System (ECLSS) research as part of the Human Exploration System Test-bed for Integration and Advancement (HESTIA) Project. This human-rated chamber is the only NASA facility that has the unique experience, chamber geometry, infrastructure, and support systems capable of conducting this research. The chamber was used to support Gemini, Apollo, and SkyLab Missions. More recently, it was used to conduct 30-, 60-, and 90-day human ECLSS closed-loop testing in the 1990s to support the International Space Station and life support technology development. NASA studies show that both planetary surface and deep-space transit crew habitats will be 3-4 story cylindrical structures driven by human occupancy volumetric needs and launch vehicle constraints. The HESTIA facility offers a 3-story, 20-foot diameter habitat consistent with the studies' recommendations. HESTIA operations follow stringent processes by a certified test team that including human testing. Project management, analysis, design, acquisition, fabrication, assembly and certification of facility build-ups are available to support this research. HESTIA offers close proximity to key stakeholders including astronauts, Human Research Program (who direct space human research for the agency), Mission Operations, Safety & Mission Assurance, and Engineering Directorate. The HESTIA chamber can operate at reduced pressure and elevated oxygen environments including those proposed for deep-space exploration. Data acquisition, power, fluids and other facility resources are available to support a wide range of research. Recently completed HESTIA research consisted of unmanned testing of ECLSS technologies. Eventually, the HESTIA research will include humans for extended durations at reduced pressure and elevated oxygen to demonstrate very high reliability of critical ECLSS and other technologies.

Marmolejo, Jose↗

Habitat Demonstration Unit Project Leadership and Management Strategies

This paper gives an overview of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) led multi-center Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) project leadership and management strategies. The HDU project team constructed and tested an analog prototype lunar surface habitat/laboratory called the Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) during 2010. The prototype unit subsystems were integrated in a short amount of time, utilizing a tiger team approach that brought together over 20 habitation-related technologies and innovations from a variety of NASA centers. This paper describes the leadership and management strategies as well as lessons learned pertaining to leading and managing a multi-center diverse team in a rapid prototype environment. The PEM configuration went from a paper design to an operational surface habitat demonstration unit in less than 12 months. The HDU project is part of the strategic plan from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Directorate Integration Office (DIO) and the Exploration Mission Systems Office (EMSO) to test destination elements in analog environments. The 2011 HDU-Deep Space Habitat (DSH) configuration will build upon the PEM work, and emphasize validity of crew operations (remote working and living), EVA operations, mission operations, logistics operations, and science operations that might be required in a deep space context for Near Earth Object (NEO) exploration mission architectures. The 2011 HDU-DSH will be field-tested during the 2011 Desert Research and Technologies Studies (DRaTS) field tests. The HDU project is a "technology-pull" project that integrates technologies and innovations from multiple NASA centers. This project will repurpose the HDU 2010 demo unit that was field tested in the 2010 DRaTS, adding habitation functionality to the prototype unit. This paper will describe the strategy of establishing a multi-center project management team that put in place the key multi-center leadership skills and disciplines to enable a successful tiger team approach. Advocacy was established with key stakeholders and NASA Headquarters (HQ) by defining a strategic vision, mission, goals and objectives for the project and team. As a technology-pull testbed capability the HDU project was able to collaborate and leverage the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and individual NASA center investments which capitalized on their respective center core competencies and skills. This approach enable the leveraging of over $7.5m of value to create an operational habitat demonstration unit 2010 PEM configuration.

