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Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Analysis Report For Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Package Review Guide for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (Revision 4)

This Package Review Guide (PRG) provides guidance for Department of Energy (DOE) review and approval of packages to transport fissile and Type B quantities of radioactive material. It fulfills, in part, the requirements of DOE Order 460.1D for the Headquarters Certifying Official to establish standards and to provide guidance for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (SARP). This Package Review Guide is intended for use by the United States Department of Energy Headquarters Certifying Official and their staff, DOE Secretarial offices, operations/field offices, and applicants for Department of Energy package approval. This Package Review Guide is generally organized at the chapter-level in a format similar to that recommended in United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 7.9. One notable exception is the addition of Chapter 9 Quality Assurance, which is not included as a separate chapter in Regulatory Guide 7.9. Within each chapter, this Package Review Guide addresses the technical and regulatory bases for the review, the manner in which the review is accomplished, and findings that are generally applicable for a package that meets the approval standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Idaho National Laboratory Site Environmental Monitoring Plan

This plan provides a high-level summary of environmental monitoring performed by various organizations within and around the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site as required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, Guide DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance, and in accordance with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The purpose of these orders is to 1) implement sound stewardship practices that protect the air, water, land, and other natural and cultural resources that may be impacted by DOE operations, and 2) to establish standards and requirements for the operations of DOE and DOE contractors with respect to protection of the environment and members of the public against undue risk from radiation. This plan describes the organizations responsible for conducting environmental monitoring across the INL Site, the rationale for monitoring, the types of media being monitored, where the monitoring is conducted, and where monitoring results can be obtained. Detailed monitoring procedures, program plans, or other governing documents used by contractors or agencies to implement requirements are referenced in this plan. This plan covers all planned monitoring and environmental surveillance. Non-routine activities such as special research studies and characterization of individual sites for environmental restoration are outside the scope of this plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Model MC&A for Pebble Bed Reactors (Technical Direction No. 5 Task 2.6 Letter Report)

In preparation for non-light water reactor (non-LWR) activities, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff are advancing risk-informed and performance-based licensing approaches and addressing key policy issues. One non-LWR reactor concept is a pebble bed reactor (PBR). This reactor design uses spherical fuel elements (pebbles) that are continually added to and removed from the reactor core. The free movement of the fuel in this design presents new challenges for material control and accounting (MC&A) programs. Therefore, an assessment of MC&A program features and measures for a PBR was performed to help NRC staff develop associated MC&A regulations or regulatory guides. The current regulatory framework for non-LWR fuel cycles excludes support for licensing reviews for MC&A programs for PBRs. Licensing reviews of an MC&A program for PBRs can be facilitated by (1) a model MC&A program for a PBR based on identification and assessment of MC&A program features and recommended measures for a reference PBR and (2) a methodology for assessing MC&A performance that can help assess different MC&A program features and measures. This report supports the NRC’s non-LWR Vision and Strategy Near-Term Implementation Action Plans.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

INL Environmental Monitoring Plan (DOE/ID-11088 Rev. 5)

This plan provides a high-level summary of environmental monitoring performed by various organizations within and around the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site as required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, Guide DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance, and in accordance with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The purpose of these orders is to 1) implement sound stewardship practices that protect the air, water, land, and other natural and cultural resources that may be impacted by DOE operations, and 2) to establish standards and requirements for the operations of DOE and DOE contractors with respect to protection of the environment and members of the public against undue risk from radiation. This plan describes the organizations responsible for conducting environmental monitoring across the INL Site, the rationale for monitoring, the types of media being monitored, where the monitoring is conducted, and where monitoring results can be obtained. Detailed monitoring procedures, program plans, or other governing documents used by contractors or agencies to implement requirements are referenced in this plan. This plan covers all planned monitoring and environmental surveillance. Non-routine activities such as special research studies and characterization of individual sites for environmental restoration are outside the scope of this plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Development of an update to ISA S67.04 and RP 67.04: 'Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants' - 146