Kennedy, Kriss J.↗

Space Radiation Cancer Risks

Space radiation presents major challenges to astronauts on the International Space Station and for future missions to the Earth s moon or Mars. Methods used to project risks on Earth need to be modified because of the large uncertainties in projecting cancer risks from space radiation, and thus impact safety factors. We describe NASA s unique approach to radiation safety that applies uncertainty based criteria within the occupational health program for astronauts: The two terrestrial criteria of a point estimate of maximum acceptable level of risk and application of the principle of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) are supplemented by a third requirement that protects against risk projection uncertainties using the upper 95% confidence level (CL) in the radiation cancer projection model. NASA s acceptable level of risk for ISS and their new lunar program have been set at the point-estimate of a 3-percent risk of exposure induced death (REID). Tissue-averaged organ dose-equivalents are combined with age at exposure and gender-dependent risk coefficients to project the cumulative occupational radiation risks incurred by astronauts. The 95% CL criteria in practice is a stronger criterion than ALARA, but not an absolute cut-off as is applied to a point projection of a 3% REID. We describe the most recent astronaut dose limits, and present a historical review of astronaut organ doses estimates from the Mercury through the current ISS program, and future projections for lunar and Mars missions. NASA s 95% CL criteria is linked to a vibrant ground based radiobiology program investigating the radiobiology of high-energy protons and heavy ions. The near-term goal of research is new knowledge leading to the reduction of uncertainties in projection models. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. The current model for projecting space radiation cancer risk relies on the three assumptions of linearity, additivity, and scaling along with the use of population averages. We describe uncertainty estimates for this model, and new experimental data that sheds light on the accuracy of the underlying assumptions. These methods make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative metrics, i.e., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well defined confidence limits. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including lunar station, deep space outpost, and a Mars mission. Factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties and application of this approach to assess candidate mitigation approaches are described.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗

Habitat Demonstration Unit Project: Leadership and Management Strategies for a Rapid Prototyping Project

This paper gives an overview of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) led multi-center Habitat Demonstration Unit (HDU) project leadership and management strategies being used by the NASA HDU team for a rapid prototyping project. The HDU project team constructed and tested an analog prototype lunar surface habitat/laboratory called the Pressurized Excursion Module (PEM) during 2010. The prototype unit subsystems were integrated in a short amount of time, utilizing a tiger team rapid prototyping approach that brought together over 20 habitation-related technologies and innovations from a variety of NASA centers. This paper describes the leadership and management strategies as well as lessons learned pertaining to leading and managing a multi-center diverse team in a rapid prototype environment. The PEM configuration went from a paper design to an operational surface habitat demonstration unit in less than 12 months. The HDU project is part of the strategic plan from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Directorate Integration Office (DIO) and the Exploration Mission Systems Office (EMSO) to test destination elements in analog environments. The 2011 HDU-Deep Space Habitat (DSH) configuration will build upon the PEM work, and emphasize validity of crew operations (remote working and living), EVA operations, mission operations, logistics operations, and science operations that might be required in a deep space context for Near Earth Object (NEO) exploration mission architectures. The 2011 HDU-DSH will be field-tested during the 2011 Desert Research and Technologies Studies (DRaTS) field tests. The HDU project is a "technology-pull" project that integrates technologies and innovations from multiple NASA centers. This project will repurpose the HDU 2010 demo unit that was field tested in the 2010 DRaTS, adding habitation functionality to the prototype unit. This paper will describe the strategy of establishing a multi-center project management team that put in place the key multi-center leadership skills and disciplines to enable a successful tiger team approach. Advocacy was established with key stakeholders and NASA Headquarters (HQ) by defining a strategic vision, mission, goals and objectives for the project and team. As a technology-pull testbed capability the HDU project was able to collaborate and leverage the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and individual NASA center investments which capitalized on their respective center core competencies and skills. This approach enable the leveraging of over $7.5m of value to create an operational habitat demonstration unit 2010 PEM configuration.

Kennedy, Kriss J.↗

Deep Space 1 Ion Engine Completed a 3-Year Journey

A xenon ion engine and power processor system, which was developed by the NASA Glenn Research Center in partnership with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Boeing Electron Dynamic Devices, completed nearly 3 years of operation aboard the Deep Space 1 spacecraft. The 2.3-kW ion engine, which provided primary propulsion and two-axis attitude control, thrusted for more than 16,000 hr and consumed more than 70 kg of xenon propellant. The Deep Space 1 spacecraft was launched on October 24, 1998, to validate 12 futuristic technologies, including the ion-propulsion system. After the technology validation process was successfully completed, the Deep Space 1 spacecraft flew by the small asteroid Braille on July 29, 1999. The final objective of this mission was to encounter the active comet Borrelly, which is about 6 miles long. The ion engine was on a thrusting schedule to navigate the Deep Space 1 spacecraft to within 1400 miles of the comet. Since the hydrazine used for spacecraft attitude control was in short supply, the ion engine also provided two-axis attitude control to conserve the hydrazine supply for the Borrelly encounter. The comet encounter took place on September 22, 2001. Dr. Marc Rayman, project manager of Deep Space 1 at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory said, "Deep Space 1 plunged into the heart of the comet Borrelly and has lived to tell every detail of its spinetingling adventure! The images are even better than the impressive images of comet Halley taken by Europe's Giotto spacecraft in 1986." The Deep Space 1 mission, which successfully tested the 12 high-risk, advanced technologies and captured the best images ever taken of a comet, was voluntarily terminated on December 18, 2001. The successful demonstration of the 2-kW-class ion propulsion system technology is now providing mission planners with off-the-shelf flight hardware. Higher power, next generation ion propulsion systems are being developed for large flagship missions, such as outer planet explorers and sample-return missions.

Sovey, James S.↗

Increasing Diversity on Spacecraft Mission Teams Reduces Risk

Many of the NASA spacecraft sent into Earth orbit and throughout the Solar System are competitively selected and led by principal investigators (PIs). These senior scientists are responsible for directing research activities, managing the use of funds, and reporting to the funding agency. Additionally, the European Space Agency (ESA) has competitively selected missions that are led by ESA-nominated project scientists and include instruments that are overseen by PIs. Usually, the PIs and project scientists form a science working team that provides scientific leadership of the mission. These NASA and ESA PI roles require a deep understanding of the mission’s scientific goals and engineering design aspects. And, importantly, these roles also require skills in team management.

Kathleen E. Mandt↗

Developing Mars-Based Clinical Scenarios for an Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) – Based Decision Support Service

As crewed missions move beyond Low-Earth Orbit, pre-mission planning cannot fully buy down the medical risks of exploration-class missions. Martian missions, where increased hazards exist, (such as long-duration spaceflight, surface-level EVA operations, and communications delays) will require a paradigm shift in the structure of a medical system. An Earth-Independent Medical Operations-based Medical System (EIMO-MS) will need to optimize four critical domains to help provide medical care: utilization of Pre-Mission Planning, augmentation of Acute and Prolonged Medical Decision Making, automated tracking of Resource Management, and assistance in Task Load Balance. The ideal EIMO-MS will be able to accomplish this goal by having an interactive, adaptable interface that will be able to provide real-time medical services. It must respond based on the level of crewmember training, medical situation, and available medical and non-medical resources. To showcase the capabilities and requirements of such a sophisticated automated MS, a series of clinical scenarios of escalating complexity were developed with clinical and systems engineering input. These scenarios describe in clinical detail what a theoretical future medical system, enhanced with multiple information streams (such as a medical database, an AI-based Decision Support System, real-time monitoring, enhanced in-situ laboratory imaging, etc.) can achieve in conjunction with a trained and experienced crew. Scenarios are comprised of: a context section including objectives and applicable spaceflight environment, a highlighted assumptions section, a clinical narrative section, and a systems engineering activity diagram demonstrating the integrated Medical System (MS). The “swim lanes” of the activity diagram act as the logistical core of each scenario and show how the MS will interact with the crew, ground support, and other in-flight systems. The Design Reference Mission that is used for the scenarios is based on existing reference mission profiles [1] with a projected 30-sol stay on the Martian surface. Scenarios span the spectrum from planned evaluations, minor medical care, urgent care, surgical guidance, critical and expectant management, and behavioral health care. Mission complexity will exponentially increase during deep space and Mars exploration-class missions, and medical support for these missions will likewise need to increase in autonomy and adaptability. The integrated system that will support these missions will need to provide assistance in a variety of anticipated and unforeseen scenarios. These medical scenarios, guided by clinician input, are initial steps in crafting the requirements for an EIMO-based medical system. By working in a systems engineering framework, requirements and capabilities can be extracted and mapped while maintaining a clinical core.