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the update to International Society of Automation (ISA) Standard ISA S67.04 - 2006, 'Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants', and ISA RP 67.04-2000, 'Methodologies for Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation'. Significant advances have occurred on the utility, Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor, and regulatory side, related to improved techniques for analysis and monitoring. These and other changes, including those related to Technical Specifications and surveillance interval extensions, are being included in the latest update to this primary standard for setpoint control in nuclear plants in the U.S. and around the world. In 2016, the ISA S67.04 Committee agreed to proceed with a revision to this Standard and Recommended Practice, with major updates in the following areas: 1. Definitions - Updates for improved definitions based on TSTF-493, Rev 4, RIS-2006-17 and NRC updated Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105 2. 95/95 - Updates based on improved guidance on the development of component input data and analysis techniques for 95% probability/95% confidence calculations 3. TSTF-493, RIS 2006-17 updates for Technical Specification input and to support changes 4. NRC input from updates in the Regulatory Guide 1.105 and Branch Technical Position BTP-7-12 revision process. 5. Improved guidance from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in References 7, 8 and 9. These standards are being updated with a new version anticipated to be issued as a draft in 2017 and submitted for ISA approval in 2019. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Estimated External Doses to Members of the Public from Patients with {sup 131}I Treatment - Paper 143

To protect individuals from the radiation emitted by a patient receiving {sup 131}I treatment a licensee must estimate the maximum likely effective dose to members of the public. Under current guidance by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a licensee may authorize the release of the patient if the effective dose is unlikely to exceed 5 mSv. NRC provides guidance to its licensees, in NRC Regulatory Guide 8.39, on acceptable methods that may be used to calculate the dose to a member of the public that may result from releasing the patient. To further assist licensees in implementing the regulation, NRC used conservative assumptions to estimate the activity of radionuclide in a patient, and the dose rate at 1 meter from the patient, that would be indicators of a potential dose to a member of the public of 5 mSv. Licensees may use these tables as operational criteria for releasing a patient if the conservative assumptions are considered acceptable. Licensees may also perform their own calculations, using case-specific assumptions, to show compliance with 5 mSv release criterion. The scope of this work is to provide dose coefficients for a variety of plausible public exposure scenarios that could be used by licensees to to show compliance. In the patient-specific calculations, the licensee is free to consider factors such as occupancy factor, effective half-life of the radionuclide in the patient's body, and tissue shielding. A conservative method of calculating the maximum likely dose to members of the public is provided in NRC Reg. Guide 8.39, which assumes no tissue attenuation of by the patient's body, no biological component that reduces the effective half-life of the radionuclide, and the patient's body burden is a point source. The assumption of no biological removal from the body introduces some conservatism into dose estimates for {sup 131}I. Also, it has been shown that the assumption of a point source with no tissue attenuation substantially overestimates the dose rate to nearby persons. The current method for calculating the maximum dose rate to members of the public from a nuclear medicine patient provided in US-NRC Regulatory Guide 8.39 assumes the patient's body burden is a point-source. Lack of consideration of tissue attenuation by the patient's body and biological removal of the radionuclide leads to a substantial overestimate of the actual external dose rate to a nearby member of the public. However, use of these assumptions in estimating potential dose to a member of the public simplifies the calculations considerably and, although generally conservative, the calculations serve as a useful screening tool. Many, if not most patients, could be released on that basis. If not, then refined calculations may be used, and the coefficients described in this paper provide one of the means for refining the calculations in cases where the screening calculations were not adequate. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Panel discussion: Challenges and improvements in accident dose analysis; Regulatory and industry perspective

Full text of publication follows. Design basis accident (DBA) analyses are one of several ways nuclear power plant licensees demonstrate, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff verifies, that the design and location of a nuclear power plant are appropriate and that the protection of health and safety of the public is maintained. In July 2000, the NRC staff issued Regulatory Guide 1.183, 'Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors' (RG 1.183) [1]. RG 1.183 provides a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the regulatory requirements contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) Section 50.67 (50.67), 'Accident source term' [2]. RG 1.183 also provides assumptions and parameters used to model postulated DBA radiological analyses for light-water reactors (LWR). Since the initial issuance of RG 1.183, the NRC staff and the nuclear power plant licensees have both gained substantial experience with the implementation of 10 CFR 50.67 and RG 1.183. Based on this experience, comments from licensees, the anticipation of licensing advanced LWRs, and new research, the NRC is developing a proposed revision to RG 1.183. This panel discussion will provide a discussion of that proposed revision, its potential impact on existing and future evaluations, and the industry perspective on the revised guidance. References: 1) USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.183, 'Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,' Revision 0, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. (2000), Electronic copies are also available in ADAMS (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html), under Accession No. ML003716792. 2) U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 (Energy), Part 50 (Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities), Section 67, (Accident source term), Office of the Federal Register, Washington, DC (1999). (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of attenuation data from the decommissioned ZIon unit 1 reactor pressure vessel beltline weld