Prashant Parmar↗

Fault Management Practice: A Roadmap for Improvement

Autonomous fault management (FM) is critical for deep space and planetary missions where the limited communication opportunities may prevent timely intervention by ground control. Evidence of pervasive architecture, design, and verification/validation problems with NASA FM engineering has been revealed both during technical reviews of spaceflight missions and in flight. These problems include FM design changes required late in the life-cycle, insufficient project insight into the extent of FM testing required, unexpected test results that require resolution, spacecraft operational limitations because certain functions were not tested, and in-flight anomalies and mission failures attributable to fault management. A recent NASA initiative has characterized the FM state-of-practice throughout the spacecraft development community and identified common NASA, DoD, and commercial concerns that can be addressed in the near term through the development of a FM Practitioner's Handbook and the formation of a FM Working Group. Initial efforts will focus on standardizing FM terminology, establishing engineering processes and tools, and training.

Fesq, Lorraine M.↗

Experiences in managing the Prometheus Project

Congress authorized NASA?s Prometheus Project in February 2003, with the first Prometheus mission slated to explore the icy moons of Jupiter. The Project had two major objectives: (1) to develop a nuclear reactor that would provide unprecedented levels of power and show that it could be processed safely and operated reliably in space for long-duration, deep-space exploration and (2) to explore the three icy moons of Jupiter - Callisto, Ganymede, and Europa - and return science data that would meet the scientific goals as set forth in the Decadal Survey Report of the National Academy of Sciences. Early in Project planning, it was determined that the development of the Prometheus nuclear powered Spaceship would be complex and require the intellectual knowledge residing at numerous organizations across the country. In addition, because of the complex nature of the Project and the multiple partners, approaches beyond those successfully used to manage a typical JPL project would be needed. This paper1 will describe the key experiences in managing Prometheus that should prove useful for future projects of similar scope and magnitude

nuclear↗

Pointing Error Budget Development and Methodology on the Psyche Project

The Psyche mission was selected by NASA as the 14th mission in the Discovery Program in 2017. The Psyche spacecraft utilizes solar electric propulsion, and will journey to the asteroid (16) Psyche during a 3.5 year trajectory after its planned 2022 launch. The spacecraft instrument suite includes a magnetometer, a multispectral imager, a gamma ray neutron spectrometer, and an X-band radio telecommunications system. It also includes the Deep Space Optical Communication technical demonstration. These instruments along with other spacecraft components require pointing accuracy to meet their scientific and engineering performance requirements. Early on in the project development, the team established a methodology by which pointing accuracy (knowledge and control) is analyzed against the system requirements by means of pointing error budgets and requirement allocations. A margin policy was implemented to ensure the instrument and engineering component pointing accuracy requirements will be met during verification and in flight. Psyche’s pointing management framework defines detailed rationales for the system and subsystem error allocations of the top level pointing accuracy requirements, with sufficient project level pointing margin, and supports end-to-end pointing requirement verification. This paper will present an overview of the Psyche project’s pointing error budget development process, and discuss the rationale behind the methodology. Psyche’s pointing budget methodology integrates best practices and lessons learned from heritage missions, while focusing on the specific needs of the Psyche spacecraft and its science instruments. Key challenges in the pointing error budget development will be reviewed, and a deep dive into two key Psyche pointing budgets are presented. The systems engineering of Psyche’s pointing budget methodology outlined in this paper will serve as a resource for future deep space missions.