In order to examine the attenuation of radiation damage through the thickness of an irradiated reactor pressure vessel (RPV), four segments were acquired from the Zion Unit 1 power plant RPV after the plant was decommissioned. The Zion Unit 1 RPV Beltline Weld Segment 1 was cut into seven blocks, consisting of five base metal and two beltline welds from the high fluence region of the segment. Through-wall test specimens were machined and tested. Specimens included those used for Charpy impact, Master Curve fracture toughness testing, and chemical analysis. The observed through-thickness ductile-to-brittle transition temperatures in the beltline weld deviated significantly from the expected behavior based on the attenuation of fast fluence as a function of depth into the RPV. Beginning at the inside surface, the 41-J Charpy transition temperature was either flat or slightly increasing until the ¾ -T location. The results of a simple, model-based analysis of the Zion beltline weld material that included the irradiation conditions and material chemistry were generally consistent with industry trend curves and the standard attenuation model, rather than the observed data. Although there was no archive material from the RPV available to permit measurement of the unirradiated properties, fracture toughness specimens fabricated from archive surveillance weld were used to obtain an estimate of the initial through-thickness values of the Charpy transition temperature. The Charpy shifts obtained using this approach were similarly in disagreement with the predictions of the US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2. However, testing of irradiated Charpy specimens taken from the RPV following post-irradiation annealing (10 hr. at 500 °C) provided a quite different estimate of the unirradiated properties which improved the agreement between the inferred through-thickness Charpy shifts and exponential attenuation model included in Regulatory Guide 1.99/2. In conclusion, the analysis of the Zion data and data obtained in previous post-mortem examinations of decommissioned RPVs indicates that more work is needed to understand the through-thickness properties of RPV materials in order to properly assess through-wall damage attenuation.

Charpy impact↗

PR-EDB: Power Reactor Embrittlement Database - Version 3

The aging and degradation of light-water reactor pressure vessels is of particular concern because of their relevance to plant integrity and the magnitude of the expected irradiation embrittlement. The radiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessel materials depends on many factors, such as neutron fluence, flux, and energy spectrum, irradiation temperature, and preirradiation material history and chemical compositions. These factors must be considered to reliably predict pressure vessel embrittlement and to ensure the safe operation of the reactor. Large amounts of data from surveillance capsules are needed to develop a generally applicable damage prediction model that can be used for industry standards and regulatory guides. Furthermore, the investigations of regulatory issues such as vessel integrity over plant life, vessel failure, and sufficiency of current codes, Standard Review Plans (SRPs), and Guides for license renewal can be greatly expedited by the use of a well-designed computerized database. The Power Reactor Embrittlement Database (PR-EDB) is such a comprehensive collection of data for U.S. designed commercial nuclear reactors. The current version of the PR-EDB lists the test results of 104 heat-affected-zone (HAZ) materials, 115 weld materials, and 141 base materials, including 103 plates, 35 forgings, and 3 correlation monitor materials that were irradiated in 321 capsules from 106 commercial power reactors. The data files are given in dBASE format and can be accessed with any personal computer using the Windows operating system. "User-friendly" utility programs have been written to investigate radiation embrittlement using this database. Utility programs allow the user to retrieve, select and manipulate specific data, display data to the screen or printer, and fit and plot Charpy impact data. The PR-EDB Version 3.0 upgrades Version 2.0. The package was developed based on the Microsoft .NET framework technology and uses Microsoft Access for backend data storage, and Microsoft Excel for plotting graphs. This software package is compatible with Windows (98 or higher) and has been built with a highly versatile user interface. PR-EDB Version 3.0 also contains an "Evaluated Residual File" utility for generating the evaluated processed files used for radiation embrittlement study.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Proposed Alternate Methodology for Preparation of a Documented Safety Analysis for the Transformational Challenge Reactor

10 CFR Part 830, Subpart B, Appendix A, Table 2 lists acceptable methodologies for development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for various types of nuclear facilities. The acceptable methodology listed for a DOE reactor is U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, or successor document. This document was developed for large commercial light-water power reactors. The difference between the Transformational Challenge Reactor (TCR) and commercial reactors in power output, radiological source term, fuel type and composition, and operational life span makes application of the Regulatory Guide to the TCR overly burdensome relative to the value added.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Implementation of 10 CFR 20.1406 Through Life Cycle Planning for Decommissioning