Lai, Peter↗

Demonstrating Autonomous Mission Operations Onboard the International Space Station

The NASA Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) project conducted an experiment to turn over operation and management of selected International Space Station (ISS) sys- tems to the on-board crew. ISS crews managed two different spacecraft systems: the Total Organic Carbon Analyzer (TOCA), a water quality analyzer, and Station Support Com- puters (SSC) laptops, which are non-critical crew computer systems. These systems were selected because they are representative of systems a future crew may need to operate au- tonomously during a deep space mission. The crew autonomously operated these systems, taking on mission operations functions traditionally performed by support teams on the ground, using new software tools that provide decision support algorithms for planning, monitoring and fault management, hardware schematics, system briefs, and data displays that are normally unavailable to the crew. The experiment lasted seven months, during which ISS crews managed TOCA and SSCs on 22 occasions. The AMO software processed data from TOCA and SSCs continuously during this seven month period. The combined performance of the software and crew achieved a 88 success rate on managing TOCA activity, the system for which ground-truth was available.

Autonomous Mission Operations↗

Spaceflight Operations Services Grid Prototype

NASA over the years has developed many types of technologies and conducted various types of science resulting in numerous variations of operations, data and applications. For example, operations range from deep space projects managed by JPL, Saturn and Shuttle operations managed from JSC and KSC, ISS science operations managed from MSFC and numerous low earth orbit satellites managed from GSFC that are varied and intrinsically different but require many of the same types of services to fulfill their missions. Also, large data sets (databases) of Shuttle flight data, solar system projects and earth observing data exist which because of their varied and sometimes outdated technologies are not and have not been fully examined for additional information and knowledge. Many of the applications/systems supporting operational services e.g. voice, video, telemetry and commanding, are outdated and obsolete. The vast amounts of data are located in various formats, at various locations and range over many years. The ability to conduct unified space operations, access disparate data sets and to develop systems and services that can provide operational services does not currently exist in any useful form. In addition, adding new services to existing operations is generally expensive and with the current budget constraints not feasible on any broad level of implementation. To understand these services a discussion of each one follows. The Spaceflight User-based Services are those services required to conduct space flight operations. Grid Services are those Grid services that will be used to overcome, through middleware software, some or all the problems that currently exists. In addition, Network Services will be discussed briefly. Network Services are crucial to any type of remedy and are evolving adequately to support any technology currently in development.

Bradford, Robert N.↗

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IVV) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IVV portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IVV projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management.

Fitz, Rhonda↗

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.

Fitz, Rhonda↗

The NASA Deep Space Network (DSN) Array

The DSN Array Project is currently working with Senior Management at both JPL and NASA to develop strategies towards starting a major implementation project. Several studies within NASA are concluding, all of which recommend that any future DSN capability include arraying of antennas to increase performance. Support of Deep Space, Lunar, and CEV (crewed exploration vehicle) missions is possible. High data rate and TDRSS formatting is being investigated. Any future DSN capacity must include Uplink. Current studies ongoing to investigate and develop technologies for uplink arraying; provides advantages in three ways: 1) N2 effect. EIRP grows as N2(-vs-N for a downlink array); 2) Improved architectural options (can separate uplink and downlink); and 3) Potential for more cost effective transmitters for fixed EIRP.

communications↗

Communicating Medical Needs to Non-Medical Managers

Differences in communication styles and languages between groups often lead to miscommunication, confusion, and/or frustration. Engineers, computer specialists, clinicians, and managers often utilize the English language in very different ways, with different groups using the same words to represent different concepts ("complaint" is a typical example). In addition, medical issues are often perceived as "off-nominal" and not "primary mission tasks" by managers, which can cause them to assign lower priorities to medical training time and resources. Knowledge bases differ due to variations in training and skill sets, and the goals (both immediate and long-term) of the communicators may also vary, with managers being primarily concerned with overall mission objectives, while clinicians focus on individual or group health issues. Furthermore, true communication is only possible when clinicians possess a deep understanding of mission requirements as well as the ability to communicate medical requirements on a priority basis using risk assessment, added value, and cost benefit analysis. These understandable differences may contribute to difficulties in expressing concerns and ideas in an efficient manner, particularly in projects, such as the space program or many military operations, where these varied groups must collaborate, and where the final decisions must be made by fully informed mission commanders. Methods: Three scenario-based approaches were developed utilizing decision trees and problem based learning, to help define and integrate these concepts. Results: Use of these techniques by NASA and military personnel will be presented. Discussion: To enhance communication, particularly of medical needs, one must identify the concerns and motivating factors for the other groups; for example, members of management may focus on financial concerns, a desire for risk mitigation, public perceptions, mission objectives, etc. Training clinicians to frame issues in these terms may lead to better understanding of the medical concerns by other groups.

Bacal, Kira↗

NASA Advanced Explorations Systems: Advancements in Life Support Systems

The NASA Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Life Support Systems (LSS) project strives to develop reliable, energy-efficient, and low-mass spacecraft systems to provide environmental control and life support systems (ECLSS) critical to enabling long duration human missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). Highly reliable, closed-loop life support systems are among the capabilities required for the longer duration human space exploration missions assessed by NASA's Habitability Architecture Team (HAT). The LSS project is focused on four areas: architecture and systems engineering for life support systems, environmental monitoring, air revitalization, and wastewater processing and water management. Starting with the international space station (ISS) LSS systems as a point of departure (where applicable), the mission of the LSS project is three-fold: 1. Address discrete LSS technology gaps 2. Improve the reliability of LSS systems 3. Advance LSS systems towards integrated testing on the ISS. This paper summarized the work being done in the four areas listed above to meet these objectives. Details will be given on the following focus areas: Systems Engineering and Architecture- With so many complex systems comprising life support in space, it is important to understand the overall system requirements to define life support system architectures for different space mission classes, ensure that all the components integrate well together and verify that testing is as representative of destination environments as possible. Environmental Monitoring- In an enclosed spacecraft that is constantly operating complex machinery for its own basic functionality as well as science experiments and technology demonstrations, it's possible for the environment to become compromised. While current environmental monitors aboard the ISS will alert crew members and mission control if there is an emergency, long-duration environmental monitoring cannot be done in-orbit as current methodologies rely largely on sending environmental samples back to Earth. The LSS project is developing onboard analysis capabilities that will replace the need to return air and water samples from space for ground analysis. Air Revitalization- The air revitalization task is comprised of work in carbon dioxide removal, oxygen generation and recovery and trace contamination and particulate control. The CO2 Removal and associated air drying development efforts under the LSS project are focused both on improving the current SOA technology on the ISS and assessing and examining the viability of other sorbents and technologies available in academia and industry. The Oxygen Generation and Recovery technology development area encompasses several sub-tasks in an effort to supply O2 to the crew at the required conditions, to recover O2 from metabolic CO2, and to recycle recovered O2 back to the cabin environment. Current state-of-the-art oxygen generation systems aboard space station are capable of generating or recovering approximately 40% of required oxygen; for exploration missions this percentage needs to be greatly increased. A spacecraft cabin trace contaminant and particulate control system serves to keep the environment below the spacecraft maximum allowable concentration (SMAC) for chemicals and particulates. Both passive (filters) and active (scrubbers) methods contribute to the overall TC & PC design. Work in the area of trace contamination and particulate control under the LSS project is focused on making improvements to the SOA TC & PC systems on ISS to improve performance and reduce consumables. Wastewater Processing and Water Management- A major goal of the LSS project is the development of water recovery systems to support long duration human exploration beyond LEO. Current space station wastewater processing and water management systems distill urine and wastewater to recover water from urine and humidity condensate in the spacecraft at a approximately 74% recovery rate. For longer, farther missions into deep space, that recovery rate must be greatly increased so that astronauts can journey for months without resupply cargo ships from Earth.

Shull, Sarah A.↗