The focus of this paper is on a regulatory guide (draft guide DG-4012) being developed by the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research for the implementation of 10 CFR 20.1406. The draft guide was published in the Federal Register on July 31, 2007 for a 90 day public comment period. Besides being available in the Federal Register, it is also available electronically in NRC's agency data management system (ADAMS). The accession number is ML0712100110. 10 CFR 20.1406 requires license applicants, other than renewals, after August 20, 1997, '..to describe in the application how facility design and procedures for operation will minimize, to the extent practicable, contamination of the facility and the environment, facilitate eventual decommissioning, and minimize to the extent practicable, the generation of radioactive waste'. The intent of the regulation is to diminish the occurrence and severity of 'legacy sites' by taking measures that will reduce and control contamination and facilitate eventual decommissioning. 10 CFR 20.1406 is significant because it applies to all new facilities and in the very near future (perhaps as soon as the fall of 2007), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) anticipates receiving one or more license applications for new nuclear power plants. The regulatory guide is intended to facilitate that licensing by providing suggestions of things an applicant can do to minimize contamination of the facility and the environment, minimize generation of waste, and to facilitate decommissioning. Over 100 different kinds of activities are covered by license applications submitted to the NRC. They do not all reflect the same potential for contamination of a facility and the environment, or for the generation of radioactive waste. Therefore, an applicant should use sound judgment to evaluate the potential for contamination and the consequences of such contamination in deciding on the extent to which this guide applies to any given facility or activity. Factors which may enter into this decision include form (e.g., dry solids, liquids, gases), inventory, and environmental mobility of unintended releases. The bulk of the guidance presented in the guide will consist of specific design considerations drawn from nuclear industry experience and lessons learned from decommissioning. These design suggestions provide examples of measures which can be combined to support a contaminant management philosophy for a new facility. The principles embodied in this philosophy are threefold: (1) prevention of unintended release, (2) early detection if there is unintended release of radioactive contamination, and (3) prompt and aggressive clean-up should there be an unintended release of radioactive contamination. If the guiding principles are followed through the use of 'good' engineering and science, as well as careful attention to operational practices, it should result in meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1406. All this should be considered in the context of the life cycle of the facility from the early planning stages through the final plans for decommissioning and waste disposal. Some of the mechanisms which can be employed for life cycle planning are described further in the Discussion section. In summary: The principles of the guide are threefold: prevention, early detection, and prompt response. If these guiding principles are followed through the use of 'good' engineering and science, as well as careful attention to operational practices, it should result in meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 20 In summary, the thrust of this guide is for an applicant to use technically sound engineering judgment and a practical risk-informed approach to achieve the objectives of 10 CFR 20.1406. This approach should consider the materials and processes involved (e.g., solids, liquids, gases) and focus on: (1) the relative significance of potential contamination; (2) areas most susceptible to leaks; and (3) the appropriate level of consideration to prevention and control of contamination that should be incorporated in facility design. Since the applicability of the guidance is a facility-by-facility decision, early consultation with the NRC is strongly suggested.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Estimated dose rates to members of the public from external exposure to patients with {sup 131}I thyroid treatment

Purpose: Estimated dose rates that may result from exposure to patients who had been administered iodine-131 ({sup 131}I) as part of medical therapy were calculated. These effective dose rate estimates were compared with simplified assumptions under United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 8.39, which does not consider body tissue attenuation nor time-dependent redistribution and excretion of the administered {sup 131}I. Methods: Dose rates were estimated for members of the public potentially exposed to external irradiation from patients recently treated with {sup 131}I. Tissue attenuation and iodine biokinetics were considered in the patient in a larger comprehensive effort to improve external dose rate estimates. The external dose rate estimates are based on Monte Carlo simulations using the Phantom with Movable Arms and Legs (PIMAL), previously developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. PIMAL was employed to model the relative positions of the {sup 131}I patient and members of the public in three exposure scenarios: (1) traveling on a bus in a total of six seated or standing permutations, (2) two nursing home cases where a caregiver is seated at 30 cm from the patient’s bedside and a nursing home resident seated 250 cm away from the patient in an adjacent bed, and (3) two hotel cases where the patient and a guest are in adjacent rooms with beds on opposite sides of the common wall, with the patient and guest both in bed and either seated back-to-back or lying head to head. The biokinetic model predictions of the retention and distribution of {sup 131}I in the patient assumed a single voiding of urinary bladder contents that occurred during the trip at 2, 4, or 8 h after {sup 131}I administration for the public transportation cases, continuous first-order voiding for the nursing home cases, and regular periodic voiding at 4, 8, or 12 h after administration for the hotel room cases. Organ specific activities of {sup 131}I in the thyroid, bladder, and combined remaining tissues were calculated as a function of time after administration. Exposures to members of the public were considered for {sup 131}I patients with normal thyroid uptake (peak thyroid uptake of ∼27% of administered {sup 131}I), differentiated thyroid cancer (DTC, 5% uptake), and hyperthyroidism (80% uptake). Results: The scenario with the patient seated behind the member of the public yielded the highest dose rate estimate of seated public transportation exposure cases. The dose rate to the adjacent room guest was highest for the exposure scenario in which the hotel guest and patient are seated by a factor of ∼4 for the normal and differentiated thyroid cancer uptake cases and by a factor of ∼3 for the hyperthyroid case. Conclusions: It was determined that for all modeled cases, the DTC case yielded the lowest external dose rates, whereas the hyperthyroid case yielded the highest dose rates. In estimating external dose to members of the public from patients with {sup 131}I therapy, consideration must be given to (patient- and case-specific) administered {sup 131}I activities and duration of exposure for a more complete estimate. The method implemented here included a detailed calculation model, which provides a means to determine dose rate estimates for a range of scenarios. The method was demonstrated for variations of three scenarios, showing how dose rates are expected to vary with uptake, voiding pattern, and patient location.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR STRAIN BASED FAILURE CRITERIA

This paper proposes an alternative methodology to determine the failure criteria for use in dynamic simulations of radioactive material shipping packages in the events of hypothetical accident conditions. The current stress failure criteria defined in the Nuclear Regulatory Guide 7.6 [1] and the ASME Code, Section III, Appendix F [2] for Level D Service Loads are based on the ultimate strength of uniaxial tensile test specimen rather than on the material fracture in the state of multi-axial stresses. On the other hand, the proposed strain-based failure criteria are directly related to the material failure mechanisms in multi-axial stresses. In addition, unlike the stress-based criteria, the strain-based failure criteria are applicable to the evaluation of cumulative damages caused by the sequential loads in the hypothetical accident events as required by the Nuclear Regulatory Guide 7.8 [4].

42 ENGINEERING↗

Management of Risks Associated with Application of Novel Materials in Novel Operating Environments in Novel Reactor Designs

There is currently no widely agreed, detailed general method for licensing a novel plant incorporating novel materials (or materials being deployed in novel environments); in many such situations, there are no directly applicable engineering code cases for decision-makers (including regulators) to rely on. This paper discusses a framework for solving this problem that is based on the Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) approach delineated in ASME BPVC Section XI Division 2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.246, Rev. 0, endorses, with conditions, the subject portion of the ASME Code. The proposed framework is meant to support development of a licensing case by addressing certain technical challenges. The framework discussed here is compatible with the Licensing Modernization Project, but applying it in a specific case will call for advances in the state of practice, if not the state of the art. The RIM approach calls for applicants to (a) allocate reliability targets to plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs), (b) show that they are able to relate the currently observed physical condition of each SSC in the program to its failure probability well enough to determine whether the target reliability allocations are being satisfied, allowing for uncertainty related to the novelty of the materials/designs/operating environments, and (c) be able to demonstrate that the proposed program of surveillances will reliably detect unacceptable degradation of an SSC before SSC failure occurs. These challenges are discussed in the paper, and a potentially applicable modeling approach based on cumulative damage rather than failure rates is briefly illustrated.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Community Guide to Regulatory Barriers Affecting Microgrids (Reports 1-3)

In response to growing risks of power outages from extreme weather and aging infrastructure, communities are increasingly exploring the potential of microgrids to provide reliable energy access. Microgrids offer promising solutions to meet this challenge but face a complex landscape of non-technical barriers, particularly regulations concerning the provision and distribution of energy. Most existing legal and regulatory frameworks were designed for a centralized, one-way power system, and are often poorly suited to handle systems that independently balance distributed energy resources with local load. This three-part report series provides a strategic analysis of existing regulatory and legal factors affecting microgrid deployments to help non-technical community leaders and decision-makers better understand the feasibility of a microgrid in their community. -Report No. 1: Foundational Issues Facing Microgrids details the universal policy barriers all microgrids face, including utility interconnection processes, rate structures, and local permitting. -Report No. 2: Single Property Microgrids outlines how direct asset ownership and operating behind-the-meter can bypass some regulatory oversight, using the Blue Lake Rancheria microgrid as a case study. -Report No. 3: Multi-Property Microgrids tackles the complex challenges of crossing public rights-of-way and navigating utility franchise rights, highlighting the Coventry microgrid project. The series equips decision-makers with phased frameworks to navigate financial and regulatory complexities, engage effectively with local utilities and Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJs), and structure successful microgrid projects.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